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 I 
Abstract 
 
 In 1994 Ethiopia introduced a federal system of government as a national level 
approach to intra-state conflict management. Homogenisation of cultures and 
languages by the earlier regimes led to the emergence of ethno-national movements 
and civil wars that culminated in the collapse of the unitary state in 1991. For this 
reason, the federal system that recognises ethnic groups‟ rights is the first step in 
transforming the structural causes of civil wars in Ethiopia.  Against this background 
this research examines whether the federal arrangement has created an enabling 
environment in managing conflicts in the country.  To understand this problematic, 
the thesis conceptualises and analyses federalism and conflict management using a 
qualitative research design based on in-depth interviewing and content-based thematic 
analysis – taking the case study of the Benishangul-Gumuz regional state. 
 
The findings of the study demonstrate that different factors hinder the federal process. 
First, the constitutional focus on ethnic groups‟ rights has led, in practice, to lessened 
attention to citizenship and minority rights protection in the regional states. Second, 
the federal process encourages ethnic-based elite groups to compete in controlling 
regional and local state powers and resources. This has greatly contributed to the 
emergence of ethnic-based violent conflicts, hostile intergovernmental relationships 
and lack of law and order along the common borders of the regional states. Third, the 
centralised policy and decision making process of the ruling party has hindered 
genuine democratic participation of citizens and self-determination of the ethnic 
groups. This undermines the capacity of the regional states and makes the federal 
structure vulnerable to the dynamics of political change. The conflicts in Benishangul-
Gumuz emanate from these causes, but lack of territorial land use rights of the 
indigenous people and lack of proportional political representation of the non-
indigenous people are the principal manifestations. 
 
The research concludes by identifying the issues that determine the sustainability of 
the federal structure. Some of them include: making constitutional amendments which 
consider citizenship rights and minority rights protection; enhancing the democratic 
participation of citizens by developing the capacities of the regional states and 
correcting the organisational weakness of the multi-national political parties; 
 II 
encouraging co-operative intergovernmental relationships, and maintaining the 
territorial land use rights of the Benishangul-Gumuz indigenous people. 
 
  Keywords: Federalism, Ethnic groups, Intra-state Conflict, Conflict management, 
Intergovernmental relationships 
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Part One: Introduction and Theoretical Framework for Analysis 
Chapter One 
 Introduction 
Statement of the Problem 
Intra-state conflicts that involve ethnic groups have become common since the 
establishment of the modern state in Ethiopia. However, Emperor Haile Selassie and 
the military regime neglected the issues and focused on Ethiopian state building. As a 
result, protracted civil wars continued and became the main reasons for the fall of the 
military regime in 1991(Young, 1998). The Ethiopian People‟s Revolutionary Front 
(EPRDF) regime has implemented federalism as a means of intra-state conflict 
management since 1994. 
 
This research project provides in-depth understanding of the relationship between the 
federal system and inter- and intra-regional conflict management in the country.  The 
motivations for this study and research focus include the following. Firstly, I 
participated in the EPRDF armed struggle that caused the collapse of the unitary state 
and the emergence of the federal system. As a result, I have a deep and compelling 
interest in discovering whether the federal arrangement can manage violent conflict 
similar to the one I participated in. Secondly, as a Civil Servant in the Internal 
Security Affairs‟ Department of the government of Ethiopia, I dealt with different 
intra-state conflicts in the early period of the federal arrangement. Although my 
contact with the conflict focused on security matters, my concerns about the repeated 
occurrence of intra-state conflicts such as between the Oromos and Somali, Afar and 
Isa, and the Gumuz and the Oromo prompted me to initiate this research. Thirdly, the 
federalisation of the state has stimulated academic debate about whether it can prevent, 
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manage and resolve intra-state conflicts in the country. On the one hand, some 
scholars have praised the federal arrangement as an innovative conflict management 
tool (Mengisteab 1997, Young, 1998, Olowu, 2003).  Others, however, consider it a 
risk to the national integrity of the country (Webengida, 2005; Kefale, 2004). For this 
reason, I developed an intellectual interest in researching the complexities of 
federalism as an approach to conflict management. Whilst studying for an MSc in 
Governance and Development Management at the International Development 
Department (IDD), University of Birmingham in 2003/04 I developed a research 
proposal on this topic. It is my hope that it will contribute new insight for the current 
debates in this field of study and possibly equip policy makers with knowledge that 
will help them to review the implementation process of the federal system in Ethiopia. 
 
The research focuses on federalism as an approach to conflict management in the 
country and investigates whether the federal arrangement has addressed and 
transformed the sources of intra-state conflicts. For this purpose, it focuses on two 
interrelated research questions: 
 Has federalism created an enabling environment for managing the 
sources of conflicts in Ethiopia? 
 What explains the conflicts in the Benishangul-Gumuz regional state 
and the federal response to their management? 
 
These research questions are relevant for theoretical and practical reasons. Firstly, the 
study is theoretically informed by the global experience of federalism as a national 
approach to conflict   management. This is because federalism has been exercised and 
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studied as a field of study in many developed and developing countries. Federalism 
also has been used to address conflicts that involve ethnic groups. For example, the 
federal system of Switzerland specifically devolves power to ethnically-based 
Cantons (Fleiner, 2006). India established its regional states on the basis of language 
and religious (mainly Punjab region) differences after such demands emerged from 
regional-based political parties in 1959 (Bharghva, 2006). Moreover, Spain also 
recently devolved power to ethnic groups to manage violent conflicts that emerged 
from demands for self-rule. However, many  federal attempts in Africa, such as in 
Cameroon (1961-1972), Rhodesia and Nyasaland (1953-1963), with the exception of  
Nigeria and  the recent  federal arrangement of South Africa, have failed due to a 
variety of factors (Kavalski and Zolkos, 2008). Hence, federalism has had less 
popularity in many multi-ethnic countries in Africa and a centralised national state has 
been considered the best nation-building approach in the 20
th
 century. As a result, the 
federal approach to conflict management has remained markedly under-researched, 
especially in the context of multi-ethnic African countries. Therefore, a study on 
federalism as a national level approach to conflict management can contribute 
empirical data and new insight to scholarly debate in this field of study in the context 
of African multi-ethnic countries. 
 
Secondly, the study contributes to understanding of the causes and management of 
conflicts in multi-ethnic countries in general, and in Africa in particular. Inter- and 
intra-state conflicts have become world phenomena since the collapse of the Soviet 
Union and the end of the Cold War. These conflicts involve different ethnic groups in 
many countries of the World including Africa, Asia and Eastern Europe. 
Nevertheless, the intra-state conflicts in Africa have been associated with primordial 
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ties of ethnic groups and the mobilising effect of greedy ethnic leaders who use the 
ethnic card to satisfy their political and economic objectives (Collier, 2001:150-152). 
The reasons for inter- and intra-regional state conflicts in Africa are associated with 
the colonial and post-colonial nation-building projects. Some of the colonialists 
adopted indirect rule (British) which resulted in two forms of governance within a 
country; and favoured and disfavoured ethnic groups in countries such as Uganda and 
Tanzania (Emerson, 1963:97).  The colonial boundaries also divided the same ethnic 
groups into different countries and become a reason for high incursions of people 
from one country into another and interference in the affairs of neighbouring 
countries. The post-colonial African leaders considered states as homogeneous 
entities and attempts to homogenise different ethnic groups into one culture and 
language followed (Emerson, 1963:104). Moreover, African leaders considered the 
rural people to be „backward‟, and that cannot hardly a reliable basis for modern 
nationhood.  They tried to modernise rural people through modern education and 
industrial expansion, but that required large amounts of capital and high technology 
(ibid). The result of the nation-building project was centralisation of the state, 
horizontal inequalities, and the emergence of ethnicity as a political frontier, during 
the post-colonial period and the post-Cold War era in Africa (Ottaway, 1999; Stewart 
and Brown, 2007).  Therefore, a study of the causes of conflict will not only reinforce 
the above analytical approaches to conflict but also provide new insight into the 
dynamics of conflict in 21
st
 century Africa.   
 
The study also has importance in the context of Ethiopia. Although much research has 
been done on the history of the Ethiopian nation-state (Zewde, 2002, Pankhurst, 1997, 
1995; Tibebu, 1995, Donham, 1986), and recently about the structure of the federal 
 5 
system (Aalen, 2002, Fiseha, 2006, Nugussie, 2006), there is a distinct lack of case 
studies that relate the federal process to specific issues of conflict management in the 
context of the constituent units of the federal system. Therefore, this study will help to 
fill this research gap.    
 
Moreover, the research also has relevance for federalisation and the policy 
formulation processes in the country. The case study of this research addresses some 
empirical issues, such as the territorial rights of indigenous people, minority rights‟ 
protection, and language criteria in defining ethnic groups. The outcome of this 
research could greatly contribute to the federal process, and lead to constitutional 
amendment, both at federal and regional levels. Moreover, the outcome of the study 
could create a greater awareness among the policy makers, mainly in relation to the 
formulation of economic, social and political policies which could affect not only the 
indigenous people in Benishangul-Gumuz, but also other ethnic groups in other 
regional states. 
 
Research Methodology 
The methodological approach of this research is qualitative because it aims to achieve 
in-depth understanding of the relationship between federalism and conflict in Ethiopia.  
Moreover, the study requires data collection that embraces perceptions about the 
actors who have been involved either in instigating or managing conflict. The 
qualitative approach enables the researcher to be „flexible‟ enough to conduct data 
collection, by identifying informants using purposive sampling methods and 
interviewing using semi-structured open-ended questionnaires (Coffen and Atkinson, 
1996). In addition, the qualitative research design also enables the researcher to apply 
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„triangulation‟ methods, which involve comparing and contrasting the empirical data 
for validation purposes (Robson, 2002). 
 
The qualitative research design was also useful in the data collection process during 
the field work. For example, I was able to be flexible in the identification of the 
people who had access to the required data about the conflict between the Oromos and 
the Gumuz in 2008.  As a result, I was able to interview different informants from the 
federal and regional governments, NGOs and political parties, who had different 
perspectives about the source of the conflict and how it was managed. The qualitative 
approach has also enabled me to validate facts that have been forgotten or were not 
emphasised by the informants, due to the differences of perspectives and access to the 
required data. 
 
In addition, the research methodology has enabled quantitative data collection to be 
used as a supplementary source. This is necessary because some of the sources of 
conflict in the regional state are associated with horizontal inequalities, budget 
allocation and population size, which require collection of quantitative data from 
secondary sources. 
 
I have focused on a regional state case study of Benishangul-Gumuz because it was a 
necessary condition to be engaged on the ground, and to address practical issues in the 
country if the research questions were to be answered. The selection of the case study 
is appropriate because a cycle of conflict has occurred in this region involving 
different ethnic groups since the federalisation of the state. Moreover, the conflicts in 
the regional state have involved other bigger states such as Oromia and Amhara. The 
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Benishangul-Gumuz regional state is relatively small with a range of different inter-
governmental relationships at both the regional and federal government levels. 
Therefore, this case study enables me not only to analyse the pattern of conflict in the 
regional state and fill the research gap but also to see the relevance of regional 
conflict at the national level. 
 
The study also focuses on the relationships between the indigenous and non-
indigenous groups in the case study of the regional state. For this purpose, it primarily 
considers the Gumuz and the Berta indigenous ethnic groups. The reason for this is 
that although the regional state composes five indigenous ethnic groups, the Gumuz 
and the Berta have been involved in several conflicts with the non-indigenous people 
and the neighbouring regional states. Moreover, both the Gumuz and Berta have 
entered into power struggles for the control of regional political institutions and public 
resources. Therefore, a focus on these two ethnic groups and inter- and intra-regional 
state relationships enables the researcher to gain an in-depth focus into all aspects of 
conflict in the regional state.  
 
To conduct the research it was necessary to select a number of conflict areas or sites. 
This was done through an analysis of inter- and intra-regional state relationships. 
Priority was given to specific conflict areas such as the BeloJeganfoy Woreda in the 
Kamashi zone because the conflict in the Woreda involved both the Benishangul-
Gumuz and Oromia regional states.  The federal authorities in these states intervened 
to manage the conflict in 2008. Other sites for study have been the Metekel zone, the 
subject of the 1992 inter-regional conflict in Pawe Woreda, and common border 
issues in the Awi zone.  Within the regional state land-use-based conflict between 
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Berta and settlers in the Bambassi Woreda and the power-based conflict between the 
Berta and the Gumuz were of special interest to this study.  
 
I identified the required informants through purposive sampling methods, which 
involved utilising networks and by conducting preliminary interviews and document 
reviews at the Ministry of Federal Affairs in Addis Ababa before I travelled to the 
research sites. These initial activities have enabled me to identify key informants from 
the federal and regional institutions, NGOs, and the political parties. The contacts 
made with key informants led to identification of other informants. 
 
Accordingly, I travelled to various places to interview the informants and to access 
archival materials. For example, it was essential that I travel to the town of Asossa, 
which is at the centre of the Benishangul-Gumuz regional state and around one hour 
flight from the capital city, Addis Ababa. I also travelled to Bahirdar, which is the 
capital of the Amhara regional state and around a one hour flight from Addis Ababa. 
It was also necessary to travel (by bus) to Glegelbeles town, which is the capital of the 
Metekel zone and around 180 kilometres from Bahirdar, to gain access to the conflict 
sites in this zone.  Moreover, additional interviews were conducted in Addis Ababa, 
which houses the centre of the federal government and the Oromia regional state 
institutions. 
 
As outlined in Tables 1 and 2 below, 80 informants with different background have 
participated in the research.  Among these 60 % are indigenous and non-indigenous 
people who live in the regional state. They represent the regional government 
institutions, elders, and local people.  Meanwhile, 12% of the informants represent 
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political parties and NGOs, which operate in the regional state. The others represent 
federal government institutions (19%) and neighbouring regional states (12%). 
A detailed breakdown reveals informants from: 
1.  The Benishagul-Gumuz regional state: President‟s office, the Security and 
Administration  Bureaus, the Regional People‟s Representatives‟ office, the Budget 
and Planning Bureau, the Civil Service Bureau, the Women‟s Affairs office, the 
Regional Agricultural College, the Metekel Zone Administration office, the Mandura  
and the Dibate Woredas Administrations offices. 
2. Federal government institutions: representatives of The House of Federation, 
representatives of the House of People‟s Representatives (Parliament), the Ministry of 
Federal Affairs, and the Federal Police.   
3. Neighbouring regional states: the Amhara and Oromia Regional States‟ Security 
and Administration Bureau, the Ganagwa Woreda administration from the Amhara 
regional state. 
4. Non-governmental organisations: Action Aid Ethiopia, the Initiative for Gumuz 
and Berta‟s Development Cooperation.   
5. Political parties: representatives of the regional parties, Oromo People‟s 
Democratic Movement (OPDO), Amhara National Democratic Movement (APDM) 
and the Oromo Congress Party (OCP) (an opposition party). 
6.  Elders and local people:  informants from the Berta and Gumuz ethnic groups, and 
non-indigenous people in the regional state. 
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Table 1.1. Total Interview participants of the research study 
Categories   Number of participants Percentage (%) 
Government institutions 
 Federal 15 19 
 Benishangul-_Gumuz 25 31 
 Oromia 5 6 
 Amhara 5 6 
Political Parties  5 6 
Ngos  5 6 
Elders & Local People  20 25 
 Total 80 100 
Education Level    
 Illiterate 20 25 
 Literate 15 19 
 College and above 45 56 
 Total 80 100 
    
Gender Male 76 95 
 Female 4 5 
 Total 80 100 
 
 
Table 1.2. Interview Participants from Benishangul-Gumuz regional state by ethnicity 
 Indigenous people Total Non-indigenous people Total 
 Berta Gumuz Shinasha Mao/Komo    
 8 10 9 3 30 20 50 
% age     60 40 100 
  
 
Different data collection methods, including in-depth interviewing, focus group 
discussions, document reviewing, and on site observation have been used in the study 
(Robson, 2002).  Among these the main data collection method was in-depth 
interviewing; therefore, an attempt has been made to capture the required data using 
open-ended semi-structured questionnaires. Overall around 65 informants participated 
in the in-depth interviewing.  In most cases the interview was conducted in the offices 
of the informants and sometimes in hotels and informant‟s homes. It took around one 
hour, on average, to complete the interview questions with every informant. Overall 
the interview process was smooth except for some interruptions mainly during 
interviews held in informants‟ offices. 
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In addition, three Focus Group discussions, attended by 15 participants, were 
conducted at the research sites. The first one was conducted with elders from the 
Gambella village of the Berta ethnic group in Bambassi Woreda on the regional 
Agricultural College campus.  It focused on understanding the reasons for conflict 
with the settlers in Amba 14 (village). The second was conducted with elders of the 
settlers from Amba 14, on the same theme. The third focus group discussion was 
conducted with the Dibate Woreda administration in the Metekel zone, and aimed to 
understand the reasons for border conflict with the Guangwa Woreda from the 
Amhara regional state and how the conflict was handled. 
 
The third data collection method was document reviews of both primary and 
secondary sources from the archives of the federal and regional institutions.  Primary 
sources such as the Minutes of the Constitutional Assembly, federal and regional 
parliamentary proceedings, the Minutes of public meetings about the relationships of 
the Berta ethnic group and others, and reports about violent conflicts (prepared by 
different investigation committees), were reviewed. Secondary sources included 
historical, anthropological, ethnographical and linguistic studies about the country in 
general, and the ethnic groups in the case study in particular. Moreover, other 
statistical sources such as the 1994 and 2007 population censuses, national and 
regional poverty indicators, agricultural policy and the strategy of the country 
(available on the websites of federal and regional institutions), were also consulted. 
The document review was useful to gain access to a historical analysis of the case 
study and important events in the regional state (Marshal & Rossman, 1999). Finally, 
although it was not a major aspect of the data collection method, onsite observation in 
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an open Saturday market in the town of Asossa was conducted to determine the role 
of the indigenous and non-indigenous people in business activities. 
 
As the data collection was mainly based on in-depth interviewing, note taking and   
audio recording were employed as main data-capturing mechanisms in the field study. 
Also memos and interim reports have been used to capture the reflections during the 
interview and summarise the main points (Miles and Huberman, 1994). Moreover, the 
audio records were transcribed in Amharic and then translated into English in a 
summarised format after the completion of the field study.  Similarly, summaries and 
an annotated bibliography were prepared from the documentary sources in accordance 
with the research questions (Robson, 2002).  
 
 However, this was not without difficulties. For example, transcribing the data and 
translating it   again from Amharic to English was not only time consuming, but also 
resulted in loss of the meaning of the message in translation. It required me to keep 
reading back the transcribed data to maintain the original meaning of the data in the 
parts where necessary. 
 
Following this, a content-based thematic analysis was conducted to analyse and 
interpret the data. The data in each case was reduced into categories and sub-
categories (Miles and Huberman, 1994). A cross-case analysis has also been utilised 
to see the patterns and themes that could be transferred from the case studies for 
conclusions at regional and country levels (Ibid). For example, the inter-regional 
conflicts in the Kamashi zone between the Oromos and the Gumuz in 2008, and 
similar conflicts between the Amhara and the Gumuz in Metekel in 1992, have been 
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compared and contrasted during cross-case conflict analysis.  Statistical data, 
presented in Table format, has been used to support the analysis from the bulk of 
qualitative data.   
 
A constructivist approach was followed to maintain the objectivity of the research. 
This means basic theoretical concepts and arguments were reviewed to inform the 
research process, which also enabled me to construct the political activities and 
societal interactions during the field work. In other words the field research aimed to 
understand how the political processes were constituted and what the consequences 
and outcome will be. Therefore, informants were not selected as individuals, but as 
persons who represent political systems or cultural groups (Robson, 2002; Finnemore 
and Sikkink, 2001). Although  it is believed that  the research process involves 
interpretation where the researcher  cannot show a neutral stance as is done  in some  
scientific  quantitative research designs (Finnemore and  Sikkink, 2001:396), methods 
such as  in-depth interviewing  and content analysis were used  to capture the inter-
subjective meanings  of the data  while  maintaining  the objectivity of the study. 
 
Data validity has been checked using triangulation methods (Robson, 2002). This was 
done using different data sources on the same issue, such as federal institutions, the 
Oromia and the Benishangul-Gumuz regional states, and NGOs operating in the 
conflict sites. Moreover, an attempt has been made to compare and contrast the data 
sources during data analysis. This approach has helped the researcher to understand 
the reasons behind the immediate cause of the conflict and the interests of the actors 
involved. 
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Ethical considerations have also been given significant attention during the field work, 
analysis, and writing-up of the outputs of the research. The researcher took a letter, To 
Whom It May Concern, from the supervisor that indicated the purpose of the field 
study. In addition, as the sponsor of my PhD study, Addis Ababa University wrote an 
additional letter in Amharic that indicated the purpose of field work. Both letters have 
greatly helped in gaining access to the required institutions and the consent of the 
required informants. 
 
However, resistance to audio recording was a challenge in the field work. This was 
overcome by explaining to informants the ethical principles of the researcher in 
keeping data confidential. Subsequently, almost 60% of the interviewees agreed to be 
recorded. However, others and mainly those who work at the federal institutions 
would not be recorded. Therefore, note taking was used instead. Moreover, as the data 
of this study is relatively sensitive, names of informants have been kept confidential 
in the analysis, interpretation and writing up of the output of the study. 
 
In summary, the research design, the data collection methods and mechanisms of data 
analysis and interpretation, and the ethical considerations used in the research process 
have enabled the researcher to address the research questions in producing the thesis. 
However, this was not without limitation.  I was not able to travel to one of the 
conflict sites for security reasons. As a result, I was unable to conduct some 
interviews from the lower level administrations and citizens of the Woreda. Moreover, 
although I wanted to capture women‟s perspectives on the study, only a few 
participated because the number of women who have access to the required data at the 
institutions is small.  
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The Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis is organised into three parts, which include ten chapters. The first section 
contains the introduction and Chapter Two, which provides the theoretical analytical 
framework for the research.  The second section includes Chapter Three, which 
discusses the socio-political and economic history of Ethiopia, and Chapter Four, 
which examines the federalisation of the nation state. Section three which includes 
Chapters‟ Five, Six, Seven, Eight and Nine gives a detailed study of the Benishangul-
Gumuz regional state. Finally, the concluding chapter brings the research to an end by 
drawing together the main findings of the research and providing further reflections 
from the researcher. 
 
 A detailed outline of each chapter includes the following. Chapter Two provides a 
theoretical analytical framework of federalism – as a comprehensive approach to 
intra-state conflict management in multi-ethnic African countries.  Federalism can be 
used as a form of governance through power devolution, resource-sharing 
mechanisms and democratic participation.  The chapter also discusses some 
challenges of federalism based on the experiences of the federal systems of the former 
Soviet Union and Belgium. In contextualising the challenges of federalism to Africa, 
the chapter relates the sources of intra-state conflict to the colonial period and, mainly, 
to post-colonial centralised African states‟ nation-building projects, which resulted in 
cultural, social, economic and political inequalities between the ethnic groups. Within 
this perspective an account is given of the debates about the social construction of 
ethnicity and the role ethnic elite leaders played in manipulating ethnic identities.  
Therefore, the chapter considers federalism as a conflict management approach in 
transforming the social, economic and political factors which affect the ethnic groups.  
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Chapter Three is about the political economic history of Ethiopia, and gives a detailed 
account of the political, economic, and social context of intra-state conflict in the 
modern history of the country.  It relates the sources of intra-state conflict to the 
centralised state structure, an attempt of homogenisation of the ethnic groups into one 
culture and language, exploitative resource appropriation methods from the rural 
population and the modernisation policies which created uneven developments. These 
problems led to civil wars and, eventually, the downfall of the military regime in 1991.  
 
Chapter Four critically examines the federal constitution and its process of 
implementation, with respect to inter-intra-regional conflict management.  Therefore, 
it examines the federal constitution, with respect to power relationships between the 
centre and the constituent units, resource sharing mechanisms, democratic 
participation and inter-governmental relationships. Accordingly, the relationship 
between national and ethnic identities, different geographical and population sizes of 
regional states, different levels of regional economic development and relationships to 
the Ethiopian state, the constitutional right of secession, the inability to protect 
minority rights, lack of democratic participation of the constituent units and the ethnic 
groups are discussed as the main issues of the constitution and the federalisation 
process.  
 
Chapter Five considers the relationship between the ethnic groups and the political 
history of the Benishangul-Gumuz regional state, the case study of this research. It 
relates the sources of intra-state conflict, discussed in Chapter Three, to the context of 
indigenous and non-indigenous people in the regional state. The indigenous people, 
and mainly the Berta and the Gumuz, have structural differences from the non-
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indigenous people, who came to the regional state from the highland areas of the 
country – through internal immigration and resettlement programmes. One significant 
difference lies in their subsistence systems, which involve shifting cultivation for the 
indigenous people and plough cultivation for the non-indigenous people. This 
difference has contributed to the conflict that arose between these groups, in relation 
to the use of land resources. The chapter also examines the political history of the 
regional state, focusing on the historical relationship between the state and the 
indigenous people, which can best be characterised as centre and periphery 
relationships; and hostility and suspicion.  
 
Chapter Six examines the basic causes of intra-regional conflict that made both the 
indigenous and non-indigenous people insecure, and how the regional and federal 
authorities attempted to address them. The social, economic and cultural inequalities 
between the indigenous and non-indigenous peoples, the territorial issues of the 
indigenous people, and issues of land use rights of settlers are considered to be the 
main causes of insecurity in the regional state. 
 
Chapter Seven discusses the role of political parties in the federal process of the 
regional state. A detailed investigation has been made of the role of the regional party, 
EPRDF and opposition parties in creating regional leadership, which has a direct 
impact on the capacity of the region to resolve conflicts. The chapter concludes by 
noting that focusing on enhancing the leadership capacity of the regional party can 
improve the ability to resolve both intra- and inter-regional conflicts. 
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 Chapter Eight looks at the power relationships between the political actors in the 
regional state and how the relationship influences the conflict management process in 
the regional state. Accordingly, the chapter examines the power struggle between the 
political elite of the regional state and the effect on the conflict management process 
of the regional state. Moreover, it discusses the reasons that the non-indigenous 
people were underrepresented in the political institutions and the impact of this to the 
federalisation process in the regional state. Overall  the  entire chapter underscores 
that  it is not  only  the federal structure   that determines  the federal process  but also 
the   dynamics of the political power relationships  between  the  political actors in the 
regional state. 
  
Chapter Nine examines the nature of inter-regional violent conflict and how it has 
been managed. Accordingly, it considers historical and cultural factors, the small size 
of the regional state and its relationship with the Ethiopian state, regional common 
border issues, international frontiers and possession of small arms as the main causes 
of inter-regional conflicts. The chapter also investigates the reasons that the above 
factors lead to violence. For this purpose two case studies are investigated: firstly, the 
violent conflict between Gumuz and Amhara in 1992-1994, and secondly, the conflict 
between Gumuz and Oromo in 2008. Issues such as the involvement of the lower 
level administration in the conflict, the lack of administrative accountability at the 
regional level, and the lack of rule of law – especially the failure to arrest people who 
aggravated inter-ethnic violent conflict – are discussed. These factors are seen to be 
the immediate causes of violent conflict. The chapter also examines the role played by 
intergovernmental relationships in the management of the violent conflict. 
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Chapter Ten, the conclusion of the thesis, draws together the main findings of the 
study. Three comprehensive issues receive significant attention in the concluding 
remarks. Firstly, at the national level, the chapter presents the danger of lack of focus 
on citizenship rights as a means of co-operation with the ethnic groups, the top down 
approach of the political elite of the country which has led to less democratic 
participation of citizens and the lack of minority rights protection as the main 
drawbacks of the federal constitution and the process. Secondly, it brings together the 
issues related to the Benishangul-Gumuz regional state. Therefore, it focuses on 
addressing the structural causes and mainly the territorial issues of the indigenous 
people and the political rights of the non-indigenous people. In addition, attention is 
given to the rule of law and to the accountability of regional authorities and considers 
how significant these factors are in the determination of peaceful conflict 
management in the regional state.  The chapter also provides some insight into the 
theoretical relevance of the conclusions. 
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Chapter Two 
 Federalism and Conflict Management 
Introduction 
Chapter Two provides a theoretical framework for analysing federalism and conflict 
management in Ethiopia. For this purpose it examines some common characteristics 
of ethnic-based federations, including the former Soviet Union and Belgium, which 
have similar characteristics to the Ethiopian federation with respect to using ethnicity 
as a principal form of organisation of the state. Following this, it examines the causes 
of conflicts in Africa to understand the challenges of ethnic federalism in the context 
of multiethnic African countries. Finally, it draws out the main issues that should be 
considered in using federalism as a general approach to conflict management in multi-
ethnic African countries. The applicability to Ethiopia will be discussed in the 
subsequent chapters. 
 
 The Concept of Federalism 
Federalism has been used as a principle of government for reasons such as better 
economic and security opportunities and accommodation of different   identities in the 
political spheres of many countries.  It has been practiced in countries such as the 
USA, Switzerland, Canada, and Australia for centuries. Moreover, it was adopted in 
many developed (such as Germany, Belgium, and Spain) and developing countries 
such as India, Malaysia, Nigeria, Ethiopia and South Africa in the 20
th
 century. Some 
of the federal states such as Pakistan, Czechoslovakia, and Cameron failed for 
different reasons (Kavalski and Zolkos, 2008). Overall, there are more than 24 federal 
countries which satisfy some of the fundamental characteristics of federalism  and 
around 40 % of the World population live in these countries (Watts, 2008: xiii).  
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Federalism is a general term that refers to the advocacy of multi-tier government, 
which combines elements of shared rule and regional self-rule. It aims to achieve 
both unity and diversity by accommodating, preserving and promoting distinct 
identities within a larger political system (Watts, 2001; 24).  
 
 However, within the general federal principle there can be different federal political 
systems, which combine elements of shared rule and regional self- rule through the 
constituent units (Elazar, 1987, 7-8). Therefore, federal political systems include a 
spectrum of more specific non-unitary forms of political systems, including 
federations, confederations, consociational polities, unions, and leagues (Elazar, 
1987:6-8; Elazar, 1994:22-23).  All the political systems include aspects of the 
federal principle – compared   to the unitary state, which is a single source of political 
authority.  
 
Federal political systems may emerge from an agreement by two or more 
independent political entities to acquire common political structures, such as the 
United States and Canadian federations. Or it may result from the federalisation of a 
unitary state, like the recent constitutional change in Spain, Ethiopia and Iraq (Watts, 
2008). The federation of a unitary state may be based on territorial, cultural, 
linguistic or other divisions that the unitary state intends to resolve (Watts, 2001:76). 
 
As the concern of this thesis is mainly with federations, it may be relevant to define 
what a federation refers to, in order to understand its main characteristics and explore 
its main mechanisms and the debates around it.   
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According to Watts, a federation is made up of:  
Compound polities, combining strong constituent units of government and a 
strong general government, each possessing powers delegated to it by the 
people through a constitution, each empowered to deal directly with the 
citizens in the exercise of its legislative, administrative, and taxing powers, 
and each directly elected and accountable to its citizens (2001:27). 
 
The above definition indicates that the following common characteristics of federal 
states have to be fulfilled in order to manage conflicts at a national level. First, federal 
states have a supreme written constitution that cannot be easily amended and, if 
amendment is required, there must be consent by a significant proportion of the 
population either through the regional governments or a referendum (Duchacek, 
1987:201-208). Second, distribution of power – that is legislative, executive and 
revenue allocation – is specified by the constitution. Therefore, the political system 
diffuses power among a number of substantially self-sustaining centres, and the 
authority to participate in exercising it cannot be taken without all their consent 
(Elazar, 1987:166). Third, in a federation, political authority is territorially divided 
between two autonomous sets of separate jurisdictions, one national and the other 
regional, in which the former operate directly upon the people of a country and the 
latter on the people of a regional state (Duchacek, 1987: 192). Fourth, provision for 
the designated representation of distinct regional/ethnic views within the federal 
policy – making institutions usually includes the representation of regional/ethnic 
representatives in a second federal legislative chamber (Weinstock, 2001:75). 
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Federalism has been considered as centralisation of power on the one hand and 
decentralisation of power on the other. With respect to centralisation of power, it 
moves some powers of the constituent units to the centre. Hence, it imposes 
restrictions on the liberties of the members of the federation. With respect to 
decentralisation, it secures local autonomy for the constituent units, which leads to 
greater fragmentation of power. But, overall, federalism is considered as a 
compromise between unity and diversity, autonomy and sovereignty, national and 
regional issues (Smith, 1995:5). 
 
Accordingly, there are different federations that can be categorised as integrative, 
ethnic-based or hybrid. The integrative federation establishes constituent units on the 
basis of geographical size and other socio-economic factors. It aims to foster the 
individual rights of citizens, like the federation that is the USA. It focuses on limiting 
and balancing the power of the federal and regional institutions in exercising their 
authority. The ethnic-based federation focuses on accommodating the ethnic groups in 
a country. It devolves powers along ethnic lines and enables ethnic groups to 
participate equally at the federal level, as in Belgium. The third type is a hybrid of the 
integrative and ethnic-based federations which aims to foster individual rights, but 
also devolve powers to territorially-based ethnic groups, like Nigerian and Swiss 
federations (Watts, 2008). 
 
The above brief description of different kinds of federation shows that federal states, 
whether they are integrative, ethnic-based or hybrid, all attempt to secure and ensure 
the reproduction of a particular political institutionalisation which reflects an 
acknowledgement of diversity. This also shows that multi-ethnic federal states have 
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common challenges, which primarily derive from the ethnic diversity of their 
populations (Smith, 1995:7). The Ethiopian federalism was also introduced to address 
the causes of conflicts, derived from the diversity of the population and ethno-national 
movements which fought against the tyranny of the unitary state during the imperial 
(1931-1974) and military (1974-1991) regimes. This makes it necessary to discuss 
some conceptual issues, such as nations, nationalities, ethnicity and associated 
elements which have direct relevance to the federalisation process in Ethiopia. 
 
Nation, Nationality, People and Ethnicity  
The constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (1995) considers 
nations, nationalities and people as the supreme power sources in the country (Article 
8/1). Following the Federal Constitution, the Benishangul-Gumuz regional 
constitution (2002) also identifies the people in the regional state as indigenous and 
non-indigenous. The above terms, which are mentioned in both the federal and 
regional constitutions, require clarity of thought on how to use them in the conflict 
analysis of this case study.  
 
The term nation has been defined and redefined in the context of the historical 
developments of countries. For example, a very popular scholar of the 19
th
 century, 
Renan, understands the term nation as a „spiritual principle‟ which connects the past 
and present memory of a group of people (Hutchinson and Smith, 1994:17-18). This 
nationhood comes by a common sacrifice of the people for the good of all and is a 
basis of liberty for humankind (ibid).  Max Weber defines the term nation more or 
less the same as Renan. According to Weber, a nation is “a community of sentiment 
which would adequately manifest itself in a state of its own; hence, a nation is a 
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community which normally tends to produce a state of its own” (Hutchinson and 
Smith, 2000:9).  For Max Weber, the people of a nation might have different ethnic 
identities or may speak different languages, but if they develop a common national 
sentiment that transcends all the communities in the territory, these people could be 
considered as a nation.  In addition, Max Weber asserts that the common national 
sentiment is basically achieved over a period of time by the common activities of the 
people (Hutchinson and Smith, 2000:8). 
 
From both Renan and Weber, we can identify three major points about the term nation. 
First, a nation suggests a group of people who have a common national sentiment 
which is developed in the process of their common accomplishments through time. 
Second, the people do not necessarily come from a single race or speak a particular 
language to be a nation. In other words, if people with different languages and races 
have a common national sentiment, which is shared by all of them, they can be 
considered as a nation. Third, the tendency of these people and their nation is also to 
establish their own state. 
 
However, Joseph Stalin defines a nation using some specific features that are common 
to those people who count as members of that nation. According to Stalin, a nation is 
a definite community of people that is neither racial nor tribal but a “historically 
constituted stable community of people formed on the basis of a common spoken 
language, territory, economic life and psychological make-up manifested in a 
common culture”. Stalin believed that, if a group of people are to be considered as a 
nation, they have to satisfy all the above factors (Hutchinson and Smith, 1994:18-21).  
However, if a group of people cannot satisfy these criteria, they could be considered 
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as a nationality, which has less socio-economic development compared to the so-
called nation. Stalin‟s definition of a nation led to the establishment of different tiers 
of republics in the Soviet Union, which became a source of resentment among the 
ethnic groups, as will be discussed in the following sections. 
 
Many scholars (Bauer cited in Ozkirimli, 2000:32-33; Ernest Gellner, cited in 
Hutchinson and Smith, 1994; John Breuilly, 1993) have believed that the common 
national sentiment of a nation could develop through cultural and language 
homogenisation of the ethnic groups in a country. For this purpose, they proposed a 
nation-building project focusing on industrial development and standardisation of 
education as the main tool to achieve a common national sentiment. They also 
suggested that a centralised state, which aspired to the realisation of the national 
community, could lead that project (Breuilly, 1993). 
 
The nation building project has been facilitated by nationalism and national 
movements which evolved as a doctrine of sovereignty and unity to achieve freedom 
of the nations in Western Europe and was mainly anchored in the evolving middle 
class movement of those countries (Hutchinson and Smith, 1994:5; Kedourine, cited 
in Hutchinson and Smith, 1994:49-55). This was greatly supported by their evolving 
industries and infrastructures (Gellner, 1983:47 cited in Ozkirimli, 2000:132; 
Hutchinson and Smith, 1994:5).   
 
Nationalism and national movements also deal with controlling state power. This has 
two aspects: firstly, it could be related to the entire people of a nation, as has 
happened during the popular anti-colonial movements in Africa (Breuilly, 1993; 
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Erikson, 2002). The aim of the anti-colonial movements was to free their countries 
from the colonisers and from the control of the colonial power. Secondly, nationalism 
and national movements could be linked to ethnic groups‟ movements, commonly 
known as ethno-nationalism, which aims to assert the rights of the various ethnic 
groups in nation-states (Eriksen, 2002).  
 
After the independence of many African countries, the national movements were 
linked with the assertion of the rights of ethnic groups, and this undermined those 
nation-building projects of African leaders who sought to provide common modern 
identities through industrial development and standardised education, which would 
lead to cultural and language  homogenisation (Ozkirimli,2000;49). 
 
Having discussed the basic concepts of nations and nationalism, it is important to 
clearly specify the working definition of a nation for the purpose of this research 
project. The following will be used: 
A nation is a named human population sharing an historic territory, common 
myths and historical memories, a mass public culture, a common economy and 
common legal rights and duties for all members (Smith, 1991:14). 
 
This definition neither implies homogenisation of languages and cultures nor imposes 
a pre-condition of a modern economy by the standard of the developed world. Rather, 
it suggests that nations and their national sentiments evolve as a historical process of 
development of common memories of the general public that have common 
administrative rights through shared state authorities. This also shows that nationalism 
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could emerge and sustain itself in societies which have not reached the level of 
development of the Western world (Breuilly, 1996:162). 
 
 The term „Nationality‟ refers to the ability of a person to communicate more 
effectively, and over a wider range of subjects, with members of one large group than 
with outsiders (Deutsch in Hutchinson & Smith, 2000:27). Moreover, during the 
1930s in Russia, the term „nationality‟ was used to separate people that had different 
customs or religion from the majority Russians. This is because there were many 
minority groups who considered themselves as different from the majority Russians 
(Sunny and Martin, 2001; Tishkov, 1997). Hence, „nationality‟ implies membership 
of a distinct group, showing a similarity to the concept of ethnicity. Second, 
„nationality‟ is used to indicate an affiliation of a person to the nation-state. For 
example, a person could be Ethiopian, British or Kenyan. This is usually marked by 
the citizenship of the person to a country. Thus, this makes the term „nationality‟ 
synonymous with the term „citizenship‟. 
 
  The term „people‟ is understood differently in different contexts. For example, the 
UN Charter mentions it in relation to the right of self-determination, referring to the 
total population of a nation-state. On the other hand, the term has been defined as 
applying to a group of people who have a common descent and similarity of features, 
or complementary habits and facilities of communication (Reynolds, 1984 in 
Hutchinson and Smith, 2000:140; Deutsch in Hutchinson and Smith, 2000:26). The 
Oxford English Dictionary (1989) also defines the term „people‟ in a way similar to 
the above definitions: “A body of persons composing a community, tribe, race, or 
nation”. Therefore, the term „people‟ could refer to the whole population if we are 
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referring to the nation-state. It could also apply to different ethnic groups of the 
nation-state, if we are referring to the groups of people within it. 
 
 The term ethnicity, a noun form of the word ethnic
1
, refers to self-identifying features 
of a group of people (Tonkin et al, 1996:23). Max Weber understood ethnicity as a 
subjective common belief linked to similarities of origin or custom that could create a 
group (Hutchinson and Smith, 1996:35-40). However, understanding of the term 
differs in different perspectives which include primordial, instrumentalist and 
constructivist approaches.  
 
The primordialist approach interprets ethnicity as relating to a particular race, nation 
or tribe and their customs and traditions; it is established at birth when people are 
born into an ethnic group in which they stay until they die (Horowitz, 1985). 
Accordingly, emphasis is given to the importance of cultural norms and blood 
relationships for one‟s identity and to the relationship between members of the ethnic 
group (Geertz, 1973; Van den Berghe, 1979; Horowitz, 1985; Lewis, 1994).  
 
The primordialist approach maintains that ethnic groups are mobilised for the 
protection of their culture and way of life. Therefore, it fails to account for changes in 
the ethnic group that could result in its dissolution or adaptation to new circumstances 
and technological developments. The approach also overlooks the economical, 
political and social relationships between members of the ethnic group. It is 
undermined by the changes that have occurred in many ethnic groups due to 
                                                 
1
 The word ethnic is derived from the early Greek word‟ethnos‟ implies an unstructured, tribal, 
peripheral people (Tonkin, et al, 1996: 18-21). 
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colonisation, frequent migration and intermarriage (Eller and Coghlan, 1993; Harff 
and Gurr, 2004:96).  
 
In contrast to the primordial approach, the instrumentalist approach focuses on the 
malleability of the ethnic identity and the role of elites in the politicisation of ethnicity 
(Ukiwo, 2005, Esman, 2004). Therefore, it is believed that an ethnic identity can be 
changed in the pursuit of economic interests and wealth (Hechter, 1996; Banton, 
1994). In other words, people can change their identity on the basis of the benefits 
they could gain by doing so. Moreover, Cohn (1996) and Brass (1996) believe that the 
symbols of an ethnic identity are something useful to the elite political leaders to 
influence their constituents in pursuing their political goals. This means it is the elite 
group (political entrepreneurs) who create identity-based differences and manipulate 
those differences (political ethnicity) for the purpose of attaining political power that 
renders ethnic differences. This has happened in many countries such as in Nigeria, 
Rwanda and Burundi during the 1990s which ultimately led the countries to instability 
(Deng, 2009:362) beyond this, an ethnic identity could be considered as any social 
identity, such as membership of a trade union. 
 
The instrumentalist approach fails to explain the reasons for the persistence of an 
ethnic identity within members of the ethnic group. It also reduces the ethnic identity 
to cost-benefit oriented economic choices; thus, it fails to account for the deeper 
social structures that allow manipulation of the grievances of the ethnic group by their 
elite leaders (Vayrynen, 1999:128).  
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The constructivist approach emphasises the reasons by which ethnic group identities 
emerge and change over time. Accordingly, ethnic identities are not static; they are 
passed on by families and other social actors like teachers, by political activities and 
by the active participation of the members of the ethnic group themselves (Jenkin, 
1997). Vayrynen (1999) emphasises the social construction and reconstruction of 
ethnic identities through time, which involve the pre-constituted and pre-organised 
socio-cultural world. This involves interactions of the members of the ethnic groups 
with other people who have different socio-cultural patterns, the roles of the state in 
creating common national political identities, globalisation and the media in adapting 
the group to new circumstances. Therefore, ethnic identities are in a constant state of 
flux due to change in the circumstances of the ethnic group, its relationships with 
others and the active participation of the members of the group themselves (Cornell 
and Harmann, 1998:85).  
 
Accordingly, ethnicity in this research context relates to group members who share a 
persisting sense of common interest and identity that is based on some combination of 
shared historical experience and values, such as cultural traits, beliefs, language, way 
of life and a common residential territory (Harff and Gurr, 2004:3; Jenkins, 1997:13).  
Accordingly, an ethnic group (community) can also  be defined  as a „named human 
population with a myth of common ancestry, shared memories and cultural elements, 
a link with a historic territory or home land, and a measure (sense) of solidarity‟ 
(Brown, 1993:28-9). However, there are no grounds for assuming any one basis for 
ethnic or cultural identity, such as religion, language, race or a common homeland 
(Gurr, 2001:163; Smith, 1997:27). As noted above, ethnic group identity is identified 
in the relationship between the traits of the ethnic group and the relationship of the 
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ethnic group with other ethnic groups.  Therefore, ethnic groups can be regionally 
concentrated cultural groups, usually with a history of separate political existence, 
who need autonomy in their internal affairs and gain equal access to the centre 
(Schermerhorn, 1996:17). Moreover, ethnic groups can also be people or minorities, 
living intermingled with other ethnic groups, who seek equal rights, opportunities and 
access to power within the existing political communities (Wolff, 2004:2; Gurr, 2001, 
163-164). 
 
 Ethnic groups can also be indigenous to a specific region or area of a country.  The 
term „indigenous‟ is usually associated with the aboriginal peoples of North and South 
America, Australia and others – as distinct from the invading whites. However, 
„aboriginal‟ does not necessarily mean first-comers or first settlers. Germans and 
English people could be some of the first settlers in their respective territories of 
Europe, but nobody refers to them as indigenous peoples (Eriksen, 2002:25). Knight 
defines „indigenous‟ as: “people who never voluntarily gave up their original status 
and who do not, or not completely, identify themselves with the state with which they 
live” (1988, 122). Eriksen also defines indigenous groups as “non-state people and 
they are always linked with a non-industrial mode of production” (2002:125). 
 
 Thus, indigenous groups have historical continuity that developed in their territories 
which makes them distinct from others. They have a tendency to preserve their 
cultures and traditions for future generations in their territories (Knight, 1988:123; 
Eriksen, 2002:127). They are also usually numerically, politically and economically 
non-dominant in comparison to other groups. Hence, their main political project is 
survival (ibid). Due to these reasons, they have continuous disputes with neighbouring 
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peoples and with the state. This occurs when the majority group wish to control 
resources in the territories of the indigenous groups. Therefore, the centre of the 
dispute is usually land possession. For these people, land possession is a matter of 
group right and any treatment that violates territorial land possession could lead to 
conflicts with the state (Knight, 1988:123). 
 
The above discussion indicates that there is no clear difference between nations, 
nationalities and people when we consider different identity groups in a country. As a 
result, the terms can be used interchangeably with ethnic groups as they imply 
different identity groups in a country. However, ethnic groups have to be understood 
through different historical, political, social and economic circumstances. In other 
words, there are no ethnic groups that can be understood only through consideration 
of their primordial characteristics. For example, the same political arrangement can 
result in different outcomes for different ethnic groups, depending on their social, 
political and economic circumstances, as happened with the Welayta and Sidama 
ethnic groups following the federalisation of the state of Ethiopia (Aalen, 2008). 
 
In the context of Ethiopia, we will consider the terms „nations‟, „nationalities‟ and 
„people‟ as synonymous with ethnic groups, but we will be cautious about the impact 
of the vague constitutional definition of the terms and the practical implication of 
using them in relation to the differences between ethnic groups with reference to 
social cohesion, size and economic strength, which has been also manifested in the 
constitutional reorganisation of the regional states. The impact of this will be 
discussed in Chapter Four. The term „indigenous people‟ will be applied to describe 
the natives of the Benishangul- Gumuz regional state, as discussed in Chapter Five. 
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Common Challenges of Multi-ethnic Federal States 
One of the common challenges of multi-ethnic federal states is that arising from the 
nationalism of ethno-regional communities. Regionally concentrated ethnic groups 
push the federal states for more devolution along ethnic lines. For example, the people 
of Quebec pushed the federal state of Canada for more power devolution in 
recognition of full sovereignty for the province of Quebec. The Juba canton of 
Switzerland also seceded through referendum from another canton in pursuit of more 
freedom for citizens in their localities. Demands by ethnic groups for the right to 
constitute an autonomous state of their own based on their sovereign homeland are 
common issues in multi-ethnic federal states. Hence, the success of federalism in such 
countries depends on whether the federal state facilitates the establishment of a dual 
identity which considers the ethnic, tribal, linguistic and religious divisions of the 
people (Smith, 1995:3-11). In other words, the issue of self-determination has to be 
addressed in ways that allow for mutual recognition of socially significant differences 
without losing sight of the right to be culturally different or of the need to safeguard 
the basic human and political rights of citizens. The following two examples of 
federations show the extent to which the above problems led to the disintegration of 
the former Soviet Union and are challenging the Belgian federation. This has direct 
relevance for the Ethiopian case study. 
 
The Russian empire became a multi-ethnic jurisdiction by acquiring the Baltic 
countries as well as Finland, Bessarabia and Georgia, and re-acquiring most of Poland 
in the early 19
th
 century. It further expanded its territories to the Caucasus and central 
Asia in the middle decades of the nineteenth century. However, initially the empire 
was far from being a unitary state because this was beyond the limited administrative 
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resources of tsarism, which became a reason for the practical autonomy of non-
Russian territories and local elites. Nevertheless, the traditional way of ruling the 
empire was later abandoned during the middle decades of the nineteenth century due 
to the emergence of Russian nationalism. This changed the country into a politically-
charged multi-national
2
 „prison of nations‟ that were primarily controlled using the 
military and security forces of the country (Pearson, 1991: 13-15). For these reasons, 
non-Russian nationalism became one of the political challenges that contributed to the 
downfall of the Tsar during the 1905-07 democratic revolution. It also became one of 
the issues for which the Socialist ruling party, the Bolsheviks, sought a political 
solution when they came to power after the 1917 October Socialist Revolution 
(Pearson, 1991:15-22; Sheehy, 1991). 
 
The Bolshevik party thought that the issue of nations and nationalities could be 
resolved through the proletariat revolution and socialism. Although the nations and 
nationalities had the right to decide on their destiny (self-determination up to 
secession), communists had to fight for the emancipation of the international 
proletariat, which goes beyond the national barriers of ethnic groups in a country. 
Accordingly, the main perpetuator of the idea of self-determination of nations up to 
secession, Joseph Stalin, made it clear in 1904 that the nations and nationalities under 
the Russian empire had a right of self-determination, but their final freedom could 
only be achieved through the proletarian revolution and under the democratic 
centralism of the Social Democratic Party (Stalin, 1904). Later, after the 
establishment of the Bolshevik party and the October Revolution, he further defended 
                                                 
2
 For example, the 1989 census shows 290 million people, which includes 22 nationalities numbering 
more than a million and a further 33 numbering over 100,000. These nationalities differ greatly not 
only as regards size, but also language, religious and cultural traditions, and level of social and 
economic development even after 70 years of the socialist system (Shehy, 1991:56-88). 
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his idea and defined what nations and nationalities mean, and the possible political 
solutions associated with the issues of nations and nationalities. Consequently, he 
introduced the idea of regional autonomy for those well-developed nations and 
cultural autonomy for the nationalities of the country
3
.  
 
The ideas of Stalin were also manifested in the 1918 federal constitution and the 1922 
amended constitution, which basically continued until the end of the Soviet system in 
1989. Therefore, under the communist party all nations and nationalities were able to 
establish their administrations on the basis of ethnicity and language as the main 
ethnic markers. However, the relationship of the ethnic groups with the centre became 
asymmetrical as some of them were considered as nations that had greater regional 
autonomy while the nationalities only had rights of cultural autonomy. Furthermore, 
some of the smaller nationalities also never enjoyed self-autonomous status in the 
Soviet Union (Sheehy, 1991; 67-77). 
 
There were two assumptions behind the ethnic-based federal arrangement of the 
Soviet Union. First, that recognition of self-determination up to secession could 
resolve the demands of some of the national movements of the Baltic nations. In other 
words, recognition of self-determination was taken as a means of bringing peace and 
conflict resolution in the transition period to Socialism. Second, the recognition of 
self-determination by the Socialist Party would also bring the proletariat and peasant 
movements of the nations and nationalities into the main stream of the proletariat 
Socialist Revolution, which was led by the Bolshevik Communist Party. Hence, this 
would serve to strengthen the national sentiment of the Soviet Union. However, the 
                                                 
3
 For further information refer to Franklin, B. (ed)(1973) The essential Stalin, Marxism and the national 
question, London ;Croom Helm pp; 54-84 
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centralised approach of the Communist Party and the ethnic-based federal approach in 
fact contributed to the disintegration of the Soviet Union after 70 years of socialist 
rule. Several points are worth discussing in connection with this: 
 
Firstly, when the Soviet federation was established in 1918, ethnic residential areas 
were the chief consideration in determining the administrative borders of the 
constituent units. Such an approach naturally resulted in establishing units differing 
greatly in the size of their populations. For example, the population of the Russian 
Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) was 94 times greater than the smallest 
republic, Estonia. In addition, in some parts of the country (mainly in the Caucasus, 
central Asia, and the middle Volga) the population was so ethnically mixed that it was 
impossible to draw up boundaries without excluding portions of the ethnic groups 
(Sheehy, 1991; 67). 
 
Secondly, the constitution ratified in January 1924 created different levels of ethnic 
republics under the federal government. The top tier were „Union Republics‟, the 
second tier „Autonomous Republics‟, the third tier „Autonomous Regions‟ and the 
fourth tier were individually too small to merit mention in the rubric of the 
constitution but consisted of the majority of Soviet nationalities (Pearson,1991:26). 
The top tier had, for example, jurisdiction over agriculture, education, justice, public 
health and social security, including the right to secede from the federation (Pearson, 
1991:27). However, the Autonomous Republics had markedly fewer rights and 
cultural advantages than the Union Republics. Thus, in most Autonomous Republics, 
higher education and even schooling above primary school level was not available in 
the native language. Moreover, the Autonomous Republics had fewer deputies in the 
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federal government than the Union Republics (Sheehy, 1991:67-77). This led to 
resentment among the different units of the federal system. 
 
Thirdly, the federal government remained committed to an approach of redistribution 
of resources from the centre and for affirmative action in promoting local 
intelligentsia in the ethnic-based republics. The redistributive approach made 
resources flow from the more developed parts such as Estonia, Latvia, Ukraine and 
metropolitan Russia to the less-developed republics, notably central Asia and the 
nationalities within the Russian empire. This also created resentment among the well-
developed republics. The affirmative action also encouraged the creation of local 
intelligentsia, but they still had less influence in the political processes of the 
Autonomous Regions compared to Russians. Russian appointees in the Autonomous 
Regions were more numerous than in Union Republics. This relationship also led to 
resentments in the Autonomous Regions (Smith, 1995; 159). 
 
Fourthly, all the relationships between the centre and the republics were controlled by 
the Socialist Party using a democratic centralist approach to governance. Accordingly, 
the party followed a top-down approach and took loyalty to socialism and the 
Socialist Party as major criteria in assigning people to different party and 
governmental posts. This made the party dependent on local cadres in its relationship 
with the republics. Hence, the ruling party lost touch with and control of the local 
population. On the other hand, the local cadres developed their vested interests and 
later became the main mobilisers of the ethnic groups against the centre during the 
disintegration of the regime (Smith, 1995, Pearson, 1991). 
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Finally, the economic progress achieved in the early period of the socialist system 
could not continue due to the control from above and decline in productivity of the 
major sectors of the economy during the 1970s and 80s. As a result, the demand of the 
general public for social services became higher than the country could provide. The 
party leaders introduced economic and political liberalisation in 1989, which was 
commonly known as Perestroika glasnost, but led to the collapse of system (Smith, 
1995:9-10). 
 
This brief analysis of the Soviet federation demonstrates that the extent to which the 
ethnic-based federal arrangement became a challenge in holding the constituent units 
of the Soviet federation together. Therefore, this casts doubt on whether an ethnic-
based federalism can be a viable approach to conflict management in multi-ethnic 
African countries like Ethiopia. In addition, the analysis shows that the centralised 
approach of governance conflicted with the interests of ethnic-based elite groups, 
which required a wider participation at all levels of the institutions of governance. 
Therefore, in a situation where there is an ethnic-based federalism and a centralised 
approach by the ruling party, the vulnerability of the system to violent conflict and 
disintegration could increase, as happened in the Soviet Union after 70 years of rule 
by the Communist Party (Watts, 2008). 
 
The second example of ethnic-based federalism is the Belgian federation. Belgium is 
a small country with 10 million inhabitants. Religious and language differences have 
played significant roles in shaping the political process since the country was 
established as a unitary state in1830. (Deschouwer, 2005:50). For example, the people 
in the southern part are predominantly Catholic where as the people in the north are 
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Protestant. Similarly, roughly 60% of Belgians speak Dutch, 40% speak French and 
0.6% speak German. More or less, the people have their own residential regions; the 
Dutch in the north and the French in the south, except for the capital city, Brussels, 
where both the Dutch and French live together (although 80% of the city population 
are French-speaking). Therefore, unlike the Soviet Union, Belgium is a bipolar 
country composed of mainly French- and Dutch-speaking people. 
 
When the unitary state was established, the French-speaking people, who were also 
economically stronger than the Dutch, played a dominant role and French became the 
official language of the country. The Dutch people, however, complained about the 
status of their language and, as a result, the Dutch language also became an official 
language in 1898 (Hooghe, 2004:58; Deschouwer, 2005:50). Furthermore, ethnic 
tensions between Dutch- and French-speaking people led to divisions of the national 
political parties along ethnic lines in 1930 and demarcations of common borders 
between the main ethnic groups in 1963. Finally, the country became officially a 
federal state through further devolution of power along ethnic lines in 1993 (ibid). 
This shows that ethnic-based federalism came gradually through dialogue and co-
operation between the main ethnic groups as a means of comprehensive conflict 
management. 
 
Unlike the Soviet federation, the Belgium federation introduced some mechanisms 
that reduced the negative consequences of the ethnic-based federal arrangement. For 
example, Brussels became a regional state and the Dutch people in Brussels 
maintained proportional representation in the state, although they were only around 20 
percent of the city‟s population. Attention was also given to co-operative mechanisms 
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that did not give any of the ethnic groups a minority status in the institutions of the 
federal state. For example, all the main ethnic groups have equal representation in the 
federal cabinet, including a veto power. This kind of power allocation reinforced 
vertical and horizontal co-operation and negotiations between the political authorities 
of the country. The result was that self-rule of ethnic groups in their regions and equal 
participation in federal institutions played a role in holding together those groups 
under the Belgian federation (Hooghe, 2004). 
 
Nevertheless, the ethnic-based federalism of Belgium has faced several challenges. 
The tensions between the ethnic groups tore apart the national political parties and left 
the country without any federal political parties. It also led to separation of the media 
and other economic and social activities. Ethnic-based violent conflicts also erupted 
periodically until the 1980s, associated with religious, social and economic factors 
(Hooghe, 2004:70-75). The problems between the main ethnic groups have also led to 
failures of governments and untimely elections; indeed the country has been under a 
caretaker government since June 2010 (The Economist, 13
th
 January 2011). 
 
The above brief analysis of the Belgium federation highlights three major points. First, 
ethnic-based federalism was introduced gradually with some mitigation mechanisms 
that protected minority rights, unlike the former Soviet Union. Because of this, the 
federal arrangement contributed to a reduction in ethnic tensions that might have led 
to disintegration of the federation. Second, there is no centralised approach to 
governance like the Soviet party system. Rather, the regional political parties take 
measures for co-operation and negotiation at the federal level. This has played a 
significant role in holding the regions together. Third, regardless of the above 
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advantages, the cost of the ethnic-based federalism is still high and has led to failure 
of governments which, in turn, has been related to the existence of bipolar ethnic 
groups in the country. 
 
Overall, some common characteristics of ethnic-federal states can be identified from 
the analysis of the Soviet and Belgian federations. The politicisation of linguistic or 
ethnic identity has almost always strengthened sharply the forces of territorial groups 
and, hence, has resulted in greater pressures for autonomy of the constituent units. As 
a result, there is a high degree of asymmetric relationship between regional parties 
and their federal counterparts in many multi-ethnic federal states. This sometimes 
leads not only to inter-communal tensions but also to competition over resources and 
grievances which, in one way or another, have the potential to mobilise individuals 
behind calls for more redistribution of power and resources (Smith, 1995:10).  For 
example, although the regions of Belgium have greater autonomy in their regional 
affairs, there are still demands for more decentralisation of more powers. In the 
former Soviet Union, the Autonomous Republics also increased from four in 1924 to 
15 by 1977 due to the pressure for more autonomy (Pearson, 1991:31). Similarly, the 
federations of Canada, India, Nigeria and Switzerland have been forced to devolve 
powers along ethnic lines following the politicisation of ethnicity (Watts, 1991:200). 
 
The federalisation of the state on the basis of ethnicity can also fuel a single 
hegemonic cultural dominance in one region, which could be problematic to some 
groups who live in that regional state. This could be manifested, for example, in 
relation to public education, language etc. This could also lead to an attempt at 
drawing common borders between the ethnic groups, which in turn could be 
 43 
manifested in land claims and counter-claims. This process caused violent ethnic 
cleansing conflicts and displacements of more than 800,000 people during the 
balkanisation of the former Soviet Union republics (Watts, 1991:200). 
 
Disparity in the relative area, population and wealth of the consistent units is also a 
characteristic of multi-ethnic federations. For example, the existence of RSFSR, 
which included more than 51% of the population and 80 % of the former Soviet 
Union territory, caused a continuation of Russian domination. Similarly, the Dutch-
speaking region and its economic strength compared to the French-speaking region 
has created stress in the Belgian federation. The greater size of the Northern Nigeria 
region also led to its division into a number of states. These kinds of differences 
between consistent units can lead to relationships between the centre and periphery 
that can potentially damage the federation itself (Watts, 1991). 
 
The politics of uneven development is another problem in multi-ethnic federal states. 
Both developed and underdeveloped regional states could feel as though they were 
not benefiting from the federation for different reasons. For example, the more 
developed regional states can feel they were disproportionately subsidising the less 
developed states. The Baltic and Russian states opposed the redistribution of 
resources from the centre for to this reason. However, less developed regional states 
can be mobilised against the centre if the development disparity among the constituent 
units is high. This has been a source of conflict in the Niger Delta areas of Nigeria and 
the constituent units of Canada (Smith, 1995; Watts, 1991). 
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The above common characteristics of multiethnic federations indicate that a number 
of factors, including a strong federal state and an increased level of autonomy with 
greater democratic participation by the regional states, are required to use federalism 
as a conflict management approach in multiethnic countries like Ethiopia. These will 
be discussed in the subsequent sections of this chapter. 
 
Contextualising the Challenges of Federalism: Causes of Conflicts in Africa 
Conflict is inherent in human societies and comprises different levels of social 
interaction
4
.  The term conflict, in its logical sense, is defined as a relationship 
between two or more parties who have or think they have incompatible goals (Fisher 
et al, 2000:4; Ramsbotham, et al, 2005). Incompatible goals can result from different 
interests, values or beliefs (ideology and religion) as well as the directions used by the 
conflicting parties to manage their differences (Bono, 1985:5; Wright, 1990:16-17). 
Social conflicts arising from imbalances of social structure, including unequal social 
status, unequal wealth, lack of access and oppression, create antagonistic social 
relations that can lead either to constructive or destructive outcomes (Dahrendorf, 
1957, in Jeong, 1999:5; Kriesberg, 1998:22). 
 
The direction of social conflicts depends on the attitude, perceptions and 
misperceptions of the conflicting parties, and on behaviour of the opposing parties 
that include cooperation or coercion, gestures signifying conciliation or hostility. 
Galtung (1996) sees social conflict as a dynamic process in which structure, attitudes 
and behaviour are constantly changing and influencing one another. Therefore, social 
                                                 
4
 These could be macro-level conflicts that embrace inter-state conflicts, such as border disputes 
between two countries, or intra-state conflicts, for example power- and resource-based conflicts 
between different groups of people within the territories of a state. Conflicts can also be micro-level 
conflicts, including personal and corporate-level conflicts (Scherrer, 1999:53). 
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conflicts can be at a latent stage of development, inthat expressing themselves in an 
observable manner, even for the parties themselves. They can be at manifest level 
developing to the extent that they are observable but not yet expressed in a violent 
manner. Violent conflicts are those escalating from a manifest level of expression to 
the destruction of resources and others (Sandole, 2003:40).  
 
Social conflicts can be identified as global, regional or national. The global conflicts 
can be related to wealth disparities, economic barriers and ideological struggles driven 
mainly by religious fundamentalism. The regional sources of social conflicts are 
related to the overspill of conflicts from one area to another, like the Great Lakes 
region, characterised by identity/secession conflicts and refugee movements 
(Ramsbotham et al., 2005:98). State level social conflicts are related to social, 
economic and political structures like ethnicity, class, religion, economic 
underdevelopment, legitimacy of a state, and law and order within a country 
(Kupchan, 2001). 
  
Earlier commentators regarded the sources of conflicts in Africa as merely tribal-, 
ethnic- or identity-based (Lewis, 1994; Horowitz, 1985, Osaghae, 1991). Others also 
associated them only with competition for power, resources of the neo-patrimonial 
state and representation at the state level (Braathen etal, 2000). However, the causes 
of the conflicts in Africa can be traced back to historical, economic and political 
factors associated with the colonial, Cold War and post-Cold War periods (Joseph, 
1999), uneven levels of development, crises of state formation and territorial factors.  
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The Colonial Rule and Intra-state conflict 
The colonial rulers imposed the Westphalian state system on African countries 
(except Ethiopia, which was occupied by Italy for about five years during the Second 
World War and Liberia). Although a state system was not new to African countries, 
the colonial administrative boundaries that cut across ethnic, tribal, religious and 
linguistic ties had a devastating political effect because they disrupted the pre-colonial 
affinities and loyalties (Francis, 2006:41). Thus, different communities of varying 
cultures and traditions came into a single state arena. This contributed to the low 
cohesiveness of the people and intra-state conflicts in some independent African 
countries (Emerson, 1963:97). Moreover, according to Ayoob (1995), colonial rule 
delayed the African economic transformation process because the economies of the 
countries were structured to supply cash crops and natural resources to the economies 
of the colonial powers. As a result, when these countries got their independence, some 
of them were only quasi- or weak states that did not have the capacity to control their 
borders or provide social services and security for their people (Joseph, 1999; 
Mamandi, 1996). 
 
The indirect rule established by the colonial states also became one of the sources of 
intra-state conflict. Indirect rule was a form of colonial governance that involved the 
local chiefs and tribe leaders in governing the local people or tribes using customary 
laws. As a result, the indirect rule became a source of intra-state conflicts. Firstly, the 
colonial powers did not create a unified law in their colonies. This means there were 
two kinds of laws operating in these countries: civil law in the urban areas and 
customary laws in the rural areas. According to Mamandi (1996) this dual system 
created divisions between rural and urban areas, which emphasised customary and 
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civic rights, respectively. Moreover, the two forms of laws became challenges to the 
post-colonial state because they had to compete with the traditional authorities to 
maintain their legitimacy. In fact, this competition became one of the contributing 
factors in insurgent activities and state suppression of them, which in some African 
countries led to state collapse (Francis, 2006).  
 
Secondly, the African independent states inherited control-based institutions, as the 
purpose of indirect rule was to control African societies. The post-colonial state also 
became control-based and the colonial institutions such as parliament, political parties 
and bureaucracy failed to operate in the context of the African countries which, in 
turn, led to the establishment of personalised rule rather than institutionalised rule. 
Personalised political rule was based on patron-client networks and patrimonial 
accumulations, which depended on military and security institutions to sustain the 
power of the authorities (Jackson and Rosberg, 1982). This, in turn, encouraged both 
elite-based rivalry for control of the state and other movements to fight for equal 
rights, which led to violent conflict and state collapse. 
 
 Thirdly, the indirect rule of some colonial states also became a potential source of 
intra-state conflicts by creating favoured and disfavoured groups (Smith, 1971). For 
example, the French favoured the Tutsi ethnic group in Rwanda in aspects such as 
education and employment. The British supported the Tanzanian Christian minorities 
over the Muslems in education and other matters (M. Tripp, 1999). In Uganda, the 
colonial power favoured the Buganda people, granting them power and control over 
land at the expense of other ethnic groups. This created the basis for ethnic 
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domination and inter-group rivalries in these countries (Stewart et al, cited in 
Grandvoinnet and Schneider, 1998:14). 
 
In Ethiopia, unlike other African countries, modern state institutions were established 
by the political elites from inside, but were imposed by force on the newly 
incorporated Southern and Western parts of the country. But, like other independent 
African countries, the centralisation of power and control of power and resources by 
one politically dominant ethnic group became a factor in the low levels of integration 
between the country‟s ethnic groups during the 20th century. This is discussed in 
detail in Chapter Three. 
 
Overall, the colonial nation-state in Africa made little contribution to integrating rural 
people but rather created the potential for ethnic domination, ethnic-based power 
struggle and ethno-national movements that contributed to the existence of 
communities with low cohesion within one state arena. 
 
State Power Relationships and Intra-state Conflicts 
At independence, African states chose a centralised system of governance for a 
variety of reasons. Firstly, as discussed earlier, almost all the newly-independent 
countries inherited a centralised colonial state. Secondly, the independent states 
considered the centralised approach as a means of social cohesion or unity as they 
inherited different identity groups
5
. Therefore, many countries abandoned the 
                                                 
5
 For example, Se‟kou Toure‟ said in 1959: „In three or four years, no one will remember the tribal, 
ethnic religious rivalries which in the recent past caused so much damage to our country and its 
population‟ (Emerson: 1963: 106). 
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customary laws and introduced centralised administrative systems. This was 
supported by the economic argument that African countries could not support a 
decentralised state structure (Thomson, 2000:108-113). Thirdly, the ideology of 
nationalism also helped to support, strengthen and legitimise the centralised and 
dominant role of the state. The promotion of African unity through the Pan-African 
movements equally contributed to the centralised approach to governance after 
independence in many countries (Stewart and Brown, 2007). 
 
The centralised state structure contributed to the exclusion or under-representation of 
groups within the political structure of some states, including powers at the top 
(parliamentary assemblies, presidency, cabinet), at lower levels (local government), in 
the bureaucracy at all levels, and in the army and the police (Stewart and Brown, 2007: 
223). This exposed the state to clientalist networks and corruption that only benefited 
people in the circle of the rulers and usually only those from one ethnic group (Ndulo, 
2006:85; Dawyer, 2002:459). This has become a motivating factor for the elite 
political leaders driven by economic interests and power struggles to control the state 
(Bloomfield et al, 1998:36).  For this purpose, some political leaders used mass media 
for propaganda against other ethnic groups in order to gain political advantage and 
created ethnic mobilisations where there are inequalities and problematic group 
histories (Brown, 1998:21; Stein, 2001:195-196). On the other hand, this has 
contributed to sustained government campaigns to repress ethnic minorities and 
democratic activities, as happened in Sudan, Rwanda, Burundi, Kenya and Nigeria 
before and after the cold war (Brown, 2001:221). 
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The centralisation of the state was also associated with cultural oppression of the 
ethnic groups. Many African nation-states adopted assimilatory domestic policies and 
cultural discrimination, which include inequitable educational opportunities, legal and 
political constraints on the use and teaching of mass languages, and constraints on 
religious freedom. For example, in Sudan the Arab language and culture was the 
driving force for nation-building. This was followed by genocide in the southern 
region of Sudan in 1982 when the homogenisation policy faced opposition from the 
people in the region (Markakis, 1994). In Ethiopia the language of the Amhara and 
Christianity became the dominant state sponsored language and religion respectively 
(Clapham, 1987). “No other indigenous language was allowed to be printed, broadcast 
or spoken in public functions, and attempts to study the culture and history of other 
groups were decidedly discouraged” (Markakis, 1994:226).  
 
 The democratisation process in Africa and the introduction of electoral systems to the 
multi-ethnic countries transiting to democracy has aggravated conflicts. This is 
because the power of mass groups has not yet been institutionalised in the countries 
transiting to democracy. Therefore, the support of the elite groups includes hostilities 
which make   the countries vulnerable to conflicts. As a result, regime changes and 
particularly the introduction of electoral systems to multi-ethnic countries transiting to 
democracy can cause conflicts due to the low level of political cohesion of the ethnic 
groups and the politicisation of ethnicity by the elite groups (Edward and Manisfield, 
1995). For example, the ethnic clashes which occurred in the Rift valley region of 
Kenya in the 1992 election took the lives of 1,500 people and displaced more than 
350,000 people from their homes (Young, 1999:28). Similar conflicts have also 
occurred along communal lines in Rwanda, Burundi, Algeria and Congo-Brazaaville 
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during elections in the 1990s (Young, 1999:29). According to Young (1999), the 
salience to ethnicity by African governments poses a clear challenge to the 
democratisation process in Africa. If there is thoughtful statecraft which enabled 
states to accommodate ethnic identity, that would help in strengthening the 
democratisation process on the continent. 
 
 In Ethiopia, the introduction of the democratisation process is associated with 
collapse of the military regime and the federalisation of the state. The federalisation of 
the state enabled the country to remove the structural sources of the previous conflicts 
that led to ethno-national movements (Young, 1999:31). However, the federal 
structure has brought new forms of power- and resource - related conflicts. These can 
be seen in the relationship between the centre and the regional states and between the 
regional states. Moreover, the existence of a multi-party system dominated by one 
political party also makes the power relationship between the ethnic groups and the 
democratisation process complex in the country (Aalen, 2002). 
 
In summary, one of the sources of intra-state conflict in Africa is the centralisation of 
the state which has led to domination and exclusion of ethnic groups from the benefits 
of the state, and the weakening of the state associated with the democratisation 
process on the continent. 
 
Uneven Development and Intra-state Conflicts 
In many African countries, uneven development is merely a result of the divide and 
rule methods of the colonial powers. For example, during the colonial period 
development efforts and urbanisation were suppressed in favour of cash crop 
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production and mining. Infrastructure developments and social services were also 
focused towards these (Keen, 2005). The colonial states had no motivation to expand 
infrastructure and education that could enhance the cohesiveness of the people. For 
example, Tanzania, when it became independent, had less than one hundred university 
graduates, approximately 200 miles of tarmac road and six factories, including only 
one that employed as many as 50 persons. Guinea-Bissau had 14 university graduates 
and an illiteracy rate of 97% when the country got its independence from Portugal 
(Ayittey, 2005:83).  
 
However, colonialism is not only to be blamed for the uneven development of the 
African countries. Control of the state by minority elites has also served to strengthen 
uneven development after the independence of many countries. For example, in Sierra 
Leone, the chiefs, civil servants and traders, who had better access to the state system, 
controlled the diamond mining licenses given by the government. Therefore, revenues 
went into the pockets of the elites who controlled the state (Keen, 2005:22). In the 
Horn of Africa development activities have been centred in urban areas and those 
favourable for building production capacity. Regions like Southern and Western 
Sudan, Northern Kenya, Northern Somalia, Ogaden, Tigray etc were left out of state 
development activities. Hence, the main rebellion movements until the end of the cold 
war were in these regions (Markakis, 1994).  
 
However, there are some disagreements about the relationship between uneven 
development and intra-state conflicts. Following the instrumentalist approach to intra-
state conflicts, Collier (2001) argues that grievances created due to uneven economic 
development and other inequalities are not the real causes of civil war. Civil wars 
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occur where rebel organisations, whose aim is to control state power for the purpose 
of getting access to public resources, are financially able to go to war.  Therefore, the 
leaders of most rebellions do not have any political agenda. Their agenda is looting 
the resources of the state and enriching themselves and their followers.  However, 
they develop discourses of grievances that aim to persuade their supporters and allow 
them to function as rebel organisations. It is the aims of their leaders that generate 
grievance. In other words the real cause of most rebellions is not the loud discourse of 
grievance, but the silent voice of greed. It is because of this that countries such as 
Sierra Leone, Liberia, Angola and Sudan, which depend on exporting primary goods 
and have many young men with little educational access, are very much more at risk 
of conflict than other countries (Collier,2001:150-152). 
 
On the other hand, Ted Robert Gurr (2001; 2007) and Stewart & Brown (2007) argue 
that this economically focused argument totally dismisses the fundamental grievances 
such as socio-economic inequality and political repression against ethnic groups. 
These inequalities are multidimensional and involve economic, social, political and 
cultural aspects 
6
(Stewart, 2008). The economic aspect includes income, access to 
employment and a variety of assets such as land and credit. Social inequalities also 
include access to services (e.g. health care, water, and education), assets (housing), etc. 
This can occur between regions, like the Tamil region as opposed to the rest of Sri 
Lanka, or between different identities within the same region of a country, as in 
Rwanda or Uganda (Stewart and Brown, 2007:221). Economic and social inequalities 
provide the conditions that lead to dissatisfaction among the general population and 
                                                 
6
 Stewart, F. (ed.) (2008) categorises the fundamental socio-economic grievances as Horizontal 
Inequalities. For further information, see Horizontal Inequalities and Conflict: Understanding Group 
Violence in Multiethnic societies. 
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consequently give rise to the possibility of political mobilisation (Stewart and Brown, 
2007; 223).  
 
 In some cases there can be conflicts motivated by private economic interests which 
can sustain wars, but this rarely explains intra-state conflicts. For example, the anti-
apartheid struggle in South Africa was solely against racism. The RENAMO struggle 
against the authoritarian regime in Mozambique, which was associated with different 
political, social and economic factors, cannot be explained by greed interests of its 
leaders (Gurr, 2001).  
 
In addition, there is no single explanatory factor for conflicts. More usually conflicts 
involve relationships between different factors and emanate from diverse sources 
(Keen, 2005, Francis, 2006). For example, economic inequalities are created by 
historical development patterns. For instance, since independence Southern Sudan has 
received few government services and has a poor infrastructure compared to the 
northern part of the country. Hence the acute poverty of the south compared with the 
north, as well as the feeling that the northern-based government was exploiting the 
southern region‟s resources, without any return to the region, contributed to the 
outbreak of conflict in 1983 (Markakis,1994). Similarly, conflicts between the Tutsi 
and Hutu in Rwanda are partly explained by the structural deprivations of the Hutus 
during the colonial period and the failed development policies pursued in the decades 
before the genocide in 1994 (Goodhand, 2001:24). 
 
Unemployment and lack of capacity to provide social services can also lead to intra-
state conflicts. When the government is unable to provide the necessary social 
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services and is unable to create employment opportunities, intra-state conflicts can 
intensify. In Sierra Leone, many youths joined the rebellion due to lack of 
employment (Keen, 1998). Yet, this does not mean that economic growth is a 
sufficient condition for managing intra-state conflicts. Regardless of the overall 
improvement of the economic picture of a country, if economic growth and 
development benefits some individuals, groups, and regions more than the others, the 
growing inequalities and gaps can still aggravate intra-state tensions (Brown, 
2001:271). Overall, uneven development in which the main manifestation is 
unbalanced resource sharing between ethnic groups can lead to intra-state conflicts. 
 
Territorial Demands and Intra-state Conflicts 
Among others, one of the issues related to intra-state conflict is territorial issues 
between the ethnic groups in a country. Territoriality refers to an „attempt to affect, 
influence or control actions by enforcing control over a specific geographical area‟ 
(Forsberg, 1999:93). Generally speaking, there are four interrelated factors that can 
cause territorial demands and conflicts (Thomas Homer Dixon cited in Hauge, 1999; 
108).  First, territorial conflicts can be caused by the degradation and depletion of 
renewable resources that result in a struggle over access to and control of natural 
resources. For example, resource scarcity has become one of the main reasons for the 
conflict of pastoral people when they move from one area to another looking for water 
and grazing land for their animal stocks in the Horn of Africa (Markakis, 1987).  
However, Broding (1998:36) argues that there is no simple causal relationship 
between scarcity of natural resources and intra-state conflicts. Other variables, 
including socio-economic factors, political institutions, and psychological factors 
mediate the relationship (Iyob and Khadiagala, 2005).  In addition, it can be argued 
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that the role of environmental factors in intra-state conflicts is situational. In situations 
of cooperation and negotiation between the ethnic groups, solutions to environmental 
problems are good, but when the relations are reversed, environmental issues will add 
to the problems created (Gleditsch, 2001:60).  
 
The second factor is connected to local people‟s perceptions of internal migrants to 
their territories. For some indigenous groups whose traditions are associated with their 
territories, the existence of a large population of migrants and settlers in their 
territories can lead to greater resentments that lead to intra-state conflicts (Forsberg, 
1999:98). For example, for the Gumuz whose livelihood is associated with their 
territories, the risk of internal migration is related to an outnumbering of the Gumuz 
by the settlers, which could lead to cultural genocide and being dominated in their 
territories (Vaughan, 2007). Therefore, these kinds of territorial issues can also lead to 
intra-state conflicts. 
 
Third, territoriality can sometimes also relate to an assertion about rights to the land. 
Territoriality can be a symbol for social kinship and an inseparable part of the 
common ethnic identity. In such situations if there is an external threat to part of the 
territory, it reinforces the collective identity of the group (ibid). Therefore, identity 
itself can contribute to territorial conflicts in this regard (Smith cited in Forsberg, 
1999:98; Ronnquist, 1999:148). 
 
Finally, territorial conflicts can involve an aspiration of domination. One of the ethnic 
groups in a country could have a growing tendency to dominate in the region and 
expand its territories into the territories of others. In this case, the territorial issues will 
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be related to power politics which include enlargement of economic assets (Forsberg, 
1999:101). 
 
 Federalism and Conflict Management 
The management of conflicts requires a deep understanding of the context and causes 
as well as a willingness to manage them. Conflict management is a pragmatic way of 
dealing with sources of conflict, including alterations to social policies generating 
violent conflicts by promoting positive behavioural changes by the parties involved 
(Burton, 1996:11; Fisher, et al., 2000:6-7). In other words, conflict management is a 
generic term, similar to conflict regulation, covering all forms of conflict intervention 
including conflict prevention, conflict resolution and conflict transformation (Miall et 
al, 1999).  
 
 Accordingly, federalism as a comprehensive approach to conflict management 
focuses on regulating the differences between the ethnic groups in a country by 
accommodating them equally in the federal political institutions and devolving power 
and resources according to their situations. In addition, it uses conflict prevention 
mechanisms which focus on preventing social conflicts from escalating to violence 
by taking measures in the long run which address the basic causes of conflict such as 
poverty and other structural factors. In addition, early warning mechanisms and rapid 
reaction capacity mechanisms can be used and co-operative mechanisms between the 
constituent units of the federation can be incorporated (Botes, 2008). Conflict 
transformation also addresses the long term structural relations and cultural factors 
behind violence and social conflict. Therefore, conflict transformation focuses on 
addressing deep-rooted causes of conflicts such as uneven development, power 
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relationships between the ethnic groups etc (Botes, 2008). These are basically 
systemic causes of conflicts which cannot be resolved but, rather, transformed in the 
federal process. Therefore, conflict transformation goes beyond conflict resolution in 
providing a deeper and more permanent level of change. On the other hand, conflict 
resolution deals more with the dynamics of the conflict itself than with that of the 
system, as for example, in resolving specific conflicts between two ethnic groups or 
regional states. However, Mitchell (cited in Botes, 2008:364-365) in this regard 
arguing that conflict resolution not only examines the parties‟ needs and options to 
resolve the specific conflicts, but also produces changes in pre-existing systems and 
patterns of relationships. In the context of this study we will use federalism as a 
generic approach of conflict management which addresses the basic causes of social 
conflicts by means of conflict prevention, transformation and resolution, but we are 
also cautious about the differences between the different aspects of conflict 
intervention in analysing the specific issues of the research project.  
 
A federal system will inherently generate conflicts. The distribution of power between 
and within levels of government provides a catalyst for conflict. Federalism as a 
generic approach to conflict management might have different effects on the 
transitional process of establishing the federal structure and on the established 
structure. For example, a transitional period to federalism which came after a 
protracted violent conflict could focus on conflict resolution, enabling the conflicting 
parties to come to a round table for negotiation. For instance, the initial assumption of 
the Soviet federal system was to bring the different republics together and, finally, 
create a general environment which overcame the barriers of ethnic nationalism 
through proletarian internationalism.  Therefore, the recognition of the right of self-
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determination contributed to bringing some republics voluntarily to the Union. 
Nevertheless, once the Union was established, the right of self-determination was not 
genuinely implemented due to the democratic centralist approach of the Bolshevik 
party. Therefore, the federal arrangement itself facilitated the disintegration of the 
Union.  
  
A federal arrangement as a generic conflict management approach might have some 
problems which commonly arise from the design of the system. For example, the 
asymmetrical four tiers of the Soviet Union served to increase grievances among the 
nationalities, which resulted in defragmentation of the republics as discussed earlier. 
Border demarcations on the basis of ethnicity also created minority groups and 
tensions between the ethnic groups of the former Soviet Union. The ethnic basis of 
the federation also created „centre‟ and „periphery‟ relationships as it created bigger 
republics on the one hand and tiny republics on the other. Therefore, the design of the 
federal system created a systemic problem which became one of the causes of the 
disintegration of the federation itself. However, although the Belgian federal system is 
based on ethnicity, the system designed-in some mitigation mechanisms which have 
reduced the negative consequences of the federation. For example, strong mechanisms 
for co-operation were established in the federal institutions, which enable the ethnic 
groups to co-operate and negotiate at the centre. Hence, regardless of some of the 
setbacks of the federation, these mechanisms of conflict management have become 
the main reasons for the sustainability of the system (Hooghe, 2004). 
 
Moreover, the federal system has to be examined in relation to the overall ability of 
the political actors to influence the federal process. This can be related to the capacity 
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of the key actors to ignore or undermine due processes in the federal structure. For 
example, regardless of the constitutional recognition of people‟s rights, dominant 
political groups can ignore those rights and impose their will on people, as happened 
in the former Soviet Union due to the centralised rule of the Communist Party. Or it 
can be related to the ambiguities or scope for self-interpretation in the federal rules, 
and from the operation of specific federal rules and mechanisms. For example, an 
ambiguity in a federal constitution can give opportunities for different interpretations 
which can lead to conflict between the protection of group rights and the universal 
political rights of citizens, as happened in the relationship between the indigenous and 
non-indigenous people of Benishangul-Gumuz regional state. This is discussed in 
Chapter Seven. 
 
Considering the above points, ethnic-based federalism as a comprehensive approach 
to conflict management can be discussed in relation to power relationships between 
the centre and regional states, resource-sharing mechanisms and democratic 
governance in the context of African multi-ethnic countries. 
 
Federalism and Power Relationships between the Centre and Regional States 
The power relationship between the centre and regional states has three aspects. The 
first aspect is related to the balance of power relationships between the different levels 
of the state. The relationship between the two levels of the state should keep a balance 
between their shared role at the centre and the autonomy of the regions. The 
devolution of authority outward to constituent units must be accompanied by reform 
of national institutions to accommodate ethnic groups and their influence on decisions 
at the centre (Simeon, 2004:118). For example, Belgian regions can protect their 
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interests in decisions made at the cabinet of Ministers and through the Senate 
discussions (Hooghe, 2004:75). Otherwise, conflicts can be intensified due to the low 
involvement of the constituent units in the national institutions (Fliner, 2001:34; 
Simeon and Murray, 2004:280). For example, the highly centralised oil revenue 
system and the lack of transparency in the distribution of those revenues contributed 
to the violent ethnic conflict in Nigeria (Suberu, 2004). 
 
With regard to the autonomy of the regional states, there are two broad models. The 
first one is the integrated model that emphasizes the uniformity of policies across the 
regions through the shared decisions made at the centre. This model maximizes the 
uniformity and application of national norms and standards across all the regions in a 
country although it can negatively influence regional autonomy and the flexibility of 
regional states to meet local needs (Simeon and Murray, 2004; Opeskin, 2001). The 
second model, the divided governance model, focuses on the autonomy of the regions 
and provides the widest room for the regions to set their own priorities and variations 
in regional policy. This model can facilitate accountability and transparency for 
citizens, but can also create some difficulties in ensuring common standards and 
policy harmonization at the national level (Opeskin, 2001).   In addition it can lead to 
formation of more regions and local governments, which in turn leads to segmenting 
or compartmentalizing of political functions and to mass interlocking bureaucracies or 
intergovernmental organisations. This can undermine the development process by 
creating expensive, less transparent and less accountable government. In situations 
where there are no corrective measures, power devolution through federalism can 
increase economic imbalances and migration in a country. Such problems should be 
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corrected by the constitution and intergovernmental relations (Wibbels, 2005; Ndulo, 
2006:82-83).  
 
 The second aspect of power relationship between the centre and regional states is 
related to border demarcations of the regional states. In countries where the ethnic 
groups have their own residential territories, administrative border issues between two 
or more ethnic groups can be raised in the distribution of power and resources to the 
regional states and local administrations. There are two broad approaches to 
addressing these issues. The first one is dispersing the ethnic groups into different 
administrative units. This means an ethnic group can be dispersed into different 
administrative units in which the regional states will be established from the multi 
units of the ethnic groups. Nigeria‟s regional states were established according to this 
formula. The assumption is that, if a regional state is established from different units 
of ethnic groups, tensions and polarisation between the bigger ethnic groups and the 
regional states can be reduced (Horowitz, 1985, (Elazar, 1994:56). 
 
 Yet it is argued that, regardless of the separation of the administrative units, the 
bigger ethnic groups could still mobilise the units in the different administrative 
regional states in competing with other ethnic groups to control state power at the 
centre. For example, the three largest ethnic groups in Nigeria compete with each 
other to expand their control at the centre, regardless of the distribution of their units 
in different regional states (Suberu, 1994:56). 
 
The second approach is where the administrative regional states are established on the 
basis of residential territories of the ethnic groups in a country. Switzerland, India and 
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Ethiopia are examples of this approach. For example, the Swiss people live in 
different cantons, which can be distinguished by language differences. Therefore, the 
Swiss federal constitution devolves power and shares resources to the cantons. 
Similarly, in India, language has been taken as one of the main factors in separating 
the administrative units of the country since 1957 (Kohli, 2004). However, the 
regional states are obliged to respect the rights of the minority groups who are living 
intermingled with the majority ethnic group. Moreover, the Indian government has a 
special law and a higher commission with the aim of maintaining minority groups‟ 
rights (Mitra, 2001:51-60).  
 
Ethnic identity has also been taken as the main criterion to define the lower and 
regional administrative units in Ethiopia (Kefale, 2004:51). Hence, as long as the 
members of an ethnic group have common residential territory and the population of 
the group is large enough, the ethnic group can establish its own administrative unit. 
However, at the regional state level, the ethnic group can either establish its own 
regional state or it can be part of a regional state comprising different ethnic groups. 
This depends on the population size of the ethnic groups, consent and geographical 
factors (The Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Article 46). 
 
The use of group identity to distinguish the administrative units has its own 
advantages and disadvantages. With respect to the advantages, it encourages people to 
participate in their local affairs and widens their opportunity to get access to 
government (Hardgrave, 1994:76). The disadvantage is that it can encourage the 
proliferation of more local states, which in turn discourages people‟s movement from 
one administrative unit into another (Ibid). Moreover, it can be problematic to identify 
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the administrative borders of the ethnic groups where two or more ethnic groups 
overlap each other and identities are mixed as a result of intermarriage (Kefale, 
2004:62).  Therefore, it can be one of the sources of tensions and ethnic cleansing as 
happened during the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
 
 The third aspect of the power relationship between the centre and regional states is 
related to a constitutional right of secession for the identity groups in a country. In this 
regard, there can be two types of constitutional right. The first one can be a kind of 
confederate constitution that brings different entities to a common market, like the 
European Union. This is a loose federation, as the members are considered as 
sovereign entities that can secede without any precondition (Elazar, 1994:22). The 
second issue is related to a constitution that devolves power to constituent units, 
which are considered as parts of the nation. In this case, the constitution will serve as 
a supra-national of the nation-state that will represent the nation (Eriksen, 2002). At 
the same time, the federal constitution redefines the nation-state in a way that 
accommodates the different groups in a country. Therefore, the constitution devolves 
power and shares resources among the groups in a country, enabling them to 
administer their internal affairs and participate equally in the federal institutions 
(Fleiner, 2001:34). 
 
Based on the above points, the inclusion of a right of secession in the federal 
constitution makes it controversial. Some liberalists support the right of secession 
from the point of view of government legitimacy and consent of the people. In other 
words, the legitimacy of a government must be based upon the consent of the people, 
and if the people are going to control their destiny, they should have a right to 
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withdraw their consent from the nation-state. Moreover, it is argued that the right of 
secession may be useful to restore identity groups‟ confidence in their relationships 
with each other, as it shows them that they have the right to withdraw from the 
federation when necessary (Turk, 1999:115; Neuberger,1995).  
 
On the other hand, there are some scholars who totally oppose the constitutional right 
for secession in a federalised state (Sisk, 2001; Fleiner, 2001; Diamond and Plattner, 
1994). It is argued that the very principle of a democratic federalised state is 
accommodation and tolerance. As long as the constitution guarantees the right of self-
determination, groups can exercise their group rights in their respective regional 
territories. At the same time, they can equally be represented in the federal institutions. 
Also, if the worst comes, a democratic state can hold a referendum without resorting 
to violence (Neuberger, 1995). 
 
Moreover, the right of secession is very impracticable in countries that have many 
ethnic groups. In most cases, ethnic groups have smaller minority groups within their 
territories. Thus, their conflict with the majority will often end up by rearranging the 
patterns of majorities and minorities, generating new sources of social violence (Sisk, 
2001:788-789; Fleiner, 2001:39; Diamond and Plattner, 1994). Even if there is an 
attempt to secede, difficulties would arise in demarcation of borders, as happened in 
the Ethio-Eritrea border conflict in 1998, as there are hardly any pure ethnic 
homelands still existing (Weinstock, 2001:79-62). 
 
 
 
 66 
 Federalism and Resources Sharing Mechanisms 
An important issue relevant to federalism is resource sharing between the centre and 
the constituent units. It is argued that federalism provides a resource sharing 
mechanism which fosters equitable development by correcting economic inequalities 
through taxation and fiscal transfer methods (Weinstock; Boadway, 2001). The 
federal constitution can specify what is to be taxed by the federal and regional 
governments respectively. This gives regions opportunities to support their budgets 
from their own internal revenues. Resources can also be transferred from the 
wealthiest regions to the poorest regions through fiscal transfer methods. This will 
help the state to maintain a balanced development in all the regional states (Dahlby, 
2001). 
 
In introducing such policies, a number of factors have to be considered. The first 
factor is related to the tax policy of a country. In this case geographical variation of 
taxation and a need to reduce horizontal imbalances between the various regions of 
the country can be considered (Rye, 1995, cited in Ndulo, 2006:93). For example, if 
the federal government wants to transfer revenues from the wealthier regions to the 
poorer regions using fiscal transfer mechanisms, a high degree of control over 
taxation will be required (Dahlby, 2001). However, in countries whose natural 
resources come from only one region and where some regions provide a higher source 
of income for the federal government, conflicts can be started as the various regions 
want to use their resources exclusively for themselves (Weinstock, 2001:78). 
 
 However, many federal states across the world have found a relatively centralised tax 
system useful together with expenditure freedom for their constituent units. For 
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example, in Australia over 70% of tax revenue is collected by the federal government. 
In Belgium, Germany and the United States the regional states‟ tax revenue ranges 
between 40% and 50%; whereas in Canada and Switzerland the regional states levy 
more than half of the total government tax revenues (Dahlby, 2001:98). 
 
The second factor is connected with the structure of fiscal transfers that consider the 
inequalities and revenue generation differences between regions. This implies tied 
grants (specific purpose payments) or untied (general) grants. The objective of the 
specific purpose grants can be related to the objectives at national level. However, 
these specific purpose payments may not address the inequalities and revenue-raising 
capacity differences between regions. Therefore, any general grants should address 
both differences of inequality and revenue raising capacity in order to prevent 
potentially violent intra-state conflicts (Ndulo, 2006:93). In relation to this, targets 
and quotas can be introduced to educational and other infrastructure developments to 
assist disadvantaged groups in a country (Kincaid, 2001:92). 
 
The third factor is ensuring the viability of the above process by using transparent 
institutional mechanisms of fiscal transfer. In this regard, different countries use 
different mechanisms or formulae of revenue sharing, but most consider the 
development level of regions, population size and the role of the regions in generating 
revenue for the federal government (Boadway, 2001:105).   However, there is no 
standard institutional set-up of revenue sharing that can be applied to all federal states. 
Therefore, countries set up either independent commissions like the Australian Grants 
Commission or other departments which are monitored by parliaments. 
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The above analysis shows that federal countries use different resource sharing 
mechanisms in consideration of equity and efficiency. Accordingly, some countries 
emphasise equitable allocation of resources together with expenditure freedom for 
constituent units, whereas others emphasise efficiency; so that they focus on 
decentralisation of resources. Countries where economic disparities are high tend to 
give more emphasis to equity that leads to long-term benefits and stability, regardless 
of its short-term negative effect on regional autonomy (Aalen, 2002:17-18). Therefore, 
there is no one correct fiscal policy that suits all countries. However, the point  that 
can be emphasised  in this regard is that the constituent  units  should be guaranteed  
enough  financial sources through  constitutional or other means to  enable them  to  
carry out their responsibilities. 
 
Nevertheless, it can be argued that federalism in Sub-Saharan Africa is, in practice, 
the decentralisation of the neo-patrimonial state from the centre to the regions 
(Weinstock, 2001:77). Neo-patrimonialism refers to „a form of organisation in which 
relationships of a broadly patrimonial type pervade a political and administrative 
system which is formally constructed on rational-legal lines‟ (Clapham, 1985:48).   
Hence, the state leaders control the state‟s resources through patron-client 
relationships in order to benefit themselves and they distribute resources according to 
their status and the loyalty of their followers (Thomson, 2000:115). The legitimacy of 
the state depends on the extent to which it can redistribute resources along the patron-
client hierarchy, which goes right down to the lowest, grass-root level by exchange of 
benefits including legal protection, job opportunity and other economic and social 
benefits (Clapham, 1985).  Moreover, as public officials do not have any 
accountability mechanisms the system moves using corruption as a lubricant to the 
 69 
state machinery. In addition, authorities  are  encouraged  to intervene in the 
economy of a country and this  leads to  embezzlement of public revenue which 
ultimately leads  to fiscal crisis  and a low level of  economic development  and 
inequalities (Clapham, 1985; Bratton and van de, Walle, 1997:67).  The effect of the 
neo-patrimonial state has been a power struggle between the elites, either to retain or 
to control state power which, in turn, has become a source of inequality between the 
ethnic groups who have access to state power and those who do not. This has led to 
factional struggles between elite groups and suppressive measures against their 
opponents (Bratton and van de Walle, 1997:61-68; Jackson and Rosberg, 1982; 
Braathen et al, 2000:14-15). Consequently, in societies where national identities has 
been fragile and resources scarce, a unitary state was appropriate because 
federalisation would have exacerbated the misuse of public resources, corruption and, 
ultimately, violent conflicts (Weinstock, 2001).  
 
 However, neo-patrimonial relationship is not a single factor that explains the nature 
of African states. Firstly, as Francis (2008:4) argues, Africa is a vast continent. 
Therefore, „dehomogenisation‟ of African politics is required. The social, political 
and economic factors which influence the state differ from country to country 
although there are some commonalities.  Moreover, neo-patrimonalism does not 
explain the reasons for economic development in many African countries. According 
to the Overseas Development Institute report (June, 22, 2010), 10 of 20 countries
7
 
which made distinct progress to global MDG targets are from Africa.  According to 
the Africa Economic outlook report of 2010 many African countries including 
Ethiopia are early achievers of some of MDG targets such as education, poverty 
                                                 
7
  Benin, Mali, Ethiopia, Malawi, Uganda, Mauritania, Ghana, Burkina Faso, Rwanda and Togo 
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reduction and health. Therefore,  the nature of African states and whether a federal 
arrangement can work or not has to be explored  by addressing a range of  issues  such 
as  the overall  relationship  between the state  and  society  in both  domestic and 
external aspects which include  political, socio-cultural, economic development, 
security and the role of different actors. 
 
 Federalism and Democratic Governance 
 The concept of democratic governance implies the right of citizens to govern 
themselves on the basis of accepted rules and procedures. This includes meaningful 
competition among individuals and groups for political power, and broad participation 
of citizens in these processes. (UNDP World Development Report, 2002; Brinkerhoff, 
2000:602). This has to lead to an establishment of an elected government, which is 
accountable to the electoral legislature or the electorate and acts according to the 
constitution (Bloomfield And Reilly, 1998:19). 
 
The acknowledgement of group identities and the evolution of non-majority 
mechanisms at the central level make the federal states different from the common 
democratic states in exercising democratic participation (Bachtiger and Stiener, 
2004:48). Proportional representation of ethnic groups in the national political 
institutions, including second legislative chambers, enables the groups within a 
country to influence decisions at the centre (Fleiner, 2001:34).  
 
 However, one of the challenges of federalism is that group politics can aggravate 
regional sentiments that disregard the national harmonization of ethnic groups and, at 
the extreme, can lead to secessionist demands (Brancati, 2006). It also challenges the 
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political decision-making. This is because individuals are consigned to their groups. 
They make their political choice and exercise their political rights by virtue of their 
culture and ethnic identity as discussed in the case of Belgium, for example. 
Therefore, this complicates the decision-making process and requires consensus or the 
concurrence of several ethnic elites, or may require „super majorities‟ (Haysom, 
2005:225). In addition, regionally dominant groups can deny access to state power 
and resources to minority groups within a particular region (Berman et al, 2004). 
Moreover, employment opportunities may be denied for those citizens that are not 
considered as natives of the region
8
 and, at the extreme, ethnic cleansing can be 
advanced to ensure ethnic homogeneity of a region as happened during the federal 
process of the Soviet Union, for example. Hence, it is argued that group rights in 
Africa should be considered if the state is to avert human rights violation and violent 
intra-state conflicts (Ayoob, 2007:107).  This shows that the adoption of ethnic-based 
federalism is not enough to accommodate diversity in a country. The effect of „ethnic 
geography
9‟ needs to be mitigated by other commitments to non-territorial forms of 
protection for civil, political, social and cultural rights (Kymlicka, 2004:69; Ted 
Robert Gurr, 2001).  
 
 Therefore, federalism in the context of Africa has to be complemented by rule of law 
which implies protection of the rights of all citizens through publicly known 
principles, rules and regulations (Kritz, 2007:402). This has two dimensions. The first 
one is the elimination of wide discretionary authority for the government and the 
introduction of formal rules that are universally applicable to everyone. Among the 
                                                 
8
 For instance, a study on Uganda showed that the power of the districts to employ staff led to a 
tendency by districts to employ people regarded as natives to the district (Ahikire, 2002 cited in Ndulo, 
2006:82). 
9
 This phrase is used to describe the geographical distribution of ethnic groups in a country. 
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formal rules of law, those related to property rights, the rights to free expression, 
freedom of association, equality before the law and protection against discrimination 
are the most prominent (Ndulo, 2006:1). The second one is to create accepted 
methods of adjudicating disputes between the actors of the society, including the 
government (Kirtz, 2007:402). This implies codes, procedures and traditional laws
10
 
that together compose an enforceable body of law that protects the rights of citizens 
and empowers them to avoid violence (Rotberg, 2007:86; Ndulo, 2006). In addition, 
there are three broad approaches of intergovernmental relations in federal systems: 
formal dispute resolution, informal dispute resolution, and popular dispute resolution 
(Crommelin, 2001). 
 
Formal dispute resolution is done by allocating powers to constituents and by making 
the judiciary revise the laws of the country. The constitutional division of power at 
federal and regional levels between the Lower House and Upper House, and the 
division of power between the parliament, the executive and the judiciary create the 
basic rule of law for conflict management. This division of power also enables 
regional states to influence decisions at the centre (Opeskin, 2001). For example, in 
Belgium the Senate advises both the federal and regional governments on conflicts of 
interest between the various governments. It also plays a full role, together with the 
House of Representatives, in constitutional reform and legislation on the organisation 
of the state, and participates in all legislations that affect the regional governments 
(Hooghe, 2004:75). The other formal conflict resolution method is court arbitration. 
In some countries, for example Canada, courts have full power to scrutinize whether 
all laws are in accordance with the constitution. In Switzerland, such responsibilities 
                                                 
10
 In some countries traditional laws discriminate against women. Hence, by correcting such 
weaknesses, these laws can be considered as an integral part of the country‟s formal laws. 
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are given to the legislative body (Amoretti and Bermeo, 2004). In Belgium, the power 
of the courts is limited to specific constitutional provisions (Hooghe, 2004:76).  
 
Informal dispute resolution mechanisms entail the use of informal methods of conflict 
resolution before appearance in the courts. For example, the South Africa constitution 
encourages informal conflict management mechanisms. Courts can reject appeals that 
have not tried other mechanisms to settle the conflict (Ndulo, 2006:95). In Ethiopia, 
communities are encouraged to practice traditional conflict management mechanisms 
that do not conflict with the general laws of the constitution. 
 
Finally, inter-governmental conflicts can be resolved through referenda (popular 
resolution) (Crommelin, 2001). For example, this is widely used in Switzerland 
regarding constitutional matters that affect Cantons (Watts, 2008). Referenda are also 
used to decide border disputes between regional states in Ethiopia. Thus, the 
administrative borders between the two regional states will be determined based on a 
ballot of the people in the disputed areas. However, although the outcome of the 
decision may enable regional states to determine their borders, it may not enable the 
regional authorities to manage the conflicts sustainably. This is because the 
referendum can also create ethnic minorities who still have grievances in the local 
administrations. Therefore, to prevent these kinds of grievances, it is suggested that 
the referendum has to avoid identity-based criteria. This enables the voters to 
determine their fate based on economic and social benefits rather than on identity, 
which could lead to polarization and violence. Moreover, regardless of the outcome of 
the referendum, the rights of the minority groups have to be respected in order to 
create a sustainable solution to the conflicts in the disputed area (Vaughan, 2006).  
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  Conclusion 
In conclusion, federalism in Africa has to recognise ethnic identity as a social 
structure of multi-ethnic countries and it has mainly to address the problems inherited 
from colonialism – power-related issues which has resulted in ethnic domination and 
civil wars, and the uneven economic development that has led to an exclusion of 
ethnic groups from the benefits of social services provided by the state.  
 
However, federalism in general and ethnic-federalism in particular can be a risky 
experiment in the context of Africa as ethnic groups have a strong tendency towards 
competition over power and resources. In addition, there is a lack of democratic 
institutions which can regulate the competition and provide a level playing field. 
Therefore, the federalisation of the state should not be imposed from above. It must 
have strong support from below, as discussed in the case of Belgium. The 
constitutional design also has to balance the power relationships of the regional states 
in consideration of geographic size, population size and resources. Power and 
resources have to be genuinely distributed to the regional states. Moreover, the right 
of self-determination of ethnic groups has to be provided with strong mechanisms for 
implementation of universal political rights and minority rights protection in every 
regional state. Chapter Three and the subsequent chapters apply the theoretical 
discussions to the context of Ethiopia. 
  
 75 
Part Two: Federalism and Nation Building in Ethiopia 
Chapter Three 
Political History, Political Economy and   Armed Conflicts 
in Ethiopia 
Introduction 
This chapter examines the causes of conflict in the modern history of Ethiopia. It 
scrutinizes how the state centralisation and resource appropriation from the rural areas 
led to armed insurgencies which in turn became reasons for the downfall of the 
military regime in 1991. The chapter concludes by bringing together the basic causes 
of conflicts that led to the federalisation of the state after the change of government in 
1991. 
 
Brief Description of Ethiopia 
Ethiopia is a multi-ethnic country. Around 86 ethnic groups were included in the third 
census of the country in 2007.  The ethnic groups in the country could be categorised 
as Nilo-Saharan, Omatic, Kushitic and the Ethio-Semetic family. Many of the Nilo-
Saharan ethnic groups that include among others Gumuz, Anuak, Nuer and Berta are 
found in the western frontier areas of the country. These people are mainly hoe 
cultivators who depend on shifting cultivation.  They primarily live in the current 
Benishangul-Gumuz and Gambella regional states of the country (Pankhurst, 1997; 
Zewde, 2002:5). 
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 The Omatic people live on both sides of the Omo River in the south-western region 
of the country. Among others the Gamo, Gedeo, Kefficho and Walayta are notable for 
their population size in the region. The ethnic groups are widely known by the 
cultivation of „Ensat‟ or false banana, which is used as the main staple food in the 
region. Many of the Omatic ethnic groups live in the current southern regional state of 
the country (Greenfield, 1965; Zewde, 2002:7). 
 
The Kushitic family of ethnic groups include among others, Oromos, Somali and Afar.    
These people live in both the highland and lowland areas of the country.  Afars, 
Somali, and some Oromos, who live in the low land areas, depend on pastoralism; 
whereas other Oromos, who live on the plateaus of the country, depend on plough 
cultivation. These ethnic groups mainly live in the current Somali, Afar and Oromia 
regional states (Barnabas, 2003:201). 
 
The Ethio-Semitic ethnic groups, which include mainly Tigrayans and Amharas, live 
in the northern parts of the country. They depend on plough cultivation. The majority 
of these groups live in the Amhara and Tigray regional states. These ethnic groups 
have played a dominant role in the political history of the country ((Barnabas, 
2003:200-201; Zewde, 2002:7). 
 
Ethiopia is also a country of different religious faiths. The dominant religions are 
Christianity and Islam, which constitute 61% and 33% respectively of the population. 
The remaining 6% comprises other religious faiths (national census, 2007). Except 
during the Jehad campaign, by gragn Mohammed (which means left handed) in the 
16
th
 century, there have been no significant religious clashes before or after the 
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emergence of the nation-state (Pankhurst, 1997.)  Ethiopia is widely known for 
religious tolerance between Christians and Muslims (Hardie, 1974; Zewde, 2002). 
 
Ethiopia‟s economy is one of the least developed economies in the world.  It depends 
mainly on agriculture, which accounts for 41.1% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), 
60% of exports and 80% of employment (Ethiopian National Bank, 2009; IMF, 2009). 
Industry and manufacturing constitute about 13% of the overall economy, among 
which 40% are food and beverages. The mining industry, which contributes less than 
1% to GDP, is quite small and under-utilised (MBendi, 2010).  Oil exploration for gas 
and oil is also underway in the Ogaden and Gambella region, but has not started 
production yet (MBendi.Com, 2010). The service sector accounts for 42.9 % of total 
GDP (Ethiopian National Bank, 2009). Overall, according to estimates of the IMF, the 
GDP of the country grew 2.8% on average between 1974-1991, and 4% on average 
between 1991/2004. Since then it has grown by more than 10 percent on average. 
 
 The infrastructure of the country is also underdeveloped. Roads are the major means 
of transport in Ethiopia, carrying about 95% of the country's passengers and freight 
traffic  with  a network density  of 33.6km/1,000 km2 in 2004/05 (MOFED, 2006).  
Although the country has significant potential for hydroelectric power and geothermal 
energy generation, only about 17% of the population has access to electricity 
(Ethiopian National Bank, 2009). Therefore, the majority of Ethiopians have to rely 
on traditional fuel – including plant and waste materials – for nearly all their energy 
consumption (UNDP, 2008). According to the UNDP human development indicators 
telecommunication links consist of two mainlines, six cellular and two internet 
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subscribers per 1,000 people in 2005. This placed the country among the least 
performing countries in technology diffusion and creation (UNDP, 2008).   
 
 Ethiopia is also one of the least developed countries regarding social services 
provision. For example, only 22% of the people had access to improved water sources 
in 2004. Health expenditure was only 21 USA dollars per person/per year in 2004. 
Infant mortality was 109 per 1,000 live births in 2005. And the mortality rate for 
children less than five years old was 164 per 1,000 live births in the same year 
(UNDP, 2008). According to the UNDP‟s human development indicators life 
expectancy at birth was 42 in 1990 and reached 54.7 in 2009. The adult literacy rate, 
for people aged 15 years, was 36 % in 2009. Real GDP per capita was 454 US dollars 
in 1990; by 2009 it had reached 779 US dollars. The overall human development 
index of the country was 0.173 in 1991 and 0.414 in 2009 – placing Ethiopia among 
the least performing countries in the world (UNDP reports 1990-2009). 
 
The country remained with a unitary state structure during the imperial and military 
regimes, with the constituent units divided into 14 administrative provinces. These 
were created mainly at the administrative convenience of the regimes. Therefore, the 
provinces were multi-ethnic – and this kind of administrative arrangement continued 
until the downfall of the military regime, except for the changes that were made by 
the 1987 constitution which recognised the regional autonomies of the Tigray, 
Gambella, Assab, Eritrea and Somali parts of the country (The Ethiopian Constitution 
of 1987). 
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Map 1: Ethiopian political map during the imperial and military regimes 
 
 
Adopted from www.mapsofworld.com 
 
Since the downfall of the military regime, the country has followed a federal state 
structure in which ethnic identity has become the main organising principle of the 
consistent units. Accordingly, there were 14 regional states during the transition 
period. These were reduced into 9 member states, in accordance with the 1995 federal 
constitution. Now the member states are: Tigray, Afar, Amhara, Oromo, Somali, the 
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Southern nations, nationalities and people regional state (SNNPRS), Gambella, 
Benishangul-Gumuz and Harrari regional states (The Ethiopian Federal Constitution, 
1995). 
 
The first five regional states are inhabited predominantly by the ethnic groups from 
which the states take their names; whereas the other regional states are multi-ethnic. 
For example, the SNNPRS absorbs more than 56 ethnic groups (Desalegn, 2003:44). 
The Benishangul-Gumuz regional state encompasses 5 indigenous ethnic groups.  The 
Gambella regional state also encompasses 5 indigenous ethnic groups (Feyissa, 
2006:209). The Harrari regional state, which is the smallest regional state, contains 
four ethnic groups (Kefale and Jemma, 2007:77). Addis Ababa and Diredawa cities 
are directly accountable to the federal government. 
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Map 2: Ethiopian Federal administrative regional states 
 
Source: FOTW Ethiopia map by António Martins and boundaries‟ data by Jarig 
Bakker,http://www.crwflags.com/FOTW/flags/et(.html 
 
 
The total population of Ethiopia is 73,918,505 according to the 2007 census; however, 
the regional states population size varies greatly. The following table shows the 
population share of each regional state. 
 
Table 3.1.Total population by each regional state 
Regional state  Population size Percentage 
country population 73,918,505 100% 
Tigray 4,314,456 6 
Afar 1,411,092 2 
Amhara 17,214,056 23 
Oromia 27,158,471 37 
Somali 4,439,147 6 
Benishangul-Gumuz 670,847 1 
Gambella 306,916 0.4 
SNNPRS 15,042,531 20 
Harari 183,344 .02 
Diredawa* 342,827 .05 
Addis Ababa* 2,738,248 4 
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*Addis Ababa and Diredawa cities are not considered as regional states as they are  
directly accountable to the federal government. 
Source:  Central Statistical Agency of Ethiopia; Census, 2007 
 
 Brief Political History 
The Ethiopian ethnic groups had their own civilizations and political history before 
they were absorbed into the nation-state in the late 19
th
 century. The Ethio-Semitic 
civilisation, which was later known as Abyssinian, has its history rooted in the 
Axumite kingdom, which lasted until the 10
th
 century. After the ruin of the Axumite 
kingdom by Yodit /Gudit, who transferred the throne to the Agew dynasty, the 
Abyssinians took the throne again from the Agew dynasty and made their centre in 
Showa and later in Gondar – which was the centre of the state for about 250 years 
though regional rulers assumed local power in the late18
th
 century. This period is 
known as the „Zemene Mesafint‟ (Era of Princes). The Zemene Mesafint lasted   
about 100 years until Emperor Tewodros ended it by defeating the regional rulers and 
began to restore the integrity of the region in the mid 19
th
 century. The Abyssinian 
region then remained intact during the rule of the following Emperors, Yohannes and 
Menilek, until it was absorbed by the nation-state, which emerged after Menilek‟s 
expansion towards the southern part of the country (Keller, 1988:15-27).  
 
 The other ethnic groups in the country also had their own civilisations which range 
from different kingdoms to communal social structures. For example, among others 
the kingdoms of Kafa, Walyta, and Yam are some of the state structures in the 
southern region of the country. There were also a number of different Oromo states 
including Limmu-Ennarya, Jimma, Gomma, Guma and Gera. Among these, the 
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Jimma and Nekemt kingdoms had a monarchical system which remained even after 
the regions were conquered by Menilek during his southern march in the late 19
th
 
century (Zewde, 2002:16; Hassen, 1990; Fiseha, 2006:18). Other states were 
associated with Islamic civilisations located in Afar and Somali areas and the emirate 
of Harar (Pankhurst, 1997).  
 
 The Emergence of Modern State in Ethiopia 
  Ethiopian modern political history is closely associated with the emergence of the 
modern state. The modern state appeared when the nation came into being in the late 
19
th
 century. This arose from two processes. The first one is the Emperor Tewodros‟s 
consolidation of the Abyssinian regions into one administrative country (Keller, 
1981:524). He defeated, if temporarily, all the regional princes, who had fragmented 
Abyssinia into different regions, and brought the regions under his central control.  In 
addition to the consolidation of the region, Emperor Tewodros attempted to introduce 
a modern army and a centralised „geber‟ (tribute)1‟ system in the country. Moreover, 
he attempted to reduce the role of the church in the state and especially the church‟s 
economic burden on peasants (Keller, 1988:26; Zewde, 2002:60; Markakis and Ayele, 
1986). 
 
 The Abyssinian consolidation was important for the nation-state formation, because 
the creation of a strong centre in the Abyssinian region meant the emperor‟s capacity 
to defend the region, against colonial aggression and international colonisers, 
increased. Moreover, it led the emperors to acquire diplomatic skills and ties which 
helped them to take the initiative for nation-state formation in the country. For 
                                                 
1
  Tribute „geber‟ is revenue collected by the noblemen from tax levy or land rent and sent to the 
emperor.  
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example, Emperor Yohannes repelled the colonial aggression of Italy several times 
and attempted to persuade the colonisers to recognise the sovereignty of the country 
(Keller, 1988:27-30. Similarly, Emperor Menilek acquired modern arms using his 
diplomatic ties with Italy and France, which he used for the successful campaign that 
enabled him to conquer the southern and western regions. This led to the nation-state 
formation of the country (Clapham, 1987; Zewde, 2002; Keller, 1988:31-43). 
 
The second process is related to the expansion of Menilek from Showa to the southern 
and western parts of the country. Although the attempt to expand Showa to the 
southern parts had started early in the 19
th
 century, it was only completed in 1900 
when Menilek conquered all the southern and western parts of the country (Donham, 
1985, 3; Halliday and Molyneux,1981). The conquest of the southern regions had two 
major features. First, it had a devastating effect on the local communities. As Menilek 
armies marched towards the southern region the communities, and mainly those who 
had their own civilizations, resisted it strongly.  Thus, Menilek‟s armies devastated 
those communities where resistance was high. This happened in Walyta, Keffa and 
parts of Oromia.  Because of the resistance the peasants‟ lands were confiscated and 
they were treated like serfs. The second feature of the conquest was negotiation. In 
some places Menilek‟s generals controlled the local communities using negotiation 
with the local leaders or kings. This happened, for example, in Wallega and Jimma.  
The king of Jimma surrendered to Menilek by negotiation; thus he retained his 
regional autonomy until later, when Emperor Haile Selassie made the region a 
province by introducing a centralised state structure in 1930. Similarly the Wallega 
monarchies surrendered by negotiation and the region remained an autonomous 
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region within Menilek‟s jurisdiction until it became the province Wellaga, created by 
Haile Selassie in 1930 (Zewde, 2002:61-68). 
 
Accordingly, the administration of the country, which was established after Menilek‟s 
expansion, had three characteristics. Firstly, the Abyssinian areas, including Gondar, 
Gojam, Northern Showa and Tigray were administered by regional and local 
administrations headed by noblemen of the region and who were accountable to 
Menilek. Similarly, some of the conquered areas in the South and West were 
administered through regional noblemen, who had surrendered to Menilek. These 
included Jimma and Wallega, which are located in the current Oromia regional state, 
and Asossa, which is situated in the current Benishangul-Gumuz regional state 
(Donham, 1985:37-44). Secondly, there were many places that were controlled by 
nobles directly appointed as administrators by Menilek. These included the majority 
of the conquered regions of the southern and western parts of the country.  Thirdly, 
there were other places which had loose relationships with the centre. These include 
the western frontiers and the eastern side of the country, which was mainly inhabited 
by Nilo-Saharan and the Kushitic pastoralistic ethnic groups. The reason for the 
presence of Menilek‟s troops in these places was basically to control the border of the 
country and sometimes to levy tax on the pastoralist people, although this was not 
always practical due to the nomadic life of the farmers (Young, 1999; Donham, 
1985:37-44). 
 
After the expansion to the southern and western parts of the country, Menilek also 
defeated Italy at the battle of Adwa in 1896. This had significant relevance in 
strengthening the nation-state with respect to both domestic and international 
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relationships. Domestically, it was the Adwa battle which united and mobilised all the 
Abyssinian ethnic groups, and the newly conquered regions, against the Italian 
aggression.  Therefore, it created a sense of common accomplishment for the 
population. Moreover, the victory also contributed to the supremacy of Menilek over 
the regional princes (Greenfield, 1965; Zwede, 2002:76-79).  Internationally, the 
victory enabled the country to be recognised as an independent state by the 
international powers and subsequently to become a formal member of the League of 
Nations (Keller, 1981:528). Thus, the international borders of the country were 
delimited with the common borders of the neighbouring colonial nation-states 
(Clapham, 1987; Zwede, 2002:81-85). 
 
The Menilek regime began the process of building the modern nation-state by 
establishing a modern bureaucracy at the centre.  This was organised at the top by 
ministerial offices, which were supported by educated people from the churches and 
by some noblemen who had been sent abroad to study in preparation for service in the 
bureaucracy (Donham, 1985, Zewde, 2002). 
 
The state formation during Menilek‟s reign shows that it had a semi-decentralised 
structure. This means the relationship between the centre and the constituent units was 
not fully centralised. At the centre there were ministerial offices which were 
responsible for the whole country. However, at the same time, regional governors had 
authority over their administrative areas as long as they remained accountable to 
Menilek. Therefore, governors had their own troops and could levy tax in their 
administrative areas (Donham, 1985:37-38). This decentralised state structure 
remained in place throughout Menilek‟s rule and after his death, during the brief 
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period of Lej Eyyasu and Empress Zewditu and until Haile Selassie became the 
Emperor of the country in 1930 (Donham, 1985). 
 
  Modern economic institutions also started to operate in the basically agrarian 
economy. For example, a modern bank known as the Bank of Abyssinia was 
established for the first time in the capital city, Addis Ababa, in the first decade of the 
20
th
 century. The country was also connected to the outside world through the railway 
that passes from Djibouti to Addis Ababa. This served to promote coffee exports 
which later became the main export item of the country (Markakis and Ayele, 1986; 
Zewde, 2002:94-100). 
 
The state formation during Menilek‟s regime shows three interrelated factors which 
provide a basic background for the causes of conflicts that  emerged later during the 
regimes of Emperor Haile Selassie and the military. First, unlike other African 
countries, the formation of a modern state in Ethiopia was initiated by an already 
existing state in the Abyssinian part of Ethiopia. This was quite different from the 
process of modern state formation in other African countries, which was initiated by 
the colonial powers whose motivation was extracting the resources of the countries 
rather than nation-building (Mamandi, 1995). Second, however, the formation of the 
modern state brought different ethnic groups together and created a multi-ethnic 
country. This is because the people who were absorbed by the nation state had 
different cultures, languages and residential territories. In addition, the state formation 
was done in competition with the European colonisers during the scramble for the 
African continent. Thus, this led to separation of one ethnic group into different 
jurisdictions as happened in the other African countries. Thirdly, the Abyssinian 
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people, whose political elite initiated the state formation, had hierarchal relationships 
amongst themselves (Donham, 1985). This, in turn, contributed to the hierarchal 
relationships between the Abyssinians and the newly incorporated people, which also 
manifested itself in cultural, social and economic discrimination against the people in 
the peripheral areas of the country. This was intensified when Emperor Hiale Selassie 
came to power and built a centralised state structure. 
 
 The Centralisation of the State 
The state became more centralised during Emperor Haile Selassie‟s rule.  Haile 
Selassie introduced a customs structure for all regions in 1931; he also introduced a 
modern army and abolished the autonomous regions that had been administered by 
the regional noblemen. For the first time he established 100 Awrajas (districts) in 12 
provinces. The Emperor himself then appointed all the leaders of the provinces and 
Awrajas.  This process meant power was concentrated in Showa the area from which 
most of the nobility that governed the country came (Tiruneh, 1993; Zewde, 2002).  
 
The country got its first written constitution in 1931. It had two main features which 
were relevant to the centralisation of the state. Firstly, it clearly defined the power 
relationship between the monarchy and the nobility – so strengthening the modern 
exercise of power, which was started by Emperor Menilek. For example, it endorsed 
the ministerial system Menilek set up in 1907.  Moreover, the constitution abolished 
the regional power and autonomy of the nobility.  Therefore, it changed all the regions 
into provinces, under the direct administration of the Emperor and the ministerial 
offices at the centre (Zewde, 2002:140-146).  Secondly, the constitution introduced a 
parliament and Chamber of Deputies. However, it restricted membership of the 
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institutions to the nobility in the selection of members done either directly by the 
Emperor or indirectly by the aristocracy. This was done by a property qualification 
which enabled members of the institutions to be drawn from the landed nobility. 
According to this qualification the peasantry and even rich merchants were unable to 
become members of the parliament and Chamber of Deputies (Zewde, 2002:146; 
Keller, 1981:532). 
 
Thirdly, the constitution gave absolute power to the Emperor.  The parliament and 
Chamber of Deputies had an only advisory role. Any law had to be accepted by the 
Emperor in order for it to be implemented.  Moreover, the constitution enabled the 
Emperor to transfer his power thorough hereditary means. Therefore, the constitution 
legalised the absolute power of the Emperor and his ability to make appointments and 
dismissals to the key posts in the country (Zewde, 2002:146; Clapham, 1969:112). 
This led to the legalisation of Showan Amhara domination in all political and 
economic aspects of the country.  For example, in the years from 1941 to 1966 the 
numbers of Showans appointed to the rank of Vice–Minister or above was a 
remarkable 62 per cent (Donham, 1985:27).  And this was reflected in the lower 
hierarchies of state.  For example, in 1969 in the Southern Arusi District of Kofele (an 
Oromo area) of 30 government employees only 5 were locals. The rest were all 
Amharas. Similarly in Arusi, in 1969 of 22 governors only 4 were locals (Ibid).  
Hence, power was concentrated at the centre and strengthened through hierarchical 
relationships in society. The central authorities exercised their power without any 
consultation with the local people and authorities. All appointments were made from 
above through the Ministry of Interior; and all relationships with lower levels were 
made in the same manner (Clapham, 1969:115; Clapham, 1975:75).  
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The constitution was amended in 1955, introducing universal suffrage and provisions 
for an elected Chamber of Deputies. However, as long as political parties were illegal, 
and the property qualification for a candidate to the parliament was maintained, the 
introduction of universal suffrage could not make any significant impact on the 
structure of the nation-state.  No change was made to the absolute power of the 
monarch (Zewde, 2002:206). 
 
The power of the monarchy was also strengthened by the establishment of a modern 
bureaucracy.  Initially, the bureaucracy was filled by uneducated aristocracy. 
However, later educated siblings of the nobility, who had been taught abroad and in 
domestic schools were recruited (Tiruneh, 1993; Donham, 1985:27; Zewde, 2002). 
Due to the need for educated people in the bureaucracy the expansion of education 
became a necessary condition to strengthen the nation-state. Therefore, a number of 
elementary schools, high schools, and the Haile Selassie I University (the current 
Addis Ababa University) were established during Emperor Haile Selassie‟s rule 
(Keller, 1981:531). However, this expansion of education was mainly focused on 
Addis Ababa and Showa, and to some extent in the northern provinces. For example, 
in 1970 there were 300,000 Ethiopian students in all elementary, high school and 
territory level education (Abir, 1970:49). This was equivalent to just over 1% of the 
whole population.  The students were also mainly from schools situated in and around 
the capital or in the north of the country.  For example 60 secondary schools were to 
be found in four big towns and especially in the capital (ibid).  This meant other areas, 
particularly in the south and west regions and the ethnic groups living there were 
neglected in the education expansion exercise (Keller, 1981:534).  Moreover, the 
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minor expansion of the education system in the south was considered a means of 
cultural assimilation. Amharic was made the Lingua Franca of all elementary schools 
regardless of the children‟s mother tongue. A study of Amharic became one of the 
qualifications for employment and even became necessary to access land in the 
southern regions (Markakis and Ayele, 1986; Donham, 1985:11). 
 
The expansion of modern education systems and institutions created a competing new 
elite group which opposed the interests of the nobility.  The view of the new elites, on 
how things should be done, differed from those of the nobility (Donham, 1985:28).  
This was manifested in various respects. For example, when the new elite group 
demanded more reforms, such as land tenure reform, the parliament which was 
controlled by the aristocracy refused to approve this. The new elite group was keen to 
participate in the national affairs of the country but the constitution did not provide 
any means of political participation. Political parties, associations and free expression 
were not allowed during that time (Clapham, 1975:72). The only option for the new 
elite group remained violence. 
 
 The above historical process of nation building shows that the centralisation of the 
state, with its power concentrated on monarchical authority and the Showan nobility, 
left the government unable to comprehend the evolving demands of the urban 
population for basic democratic rights and policy changes related to land ownership 
and other issues. Moreover, the homogenisation policy of the government made 
ethnic identity a hot issue among the educated elite, who were rooted in different 
ethnic groups (Tiruneh, 1993: 299). These factors became structural factors for the 
1974 revolution. 
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 However, the modern political history of Ethiopia has led to political analyses that 
Ethiopia is, historically, the most well situated country in Africa. Hence, ethnic 
differentiation can be seen as a secondary issue in comparison to the common national 
identity of the ethnic groups (Tibebu, 1995).  Moreover, it is argued that there was no 
Amharan ethnic domination and subordination in Ethiopia, and that the Amhara elite 
group have remained multiethnic for many centuries due to intermarriage practices 
and they were oppressed along with other ethnic groups by the country‟s various 
regimes. (Levine, 2000: XVIII-XIX). 
 
The problem with this analysis is that it gives little attention to the history of the 
South-West Ethiopian people before they were absorbed into the nation state. The 
point is that when these people made their own history, they were not part of the 
Abyssinian state. In fact, as Zewde (2002) argues, the people who were absorbed into 
the Menilek Empire in the late 19
th
 century had their own states and civilisations. 
Moreover, although the Amharan elite group during the Menilek and Haile Selassie 
regimes used intermarriage as a means of establishing its supremacy in rival regions, 
such as Wallega and Tigray, little integration existed between the rural areas of Tigray, 
Amhara and Oromo (Donham, 1986). In addition, during the Haile Selassie regime, it 
was the Amhara elite who controlled all the central and local administrative 
hierarchies. For example, during 1963-8 three-quarters of the public offices in the 
country were occupied by people drawn from Showa (Markakis, 1987:251). As 
discussed in the subsequent sections of this chapter, the restriction of movement and 
suppression carried out by the military regime against ethno-national movements also 
undermined any integration that could have happened between the ethnic groups in 
the country (Tiruneh, 1993). 
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In addition, when culture is not respected and people are prevented from speaking 
their own language in public places, this demonstrates state-sponsored domination of 
ethnic minority groups. Therefore, the argument that Amhara were as much victims as 
other ethnic groups does not explain the reality. Regardless of the class differences 
between the elite group and the peasants, the Amhara were not victims of cultural 
suppression, as the elite group had the same cultural institutions as the Amhara 
communities. As a result, Amhara had better opportunities than others, such as access 
to a justice system, employment opportunities simply because of their language 
abilities (Fiseha, 2006).  
 
Rural Resource Appropriation 
One of the features of the Ethiopian nation-state was surplus appropriation from the 
peasant subsistence economy during the imperial regime. When Emperor Menilek 
conquered the southern and western parts of the country, he imposed on them the land 
tenure system, known as the „Gult‟2 system, already in use in the Abyssinian parts of 
the country.  As a result the land of the native people was confiscated and was given 
to Menilek‟s nobility and their troops (normally known as „Nefteyaa‟ in the 
conquered regions. This made the peasants land-less, but enabled the aristocracy to 
extract the surplus from the peasants as much as they could and use it to strengthen 
their own regional power and the imperial regime (Halliday and Molyneux, 1981; 
Zewde, 2002:88, Donham, 1985). 
 
                                                 
2
 Gult was a grant given to a member of the nobility who was authorised by the Emperor to administer 
a local area. The Gult owner  collected a tax in kind that would  be sent  to the emperor in exchange  
for an entitlement to all  necessary  services including food expenses and labour  service for himself 
from  the peasants under the „Gult‟(Donham, 1985:5; Keller, 1981:535). 
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 The Emperor Haile Selassie introduced a tax system when he was Regent for 
Empress Zewditu and implemented it fully when he became Emperor in 1930. The 
newly introduced tax system, known as „qalad‟, allowed for the selling and buying of 
land, so that land owners were obliged to pay taxes for their land holdings to the 
government.   According to the new system peasants were not obliged to pay tax in 
kind and labour service to the nobility, but they were obliged to pay a rent to the land 
owner for the land they were using to grow crops (Zewde, 2002:85-94). However, the 
landlords forced the peasants to buy the plots they were farming or to become their 
tenants, giving part of their produce to the landlords if they were not able to buy the 
plots.
3
 Consequently, the tax system became a tool of exploitative expropriation of the 
peasant resources by the nation-state (Markakis and Ayele, 1986; Zewde, 2002:192).  
 
The Haile Selassie regime also focused on expansion of commercial farms that were 
needed by the international market. Here, the focus was on coffee producing 
commercial farms and, to some extent, sugar-cane plantations (Donham, 1985:28). 
Thus, many landlords tended to produce coffee either by themselves or as a joint 
venture with expatriate investors.  However, this led to expulsion of the peasants from 
their land holdings in the coffee producing areas of the southern regions. For example, 
many peasants from the Ari ethnic group were expelled from their land holdings to 
enable the expansion of coffee farms (Naty, 2002:62).  Moreover, the sugar cane 
plantation in the Awash valley dislocated many Afars around Issa. This became one 
of the contributing factors of the ongoing conflicts between Afar and Issa. The 
attempt to create modern farms in the Walyita Agricultural Development (WADU) 
                                                 
3
 For example, Ras Birru, who was one of the Menilek appointments, forced the peasants, in the „Gult‟, 
given to him by Menilek, either to buy the plots they were farming or to become his tenants and to give 
him a quarter of their harvest. Many peasants were forced to work as tenants of the landlord because 
they were not able to buy the plots (Zwede, 2002:90). 
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also dislocated many peasants from their land holdings (Markakis, 1987:96). In 
addition, the low budgetary allocation for agriculture, which was 2% in 1967 for 
example, focused on commercial farms rather than to the peasant economy (Zewde, 
2002; 194), which remained neglected.  As a result, by 1967 90% of the agrarian 
sector was of subsistence peasant economy and 90% of the population was illiterate 
(ibid). 
 
The Haile Selassie regime also adopted a policy of import substitution 
industrialisation.  This led to the establishment of some textile industries during the 
1960s.  However, the impact of the industries on the whole economy was negligible. 
For example, by 1970 there were about 300 industrial enterprises, whose contribution 
to the economy was around 4% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (Markakis, 
1987:96).  The labour force employed in the industrial sector was estimated at only 
50,000. Moreover, it was concentrated in only a few cities such as Addis Ababa, 
Diredawa and Asmara (Zewde, 2002:200). 
 
The above analysis shows that the state became the main resource extractor and 
distributor, in order to satisfy the interests of the   Emperor‟s and his associates‟ inner 
circle. Public and private resources were not separate during this period (Jackson and 
Rosberg, 1982; Clapham, 1985; 47). Accordingly, patrimonialism in “which authority 
is ascribed to a person rather than an office holder” (Clapham, 1985:48) was the main   
feature of the Haile Selassie imperial regime. Hence, the  Emperor  was considered  
the  father of the nation and all the  persons  in the state hierarchy  were held  together  
by means  of loyalty  and kinship to him. For this reason, the Emperor himself and the 
aristocracy became the owners of construction companies, modern farms and factories 
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(Zewde, 2002). On the other hand, the regime did not have any developmental interest 
which did not benefit the political elite of the regime. Infrastructural development and 
budget allocation were tuned to the places and sectors which provided benefits to the 
political elite. The regime also depended on repression and undemocratic practices to 
sustain itself. It did not allow political participation of citizens in the governance 
process. Political parties and private media were not allowed to operate in the country 
(Tiruneh, 1993).  
 
It was a combination of different structural factors contributed to the downfall of the 
imperial regime. First, the centralisation of the state and patrimonial character of the 
regime meant undemocratic handling of every political issue and ethnic 
marginalisation – manifested in cultural, economic and social benefits which ignored 
the majority of the ethnic groups, as discussed in the above sections. The land tenure 
system was another issue, not only for the rural population but also for the 
intelligentsia in the urban areas, who were basically affiliated with the rural 
population in one way or another. The regime had very little conception of what was 
required for handling these issues nor did it have the capacity to reform the system. 
Thus, the regime became hated by the population in general and urban people in 
particular, who were demanding democratic rights, equality of nationalities and land 
reform. Under these circumstances, the irresponsible handling by the government of 
the 1973 famine and price increases in the urban areas (which were aggravated by 
increased international oil prices) sparked popular urban uprisings against the imperial 
regime in 1974. This brought the imperial regime to an end and led to it being 
replaced by a military junta in 1974 (Clapham, 1987; Markakis and Ayele, 1986; 
Halliday and Molyneux, 1981; Tiruneh, 1993:34). 
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 Second, the predatory relationship of the nation state with the peasants and the 
marginalisation of the rural population from any social benefits provided by the state 
contributed to the continuation of the momentum of the 1974 revolution in the rural 
areas (Donham, 1985:14-15; Zewde, 2002:98, Markakis and Ayele, 1986). This was 
manifested  by the support of  the rural population  for  the military‟s land  reform that 
put land under the control of the government, and abolished the selling and buying of 
land bringing the former system to an end and enabling  the military regime to gain 
support mainly in the southern  and western regions (Tiruneh,1993).  
 
The Military Regime’s Political Solution: Adoption of Socialism 
 The military junta (Derg), which was the only organised force in 1974, made its main 
motto „Ethiopia First‟ when it took control of the state administration. Although the 
purpose of this slogan was not clear at first, it was clarified later, when it was defined 
as Ethiopian nationalism first under Ethiopian socialism. Therefore, although the 
regime in principle recognised the issues of nationalities and the necessity of land 
reform, it was not ready to answer the demands for democratic rights for the urban 
population. This was demonstrated by the proclamation issued in 1974 which 
removed all democratic rights from citizens.  Nor was the junta ready to resolve the 
Eritrean question peacefully. The Eritreans started fighting for independence after the 
federation was abolished by the Haile Selassie regime in 1960. Hence, Eritrean 
independence became an issue in the student movements during the 1960s along with 
self-determination of nations and the issue of secession. This is discussed in the 
following section. 
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As soon as the military committee assumed power, it took measures such as the 
nationalisation of financial institutions, land reform and nationalisation of urban land 
and extra houses of urban dwellers. All these measures were taken between 
September 1974 and July 1975 (Halliday and Molyneux, 1981; Zewde, 2002:242; 
Tiruneh, 1993). The measures enabled the military regime to tighten its control on the 
finance and resources of the country (ibid). In the following years the government 
confirmed its ideological socialism. It created centralised and hierarchical institutions, 
such as the Ministry of Central Planning, the Agricultural Marketing Corporation 
(AMC), a national party, and national peasant and youth associations, which served 
the government as apparatus to implement the policies of its centralised system 
(Clapham, 1987; Clapham, 2002:19). The Derg‟s goal became promotion of 
Ethiopian nationalism under a socialist system. 
 
There are domestic and external factors for the military regime‟s adoption of 
socialism. Firstly, the 1974 Ethiopian revolution was one of the most radical urban 
people‟s uprisings in the history of Ethiopia. Influenced by the then  socialist 
movements  in Asia  and Latin America,  socialism  was  considered as the best  
solution   for  the  Ethiopia‟s problems  by the  educated people  who played a leading 
role  in the revolution (Tiruneh, 1993).  As the military Junta was a group of junior 
officers, it was not surprising that it was influenced by the Marxist   ideology and 
slogans among the educated people in the country. In addition,  as Clapham (1987:6) 
argued,  if the military regime  was  going to claim  to be  the leader  of the revolution, 
it was a necessary condition to  bring  a different organisation  to  the state and the 
society  from the monarchical system, which, in turn,  determined  the survival of the  
new regime.  Therefore, socialism became the best option to appeal to the masses that 
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revolted against the monarchical system and to sustain the new regime. On the 
external side, the military Junta did not get immediate recognition from   the western 
side as the revolution was also against the western allies of the monarchical system 
(Keller, 1988). So, the military regime adopted socialism and got recognition and 
military support from the Soviet Union, which contributed to the survival of the 
regime. 
 
 The military regime made little effort to change the centralised provincial 
administration of the Emperor; it retained the 14 provincial administrations of the 
Emperor until its downfall in 1991.  Nevertheless, the military regime accepted, in 
principle, the self-determination of nationalities. Accordingly, it established an 
Institute of Nationalities Studies which focused on study of the culture, language and 
the socio-economic situation of the Ethiopian nationalities. The study results of the 
Institute, in fact, became a basis for the draft federal constitution which happened 
later, after the downfall of the military regime. The military regime also conducted a 
census in 1987 which recognised the existence of nationalities in the country for the 
first time in the history of Ethiopia.  However, regardless of the rhetoric about the 
rights of nationalities in the country, Amharic continued as the national language and 
other languages were discouraged from being used in public areas (Markakis, 1994).  
In addition, the military regime took measures against the demands of the urban 
population for democratic change and support for ethno-national movements. As a 
result, it adopted illegal and repressive measures from the day it came to power. For 
example, it killed 60 senior members of the imperial regime without trial.   It passed a 
proclamation that banned all democratic rights including speaking, writing and even 
thinking against the government. 
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In addition, in the aftermath of the revolution, a fierce struggle between the factions of 
the military regime eventually led to the personal rule of Mengistu Hailemariam who 
became head of the military junta (Markakis and Ayele, 1986).  The whole state 
structure was controlled by military officers and civilians who were loyal to Mengistu 
at the top of the state hierarchy. Moreover, the state controlled the urban and rural 
population through different associations, which were directly controlled initially by 
the Commission for Organising the Party of the Working People of Ethiopia 
(COPWE), and later by the Workers Party of Ethiopia (WPE). Membership of the 
ruling party and the associations served as a means of getting security and job 
opportunities which can be described as patron-client relationships (Clapham, 1987; 
Tiruneh, 1993). Therefore,   provision of special privileges to the families of the party 
elites; nepotism (manifested by giving better access and job opportunities to the 
relatives of persons who controlled the party and the state) and cliental relationships, 
with the persons who controlled the ruling party and the state in return for gaining 
some benefits, became the main manifestations of neo-patrimonial relationships 
during the military regime.  
 
Marxist oriented opposition political parties proliferated during and after the 
revolution growing out of the nature of the monarchical regime and the international 
situation. The monarchical regime did not allow any organised political movement or 
participation by citizens in the governance process (Clapham, 1988). Therefore, the 
communist movements around the world, the Chinese revolution, Cuba and the 
Vietnam War against American occupation, all influenced the young educated people 
who participated in the 1974 revolution (Tiruneh, 1993).  As a result, the differences 
between the political parties were not ideological, but domestic political issues.  The 
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domestic political differences mainly focused on how to address the issue of 
nationality (ethnicity) and how to establish a democratically elected government.  The 
All Ethiopia Socialist Movement (AESM) considered the nationality issue as one 
element of the Ethiopian Revolution that had to be addressed by the class struggle. 
Therefore, it decided to work with the military regime and critically support it. The 
Ethiopian People‟s Revolutionary Party (EPRP), which considered itself a vanguard 
party, took a similar political position on the nationality issue as AESM, but it 
considered the military regime to be against the „revolution‟ and decided to fight it 
using insurrections based on the urban areas (Markakis, 1987; Berhanu, 2003).  
 
The military junta, however, saw all the opposition groups as anti-Ethiopian 
nationalism and decided to eradicate them using force.  It started a campaign of mass 
killings, the so-called „Red Terror‟, and gave local administrative leaders the authority 
to kill anyone suspected of being against the revolution. Tens of thousands of people 
were killed and left on the streets. The outcome was rule by terror and the 
development of a completely anti-democratic situation in all urban areas (Woodward, 
2003:91; Zewde, 2002:248-256).  
 
The above brief analysis shows that the military regime made no effort to address the 
basic causes of conflict in the state, which included the centralisation of the state and 
ethnic domination in the country. Rather, it aggravated them by adopting 
undemocratic polices masked by a socialist ideology. This led to mass killings and 
repressive measures which led to a proliferation of ethnic-based armed groups in the 
country. 
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 Rural Resource Appropriation during the Military Regime 
The military regime implemented different policies to enable it to appropriate the 
surplus of the peasant-based subsistence economy.  For this purpose, Agricultural 
Marketing Corporation (AMC) was established to buy the grain of peasants and other 
products at prices fixed by the government. As these prices were normally below 
market prices, they discouraged the peasants from being more productive. Moreover, 
the AMC used a quota system that forced peasants to give some of their grain to the 
market. Consequently, when the peasants were not able to provide the specified 
amount of grain to the AMC they were forced to sell their animals to realise the 
required cash (Markakis, 1987:267). The government also introduced a villagisation
4
 
system with the stated objective of modernising the rural economy, but in practice it 
was designed to control the resources of the peasants and to mobilise the rural 
population in order to resist oppostion groups and insurgents.  However, the 
programme failed due to its highly centralised nature, which did not consider the 
cultural and social factors of the people
5
  nor the lack of resources or the low 
provision of social services to the newly established villages (Berisso, 2002, 119-130; 
Zewde, 2002, Naty, 2002:68). The tax system was also a heavy burden on the rural 
population. In some places tax was levied on all family members, whether they were 
married or not. This created significant resentment in the rural population. 
 
                                                 
4
 Lirenso(1989:1) defines  villagisation in Ethiopia as a process by which  „rural households formerly 
living in dispersed settlements are concentrated into nucleated settlements as a result of  government 
policy  to reorganise  rural settlements‟ (cited in Berisso,2002:116). 
5
  For example Berisso (2002:119) noted that, for the Guji Oromo (who are polygamists), the 
villagisation programme meant intensified conflict within their own families, because polygamy is 
exercised by dispersing the wives in different locations.  Moreover, it also became problematic for 
some ethnic groups who bury deceased people near their houses. Thus, villagisation meant these ethnic 
groups could be forced to loose touch with their dead. 
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Another economic (perhaps political) policy of the government was a programme of 
resettlement. The resettlement programme was initiated as a response to the 1984 
drought which focused largely in the north, mainly Tigray, Wollo and Northern 
Showa, and some places in the south. Overall around 594,190 people were resettled 
into the current Beishangul-Gumuz regional state and Wallaga, which is a zone of the 
current Oromia Regional State (Mebratie, 2004:144). However, the resettlement 
process was largely a forcible resettlement package which separated families. In 
addition, it was conducted without adequate infrastructure or other social services in 
the new settlement areas. Hence, many people died due to harsh weather, malaria and 
other communicable diseases (Zewde, 2002:262; Pankhurst, 2002:133-135).  Equally, 
it displaced native peoples living in the new resettlement areas (Yntiso, 2004:46).  It 
is also argued that the resettlement programme was designed to weaken the ethno-
national movements in the country.  Significant numbers of the settlers were taken 
from Tigray, in which an ethno-national movement had developed, spearheaded by 
the Tigray People‟s Liberation Front (TPLF).  The resettlement package, in effect, 
reduced the mass base of the TPLF by dispersing the rural population away from the 
main places which had attracted TPLF insurgents (Tiruneh, 1993:349).  
 
The government also attempted to expand modern farms. However, these farms 
contributed little to the national economy but instead consumed government 
expenditures that had been allocated to agriculture. For example, by the beginning of 
the 1980s, state farms, which occupied 324,000 hectares or 4% of the total cultivated 
land,  consumed 82% of all fertiliser, over 73% of improved seeds, 80% of 
agricultural credit, and nearly all other agricultural inputs provided by the state 
(Keller, 1985:14 cited in Markakis, 1987:267). 
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In parallel to the rural development, an attempt was made to develop industry, such as 
the textile industries in Combelcha and Bahrdar. However, as the resources of the 
government were mainly invested in the importation of armaments from the eastern 
socialist countries, industrial development could not expand significantly during the 
military regime (Keller, 1985:14 cited in Markakis, 1987:267). All in all, the 
development of the economy was minimal. For example, when the government made 
a revolutionary economic development plan for 1984/85-1993/94 the anticipated 
economic growth was 6.5% growth in GDP and 3.6% rise in per capita income. 
However, this never materialised; in fact per capita income declined by about 0.8% 
(Zewde, 2002:263).   
 
The above analysis shows that, regardless of the abolition of the monarchic system, 
the exploitative nature of the state towards the rural population continued during the 
military regime – through the centralised state apparatus including the AMC and 
through villagisation. Therefore, the relationship between the military regime and the 
rural population has remained conflictual except in the early few years of the 
revolution. This became a reason for the proliferation of insurgent groups and 
increasing support for EPRDF forces in the rural areas when they expanded their 
influence from the Northern part of the country to the Central and South-Western 
areas, including Showa, Gojam, Gondar and Wallega(Omer, 2002:84-89). 
  
Armed Conflicts in Ethiopia 
The nation building project which focused on centralised state building, ethnic 
assimilation and rural surplus appropriation led into ethno-national movements across 
the country. Hence, many armed groups from different ethnic groups started insurgent 
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activities – including in Tigray, Oromo, Somali, Sidama and Afar, in addition to the 
Eritrean struggle for independence which started during the Haile Selassie regime. All 
in all, there were 17 insurgent groups fighting against the military regime before its 
downfall in 1991 (Barnabas, 2003). Most of the insurgent activities demanded self-
determination although the EPLF, OLF and ONLF were fighting for the independence 
of Eritrea, Oromia and Ogaden respectively. The civil wars associated with these 
insurgent activities can be discussed in relation to the main resistance groups which 
emerged in Eritrea (1960-1991), Tigray (1975-1991) and Oromia (1967-1991). The 
inter-state wars which include the Ethio-Somali wars (1977-1978, 1982, 2006-2009) 
and Ethio-Eritrea war (1998-2000) are not discussed here as the focus of the study is 
on intra-state civil wars.   
 
The Eritreans started their armed struggle for independence in 1960 (Markakis, 
1978:94).   After 1941 Eritrea became independent from Italy but remained under a 
British care-taker administration until it was federated with Ethiopia in 1952. 
However, the Haile Selassie regime dismantled the federation and made the country a 
province of Ethiopia.  This was done mainly because when Eritrea was federated to 
Ethiopia, the Haile Selassie regime was not comfortable with the emerging national 
identity of Eritrea, its free media and the number of political parties in the country. 
Moreover, as the main aim of the regime was the centralisation of the state, the 
Eritrean federal structure was considered a threat to that centralist objective.  The 
federation was dissolved in 1962 and immediately the Emperor‟s official 
representative urged Eritreans to study Amharic, now they were Ethiopians (Markakis, 
1998:109-116; Markakis, 1987:94; Zewde, 2002). 
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As a result, an armed struggle for independence was started by the Eritrea Liberation 
Front (ELF) in 1961. But later the Eritrea People‟s Liberation Front (EPLF) became 
the main resistance group, which fought against the Ethiopian Imperial and Military 
regimes for about 30 years, until the unitary state collapsed in 1991 and Eritrea‟s 
independence  was formally acknowledged after a  referendum in 1993 (Gilkes and 
Plaut, 1999). 
 
The right of self determination became a burning issue in Tigray, which is considered 
the centre of Abyssinia, during the Haile Selassie regime. The reason is that although 
Tigrayans are predominantly Christians, and have lived for centuries in one region 
with the Amhara, they consider themselves to be culturally distinct from the Amhara, 
and they speak Tigrigna, which is different from Amharic. Moreover, as the Tigrians 
had their own place in Abyssinian history, they remained a rival ethnic group in the 
region.  Since the death of Emperor Yohannes they had felt marginalised from the 
benefits of the nation-state (Clapham, 1988:206). And when the Menilek troops 
marched north to fight the Italian colonisers they destroyed the property of the local 
people. Moreover, after Emperor Haile Selassie returned from exile in 1941 he sent an 
unpopular Amhara governor to Tigray and the tax subsequently levied on that region 
was higher than the tax paid to the Italians during the occupation (Markakis, 1987). 
 
As a result the Tigrayans revolted against   the regime in 1943.   The rebellion started 
around Mekelle, the region‟s capital city, and destroyed the government‟s military 
forces stationed there. However, the government dispersed the rebellion with the 
support of the British Air Force and took barbaric measures to suppress the rebellion 
(Zewde, 2002:216). The peasant rebellion surrendered and as punishment the districts 
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of Welkait and Thegede, in the west, and Raya, in the south of Tigray were given to 
Gondar and Wollo provinces respectively (Clapham, 1988; Markakis, 1987). 
 
In addition to this the government imposed Amharic on Tigrayans as a national 
language and this created difficulties for young Tigrayans who wanted to go to 
university, as it became an entry requirement. Consequently in 1963-8 only 2% of 
Tigrayans were qualified to attend university compared to 65% who qualified from 
Showa (Haile W. Michael, 1969:3 cited in Markakis, 1987:251).  In addition, the 
government made little effort to prevent the repeated famines that took hundreds of 
thousands of lives in the region. It did nothing to develop the region, except locating 
an abattoir there (Markakis, 1987:251). 
 
The Tigray People‟s Liberation Front (TPLF) started an armed struggle in February 
1975 (Young, 1999), fuelled mainly by their concern that a change of government 
would not eliminate state structures, which discriminated against them (Ibid).  The 
TPLF was established by disaffected university students, who participated in radical 
movements, influenced by Marxist ideology, against the imperial regime (Markakis, 
1987:254).    They went on to attack the military regime and later became the main 
resistance group which ultimately created a nation-wide front (Ethiopian People‟s 
Revolutionary Democratic Front), in co-operation with other insurgent groups, and 
played the key role in overthrowing the military regime in 1991 (Young, 1999; 
Markakis, 1994).  
 
The TPLF leaders considered the national question in Ethiopia as a primary 
contradiction which determined the resolution of other political issues in the country. 
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Moreover, they thought that the national question should be resolved through self-
determination up to secession, which imitated Stalin‟s approach of the nations and 
nationalities of the former Soviet Union, discussed in Chapter Two. This became a 
fundamental principle for the federal constitution which was ratified in 1995. The 
origins of the thesis started in the academic movements of the Haile Selassie I 
university during the 1960s, which were greatly influenced by the Marxist approach 
to the issues nations and nationalities. Ethiopia was considered a „prison house‟ of 
oppressed nationalities by many scholars, including the very popular student 
movement‟s leader Tilahun Gizaw – who was killed by the imperial regime‟s security 
forces before the 1974 revolution (Gudina, 2006:126:127). 
 
Although the thesis partly explains the oppression of the ethnic groups by the nation-
state, it overlooks the common national sentiment created between the ethnic groups.  
For example, the mobilisation of all local leaders against the Italian invasion (1896) 
and occupation (1935-41) created a sense of common accomplishment. The 
assimilation practices of the nation state (especially intermarriages and adoption of 
Christianity mainly in Showa and Wallega) created a sense of commonality. 
Moreover,  the expansion of the  standardised education system all over the country  
enabled the educated people to  focus on common issues – for example the debate 
conducted by the student movements of Haile Selassie I university during the 1960s  
were mainly focused  on national issues  such as  the nationalities  and land reform 
issues  that concerned  all Ethiopian people (Zwede, 2002). Therefore, Ethiopia 
cannot be considered to have been merely a „prison house‟ of ethnic groups. There 
existed an Ethiopian national sentiment between the ethnic groups – and that made 
them a nation. 
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However, the common national sentiment was not strong enough to integrate the 
ethnic groups into the nation-state.  For example, the predatory tendencies of the 
nation-state towards the peasant-based subsistence economy, and the modernisation 
policy of the government, meant the rural areas (in which the majority of the ethnic 
groups lived) were disregarded (Donham, 1985).  In addition, the response of the state 
to identity-based mobilisation as in Tigray and Oromia remained harsh (Clapham, 
1987; Young, 1998). Moreover, the peripheral ethnic groups had little interaction with 
the nation-state during the Imperial and Military regimes in the 20
th
 century
6
.  All 
these problems contributed to the existence of weak integration of the ethnic groups 
into the nation-state. 
 
  The Oromos also rebelled between 1963-1970. These people were one of the 
disadvantaged groups during the imperial march to the western and southern parts of 
the country. For example, when Menilek went to Arusi the local people resisted him 
and as a punishment he confiscated their land and distributed it to his noblemen. 
Hence, the local people became tenants of Menilek‟s noblemen.  As this had 
happened relatively recently, it remained in the collective memory. The rebellion took 
place in Bale province as result of religious subordination and the land tenure system 
imposed by the government. This was also suppressed by military force (Zewde, 
2002:216; Markakis, 1987:259, Clapham, 1987).  
 
                                                 
6
 For example, the Dassanetch ethnic group, which lives along the borders of Kenya, the pastoralist 
people of Afar and Somali, and other ethnic groups such as the Anywaa, Nuer, Berta and Gumuz in the 
south-west remained alienated from the nation-state and little national sentiment was formed that 
would have encouraged them to integrate into the nation-state (Donham, 1985; Feyissa, 2006; Almagor, 
1985:96-97). 
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The Haile Selassie regime also imposed Amharic on the Oromos, so that by the mid 
1960s and throughout the 1970s only 15% – 20% of university students were Oromos 
despite the Oromos forming the largest ethnic group in the country.  Again the 
development efforts focused on the coffee producing areas, which were unreachable 
for the majority of the rural Oromos (Markakis, 1987: 259).  As a result, the educated 
Oromos created the Mechana-Tulema self-help association in 1963. The association 
linked the poverty of the Oromos with the conquest of Oromia by the northerners, and 
attracted many members including prominent military men from the army (Donahm, 
1985:35). 
 
The Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) was established along ethnic lines in 1975 with 
the aim of independence for Oromia.  The OLF believed colonial domination was 
responsible for the position Oromia found itself in. It is argued that conquest of the 
Abyssinans to the Southern parts of Ethiopia during late 19
th
 century should be 
considered as a colonisation process, which could not be separated from the scramble 
for Africa by the European colonisers.  Supporting this view was the harshness of 
conquest, the destruction of local institutions, and the imposition of an Abyssinan 
culture on the local people and the resource appropriation made by the Menelik 
regime (Lata, 1999; Jalata, 2005:1).  Accordingly, the OLF fought for their 
independence from the jungles of Harar and continued to operate in Harar and 
Wallega until the downfall of the military regime in 1991 (Markakis, 1987). 
 
However, African colonialism was mainly associated with the development of 
capitalism in the European countries. Therefore, it could be argued that colonialism in 
African was basically capitalism‟s conquest over the African mode of economies 
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(Jackson and Rosberg, 1982).  On the other hand, the expansion of Abyssinia should 
be considered as the historical outcome of a scheme to expand one group‟s territory, 
whose own economic and cultural development was the same as their conquered 
people (Gudina, 2006:125-126).  Moreover, there was no colonial boundary between 
the Ethiopian peoples, in the same way that was created by the Europeans (Ibid). 
Therefore, the colonial thesis of conflict analysis does not provide any insight to the 
problems of the country.   
 
The response of the military regime to the armed opposition groups was an increase in 
repressive measures. This had two interrelated consequences, which eventually led to 
the ruin of the regime. Firstly, many civilians were killed and this contributed to 
stronger solidarity between the rural population and the armed forces in opposition to 
the military regime. Moreover, the opposition groups found it easier to rally the rural 
population to support them and to recruit youngsters who strengthened the military 
power of the armed opposition parties (Young, 1998). Secondly, the wars required a 
huge conscription programme, and mobilisation of resources, which ultimately 
became too big a burden for the country. For these reasons, coupled with the 
increased military pressure created by the insurgents (mainly EPRDF and EPLF), the 
military regime collapsed in 1991(Zewde, 2002). 
 
 Conclusion 
The historical sources of intra-state conflict in Ethiopia are largely associated with its 
nation-building project. These are, in the main, related to the centralisation of the state 
and ethnic domination, surplus appropriation from the rural areas and the repressive 
measures taken by governments against their opponents.  
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For these reasons, the domestic political process during the military regime created 
two factors which influenced the nature of the transitional and federal processes that 
followed the downfall of the military regime. Firstly, as the insurgents‟ activities were 
led by ethnic-based armed groups, the confrontations with the military regime 
aggravated the issue of nationalities that would be addressed by the transitional 
government. Secondly, the political process during the military regime also resulted in 
weakness of the national parties as they were heavily hit by the military regime and 
many of them were forced to live in exile. Thus, ethnic-based political forces emerged 
as significant political players from the civil wars that concluded in 1991. The 
domestic political process during the military regime necessitated a federalisation of 
the state, but it was dominated by ethnic-based political players, which will be dealt 
with in detail in Chapter Four. 
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Chapter Four 
Redefining the Nation-state: The Federalisation Process in Ethiopia 
 Introduction 
This chapter examines the federalisation process in Ethiopia. First, it discusses the 
reasons for the federalisation of the state, the main activities of the transition period 
and the realisation of the federal arrangement. Additionally, it scrutinizes the main 
features of the federal constitution, with respect of accommodation of the ethnic 
groups and the management of intra-state conflict in the country. Institutionalising 
identity, resource-sharing, democratic participation and intergovernmental 
relationships can be seen as the main influential factors when analysing the challenges 
and opportunities of the federal system.  
 
Reasons for the Federalisation of the State  
Ethiopia became a federalised country officially in 1995, after a four-year transitional 
period. There were several reasons for the federalisation of the state.  Firstly, there 
was the failure of the nation-state nation building project. As discussed in Chapter 
Three, the driving principle of the nation state was one nation, one people and one 
flag (Abbay, 2004). Therefore, there were attempts to assimilate the multiple ethnic 
groups into one culture and language (ibid).  These factors were reinforced by uneven 
economic development that disregarded the rural areas, where the majority of the 
ethnic groups lived. The policies and programmes of the nation building project 
created ethnic grievances, which were followed by demands for self-determination 
from a majority of the ethnic groups in the country. Therefore, a state restructuring, 
which could address the ethnic grievances, was required to maintain the integrity of 
the country (Eshete, 2003).  
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 In addition, demands for self-determination were followed by civil wars. This 
involved the TPLF in Tigray and the OLF in Oromia, and other ethnic-based armed 
groups, among the Somali, Afar and Sidama. Their main demand was for self-rule, or 
secession. Therefore, a federal arrangement that restructured the state on the basis of 
shared rule, and self rule, was a necessary condition for round-table conflict 
management, before most of the armed groups in the country would disarm (Ibid). 
 
However, although federalization of the state was a necessary condition for its 
survival, the reason that the EPRDF wanted an ethnic-based federal approach 
depended on a number of interrelated factors. First, the EPRDF‟s choice of an ethnic-
based federalism was influenced by the Marxist understanding of the national 
question in Ethiopia. The national question in Ethiopia was compared to the national 
question of the Russian empire at the end of the 19
th
 century. Hence, the Ethiopian 
student movement during the 1960s considered Haile Silassie‟s Ethiopia as the 
„prison house‟ of nationalities and advocated self-determination of nations up to 
secession (Mekonneen, 1969). The TPLF leadership, which was highly influenced by 
the radical student movements in the 1960s, adopted the Marxist understanding of 
nationalities into its political programme and used it as an ideological guidance in the 
armed struggle that overthrew the military regime in 1991(Markakis,1998). The 
Marxist Leninist League of Tigray (MLLT), which was established by the core 
leaders of the TPLF in 1985, took the national question in Ethiopia not only as an 
immediate question that had to be resolved through self-determination but also 
wanted to use it as a tactic of socialist revolution to overcome the barriers between the 
nationalities in Ethiopia. After the Soviet Union disintegrated in 1989, the MLLT 
officially disappeared as a result of the unfavourable global conditions for Marxist 
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political parties
1
. However, the EPRDF incorporated the ideas of self-determination 
up to secession and ethnic-based federalism into the constitutional design during the 
transitional period (1991-1994). Accordingly, the Ethiopian ethnic groups were 
understood to all have their own culture, psychological makeup and residential 
territories (Article 39). The Ethiopian nationalities were also considered as having 
different levels of social cohesion and economic development. Hence, they were 
categorised as nations, nationalities and people, which is quite similar to Stalin‟s 
categorisation of the ethnic groups in the former Soviet Union. Consequently, the 
ethnic groups which were considered relatively bigger and more economically 
developed established their own regional states and the smaller ones established 
Zones, Woreda and even Kebele levels of administration. This is also quite similar to 
the four tiers of republics established after the constitutional amendment of the Soviet 
Union in 1924. Therefore, Marxist understanding of the national question became the 
ideological basis for the federal constitutional design during the transitional period. 
 
However, the ideological issue was not the only factor which contributed to the 
ethnic-based constitutional design. The process of the armed struggle and the balance 
of power between the armed political parties also influenced the constitutional design. 
The armed struggle against the military regime, which was mainly conducted in 
Tigray, created liberated areas, including some places which were formerly 
administered under Gondar and Wollo provinces. When the TPLF liberated most parts 
of the Tigrinya-speaking areas in the north of Ethiopia, the assumption was to create 
self-rule for Tigray. Hence, after the downfall of the military regime, ethnic-based 
federalism was the best way in which this could be legitimized.  However, giving self-
                                                 
1
 Interview notes, former central committee member of TPLF, Addis Ababa, May 2011. 
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rule only to Tigray and following another approach in the rest of the country was 
incompatible with the ideology of the TPLF and would also undermine the legitimacy 
of the ruling party in the eyes of many other ethnic groups including the Oromos, 
Somalis and Afars, who had also fought for self-rule during the military regime. 
Similarly, following an integrative approach of federalism was not a choice for the 
EPRDF because it could challenge its legitimacy in its main support area of Tigray 
and in the other parts of Ethiopia that had fought for self-rule. 
 
A former TPLF member of the Central Committee explains this as follows: 
 It is not because that we were Marxists we fought for Tigray self-rule. The 
demand for ethnic-based self-rule was a necessary result of the tyrannical 
relationship of the Ethiopian nation state and its constituents. Then the process 
of the armed struggle brought all the liberated areas of the Tigrayina speaking 
people together into one de facto administration. Thus, providing a sustainable 
administration to the people (ethnic group) through ethnic-based federalism 
was a basic political right of the people
2
. 
 
Nonetheless, it is possible that the EPRDF would have negotiated on the 
constitutional design, if there had been other strong, multinational political parties that 
had had a role in overthrowing the military regime in 1991. However, this did not 
happen because the opposition parties were organisationally weak and this created 
favourable condition for EPRDF domination of the domestic politics of the 
transitional period and of the constitutional design process. Therefore, the reason that 
the EPRDF chose a constitutional design based on ethnic federalism has to be 
                                                 
2
  Interview  notes, Addis Ababa, May 2011 
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answered in relation to the above factors. In other words, if the power balances in the 
domestic politics had been different from that described above, then the process of 
federal constitutional design would probably have been different, regardless of the 
Marxist influence on the EPRDF. 
 
The Transitional Period and the Federalisation Process 
As the country emerged from protracted civil war a transitional period was necessary 
to prepare for the federalisation process. Establishing a transitional government, 
which could stabilise the country and drafting and ratifying a new constitution became 
the main tasks during the transitional period. However, in the aftermath of the civil 
war, two contradictory attitudes were seen among the political actors of the country. 
On one hand, the ethno-national movements showed interest in participating in the 
transitional government. For example, Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) agreed to 
participate in the transitional government during the negotiations, held in London and 
mediated by Herman Cohen, the USA‟s Deputy Secretary of State for African Affairs. 
Other national representatives, including those from Afar, Somali, Gambella, and 
Sidama, also agreed to participate in the transitional government (Fiseha, 2006:47).  
 
However, on the other hand there was reluctance, on the side of the multinational 
political parties, to become involved in the transitional government. For example, the 
Ethiopian People‟s Revolutionary Party (EPRP) which had irreconcilable political 
differences and armed confrontations with EPRDF during the armed struggle was not 
ready for reconciliation (Vaughan and Tronvoll, 2003). 
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A transitional conference was held in Addis Ababa in July 1991. Thirty-one political 
parties, including all members of EPRDF
3
, the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), the 
Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), the Afar Liberation Front (ALF), the 
Islamic Front for the Liberation of Oromia (IFLO), and other newly established 
political parties from the Southern region as well as professional associations such as 
the Labour Confederation and Addis Ababa University, attended the conference. They 
signed the charter which led to the establishment of a transitional council with 87 
seats. Moreover, a power-sharing agreement was reached between the political parties, 
in accordance with their contribution to the armed struggle fought against the military 
regime.  The conference passed decisions to change the state structure, to maintain 
peace and order, and to stabilise the economy (Fiseha, 2006:47-:53). 
 
The Charter created a remarkable change in the state structure (Fiseha, 2006, Young, 
1998, Menigestab, 1997). It made ethnicity the main factor of political representation 
in political institutions. This guaranteed the ethnic groups the right of self-
determination, including the right to establish local and regional administrations. In 
all, some 64 ethnic groups were identified and 48 of them were allowed to establish a 
Woreda, which is the lowest local government unit. The remaining ethnic groups were 
considered minorities. Their population size was too small to establish the Woreda 
level administration, so instead they joined a district level administration. Language 
difference was taken as the main ethnic marker between the ethnic groups (Fiseha, 
2006:47-53). The basis for the division of Ethiopia between nationalities was the 
                                                 
3
 The Member parties of EPRDF in the aftermath of the civil war were the Tigray People‟s Liberation 
Front (TPLF), the Ethiopian People‟s Democratic Movement (EPDM), later the Amhara People‟s 
Democratic Movement (APDM) and the Oromo People‟s Democratic Organisation (OPDO). The 
Southern Ethiopian People‟s Democratic Coalition (SEPDC) was another party that became a member 
party of EPRDF during the transitional period. 
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work of the institute for the study of Ethiopian nationalites established by the Derg 
before 1991, with its emphasis on language. 
 
Popular regional and local elections were held for the first time in the country, with 
the regional elections being originally scheduled for June1992 (Vaughan and Tronvoll, 
2003). However, the OLF and the All Amhara People‟s Organisation (AAPO) asked 
for a postponement of the elections because they needed more time to prepare; but the 
EPRDF insisted they take place as scheduled. As a result, the OLF withdrew from the 
transitional government and attempted to re-launch guerrilla insurgency. The AAPO 
also withdrew from the elections. Consequently, the EPRDF won the elections 
without significant competition from opposition parties (Fiseha, 2006). 
 
Following the withdrawal of the opposition parties, other activities of the transitional 
period included the constitution-drafting process, elections for the constitutional 
assembly, and the elections for the first national and regional parliaments, This was 
all done without the meaningful participation of the opposition parties.  There were a 
number of reasons for this. First, the OLF only participated half heartedly in the 
transitional process. It was not ready to disarm its fighters and was recruiting new 
candidates mainly from the former soldiers of the military regime, and it was accused 
of killing innocent people in Bedono, Arusi and Arba-Gugu 
4
 (Minutes of the 
transitional government council, 1992). Second, the opposition parties were 
fragmented during the transitional period. They did not have clear policy alternatives 
that enabled them to appeal to the public. Nor did they have cohesive party structures, 
which would have enabled them to compete with EPRDF with its strong country-wide 
                                                 
4
 The transitional council established a committee that scrutinised all the accusations against OLF and   
these were discussed in the presence of OLF before it left the council. 
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party structure (Fiseha, 2006:53). Third, preferential treatment by EPRDF towards its 
member parties in the Oromia and southern regions created obstacles for the OLF and 
other opposition parties in the south (Birhanu, 2003).  
 
Overall, the state was radically changed during the transitional period. However, the 
domination of one political party, and the minimal participation of the opposition 
parties, remained the main drawback of the transitional period. The result was that the 
new transitional institutions such as the central and regional government institutions 
fell completely under the control of the ruling party. In fact, it can be concluded that 
the transitional process created conditions that favoured the ruling party‟s control of 
the emerging federal state and its institutions. 
 
Institutionalising of Ethnic Identity and its Consequences 
 The Ethiopian federal arrangement can be considered as a federalisation of the 
unitary state into a federal centre and constituent units. The main purpose of this 
arrangement was to change the structure of the unitary state which caused the 
formation of armed ethno-national movements and civil wars in the country.  
 
The late Ato Kifle Wodajo, who headed the Constitutional Drafting Committee, aptly 
stated that: 
Like most other constitutions, the constitution of FDRE has been greatly 
influenced by, and has, in fact, emerged out of the immediate conditions that 
preceded it – three decades of protracted civil wars that destroyed countless 
lives and livelihoods, and wreaked havoc on the social fabric of Ethiopian 
society. The constitution was designed to remove the causes of future civil 
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wars; to restore peace and sustain it; and to establish a democratic order in 
which the rights of national communities and of citizens are recognised and 
protected.
5
 
 
The federal constitution became effective through the proclamation of statute No 
1/1995. The constitution particularly gives attention to the right of self-determination 
of ethnic groups (Article, 39). Therefore, institutionalising ethnic identity can be 
considered the main feature of the federal arrangement, hence the description „ethnic 
federalism‟. In other words, this feature became the main determining factor for the 
power relationships and intergovernmental relationships between the centre and the 
constituent units.  There are several reasons for this. 
  
 Firstly, focusing on nationality, the constitution stipulates that sovereign power lies 
with the nationalities of the country (Article 8/1). Accordingly, the federal institutions 
of governance are established with the consent of the stipulated nationalities. 
Moreover, the nationalities can withdraw their consent to the federal government 
through the provisions of session, provided for them by the constitution. “Every 
nation, nationality and people in Ethiopia has an unconditional right to self- 
determination, including the right to secession” (Article 39/1). 
 
Secondly, the constitution enables the ethnic groups to administer themselves on the 
basis of their identity differences.  “Every nation, nationality and people in Ethiopia 
has the right to a full measure of self-government which includes the right to establish 
institutions of government in the territory that it inhabits and to equitable 
                                                 
5
 Advisory opinion given by Ato Kifle Wodajo to the House of Federation, on the constitutionality of 
Article 38(1)(b) of proclamation 11/1995, February  2003 
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representation in state and federal governments” (Article 39/3). Accordingly, the 
constitution has identified nine regional states. Among these Oromia, Amhara, Somal, 
Tigray and Afar are predominantly composed of the ethnic groups that give their 
name to the regional states. Others, including Benishangul-Gumuz, the Southern 
regional state, Gambela and Hararri reflect multiethnic regional states, where the 
lower level of governance is established on the basis of ethnic identity.  
 
Finally, the constitution stipulates that borders of regional administrations can be 
identified on the basis of ethnic identity. “States shall be delimited on the basis of the 
settlement patterns, language, identity and consent of the people concerned” (Article 
46/2). Therefore, the Ethiopian federal system institutionalises ethnic identity through 
the regional states and lower level administrations which are established along ethnic 
lines.  
 
 Language as Main Ethnic Marker 
For the above purpose language has been taken as the main ethnic marker (in practice) 
to identify ethnic groups, regional states and their common borders for the last 18 
years. However, this has caused much debate. It is argued that the federal constitution 
assumes that every ethnic group inhabits a territorially defined geographical area 
(Vauguan, 2008; Fiseha, 2006:135). But this does not take into account migration. For 
example, a number of Amhara people migrated to Oromia and the southern regions 
during the Menilek expansion, and later in search of economic opportunities. The 
military regime resettlement package also moved more than 600,000 people to 
Gambella, Wallaga, Metekel and Asossa (Pankhurst, 2002). Moreover, the urban 
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areas are multi-lingual and the growing mobility of the population, due to social, 
economical and political change, means it is less feasible to use language as an ethnic 
marker in Ethiopia (Fiseha, 2006:253-254).   
 
 However, the use of language as an ethnic marker is related to the level of integration 
of the ethnic groups within the state and the social structure of the rural population. 
The nation building project, which originally focused on establishing garrison towns 
around the commercial farms, served to maintain the centre and periphery 
relationships between the nation-state and the ethnic groups.  Because of this, the 
rural people remained „loosely‟ integrated within the nation state (Donham, 1985).  
 
This can also be seen from a sample of ethnic groups in the country as shown in the 
table below. The sample was of the larger ethnic groups, which established regional 
states, and the most urbanised ethnic groups. Accordingly, 76% and 42% of Hararri 
and Gurague‟s ethnic groups, respectively, live in urban areas; whereas the population 
of the other ethnic groups – ranging from 76%-95% – live in rural areas. On average 
83% of the Ethiopian population live in rural areas. 
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4.1. Urban and Rural dwellers by regional states 
  Total 
population 
Urban Rural Percentage of the urban 
population 
Percentage of 
the rural 
population
6
 
Afar 1,276,374 108,488 1,167,886 9 91 
Amhara 19,870,651 4,387,853 15,482,798 22 78 
Oromo 25,489,024 3,045,027 22,443,997 12 88 
Hadya 1,284,373 150,949 1,133,424 12 88 
Sidama 2,966,474 149,480 2,816,994 5 95 
Welaita 1,707,079 289,707 1,417,372 17 83 
Guragie 1,867,377 792,659 1,074,718 42 58 
Berta 183,259 10,611 172,648 6 94 
Somali 4,581,794 675,466 3,906,328 15 85 
Newer 147,672 28,236 119,436 19 81 
Harari 31,869 24,347 7,522 77 23 
 
Source: Central Statistics Authority of Ethiopia (CSAE), Census of 2007.  
 
People in the rural areas still depend on a peasant-based subsistence economy. This 
means ethnic ties have remained more significant in the rural areas. Because of this 
the group identity of the rural people can easily be identified by their language.  So, 
language difference, in rural areas, is closely related to cultural and identity 
differences (James et al, 2002). 
 
Okwudiba Nnoli (1978:5) explains the crucial role of language in the context of 
Africa as follows:  
Ethnic groups are social formations distinguished by the communal character 
of their boundaries. The relevant fact may be language, culture or both. In 
Africa, language has been the most crucial variable.  
 
This quotation helps explain the relevance of language in defining ethnic groups in 
the context of Ethiopia, because many ethnic groups do not differ other than in their 
language and culture. For example, there is no significant noticeable physical 
                                                 
6
 The percentage calculation is the researcher‟s. 
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difference between the Berta and Gumuz ethnic groups in the Benishangul-Gumuz 
regional state. Nevertheless, the ethnic groups have different languages, cultures and 
traditional faiths as well as different territories. Similarly, despite the common 
interaction between the Amhara and Oromos ethnic groups, they have mutually 
unintelligible languages, different cultures and they live in separate areas, except for 
those Amharas who migrated to the Ormos territories during the emergence of the 
modern Ethiopian state. Therefore, language difference is one of the major ethnic 
markers in Ethiopia. 
 
4.2. Percentage of different languages speakers in regional states 
Regional state Main language  Percentage of speakers
7
 
Tigray Tigrigna 97 
Amhara Amharic 91 
Afar Afar 96 
Oromia Oromifa 91 
Somali Somali 98 
Southern regional state Multi-lingual  
Benishangul-Gumuz Multi-lingual  
Gambella Multi-lingual  
Harari Multi-lingual  
 
Source: CSAE, National census of 2007 
 
The language difference also reflects, in many cases, the territorial difference of the 
ethnic groups. For example, the above table shows in the first five regional states 
more than 90% of the population speak the official languages of the regional states. 
This means the language difference and territorial residence of the ethnic groups 
coincides in these states. Even in the multi-ethnic regional states the predominant 
ethnic groups have their own territory. Multi-ethnic regional states exist because of 
political, social and economic advantages and because many of the ethnic groups are 
                                                 
7
 Percentages calculated by the researcher. 
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too small to establish their own regional administration (Desalegn, 2003). Therefore, 
the argument against an ethnic identity as the main criteria for the federal arrangement, 
and language as the main ethnic marker, does not seem valid in the context of 
Ethiopia. There are solid grounds for using language as an ethnic marker – as  the 
ethnic groups primarily live in rural areas, speak their own language, have cultural 
differences, and live predominantly in their own territories. 
 
However, a language may be spoken by neighbouring groups and in the common 
border areas of ethnic groups or by two or more ethnic groups; hence, the Tutsi and 
Hutu in Rwanda speak the same language and share the same territory and cultural 
traditions (Francis, 2006:78). If this is the main trend of the ethnic groups under 
investigation, there are no grounds for language to be used as an ethnic marker. 
Nevertheless, in the context of Ethiopia and except in the garrison towns (established 
during the unitary state), Addis Ababa and the common borders of the ethnic groups, 
the majority of the ethnic groups speak their own languages and these convey the 
cultural and territorial differences of the various peoples. 
 
The role of urban areas and the mobility of people in promoting a federal identity also 
has to be seen alongside the overall territorial residency of ethnic groups in the 
country. Although economic development and urbanisation facilitate greater mobility 
of people that does not mean all cities become multi-cultural. There is an evolving 
tendency towards both multicultural and homogenous cities in Ethiopia. In many parts 
of the country, mainly in those regional states where the spoken language is 
predominantly homogenous, the spoken language in the cities and towns follows a 
similar tendency. For example, Mekelle and Bahrdar are growing as Tigrigna- and 
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Amharic-speaking cities respectively (National census, 2007). In those multi-ethnic 
regional states such as the southern one there will be multi-ethnic cities as well as 
smaller ethnic-based towns. For example, Hawassa, the capital city of the southern 
region, is evolving as a multi-cultural city; whereas Hosaena, a town also in the 
southern region, is evolving as a centre of the Hadiya ethnic group as the people in the 
rural areas surrounding the town are  only Hadiya by ethnic identity (Ibid). 
 
However, whether the cities are multiethnic or homogenous, civic relationship is a 
common feature of all of them. The existence of civic relationships in the urban areas 
also enhances civic ties between the members of ethnic groups, which greatly 
facilitate the cultivation of federal identity in the country. However, the urban areas 
do not need to be multi-cultural to become centres of civic ties and federal identity. 
Civic ties can develop in homogenous as well as multi-cultural cities; therefore both 
types of cities can be a centre of federal identity (Simeon and Murry, 2004). 
 
In addition, it has to be clear that federalisation of the state imposes a constitutional 
framework upon urbanisation (Elazar, 1987:256). This means that federalisation of 
the state reduces the adverse effects of urbanisation that cause migration of people, as 
happened during the unitary state because of uneven economic development. In other 
words, the resource-sharing mechanisms devised by the federal system encourage 
evolving small towns that can create employment opportunities for their residents 
(ibid). Therefore, multi-ethnic urban areas cannot be the main phenomenon of 
Ethiopian economic development. However, as the country emerges into a developed 
nation, mobility of people (but not migration) could be increased because of the 
emergence of networks of different interest groups and of professional employment 
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opportunities, as seen in developed countries. At this stage there is a greater chance 
for multi-cultural urban areas to emerge. This means that group rights have to be 
redefined in accordance with the societal development level. 
 
 Nevertheless, the focus of the federal arrangement and federalisation process on 
ethnicity has had some consequences. These include imbalances between the 
promotion of ethnic and national identities, imbalances between the sizes 
(geographical and population) of the regional states, lack of minority rights protection 
and the issue of secession. These problems are primarily associated with the weakness 
of the constitutional design which will be discussed in the following sections. As a 
result some of them have become causes of intra-state violent conflicts in some 
regional states. Others can also potentially damage the federal integrity of the country 
which is assumed to being built up in the federal process.  
 
Relationship between National and Ethnic-Identities  
It is argued that the above parameters for the institutionalisation of ethnic identity are 
influenced by a primordial approach to ethnicity. The constitution implicitly denies 
the existences of other identities of people who cannot be defined by the ethnic 
markers specified in the constitution. For example, there could be many people with 
mixed identities or people who were born and grew up in urban areas such as Addis 
Ababa. These people may not have   close affiliation to one of the ethnic groups   in 
the country; therefore, they may define themselves only as Ethiopians.  Moreover, the 
constitution also considers that all the ethnic groups have their own territorial 
residence. Although this is predominantly true for the reasons discussed in the 
previous sections, it does not consider the intermingled residential territories of the 
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ethnic groups in some places and along their common border areas (Aalen, 2006:246-
248). 
 
 The practical implication of the above constitutional problem manifests itself in 
lower attention to the commonness of the ethnic groups. This is demonstrated by 
lower attention to citizenship rights and lack of minority rights protection in the 
regional states. Moreover,  the constitutional emphasis  on ethnicity   encourages  
ethnic-based  competition aimed at  controlling   state resources  and identity-based 
demands  targeted at  establishing  ethnic-based local administrations, which, in turn, 
create a wider access to  state resources for the ethnic-based elite groups ( Kefale, 
2004; Aalen, 2006:248; Aalen, 2008). This is further discussed in the following 
sections of the Chapter and in Chapters Six and Seven. 
 
 Different Geographical and Population Sizes of Regional States 
One of the major consequences of the ethnic-based federalism in Ethiopia is that it has 
created regional states with significant geographical and population size differences. 
For example, some of the regional states including, Oromia, Amhara and Somali, are 
bigger in area than Harari, Gambella and Benishamgul- Gumuz. Similarly, Amhara 
and Oromia between them have around 60% of the total Ethiopian population. This 
has provoked several controversies among scholars. 
 
The Ethiopian constitution enables ethnic groups to create their own „mother state‟ 
(Article 39/3). This is because creating a „mother state‟ was considered the best means 
of realising the right of ethnic group self-determination. However, it is argued that the 
criteria for the establishment of the regional states are not entirely clear. For example, 
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some ethnic groups with smaller population such as the Harari established their own 
regional states. However, other ethnic groups with relatively greater population such 
as the Sidama in the Southern region were not allowed to establish a regional state   
although they have made demands for that
8
. Therefore, in addition to the unfair 
treatment of the demands of the ethnic groups in practice it has led to the 
establishment of smaller regional states, such as Harari, Benishangul-Gumuz and 
Gambella, on one hand, and bigger regional states, such as Oromia and Amhara, on 
the other. 
 
This has caused great concern about both vertical and horizontal inequalities between 
the states (Fiseha, 2006; Turton, 2006; Clapham, 2006). For example, Fiseha (2006) 
argues that as Oromia and Amhara together have more than 50% of the seats in the 
federal parliament, a coalition of the winning parties from these regional states could 
threaten the federal structure. In addition, Clapham (2006) argues that  as Amhara and 
Oromia are historically rival regional states, they may not be prepared to work 
together in a coalition and competition between them to control the centre could lead 
to fierce lobbying to gain support from other regional states, such as in the  south. 
This could destabilize the status quo between the central and regional forces.   
Moreover,   as Kefale (2008) noted, the geographical and population size differences 
between the regional states could create administrative and logistical consequences.     
For instance, the small size of some the regional states such as the Harari could create 
difficulty in ensuring their economic viability.  The bigger regional states could also 
feel they are subsidizing the smaller regional states at the expense of their tax payers 
(Kefale, 2008).   
                                                 
8
  Representatives of the Sidama ethnic group have officially asked the regional and federal 
governments whether they can establish their regional state mainly during the first decade of the federal 
state. 
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 The imbalance of the population and geographical size of the regional states is also 
manifested in their relationship with the federal government. Based on field research, 
the Benishangul-Gumuz regional state does not have any representation in federal 
executive institutions. However, the Oromia and Amhara regional states are 
represented in many of the executive ministries. This has created a sense of exclusion 
from the federal institutions so far as Benishangul-Gumuz is concerned, particularly 
during the management of the border conflicts between this state and the Oromia and 
Amhara regional states.
9
 This was also manifested in the budget allocation made by 
the HOF. The parameters used by HOF to allocate the federal subsidy to regional 
states were mainly related to population size. Hence, in the 2006 budget subsidy the 
smaller regional states, such as Gambella, Benishangul-Gumuz and Afar, did not 
receive enough money to cover their recurrent budgets. Thus, the main opposition to 
the budget subsidy comes from the smaller regional states (Fortune, 2008). 
   
This has led to suggestions for a refining of the structure of the regional states that 
could strengthen the federal arrangement. This could be done by dividing the bigger 
regional states into two or more units, and so enabling the federal state to deal with 
more equal sized regional states. This would create sustainable stability as it would 
give a slight advantage to the central forces over the regional forces (Fiseha, 2006, 
Clapham, 2006; Turton, 2006, Kefale, 2008). 
 
However, the idea of dividing the bigger regional states into smaller ones has to be 
treated with caution. Two major points need to be considered.  First, the impact of the 
division on the ethno-national sentiment and federal identity: for example, in Oromia 
                                                 
9
 Interview notes, President of the Benishangul- Gumuz  regional state, May 2008 
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there are regional differences which are manifested in religion and way of life (Fiseha, 
2006).  However, a feeling of „oneness‟ has evolved in this state, mainly since the 
establishment of the Mechanana-Tuluma self-help association in 1960 and this has 
been strengthened by the establishment of the regional institutions of governance 
since 1991.
10
 Moreover, there are no significant differences in the dialect of Oromiffa, 
the language spoken in all parts of Oromia (Baxter, 1978). Therefore, it is debatable 
whether an attempt to divide Oromia into different units will enhance an Oromo 
ethno-national sentiment or promote a federal identity.  
 
The second point relates to ethnic-based political parties using the case of Nigeria. 
Suberu (2006) argues that the division of the former three regional states into 9 then 
12 and finally into 36 states has enabled central government to reduce the challenge 
that came from the bigger regional states. This arrangement was achieved by banning 
ethnic-based political parties in Nigeria. However, the bigger ethnic groups still 
compete with each other to control the federal institutions of governance (Suberu, 
2004). In Ethiopia, banning ethnic-based political parties might harm the smaller 
ethnic groups. This is because the ethnic-based political parties can be useful to the 
smaller ethnic groups to articulate their interests and make them visible in the regional 
and federal institutions of governance. It might also undermine the benefits of the 
smaller ethnic groups that have gained from the federal arrangement.  
 
Therefore, the idea of dividing Oromia and Amhara into different units could lead to 
unintended problems that might harm the federal structure. However, under the 
existing structure, with some refinement, healthy competition between the ethnic 
                                                 
10
 Interview notes,  administration and security experts, Oromia regional state, Addis Ababa, June 2008 
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groups could be maintained. Firstly, every ethnic group is aware that no individual 
group should dominate the federal state. The optimum goal of an ethnic group is to 
have a political role that reflects its population size. This could be achieved through, 
for example, its federal working language, allocation of the executive power, or 
budget subsidy. The federal state must resolve such issues in order to avoid 
unnecessary competition that can lead to conflict (Gudina, 2003). Secondly, 
increasing the role of the smaller ethnic groups at the centre could help achieve these 
goals. The role of the smaller ethnic groups would have to be increased, among other 
things, in all conflict management institutions, such as the HOF, the Prime Minister‟s 
office, the Federal police, and defence. This would promote fairer competition at the 
centre and mediation between groups when problems arise (Esman, 2004). Thirdly, 
equal resource allocation could also minimize the competition at the centre. If 
resources at the centre were allocated transparently and fairly, unnecessary 
competition to control the centre would be reduced significantly. To achieve it would 
be important to establish an independent commission of budget subsidy (Negussie, 
2006) or introduce other mechanisms that enhance the transparency and 
accountability of the existing system.   
 
Different Levels of Regional Economic Development and Relationships to the 
Ethiopian State 
The ethnic-based federalization has also resulted in the creation of regional states with 
different levels of economic development and relationships to the historic structures 
of the Ethiopian state. For example, among the nine regional states, Benishangul-
Gumuz, Gambella, Afar and Somali are considered as emerging (developing) states 
compared to the others. Historically, the people in the emerging regional states have 
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been considered as peripheries. As a result the nation-state‟s interest in these people 
had been focused on exploiting their resources rather than developing them (Donham, 
1985). For these reasons, the peripheral regional states lag behind the others in all 
social, economic and development factors.  
 
The federal government has also enhanced utilization of the fertile land in the 
peripheral regional states for modern agricultural farms. For example, cotton and 
sugar plantations have expanded in the lower Awash valley which, in turn, can greatly 
affect the livelihood of the Afar people in Dubti Woreda and Mile, for example. In 
addition, the people who come to work on the modern farms are mainly from the 
highland areas of Ethiopia. This affects the demographic composition of the local 
population
11
.    
 
The peripheral regional states have also been the most conflict-prone areas over the 
last 20 years. For example, Benishangul-Gumuz remained unstable during the 
transitional period and for the first decade of the federalisation of the country. The 
Gambella regional state also faced serious violent conflict between Anuak and Nuer, 
which resulted in hundreds of deaths and the migration of thousands of people to 
neighbouring countries (Feyissa, 2006). The Somali regional state has also remained a 
war zone.  
 
Geopolitical factors, which include the political and religious interests of regional and 
international powers, play a role in the instability of the peripheral regional states. For 
example, an increase in Islamic fundamentalism in the politics of Sudan greatly 
                                                 
11
 Interview notes, Semera, Afar regional state, August 2010. 
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affected the domestic politics of Benishangul during the transitional period (1991-
1994). The Ogaden issue became one of the causes of the 1977, 1978 and 1982 Ethio-
Somali wars during the military regime (1975-1991) and the 2006-2008 Ethio-Somali 
wars during the EPRDF regime (1991 onwards). The independence of Southern 
Sudan from the North could also affect the politics of Gambella, for different reasons. 
Firstly, the Anuak and Nuer in Ethiopia are part of the bigger Anuak and Nuer ethnic 
groups in South Sudan. They have historically been marginalised from the centre; 
hence, their relationship with their counterparts in Sudan has been better than that 
with the rest of Ethiopia. Therefore, whether the ethnic groups in Gambella can 
integrate into the federal state depends on whether they would be better off than their 
counterparts in South Sudan. This shows that the stability of the peripheral regional 
states not only depends on internal factors but also on regional and international 
geopolitical factors. 
 
The stability of the peripheral regional states is also related to their relationship with 
the centre. Although the federal constitution considers these states as equal to the 
others, the EPRDF considered the peripheral regional states as emerging and requiring 
special support and an intergovernmental relationship with the federal government. 
Accordingly, the federal government attempted to support them using special 
executive authorities originally organised under the Prime Minister‟s office and, later, 
through the Ministry of Federal Affairs. The ruling party also excluded the regional 
parties of the peripheral regional states from its structure and created partner 
relationships with them. However, as argued by Feyissa (2006), the involvement of 
the EPRDF and the federal government in the internal affairs of the peripheral 
regional states did not create regional capacities capable of realising regional interests. 
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One of the contributing factors for this is that the ruling party and the federal 
government focused on urgent security matters rather than capacity and development 
issues in the regional states. The approach of the federal government and the ruling 
party has, therefore, undermined the regional capacity for policy-making which, in 
turn, has contributed to greater power competition between the political elites of the 
peripheries and to the instability of the regional states. 
 
The Issue of Minority Rights 
The Constitution is vague with regard to minority groups that were created when the 
new federal restructuring was implemented in 1995. This has led to clashes between 
the entitlements of individuals and groups in the country. For example, in Oromia 
regional state among the 27,158,471 people only 23,846,380 are Oromos. This means 
18% per cent of the total population are non-Oromos, and among these 5.46% are 
Amharas (National Census, 2007). The non-Oromos cannot stand for elections in the 
regional state (Beken, 2007:123). Similarly, in Gambella and Benishangul-Gumuz the 
number of settlers is almost half of the total population, but they have limited political 
participation. The settlers in Gambella are not allowed to hold elections (Feyissa, 
2006).  
 
The Harari regional constitution also created elite minority and subordinated majority 
groups. For example, the state is predominantly composed of Oromo, Amhara and 
Harari, with populations of 103,421; 41,755 and 15,858 respectively (National, 
Census, 2007). However, the regional constitution allows the Harari to establish the 
regional state although Oromos also can share regional political power as a junior 
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partner. The Amhara do not have a right to hold elections although they can vote 
(Kefale and Jemma, 2007). 
 
The problem here is that there is no clear procedure for the political participation of 
minority groups. Hence, this situation has created a clash with the constitutional 
political rights of citizens
12
. Therefore, this kind of majority-minority relationship will 
remain as a structural source of conflicts unless corrected at national level.  
The Issue of Secession 
The Ethiopian constitution stipulates the right of secession in the following way: 
“Every nation, nationality and people in Ethiopia has an unconditional right to self-
determination, including the right to secession” (Article 39/1). However, this has 
invoked controversy. On the one hand it is argued that the right of secession is 
relevant  to Ethiopia when considering its historical context and the balance of power 
which was created between the ethno-national movements and the central forces 
during the transitional period (Eshete, 2003, Tewfiq, 2003, Barnabas, 2003, Abbay, 
2004).  
 
As the other national political parties were disorganised during the transitional period 
the political forces available to negotiate the establishment of a new government were 
EPRDF and OLF.  But OLF was fighting for independence in Oromia. Therefore, 
right of secession had a negotiating effect which in practice brought the OLF and 
national movements in the Somali region into the transitional government (Eshete, 
                                                 
12
 Article 38/1/a-C: 
“Every Ethiopian national, without any discrimination based on colour, race, nation, nationality, sex, 
language, religion, political or other opinion or other status, has the following rights: (a) To take part in 
the conduct of public affairs, directly and thorough freely chosen representatives (b) On the attainment 
of 18 years of age, to vote in accordance with law (c) To vote and to be elected at periodic elections to 
any level of government; elections shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret 
ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors”. 
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2003:158). In addition, the historical relationship of the nation-state and the ethnic 
groups is characterised by tyranny, which contributed to the secessionist tendencies of 
the ethno-national movements. This has forced the ethno-national movements to 
include secession in their political programmes; and the inclusion of secession in the 
constitution could play a „holding together‟ role (Eshete, 2003:168). 
 
But there are three divergent debates on the constitutional right of secession. The first 
one comes from the central forces, which oppose the constitutional recognition of 
ethnic identity and the constitutionalising of it into the political structure of the 
country. This stems from a denial of ethnic identity as a social structure in society. As 
maintained by Gudina (2006), those who deny, and even refuse to talk about, ethnic 
identity have little influence in Ethiopian politics. This is because ethnic identity has 
been an issue since the student movements of the 1960s and it was recognised by the 
Derg regime as such, when it came to power, and in the 1987 constitution. The second 
debate comes from those who consider that ethnic identity has to be protected, like 
any identity in society, advocate for constitutional democracy. In other words ethnic 
identity can be protected by exercising individual rights. Scholars, such as Webengda 
(2005), oppose Ethiopian federalism and secession from the perspective of 
constitutional democracy. They propose an integrative type of federalism, which 
fosters individual rights.  
 
The third view on the constitutional right of secession, which the author of this 
research shares, comes from those who accept the constitutional right of self-
determination of all nationalities but do not consider secession to be useful to the 
conflict management process. Fiseha (2003) puts forward three points with regard to 
 139 
this. The first point stems from his argument of unity with diversity and the impact of 
secession on the federal agreement. In federal states, although the powers of the 
central and federal governments are equally protected by the constitution, they do not 
have equal power. In fact, if the status quo of the federal arrangement is to be 
maintained it has to have supremacy. It is by this combination of central and regional 
forces that the balance of power is sustained. Fiseha makes this point:  
To come to the nexus between federal supremacy and the unity–diversity 
matrix, in established federations one should note that the explicit declaration 
of the supremacy of federal law over state law is something that reflects the 
outcome of the unity-diversity combination during the federal bargain 
(2003:313). 
 
The second point is related to citizenship rights. The federal government is 
established from the direct participation of all citizens and with the consent of the 
states. The source of the federal government‟s power is both the direct participation of 
citizens in the lower house and the participation of states in the upper house. The 
existence of the federal state depends on a dual power exercise. Therefore, in 
federations there is nothing that can be designated as an absolute power to the 
regional states, especially those that were unitary states before federalisation. This 
principle governs the relationship between the federal and regional governments of 
any country (Ibid). The third point is related to the contractual agreement of the 
federalised state. The federal contractual agreement brings the federal state and 
regional states into existence, with all their bargaining power, but does not confer 
sovereignty on the regional states, unless and otherwise there is a con-federal 
arrangement (Fiseha, 2003:317). Fiseha (2003) argues that the Ethiopian federal 
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structure has to be thought through carefully in order to create a balanced combination 
of unity with diversity.  
 
Fiseha‟s argument can also be strengthened by the practical implication of the right of 
secession to conflict management. The right of secession could undermine the 
common national sentiment of the ethnic-groups created during the last century. As 
Fiseha (2003) argued the Ethiopian federal arrangement is a federalisation of a unitary 
state, which has existed for almost a century. In this process, the Ethiopian ethnic 
groups created their history together. In other words, when the Ethiopian state was 
federalised in 1995, there was a sense of shared Ethiopian identity, which was by far 
stronger than among those who came to a federalised state from different sovereign 
states, such as the USA
13
 and Nigeria
14
. Therefore, the „tyranny‟ of the nation state 
seems solid ground for a federal state, like Ethiopia, on which to build a sustained 
diverse unity. 
 
The balance of power, which was created between the central and regional forces 
during the transitional period, has to be seen within the above context. It is a fact that 
the recognition of „referendum‟ as an element of the transitional charter offered a 
bargaining chip, particularly for the OLF and the armed fronts in the Somali region 
(Eshete, 2003). However, if we see the transitional charter as an accord of post- 
conflict management, it aims to create a peaceful situation that enables the conflicting 
parties to settle their differences in round table discussions. The recognition of a 
referendum as a means of peace creation may be acceptable. However, this does not 
                                                 
13
 The Civil war in the USA happened after the formation of the confederation of the American states. 
14
 The Biafra civil war in Nigeria can be taken as an example of loose relationship between a federal 
state and its constituent units. 
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mean that all the elements contained in the transitional charter have to be included in 
the constitution. What is included depends on the power relationship and on the 
outcome of the negotiation process of the contending parties. 
 
The constitutional draft was one of the tasks of the transitional period that had to be 
negotiated between the contending parties. The OLF was the main champion of 
secession, as it put secession as a primary goal of its political programme, but it had 
already left the transitional government before June 1992; possibly before the 
constitutional draft was written (Pausewang et al, 2002). Moreover if EPRDF were 
not the champion of the right of secession, it would have had more scope to bargain 
with the Somali regional opposition parties on unity with diversity. The Tigray 
population fought for self rule (Eshete, 2003; Markakis, 1987) but the issue of 
independence did not have a mobilising effect on them. This is because, in Tigray the 
Ethiopian national sentiment, which is historically entrenched, has never been 
compromised, even when the military regime conducted mass killings during the 
armed struggle (Young, 1998). Therefore, there was not significant domestic pressure 
forcing the constitutional drafting committee to incorporate the right of secession into 
the draft constitution by the time the OLF left the transitional government and when 
EPRDF had an upper hand to bargain with the Somali armed forces. 
 
Therefore, the ideological background of the EPRDF would seem to be of paramount 
importance. EPRDF saw secession as a crucial element of the right of self- 
determination. It adopted this view from Marxist ideology but the idea was not only 
related to Marxism. Liberals also argued for secession, based on the right to vote or 
withdraw support for governments (Turk, 1999:115; Neuberger, 1995). EPRDF 
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believed that in multi-ethnic countries, like Ethiopia, the tendency to dominate can be 
mitigated by the right to secede that enables people to withdraw their consent from the 
federation. Accordingly, from the point of view of EPRDF, the right of secession 
increased tolerance and respect and the democratic unity of the country. And if the 
worst came to the worse secession could prevent violent conflict by enabling people 
to conduct a peaceful divorce from the federation.
15
  
 
The ideological belief of EPRDF about the right to secede is debatable.  However, 
when the constitutional right of secession is related to practical conflict management a 
number of issues must be considered. In multi-ethnic countries there is always a 
tendency of differentiation of identity, a tendency of one to dominate the other. This 
tendency exists in every ethnic group and can be managed by creating a kind of 
political arrangement that promotes collaborations and mutual respect between the 
ethnic groups (Eriksen, 2002).  
 
In the Ethiopian context, the federal constitution manages the above tendencies by 
considering all the nationalities as minority groups at the federal level. In other words, 
there is no one ethnic group that can gain majority status within the federal state – 
reflecting the situation in the country. Even the larger states of Oromia and Amhara 
would not have majority status, unless they were allied. Therefore, it is the shared rule 
of all the ethnic groups that creates a majority status in the country (Amoretti, 2004). 
In such an arrangement, if one attempts to dominate the others its sustainability is 
reduced. This is because the ethnic group which attempts to dominate will have less 
representation at the centre, compared to the other ethnic groups combined. The 
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 Minutes of the constitutional assembly, 1994 
 143 
Amhara elite group domination in the last century had its own particular historical 
factors (Markakis, 1987). Nevertheless, even in that situation, the smaller population 
of Amhara, compared to the other ethnic groups, contributed to the failure of the 
nation-state. As any one ethnic group is not able to retain a majority status at the 
centre, and none of them want to be dominated, this gives the ethnic groups a stronger 
combined negotiating capacity. This, in turn, reinforces tolerance and respect between 
the ethnic groups.  The outcome of this process is unity with diversity. 
 
 Moreover, a peaceful status quo is not possible through secession in Ethiopia. If we 
consider Oromia, for example, which is located at the heart of Ethiopia, its 
independence would mean the disintegration of the country (Gudina, 2006). Moreover, 
the process of establishing an Oromia independent state could lead to endless conflict 
as there are mixed identities and inter-marriage, or domestic living arrangements of 
the ethnic groups, including between Oromia and Somali; Oromia and Amhara; 
Oromia and Belishangul-Gumuz; and Oromia and the southern regional state. This is 
also aggravated by the absence of common boundaries between the regions (ibid). 
Therefore, the right of secession aggravates conflict and makes it difficult for ethnic 
groups to exercise their right of self-determination.  
 
Furthermore, the right of secession is not a necessary condition for a cultivation of 
federal identity. In multi-ethnic federal countries a federal identity is cultivated 
through tolerance, compromise and partnership (Kavalski and Zolkos, 2008). For 
example, the Indian constitution does not accept secession. However, the federal 
state‟s capacity to accommodate and negotiate with ethnic groups contributes to a 
„holding together‟ of society and is resulting in the building of an Indian federal 
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identity (Bhargava, 2006). Therefore, the right of secession neither contributes to 
making the system federal nor enables a peaceful divorce.  
 
In conclusion, the institutionalisation of ethnic identity has addressed the causes of 
civil wars. This was achieved because the constitution devolved power to the ethnic 
groups, and this has enabled them to acquire elements of self-rule. However, the 
issues discussed above including imbalances between national identity and ethnic 
identity, different geographical and population size between the regional states, 
different levels of economic development, varying relationships to the state, issues of 
minority rights and the issue of secession could all challenge the sustainability of the 
federal system, and might necessitate constitutional amendment and refinement. 
 
Mechanisms of Resources Sharing 
The Ethiopian federal system follows a centralised tax and revenue system. In doing 
this the Ethiopian constitution identifies the tax sources of the federal government and 
the states. The federal government levies taxes and collects revenues from customs 
duties, imports and exports, income from air, rail and sea transport services; and 
monopolies (Article 97). The regional states can also levy tax and collect revenue 
from income taxes on employees of the state, private farmers in the regions, fees for 
land use and from business firms operating in the regions (Article 97). In addition, the 
constitution specifies concurrent powers of taxation (Article 98). Unlike the residual 
political powers, the constitution highlights that undesignated powers of taxation are 
to be decided by a joint session of the HOF and HORP (Article 99). The constitution 
also guarantees regional governments a right to receive federal subsidy and gives 
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them a right to spend money, which enables them to carry out their legal 
responsibilities (Article 94). 
 
Two features can be identified from the above description of the fiscal responsibilities 
of the federal and regional governments. Firstly, the major revenue sources are 
controlled by the federal government. This means that the revenue sources assigned to 
the regional states are less lucrative in comparison to those sources assigned to the 
federal government. This makes the regional states financially dependent on the 
federal government. Secondly, the federal government allocates subsidies on the basis 
of equality to the regional states. Accordingly, a budget formula is prepared by the 
HOF, taking into account population size, revenue collection contribution and 
development disparity between the regional states (Negussie, 2006). 
 
However, this fiscal system has caused controversies. It is argued that the constitution 
makes the regional states financially dependent on the federal government so that 
power devolution without financial independence becomes meaningless (Aalen, 2002; 
Aalen, 2008; Keller, 2002; Negussie, 2006). Moreover, the budget allocation process 
is not very transparent as it is controlled by the HOF, which is directly controlled by 
the ruling party. Therefore, the budget formula can unfairly benefit some regional 
states (Negussie, 2006; Gudina, 2003). The centralised system of the ruling party also 
prevents the regional states from exercising their expenditure rights (Keller, 2002). 
 
 The above criticisms of resource sharing mechanisms basically arise from two factors: 
The role of the ruling party in controlling the resource sharing mechanisms and the 
centralised nature of revenue sources. As noted by different scholars (Keller, 2004, 
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Aalen, 2002, 2006; Negussie, 2006) the ruling party‟s control of all the resource 
allocation mechanisms can give a greater opportunity for neo-patrimonial activities. 
For example, the ruling party controls the HOF which allocates the federal revenue 
subsidies to regional states. This can give a wider opportunity to benefit the bigger 
regional states by manipulating the revenue allocation formula as happened in the 
2006 budget subsidy allocation to the regional states as discussed earlier. Moreover, 
the regional states are also controlled by the ruling party. This can create a greater 
opportunity for the ruling party to use public resources for regime survival including 
the electoral process as was noted by EU observers during the 2010 national and 
regional elections
16
. Moreover, the ruling party controls the outlets of public 
expenditures of the regional states
17
 (Keller, 2004). This can limit and, in fact, 
negatively influence the choice of the regional states, which, in turn, influences their 
development opportunities.  The centralised party structure also provides greater 
opportunity for private resource appropriation as many of its members are involved in 
decisions about state resource allocations with less accountability mechanisms. 
 
The relationship of the state and the business community is also influenced by neo-
patrimonial relationships. Government is very involved in leasing urban and rural land 
and infrastructure development. Recently, leasing rural and urban land to domestic 
and international investors has become one of the main sources of government 
revenue. The government is also the main participant in infrastructure development, 
such as telecommunications, hydroelectric dams, roads, and water supply (MOFED, 
2006).  In addition, the recent economy boom, and the emerging private sector, 
                                                 
16
 The EU election observers   noted that the ruling party used government resources for election 
campaigning in the 2010 national and regional elections. 
17
  This is because all the lower government hierarchies are controlled by elected party members whose 
primary accountability is to the ruling party. 
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created favourable conditions for neo-patrimonial relationships to develop. Moreover, 
there is an emerging business class, which tends to operate through loyalty and 
clientelistic networks with government officials (Abbink, 2006:175-177). 
 
As a result, this intensive government involvement in development, the lack of 
transparency and accountability in the institutions of governance, and the weakness of 
anti-corruption institutions, has encouraged corruption. The Transparency 
International corruption perception index (CPI) for Ethiopia underscores this problem. 
For example, in 2002, the CPI for Ethiopia was 3.5 – which put Ethiopia in the 
countries which had low corruption practices and better   than Malawi (2.9) and many 
other African countries. However, this has deteriorated significantly over the last 
eight years and in 2009 reached 2.7.   In the same year Malawi‟s CPI increased to 3.3 
(TI reports, 2001-2009). This shows the extent to which corruption is challenging the 
EPRDF‟s federal government.  
 
Furthermore, it is argued that the ruling party „favours‟ the Tigray region, which is its 
stronghold, so far as federal government budget subsidies are concerned (Gudina, 
2003). As noted earlier, there has been much government involvement in business 
contracts – resulting in greater opportunity for neo-patrimonial relationships, which 
can negatively influence the economy. But whether this influence is extended to 
government expenditure is dependent on the federal control mechanisms. For example, 
the federal budget subsidy to regional states is controlled by HOF, which includes 
representation of all regional states. Moreover, budget allocation is done in 
accordance with a budget formula that is dependent on the population size, 
development level, and revenue collection capacity of each regional state. Finally, the 
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annual budget subsidy is approved by HPPR
18
. Moreover, the act of favouring Tigray 
also can affect the loyalty of the EPRDF‟s member parties to the ruling party.  
Therefore, resource appropriation, which favours one regional state at the expense of 
the others, cannot be the manifestation of neo-patrimonial relationship in today‟s 
Ethiopia.  The problem  is  related to  neo-patrimonial relationships  which focus  on 
maintaining  regime survival   through  party and state structures  and  control the 
society  through  patron and client  relationships  and repression. 
 
Nor does the centralisation of revenue sources have a direct relationship with the role 
of the ruling party in resource allocation. The minutes of the constitutional assembly 
(1994) indicate that the main reason behind the choice of centralised revenue sources 
is equity consideration. However, the constitution gives expenditure freedom to 
regional states to maintain efficiency (Article 94). Whether these considerations 
manifest themselves in the context of Ethiopia or not can be discussed with respect to 
the following points. First, Ethiopia is an underdeveloped country. Infrastructures 
such as roads and social services like health and education are at a minimum level. 
Allocation of resources to these sectors can‟t be left to regional states due to the 
nationwide urgency of the problems and scarcity of resources. So the federal 
government has to play a greater role in controlling and allocating the limited revenue 
available. Second, the federal government emerged from a protracted civil war. 
Uneven development was one of the causes of the civil war. The federal state now has 
to play a „holding together‟ role to maintain peace and order. In doing this, equitable 
resource sharing has to be one of the mechanisms of fiscal policy (Eshete, 2003). In 
addition, tied and untied grants can guide the direction of expenditure by the regional 
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 Interview notes, Speaker of the HOF,  Addis Ababa, June 2008 
 149 
states. Tied grants can be utilised to guide regional states to meet national standards. 
Untied grants can be used by regional states to satisfy their local preferences (Ndulo, 
2006:93).  
 
However, in the Ethiopian context, the decentralisation of revenue collection to 
regional states has both efficiency and equity consequences. First, programmes 
designed in one region could involve spillover effects to other regional states 
(Boadway, 2001:106-107). For example, if the wealthier regional states were allowed 
to invest more locally, educated and skilled people would migrate to these regions. 
Moreover, as the service provision in these regions will be better than in other 
regional states, people would migrate just to receive the services provided. The 
overall result would be under-utilisation of the human resources of the country. 
Second, decentralisation of revenue collection will be followed by tax variations 
between states. As argued by Boadway (2001), this will distort the national common 
market by creating different markets for labour, capital, goods and services across the 
common borders of the states. The national resource allocation will therefore be 
distorted. Third, the decentralisation of revenue sources can also create imbalances 
between national standards. For example, if the country is to fulfil the millennium 
goals of education and health services, the programmes have to be supported by 
equitable budget allocations to all regional states.  
 
Taking the idea of fiscal dependency of the regional states, Negussie (2006) proposes 
sub-division of the larger regional states, so that states will have balanced revenue 
sources. However, this does not resolve the main reasons for having centralised 
revenue sources as discussed above. Whether or not the regional states have equal 
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revenue sources, if the country is suffering from poverty and development disparity, 
centralised revenue collection and allocation can help to utilize the available resources 
more efficiently (Boadway, 2001). Moreover, equality of revenue sources does not 
necessarily lead to equality in development levels. In addition, equality in revenue 
sources may not be sustainable as development of new sources in one or more 
regional states will still create variation between the revenue sources.  
 
However, the fiscal dependency of regional and local administrations has to be 
reconsidered with respect to administrative divisibility in the country. As discussed 
earlier, the centralised fiscal policy gives little responsibility to regions in revenue 
collection but gives them full responsibility of fiscal expenditure. On the other hand, 
the constitution enables ethnic groups to establish their administration units at any 
time. The relationship of both the fiscal dependency of the administrative units and 
power devolution to the ethnic groups can lead to administrative fragmentation which, 
in turn, leads to corruption and misuse of resources. Vaughan (2006) argues that the 
block grants to Woreda have pushed the smaller ethnic groups in the southern 
regional state into establishment of independent administrative units. For example, 
according to the deputy director of the department of conflict management at the 
Ministry of Federal Affairs in the Southern regional state the number of Woreda 
increased from 91 to 129 in around ten years
19
. This happens because, when ethnic 
groups establish independent administrative units, their elites get an opportunity to 
administer the block grant which, in turn, creates a lot of privileges for them. This 
suggests that the ethnic politics, or what Aalen (2006:260) calls „ethnic 
entrepreneurship‟ of the ethnic-based political elite and neo-patrimonial relationship 
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 Interview notes, deputy  director  of the  conflict management department, Ministry of Federal 
Affairs, Addis Ababa,  June  2008 
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of the state can paralyse the federal structure. This is because leaders of the ethnic 
groups use ethnic politics for the purpose of establishing administrations at Woreda 
level or above, which enables them directly to control public funds. It is because of 
this that several analysts (Aalen, 2002,  2006,2008; Asefa, 2006; Tronvoll, 2000)  
have warned that the emphasis on ethnicity and lower attention to citizenship rights 
can lead to the proliferation of  many smaller units of administrations which can harm  
the federal process.  
 
Regional states and local administrations have, therefore, to bear some percentage of 
revenue collection in order to exist as a regional or local government authority and to 
get federal grants. This kind of fiscal responsibility encourages the ethnic groups to 
establish joint administrative units that make them viable units for federal grants. This 
will also enhance collaboration between ethnic groups. 
 
Mechanisms of Democratic Participation  
It is argued that since virtually all electoral districts are drawn from within the 
ethnically-defined constituents, the legislative body of the federal system is 
necessarily made up of representatives of the regional states. This enables the ethnic 
groups to participate in the legislative making processes. Moreover, representatives 
can vote against „hostile laws‟ which disadvantage the interests of the ethnic groups 
(Eshete, 2003:159). 
 
Representation of the ethnic groups at the HOF also creates greater opportunities for 
these groups. As the HOF decides the budget subsidy for regional states, 
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representatives of the ethnic groups can directly participate in this process and make 
decisions. This prevents unfair treatment between the regional states (Ibid). 
 
The HOF also provides extensive opportunities to foster tolerance, and encourage 
negotiation and a sense of belonging in the ethnic groups. This is because the HOF 
seeks solutions when there are disputes between regional states and instructs the 
federal government when there are constitutional disorders in the states (Article 62/9). 
Representation of the ethnic groups at the HOF enables them to foster good 
relationships between the groups and protect their interests when there are undesired 
interventions into regional governments by the federal government
20
. 
 
Equally, it has been argued that the constitution limits the participation of the ethnic 
groups at the centre (Fiseha, 2006). First, there was no legal means of influencing the 
legislation process which enables the ethnic groups to protect their interests. Second, 
the ethnic composition of members of the Cabinet and Presidents of the Supreme 
Court is under the control of the Prime Minister. In addition, the defence forces and 
the council of ministers are accountable to him (Article 74).  Therefore, taken together, 
this implies strong central executive power which is less controlled by the 
constitutional mechanisms. This has several implications for the federal system. As 
the ruling party controls domestic politics at all levels, both the executive and the 
ruling party can be complementary to each other in policy implementation without the 
consultation of the regional governments and other political parties (Aalen, 2006:249; 
Aalen, 2008). However, the greater the power of the executive and particularly of the 
prime minster, the greater the risk that executive be dominated by one or two ethnic 
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  Interview notes, the Speaker of the HOF,  Addis Ababa, June 2008 
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groups and exclude the smaller groups. This is because the selection process of the 
members of the executive is usually influenced by regime survival and this is 
determined mainly by representations from the politically dominant ethnic groups.  
 
In addition, The EPRDF always works to control government offices from top to 
bottom and it has never been attempted to work with and share power with others who 
have different opinions on national matters.  
 Clapham asserts this as follows: 
The EPRDF proved entirely incapable of recognising the legitimacy of any 
regional or ethnic movement that was not under its own control, or of 
according any such movement an autonomous role in the government even of 
the most insignificant local areas (2009:187). 
 
Therefore, the federal structure has worked only under the ruling party. It has never 
been tested to see whether it can work under the control of political parties which 
have different opinions from the ruling party. This makes the federal system 
vulnerable to changes and the dynamics of the domestic politics as has happened in 
many African countries since independence. 
 
 In addition, the politics of regime survival undermine the local autonomy guaranteed 
by the federal constitution to the regional states.  The ruling party has changed the 
regional government leaders several times before the end of their term when their 
loyalties have been in doubt. For example, when the TPLF leadership split into two, 
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the regional states leaders who supported the losing opposition were sacked from their 
positions in 2002
21
.  
 
The Ethiopian federal constitution basically allows for representation of the ethnic 
groups in both the shared and self-rule institutions of governance (Article 8 and 
Article 39). This has brought wider opportunities to ethnic groups that include the use 
of their languages in public places, employment; and sense of pride and 
accommodation with the federal institutions of governance (Watson, 2002, Aalen, 
2006). Nevertheless, many scholars argue that Ethiopia has not witnessed real 
political participation by its citizens in the political process (Fiseha, 2006, Eshete, 
2003; Vaughan and Tronvoll, 2003). The main issue here is that having a federal 
arrangement or structure is one thing, but making it work is quite another thing, 
depending upon other factors including the   political culture of the political elite, and 
social and economic factors. For example, the political culture  of  the political elite 
has shown  a tendency towards power  centralisation  and a top down approach to 
governance  which has been  entrenched  since the establishment  of the   Ethiopian 
nation state  at  the end of the 19
th
 century(Donahm, 1985; Clapham, 2006, Markakis, 
1987). 
Clapham asserts this in the following way: 
…These all reflect an essentially technical conception of governance in which 
desired outcomes such as peace and development are conceived as driving 
from the ability of rulers first to develop the right policies and then to 
implement such policies efficiently throughout the territories that they 
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 For example, both  the presidents of the Oromia  and Southern regional states  were sacked  due to 
their support  to the descendents  of TPLF leaders 
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control…This conception is deeply entrenched and indeed widely shared even 
among many of the government‟s opponents (2006:240).  
 
When we relate Clapham‟s assertion to the federal process it can be dealt with 
comprehensively in relation to the multi-party system of the country. The Ethiopian 
constitution allows a multi-party system including political parties organised along 
ethnic lines (Article 31). There are two categories of political parties in the country: 
ethnic-based and national. Among the ethnic-based political parties, the ruling party, 
EPRDF, is a coalition whose member parties operate in the regional states of Tigray, 
Oromia, Amhara and Southern regional states. Also, there are affiliated, ethnic-based 
political parties operating in the remaining peripheral states (Vaughan and Tronvoll, 
2003). There are other ethnic-based opposition political parties mainly from the 
Southern region, Oromia, Tigray and Amhara regional states. Recently, they have 
created a coalition party known as the Forum for Democracy and Unity (FDU), which 
includes some of the national parties. The other categories of political parties are 
those that claim to be national. These are not organised along ethnic lines, but aim to 
recruit their members on an individual basis from every ethnic group in the country. 
These include the Ethiopian Democratic Party (EDP), All Ethiopian Democratic 
Organisation (AEDO) and others (Birhanu, 2003).  
 
Therefore, the reason for the lack of real democratic participation of Ethiopian 
citizens can be explained by reference to the nature of the multi-party system of the 
country for the following reasons. The first point is related to the centralised nature of 
the ruling party. This can be seen in relation to the rebel background and ideology of 
EPRDF. During the armed struggle EPRDF followed „democratic centralism‟ as the 
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main controlling mechanism for its members (Young, 1998, Aalen, 2002). 
Democratic centralism is related to the idea that decisions made by the majority have 
to be respected by the minority, and members of the armed front also must respect 
decisions made by the central committee of the national front. As this principle was 
used in the day-to-day life of the insurgency, it contributed to the construction of 
loyalty by the members of the EPRDF to their leaders. The EPRDF maintained this 
control mechanism after the downfall of the military regime and transferred it to the 
newly established member political parties using recruitment processes and 
indoctrination methods (Vaughan and Tronvoll, 2003). 
 
For the above reasons, the relationship between the EPRDF and its member parties 
has remained a top-down one. In other words, the EPRDF leaders generate policy 
ideas and member parties implement them. Similarly, at the grass-roots level the 
members of the political parties make plans and the public implement them (Fiseha, 
2006). 
 
This control mechanism can be seen to have both positive and negative aspects. On 
the positive side, it has given the party a greater leverage in implementing policies 
that have a nationwide impact (Aalen, 2006; 2008). In multi-ethnic African countries, 
unless there is a congruence of approaches between the centre and the regional states, 
it can be difficult to meet national standards such as the millennium goals. 
 
However, the centralised system with its top-down approach has a number of 
problems. First, it has contributed to the lack of understanding of identity-based 
demands in the regional states. For example, the ruling party did not understand the 
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identity-based issues around the Silte and Gurague in the Southern regional state. The 
Silte were categorised as Gurague by mistake; the party did not consult local people 
when it made this categorisation. This was corrected after a long time and several 
demonstrations and violent conflicts (Kefale, 2004:56-57, Aalen, 2008). Moreover, an 
artificial language, called Wogagudu, was designed as a medium of instruction for 
four ethnic groups in the Southern regional state. A lot of resources were invested to 
produce the artificial language and text books. Then, when an attempt was made to 
implement it, violence erupted in the ethnic groups that were supposed to be using the 
artificial language. As a result, some people died and others were arrested during the 
violence (Aalen, 2006). This underlines the point that the ethnic groups can only 
define themselves according to the decisions of the ruling party and as long as they 
pose no threat to the regime‟s survival (Aalen, 2008). 
 
 Nevertheless, this has increased local conflicts among those aiming at identity 
recognition. To contain such conflicts several special Woreda administrations have 
been established   in the Southern regional state. However, as long as the identity-
based demands are used to promote the patrimonial vested interest of the ethnic 
leaders, they have become a challenge to the integrity of the regional states by 
encouraging divisibility. According to Vaughan (2006) one of the effects of the power 
distribution along ethnic lines in the Southern regional state is the exacerbation of 
class differences within the ethnic groups. Therefore, the top down approach of the 
ruling party, which mainly focuses on regime survival, does not allow for greater 
democratic participation on the ground.  Hence, it becomes an inherent problem of the 
system to generate local demands, which can be exploited by the neo-patrimonial 
interest of the ethnic leaders, which, in turn, can lead to the formation of many units 
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that can undermine commonness, co-operation between the ethnic groups and the 
legitimacy of the federal structure. 
 
 Second, it has also led to the Prime Minister‟s dominant role, particularly since the 
TPLF‟s leadership division into two factions in 2002.   The ruling party now 
emphasises loyalty in recruitment of party members and employees of state 
institutions.  As a result, all levels of government structures have been filled by party 
members which have made the party and government structures essentially one and 
the same
22
. This has created an enabling environment for the ruling party to use state 
resources for the benefit of one party rule in the country.  For example, as   public 
jobs are given primarily to members of the ruling party, the EPRDF also recruited 5 
million party members out of around 80 million people
23
. The Party members greatly 
contributed to wining the ruling party 99.6% in the national and regional 
parliamentary elections of 2010
24
.  
 
Although this is not unique to EPRDF as it is a wider, if not global, problem faced by 
emerging and developing democracies, its conception of direct democratic 
participation also encourages a top down approach to political process in the country. 
The concept of direct participation is conceived by the EPRDF as a mechanism for 
creating consensus and getting feedback on policy matters from the public. Hence, as 
long as the party can maintain public participation, whether or not other political 
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 All federal, regional, Zone and Woreda   government structures are filled by elected members in 
national, regional and local elections, which have been controlled by the ruling party over the last 19 
years. 
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   All opposition parties accused the ruling party in the 2010 election campaign of employing its 
members in public works during election campaign  discussions between  the ruling party  and 
opposition parties, Posted on the Ethiopian  Radio and Television website, April 2010. 
24
  Speech of the  Prime Minster, Melese Zenawi, to the public  rally  at  Meskel square, Addis Ababa, 
24 May 2010 
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parties exist or alternative ideas are presented to the public, they believe that the 
democratic process is not negatively affected (National Policy papers of EPRDF, 
2003). 
 
However, in practice the concept of direct participation has created problems. When 
the party does go to the public, it does not listen to them; rather, it tells them what to 
do. It was after the failure of the 2005 election in many places, including Addis Ababa 
that it started to do this. Since then the party has remained without a clear 
understanding of public opinion about its policies. For example, in the 2005 election 
the party got only a single seat in Addis Ababa. It seemed that the party never 
expected that kind of blow, according to the public comments that were made by 
EPRDF leaders during that time
25
. 
 
This partial implementation of the concept of direct democratic participation also 
shows a low commitment by the ruling party to the multi-party system in the country. 
Democratic participation is a political process that should enable the public to choose 
from alternative policy ideas. In addition, it can be perceived as a mechanism of 
consensus creation in chosen government policy. EPRDF leaders treat party policies 
as the only choice and invite the public to participate in implementing them 
(EPRDF‟s policy papers, 2003).  For this purpose, the regime controls the flow of 
information using its monopolistic ownership of government media. This has 
contributed to the existence of weak opposition parties because, regardless of the 
rhetoric for a multiparty system, the existence of opposition parties is not considered 
by the EPRDF to contribute to democratic nation-building.  
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 Interview notes, Member of Parliament, Addis Ababa,   June 2008. 
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Moreover, it is argued that the EPRDF follows a hostile policy against opposition 
parties that undermines their participation in the political system (Teshome, 2009:64). 
Hence, as noted by Clapham (2006), whether the incumbent ruling party will be able 
to transfer power peacefully to a democratically elected opposition party remains one 
of the challenges of democratic transition in Ethiopia. This has also been shown by 
the four national election processes and the outcomes which undermine the 
participation of opposition parties in the national and regional parliaments of the 
country. The country has had four national elections in 15 years since 1994. The first 
two elections (1995, 2000) were conducted without significant participation of the 
opposition parties.  They did participate in the third (2005) election - but it was 
accompanied by violence and 196 people were killed in its aftermath in Addis Ababa 
alone
26
. The ruling party, and its allies, won 545 of the 547 federal seats in the 2010 
election.  The Federal Democratic Forum Party won only a single seat, and another 
seat was won by an independent candidate
27
.  Therefore, although the multiparty 
system is constitutionally institutionalised one party politics has been the dominant 
feature of Ethiopian domestic politics over the last 19 years. This has made the 
Ethiopian federal system lose the inclusiveness and accommodation of diversity 
which are fundamental principles of democracy and indeed determine whether a 
federal system can function properly and manage conflicts. 
 
 In addition, the ruling party established different associations, such as Youth leagues, 
which are directly influenced by and linked to the party structure
28
.  It also provided 
credits to youth for establishing small scale industries used to expand party influences 
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 Source: the Federal Inquiry Commission, which was established in the aftermath of the violent 
conflict in 2005 
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  Ethiopian News Agency, 25 May 2010. 
28
  There   are men and women youths organised from national to local level. These associations are 
directly linked to and influenced by EPRDF.  
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during the 2010 elections.  This can be proved  by the fact that 50,000 youths who 
were benefited  by the credit scheme decided to vote  for EPRDF in the meeting they 
held  in the Addis Ababa Stadium  the second week of May 2010
29
. 
 
Having observed the lack of democratic exercise in the federal process, some analysts 
(Aalen and Tronvoll, 2009) saw an end to democracy   in Ethiopia
30
 mainly after the 
conflicts in the 2005 election and the 2008 local elections which were fully controlled 
by the ruling party. Accordingly, they noted “the only opposition avenue remaining 
open appears to be that of armed struggle” (Aalen and Tronvoll, 2009:204).  If 
election results are the only criteria for the survival of democracy, the 2010 national 
election results might also reinforce the conclusion because the ruling party won 99.6% 
in all the national and regional parliaments. 
 
 However, this generalisation lacks  consideration of other factors such as  the socio- 
economic transformation  made  in the country over  the last 18 years  and its impact  
on enhancing  citizens‟  demands  for democracy  through peaceful  means. In 
addition, the analysis fails to consider whether the rural population which has 
benefited from the social and economic development would support an armed 
struggle against the incumbent ruling party at the expense of the benefits from the 
development. Whether  democracy  and the federal system  can work  in Ethiopia   is 
not  only determined  by election processes  and results, but  by the overall social, 
economic and political  transformation which also  requires a period of time. 
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 Ethiopian Radio and Television Agency May 2010. 
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 The conclusion came  after  the 2005 election conflict and  the 2008 local elections result  which  
were  fully controlled by the ruling party 
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However, the problems of the ruling party are just one side of the coin; the other side 
relates to the opposition parties. There is little experience of a multi-party system in 
Ethiopia. There was no political space for opposition parties during the Haile Selassie 
and military regimes, and it was not until 1993 that the first multi-party registration 
was made. 
 
Since then, three categories of opposition party have evolved. The first category is 
those that can be considered as „loyal‟ opposition parties, who participate in elections 
and use their seats in the parliament to promote their political objectives (Teshome, 
2009). The second category consists of illegal political parties who aim to overthrow 
the incumbent party through violence. This category includes the OLF, the Ogaden 
National Liberation Front (ONLF), the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Oromia 
(IFLO) and the Sidama Liberation Front (SLF). The third category is those parties 
which operate amongst the diaspora and tend to support both the loyal and illegal 
political parties (Teshome, 2009:65). 
 
The disagreements between the loyal opposition parties and the ruling party spring 
from constitutional issues. As discussed earlier, opposition parties were not well 
represented in the constitution drafting process and constitutional assembly (Teshome, 
2009). This was partly a result of the organisational weakness of the opposition 
parties. In addition, it is a result  of the preferential  treatment  of the ruling party  to 
its member political parties  and the exclusion and marginalisation of the opposition 
parties  from the political  and economic processes and access  to state power  and its 
patrimonial  resources. Therefore, as Gudina (2003) argued, the constitution was 
poorly negotiated before being ratified. As a result, the opposition parties still oppose 
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constitutional issues associated with self-determination that have, in turn, become a 
source of proliferation of ethnic-based political parties. They also oppose an electoral 
system, which they say is designed to serve the domination of the ruling party 
(Gudina, 2003). 
 
For the above reasons, participation by opposition parties during the latest elections 
has been half-hearted. They boycotted the first local and regional elections, and took 
little part in the first national and regional elections. It is only since 2000, and 
particularly in 2005, that they started participating in all elections. Overall, half-
hearted participation in the political process has been one of the features of the 
opposition groups. This has led them into a dilemma about using the parliamentary 
seats they won in Addis Ababa and other places in the 2005 election (Smith, 2008).  
 
The second feature of the opposition groups is fragmentation. There is no strong 
opposition party or coalition party that can compete with the ruling party in all the 
regional states of the country. For this, there are different contributing factors. First, 
as Gudina (2006) argued, the different interpretation of the past and present political 
history of the country has played a significant role in keeping them apart. For example, 
while some ethnic-based political parties see a colonial history, other multinational 
parties consider it a nation-building process. Others see a history of Amhara ethnic-
domination over other groups (Gudina, 2003). Second, the need to control the 
political space alone has led to fragmentation of the opposition parties. This was 
clearly observed in the political struggle between the Coalition for Unity and 
Democracy (CUD) member parties which finally led to its disintegration in the 
aftermath of the 2005 election. 
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In summary, neither the ruling party nor the opposition parties gave priority to 
negotiation and dialogue with each other. The ruling party took little notice of the 
opposition parties before the 2005 election. Even since then, regardless of some 
negotiations made to improve the parliamentary and electoral procedures, the 
opposition parties complain about the obstacles created by the ruling party (Ethiopia 
First web page, June 2009).  This led to 96.6% control by the ruling party and its 
allies of the national and regional parliament after the 2010 elections, which can also 
be   interpreted in terms of a one party state. The half-heartedness of the opposition 
parties also created problems in the democratic process. The poor exercise of 
democratic participation has made the federal system somewhat fragile over the last 
18 years. 
 
Mechanisms of Intergovernmental Relationships  
The constitution sets the basics of relationships between the centre and the regional 
states, and between the regional states themselves. For example, the political and 
economic division of power between the centre and the regional states is the basis of 
the relationship between them (Articles.51 and 52).  
 
The constitution also provides for the set-up of institutions to manage the 
relationships between the centre and the regional states, and between regional states. 
The constitution assigns the HOF to decide on matters of self-determination, budget 
subsidy and federal intervention in the regional states. The HOF is also responsible 
for finding solutions when there are conflicts of interest between regional states 
(Article 48). In doing this, the HOF gets advice from a constitutional inquiry 
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commission which is specifically set up to provide professional advice on matters 
related to constitutional interpretations (Article  48). 
 
The executive body also established an institution firstly known as the Office of 
Regional Affairs and later the Ministry of Federal Affairs. This facilitates the 
relationship between the centre and regional states and focuses on supporting the 
emerging regional states (Fiseha, 2006).  
 
The party structure is also used as a means of informal relationship between the centre 
and regional states. As the ruling party has been able to win all the elections, this has 
helped it to implement government decisions in all regional states (Fiseha, 2006:389-
396).  
 
However, the Intergovernmental Relationship (IGR) mechanisms have made little 
contribution towards conflict prevention. A number of observations can be made in 
this regard. Although the HOF is responsible for managing conflict between regional 
states, it does not have legislative power which can influence the laws that affect 
regional states and minority groups (Fiseha, 2006). Moreover, the HOF heavily relies 
on the information provided by the regional states; it lacks professional capacity to 
acquire the necessary information, historical facts and local conditions, which would 
enable it to handle cases fairly (Ibid). 
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The role of the Ministry of Federal Affairs in managing conflict between regional 
states is limited. First, it only focuses on the emerging 
31
 regional states.  And even in 
the emerging regional states it focuses only on control (Young, 1999; Samatars, 2004). 
In addition, the representatives who are sent by the Ministry to support the regional 
states lack the competence to provide the required support to the states.
32
  
 
The centralised party system also made little contribution towards enabling the 
regional states to manage conflict in their own way. This is because the party follows 
centralised policy-making and implementation processes, giving little opportunity for 
alternative ideas to emerge from below. Therefore, this has contributed to the 
development of relatively dependent regional states with regard to all strategic 
planning (Fiseha, 2006:158). In fact, it can be argued, the main problem for regional 
state dependency is the centralised structure of the ruling party (Fiseha, 2006:138).   
 
The implication of the ruling party‟s centralised approach to the intergovernmental 
relationship is that it encourages vertical relationships by which all policy level 
decisions come from one person at the top of state hierarchy. This can generate a 
patron client relationship between the public office holders, as Clapham argues (1985).  
In other words, ideas are generated from the person/s at the top of the hierarchy and 
the subordinates are obliged to follow and implement them through   party procedures. 
Hence, the relationship cannot create regional capacities that can articulate the 
regional developmental and other requirements in a way that enables them to 
negotiate in the intergovernmental relationships as argued by Feyissa (2006), taking 
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the case study of Gambella.  This is very visible in the relationship between the 
federal and emerging regional states; it is also true of the other regional states. 
 
Moreover, the centralised approach of the ruling party discourages horizontal 
relationships between the regional states. This can be seen  from  the low level of  
horizontal  intergovernmental relationships between Oromia and  Benishangul- 
Gumuz regional states   even when they had pressing issues  of concern  before  the 
violent  conflicts along their common borders in 2008
33
  as discussed in Chapter  Nine. 
 
  The centralised party structure also causes the intergovernmental relations to suffer 
from lack of accountability. This is because although decisions are made by a few 
people, the decisions   come to the government hierarchy as a collective decision of 
the ruling party leadership. This lacks individual accountability and leads to abuse of 
power and self-protection in a collective form.  However, when some pressing issues 
occur that make authorities accountable for their actions, the collective form of the 
decision process usually protects the persons at the top of the hierarchy. This can be 
seen from the investigations conducted after the violent conflicts between Oromos 
and Gumuz in 2008.
34
  As discussed in Chapter Seven, the violent conflicts took many 
lives and destroyed property of the local people. Regional anti-riot police, Woreda 
level and local administrations participated in the violence
35
. However, the 
investigation results only held accountable the lower level administrations who were 
involved in the violent conflict. No one wanted to question the participation of the 
                                                 
33
  The former   Benishangul-Gumuz regional state complained that horizontal relationships are only 
based on the willingness of the regional leaders; therefore, they can work as long as there is good 
relationship between them. 
34
 Interview notes, member of parliaments, Addis Ababa,  June 2008 
35
 Ibid 
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higher level authorities in the disturbances
36
.  Overall the centralised approach of the 
ruling party means that intergovernmental relationships suffer from a lack of regional 
capacity for policy formulation, accountability and horizontal intergovernmental 
relationships. 
 
 
 The Impact of the Domestic Politics on the Federalisation Process 
Domestic politics has made the institutionalisation of ethnic identity one of the issues 
of conflict over the last 18 years.  This is closely associated with the different ways 
the elite groups interpret history and compete to secure control over the state and its 
patrimonial resources. As discussed in Chapter Three, there are two political history 
interpretations which are relevant to current domestic politics. On the one hand, the 
ruling party, and other opposition parties, consider the issues of ethnic identity to be 
associated with an ethnic domination – which was followed by civil wars in the 
country (Guidna, 2006). Therefore, they felt these issues had to be addressed by 
constitutional recognition of both individual and group rights (Abbay, 2004). The 
institutionalising of ethnic identity became one of the main features of the federal 
constitution.  This interpretation has become the dominant view in domestic politics 
since 1991.  
 
But a significant part of the Ethiopian elite, and many opposition parties, do not 
recognise ethnic domination as the source of civil wars in Ethiopia. So they want to 
address ethnic rights as only one aspect of overall individual rights.  As a result, they 
do not recognise Article 39 of the constitution, which institutionalises self-
                                                 
36
 Ibid 
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determination of the ethnic groups, and defines how this can be implemented. This 
difference of opinion has clearly been seen in the debates between the elite groups 
over the last 18 years, in manifestos of the opposition parties, and during the election 
debates of 2010
37
. In other words the crucial feature of the constitution, the 
institutionalising of ethnic identity, has not received consensus support from either the 
elite groups or the opposition parties.  
 
In addition, the ruling party has not shown itself ready to reconsider some of the 
weaknesses of the constitutional issues such as minority rights protection and the use 
of language as the only identity marker. Moreover, the federal process which 
undermines citizenship rights and focuses in practice on fostering ethnic-based 
demands is not well recognised by the ruling party
 38
.  This has meant the federal 
arrangement has been accompanied by intra-state conflict
39
. The constitutional clause 
on the right of secession has also been rejected, mainly by the groups who advocated 
for Ethiopian nationalism and national integration. 
 
The ruling party‟s domination of domestic politics has also made the federalisation 
process problematic and dominated by activities tuned towards regime survival. There 
are two aspects of this problem. Firstly, as discussed elsewhere, the centralised party 
structure restricts bottom-up democratic participation – controlling all the regional 
states through party structures (Fiseha, 2006). Therefore, the capacity of the regional 
government‟s executive body, the Regional Council, to formulate policy has been 
                                                 
37
  Debates of the  2010  election, between the ruling party and opposition parties, on the Ethiopian 
Radio and  Television web site, posted  in April 2010 
38
 The ruling party has never recognised that there are constitutional problems which can be sources of 
intra-state conflict. For further information see the debates of the 2002 election, between the ruling 
party and opposition parties, on the Ethiopian Radio and Television web site, posted in April 2010 
39
  Further examples are discussed in chapters six and seven 
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limited. In other words, the main purpose of the regional states has been to execute 
the ruling party‟s polices which are aimed for regime survival, but not for real self-
determination of the ethnic groups. Secondly, the relationship between the ruling 
party and security and the defence forces has also strengthened regime survival party 
politics. The security and defence forces emerged predominantly from the EPRDF 
forces, which fought against the military regime.  Therefore, their leadership is 
dominated by former EPRDF fighters, mainly Tigrayans who played a significant role 
during the armed struggle against the military regime.  Although the greater role 
played by the Tigrayans in the armed forces was inescapable in the initial period of 
the federal arrangement, significant effort has not been made to increase the diversity 
of the leadership, but  only really in the lower ranks
40
.   Therefore, the security and 
defence forces are criticised for being dominated by Tigrayans who represent only 6% 
of the total population (census, 2007). As a result, grievances have been created 
among several ethnic groups, who say that the leadership of the security and defence 
institutions has not been shared equally between all the ethnic groups
41
.  
 
 At worst, it is perceived that the federal system was designed for the purpose of 
Tigray domination over the other ethnic groups.  Therefore, federalisation of the state 
still does not resolve ethnic domination in the country 
42
(Aalen, 2006). This 
perception has significantly and negatively affected the legitimacy of the federal 
process. Although the federal executive is   more or less ethnically well represented as 
shown in the table below, this is not accepted by many commentators because the 
                                                 
40
  This was discussed when the Prime Minster presented his government‟s progress report to the 
federal parliament in 2009. Thus, the Tigrayans domination in the military leadership was criticised by 
the opposition groups, such as the EDP and the OFDP 
41
 This is a genuine concern among many people I interviewed during my field visit in Addis Ababa, 
2008 
42
  This opinion is expressed mainly on the Ethiopian Diaspora websites, such as Nazret. Com  and 
Ethiomedia.Com 
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prime minster position has been held by a Tigrayan since the transition period.  
Moreover, regardless of the ethnic representation of the Cabinet, the persons who are 
assigned to executive posts   came only from the member parties of the ruling party 
which were created by TPLF cadres during the transitional period. 
 
4.3: Ethnic representation of the Ethiopian government cabinet members, adopted 
from the press release Ethiopian Embassy, UK, Thursday 13
th
 2005. 
Tigray Amhara Oromia Southern nationalities Somali Afar 
3 6 5 5 1 1 
15% 30% 25% 25% 5% 5% 
 
Therefore, lack of  general consensus  on constitutional  issues, the control by  the 
ruling party  of domestic  politics  and  the greater power  of the executive  have 
undermined   the benefits  to the ethnic groups  that could  have come  from the 
federal structure of the country. 
 
Conclusion 
The constitutional right of self-determination in Ethiopia has changed the direction of 
intra-state conflict.  Previously, its main manifestation was between the nation-state 
and ethno-national movements.  Moreover, right of self-determination has created the 
significant presence of the ethnic groups in the federal and regional institutions of 
governance. This has, in turn, increased the self-esteem and economic opportunities of 
the ethnic groups (Fiyessa, 2006). 
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However, the federal system still faces three basic sources of intra-state conflict. The 
first is related to the inability of the system to provide the necessary structure to fully 
accommodate the ethnic groups in the regions. This is related to an inability to clearly 
understand their identity-based demands and quickly resolve them. Moreover, it is 
related to the unnecessary aggregation of identities that has led to further 
fragmentation and violent conflict. The Silte and Gurague and the issues of 
Wogagudu language can explain this problem. This was also a reason for ethnicity 
politics and promotion of neo-patrimonial vested interests which manifested itself in 
tendencies to fragment the multi-ethnic regional states.  
 
 The second source of intra-state conflict is related to the low emphasis given to 
citizenship rights of the ethnic groups by the constitution and the implementation 
process. This is manifested in the constitution in a manner that implicitly denies the 
existence of a national identity and exaggerates ethnic identities. This is also 
reinforced by a lack of minority rights‟ protection in the regional states. 
 
 The third source of intra-state conflict is related to the weakness of democratic 
participation. This is mainly manifested in the political culture of the Ethiopian elite 
which gives emphasis to regime survival. The ruling party‟s centralised structure and 
top down approach also proves the existence of the problem. All in all  lack of  
genuine self-determination of the ethnic groups ethnicity politics  and neo-patrimonial 
interests, too little attention to citizenship rights and excessive  emphasis  on the 
politics of  regime survival  have become  the main challenges  to the sustainability of 
the federal system  of the country. 
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Part Three: Case Study of Benishangul- Gumuz regional state 
Chapter Five 
The Ethnic Groups and Political History of Benishangul-Gumuz Regional State 
Introduction 
This chapter outlines the historical analysis of conflicts in the Benishangul-Gumuz 
regional state. It discusses the relationship between the indigenous and non-
indigenous people and relates it to an analytical approach to ethnicity to understand 
the nature of ethnic relationships in the regional state. The chapter also briefly 
scrutinises the political history of the regional state as this provided one of the reasons 
for the establishment of the regional state. 
 
Features of the Regional State 
The Benishangul-Gumuz regional state is located along the margins of the Blue Nile.  
It comprises regions that were previously administered as part of Wellaga and Gojjam 
provinces, in the western and northern parts of the river. In the north west the state 
borders the regional state of Amhara; in the east, Oromia; in the south, Gambella; and 
in the south west, Sudan. The regional state occupies an area of 50,380 square 
kilometres, and is divided by the Blue  Nile – with  the Metekel  zone  and the Pawe 
special  Woreda to the north (occupying over 26,560 km
2
) and the Assosa and 
Kamashi zones, and the Mao-Komo special  Woreda to the south (occupying 23,820 
km
2 
) 
  
(BIPPCSA, 2005).  
 
Administratively, the regional state comprises three zones, 19 Woreda councils 
(including two special Woredas) and 474 Kebele councils (Ibid). Table 1 below 
shows the names of the Woreda in every zone administration. 
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5.1. Names of zone and Woreda administrations 
Zone  Woreda 
 Asossa (six Woredas) Bambasi, Assosa, Oda Godere, Menge, Komsha, Sherkole 
 Kamashi(Five Woredas) Sirba-Abbay, Meti, Kamashi, Belo- Jeganfoy, Yaso 
Metekel(6 Woredas) Dibate, Bullen, Mandura, Dangur, Guba, Wombera 
 Pawe special Woreda  
 Mao/ Komo special Woreda  
 
Source: Department of Press and Public Relation of Benishangul-Gumuz Regional 
State. 
 
Map 3: Benishangul-Gumuz Adminstrative Map 
 
 
Source: Regional state‟s President Office 
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The Benishangul-Gumuz regional state has a total population of 670,847 with an 
average annual growth rate of 3% (Census 2007).  The regional state‟s population 
growth rate is the second highest in the country, after Gambella regional state‟s 4.1%. 
Just over 86% of the population of Benishangul-Gumuz live in rural areas, with the 
remainder living in urban areas. Table 2 below shows the population distribution in 
each zone. 
 
5. 2. Population distribution by zone 
 Zone  Population 
 Metekel 235,638 
 Asossa 267,420 
 Kamash 88027 
Mao/Komo special woreda 42,050 
Pawe special Woreda 37,711 
 
Source: CSAE, census, 2007 
 
There are different religious faiths in the regional state; the most important being 
Islam, Christianity (Orthodox, Protestant, and Catholic) and traditional spiritual 
practice. Table four below shows the population distribution with respect to religion.  
 
5.3. Distribution of   population with respect to religion 
Religion  Population Percentage 
Muslim 304,432 45.5 
Orthodox 221,168 33 
Protestant 90,272 13.5 
catholic 4,191 0.6 
Traditional spiritual practice 47,478 7.1 
Others 3,306 0.5 
 
Source: CSAE, census, 2007 
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Agriculture is the main economic activity, generating 70.31% of the state income and 
employing around 90% of the total population of the regional state. The major 
farming systems are sedentary and shifting cultivation, for indigenous and non-
indigenous people respectively. Cereals, vegetables and fruit are the major products, 
but productivity has fallen sharply due to inadequate modern technological inputs to 
the sector (BIPPCSA, 2005). 
 
The regional state also has sufficient raw materials for both small and large-scale 
industries. However, except for some small cottage industries, the industrial sector is 
not well developed. There were 355 small-scale industries in the region, with a total 
capital of 4.4 million Birr in 2005. The regional state is also known for minerals, such 
as marble, granite, gold, and base metals, but only the gold has been exploited to any 
extent (BIPPCSA, 2005). 
 
The regional state is connected to Addis Ababa by all-weather roads and one domestic 
airport. There are 1,290kms of all weather roads and 1,238kms of dry weather roads 
that connect the zone centres, Woreda centres and the state capital Asossa (Ibid). A 
highway is also under construction to connect Assosa to Metekel
1
.  
Telecommunications and electric services are also expanding to the Woreda centres. 
 
The general primary school enrolment rate has accelerated over the last 18 years.  
Gross primary enrolment reached around 80 percent in 2006/07 (Ethiopian National 
Bank, 2008). According to the regional President‟s six month‟s progress report of the 
2010 fiscal year, 824 students sat for the higher education entrance exam in 2009. Of 
                                                 
1
 Interview notes, head of the Regional Finance and Planning Bureau, Asossa,  May 2008 
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these, 809 students passed the exam and enrolled for higher education.   This was 
considered a major achievement, by the regional state, which had far few higher 
education students during the unitary state regimes.  
 
Access to health services has also increased in the regional state since 1991. There 
was one nurse for every 2,802 people, one physician for every 297,000 people, and 
one GP for every 33,000 people in the regional state in 2005 (DPPR, 2005).  The 
state‟s infant mortality rate was 84 per 1,000, compared with 77 at the national level 
in 2007/08.  The state‟s under-five mortality rate was 157 per 1,000, compared with 
123 at the national level.  State life-expectancy was 50.1 years for men and 51.1 years 
for women, compared with 53.4 and 55.4 respectively, at the national level.  Access to 
a potable water supply reached 49.3% people, compared with 59.5% at the national 
level in 2007/08 (Ethiopian National Bank, 2008). 
 
In political terms, the small administrative and population size of the regional state 
indicate that Benishangul-Gumuz regional state is not  a significant or important state.  
However,  the description of the regional state  underlines  the relevance of the  
regional state   to the issue of   whether  ethnic diversity  causes  conflict  and how   
federalism  in the regional state  has responded  to conflicts. This is because there are 
multiple indigenous ethnic groups and non-indigenous people who live in the 
territories of the regional state. In addition, there has been a migration of people from 
the neighbouring Amhara and Oromia regional states to the regional state. This has 
influenced the nature of regional domestic politics and intergovernmental 
relationships.  The regional state also shares international borders with Sudan, from 
which insurgents have crossed into the country.  This factor also meant the regional 
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state has attracted the attention of the federal government. In fact, the dynamics of 
conflict in the regional state   can therefore show whether the federal arrangement is 
succeeding in managing the conflicts in the country. 
 
The Ethnic Groups in the Regional state: Indigenous versus Non-indigenous 
Benishangul-Gumuz hosts different ethnic groups, which are categorised as 
indigenous and non-indigenous according to the regional state‟s constitution (Article 
2). The indigenous ethnic groups are the Nilo-Saharan families, including Berta, 
Gumuz, Mao and Komo, and Shinasha (an Omatic family) (Wedekind and Alga, 
2002). The non-indigenous groups include Amhara, Oromo, Agaw, Tigray and others.  
 
The indigenous ethnic groups predominantly live in their own territorial areas. For 
example, the Berta ethnic group live in the Asossa zone and the Gumuz ethnic group 
live in the Metekel and Kamashi zones. Mao and Komo ethnic groups also live in the 
Mao/Komo special Woreda.  Table four below shows the population size of the 
indigenous groups and the major non-indigenous people in the regional state. 
 
The non-indigenous ethnic groups either live with the indigenous groups or in 
separate Woreda administrations. For instance, the Oromos live in both the Asossa 
and Kamashi zones alongside the indigenous groups. The Amharas live mainly in the 
Asossa zone and the Pawe special Woreda. The Agaw-Awi live predominantly in the 
Metekel zone (BIPPCSA, 2005). 
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5.4. Population size of each indigenous ethnic group and the major non-indigenous 
groups 
Ethnic group  Population size Percentage 
 Indigenous groups  
 Berta 173,743 25.90 
Gumuz 141,645 21.11 
 Shinasha 50,916 7.59 
 Mao 12,744 1.96 
 Komo 6,464 0.96 
  Major Non-indigenous Groups  
 Amhara 142,557 21.25 
 Oromo 89,346 13.32 
 Agaw-awi 28,467 4.24 
Tigray 4,559 .68 
 Sudanse 4551 .68 
 
Source: CSAE, census, 2007 
 
As  the names  of the people   indicate  the  indigenous  ethnic groups  are  distinct  
from  each other  in their language, culture  and their territorial  residence areas. For 
example,  the  Berta  ethnic group  live in Asossa and speak  their own  language,   
which is  different  and non intelligible with the  languages of  the other  indigenous 
people. Similarly, the Gumuz   predominantly live in Metekel and Kamashi zones and 
speak their own language which is not incomprehensible to the other indigenous 
ethnic groups. The Mao, Komo and Shinasha ethnic groups also live primarily in their 
own residential territories and they speak different languages. 
 
 The indigenous people also differ from each other with respect to culture. The 
Gumuz ethnic group are predominantly traditional spiritual faith believers, influenced 
by Christianity from the highlands of Ethiopia and by Islam from Sudan.   The culture 
of   Berta is highly influenced by Islam. This is because they were administered by 
Sheikhs, Islamized by their relationships with Sudanese Arabs. However, despite the 
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spread of Islam, traditional spiritual faith and customs remain important aspects of the 
spiritual life of the Berta people (Vaughan, 2007:30). The other ethnic groups 
including Mao, Komo and Shinasha have their own distinct cultures. However, unlike 
Gumuz and Berta, these ethnic groups are highly influenced by the cultures of the 
neighbouring   Amhara and Oromo ethnic groups. For example, the Mao ethnic group 
are multilingual and their culture and way of living has been very much influenced by 
the neighbouring Oromos (Gonzảlez-Ruibal and Martinez, 2007:10; Vaughan, 
2007:30). The  Shinasha people, who live in  Metekel,  also  have  their own  identity  
and culture, but   they are  influenced  by Christianity  and  by the  Agaw and Amhara  
way of  life (Endalew, 2005:2).  
 
The other people in the regional state are the non-indigenous people who formally and 
informally settled in the regional state.  Around 135,000 of the non-indigenous people 
came mainly through the massive resettlement packages begun as part of the national 
resettlement programme after the country‟s 1984 drought (Abbute, 2002:114; 
Pankhurst, 1990:126). The settlers were mainly from Amhara, Wollo, Gondar, North 
Showa and Tigray – all categorised as drought affected areas – and from the southern 
region, including Kembata, Hadiya and Walyita, where there was a shortage of arable 
land (Pankhurst, 1990:126).  
 
Nevertheless, the number of non-indigenous people in the territories of the 
Benishangul-Gumuz regional state has increased since the resettlement programme of 
1984. This is because many internal immigrants from Amhara and Oromia have 
migrated to the regional state.
2
 So, the number of non-indigenous people in the 
                                                 
2
 Interview notes, informant from zone administration, GlegelBeles town, July,2008 
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regional state is now nearly equal to the number of indigenous people counted in the 
1994 census. In the 1994 census, the general population of non-indigenous people was 
around 42.2%. This did not change significantly in the 2007 census (Census, 1994, 
2007), but this is probably because the regional state has refused to accept immigrants 
as legal residents of the regional state, since the 1994 census.  Literally, the real 
numbers now appear to be more or less equal. 
 
The definitions, indigenous and non-indigenous, are not clarified in the regional 
constitution, but the former are implicitly understood as the people who have lived in 
the region prior to the arrival of the highlanders in the early part of the 20
th
 century. 
The regional authorities of the state appear to appreciate the difference between the 
indigenous and non-indigenous groups. For example, a senior expert at the regional 
Police Commission, who conducted undergraduate research on indigenous and non-
indigenous issues, defines the terms with respect to inward migration (Wodisha, 
2004:60-61). Other experts in the regional state understand this issue in the same way. 
 
Abbute (2002) conducted a detailed anthropological study of the relationship between 
the Gumuz and the Settlers in Metekel. He relates the term indigenous to population 
size and the cultural differences between the native people and the non-indigenous 
people. Accordingly, referring to Berkes (2001:115 cited in Abbute, 2002:29).  
Abbute identifies the following four criteria of indigenous people. 
They are descendants of groups inhabiting an area prior to the arrival of other 
populations; they are politically non dominant; they are culturally different 
from the dominant population; and they identify themselves as indigenous 
(Abbute, 2002:29). 
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The above criteria for indigenous groups frame the theoretical definitions utilised in 
Chapter Two. However, there is an omission in Abbute‟s (2002) criteria; that is the 
relationship between the dominant ethnic groups and the state.  The indigenous 
groups tend to respect traditional value, which may be inconsistent with the features 
of the state. These values include property rights, law, and the role of companies. 
Moreover, as the indigenous group has a special attachment to its territory, land 
becomes a major source of dispute when the dominant ethnic groups expand their 
territories towards those of the indigenous groups (Eriksen, 2002:127; Knight, 
1988:123). 
 
We can, however, utilise Abbute‟s criteria to see the difference between the 
indigenous and non-indigenous people in the regional state.  For this purpose, we will 
focus on the features of the Gumuz and Berta ethnic groups, compared to the non-
indigenous groups (mainly Amharas and Oromos).  This analysis will also enable us 
to discuss the conflict in the regional state as the Gumuz and Berta are the indigenous 
peoples most frequently involved in conflict with the non-indigenous people.  
Accordingly, the difference between the indigenous and non-indigenous peoples can 
be summarised as follows. 
 
Firstly, both the indigenous and non-indigenous people have categorical names for 
each other.  For example, „highlanders‟ and „lowlanders‟ are used as broad categorical 
names to identify the non-indigenous and indigenous groups, respectively. This is 
because the Nilo-Saharan ethnic groups predominantly live in the lowland areas and 
the non-indigenous ethnic groups either originate from, or live in, the highland areas 
of the country. Moreover, the Gumuz ethnic group defines all the „highlanders‟ as 
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Shuwa, which denotes people with cruel and brutal behaviour (Abbute, 2002:224-
226). On the other hand, the „highlanders‟ identify all the Nilo-Saharan ethnic groups 
as Shankilla, which means „Black‟ or „Negro‟ with its derogatory implication (Abbute, 
2002:226; Triulzi, 1981:29; Donahm, 1986). 
 
Secondly, both the Berta and Gumuz ethnic groups have lived in their current 
territories for as long as anyone can remember.  The Gumuz ethnic group were 
considered to be the first settlers of Lake Tana and Wombera – before they pushed 
into to the lowland areas of Metekel. Moreover, they are also considered to be the first 
habitants of both sides of the Blue Nile tributaries (Pankhurst, 1997). The Berta have 
lived in the Benishangul or Asossa area since they moved to Ethiopia from Sudan in 
the 17
th
 century. However, the non-indigenous groups came to the territories of 
Gumuz and Berta more recently, mainly during the resettlement programme of the 
military regime and by voluntary immigration from the neighbouring regional states 
(Abbute, 2002, Membratie, 2004; Rahmato, 1988). 
 
Thirdly, the indigenous groups are culturally different from the non-indigenous 
groups. For example, Gumuz society centres on a polygamy family system. A family 
unit usually consists of a grandfather, father, co-wives, sons and daughters.  The 
commune that is created from a group of family units is also an economic unit that 
determines the survival of the Gumuz society (Abbute, 2002:66).  Commune 
members practice field cultivation and harvesting together, supervised by elders. The 
Gumuz have a sister exchange marriage system, in which a bridegroom gives his 
sister or the daughter of his close relatives in exchange for his bride to a bridegroom 
from another clan (Abbute, 2002:67). The Gumuz are predominantly traditional 
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spiritual faith believers.  The marriage system of the Berta, however, is strongly 
influenced by the Islamic religion, though the traditional beliefs, such as shangur 
(performed before major events such as  hunting, harvesting, gold extracting, long 
trade journeys, and migration) still has special relevance (Triulzi,1981:26).  By 
contrast, the non-indigenous groups have an exogamic family structure which exists 
as a single social and economic unit, while intertwined with the community in a 
hierarchal manner (Donham, 1986). Moreover, the non-indigenous people follow a 
bride-price marriage system, which is rare in Gumuz society and which is considered 
a shameful practice (Abbute, 2002). The non-indigenous are either Christian or 
Islamic believers. 
 
The agricultural subsistence method of the indigenous groups is also different from 
that of the non-indigenous groups. For example, the Gumuz and Berta practice 
shifting cultivation as a means of subsistence. This involves the clearing of land by 
cutting and burning trees and bushes, using the hoe as the main means of cultivation 
and leaving the land fallow one year in every four – when fertility is reduced 
(Mebratie, 2004; Triulzi, 1981). Moreover, the Berta and Gumuz see land as 
communal property; therefore, there is no permanent individual ownership of land 
that can be passed to future generations (Rahmato, 1988:123). In contrast to the 
indigenous people, the non-indigenous groups practice plough cultivation as a means 
of subsistence. This involves full clearance and cultivation of land by family members 
and oxen (Abbute, 2002:236). Land is also considered private property that can be 
leased either from the government or an individual and inherited by children (Donham, 
1986).   
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Finally, in indigenous groups the elders mediate disputes. As a result, they have a 
loose relationship with the rules of the government and the government authorities. 
For example, the Gumuz tend to deal with incidents of homicides using traditional 
means of conflict management. The responsibility for conflict resolution is given to 
local elders who act as neutral mediators between contending families or clans. The 
reconciliation process involves swearing an oath not to perpetuate further killing and 
to provide compensation to the family of the deceased, in accordance with the sum 
agreed by the elders (Abbute, 2002).  Although this process may reconcile rival 
families or ethnic groups it does not discourage murder as the killers are not punished 
by the law.  The non-indigenous groups primarily abide by legal procedures for 
dealing with the social and economic affairs of their communities. They normally 
have strong and hierarchal relationships with the state and the government authorities 
(Donham, 1986; Abbute, 2002). 
 
The result is that  the categorical  names which  the indigenous  and no-indigenous  
people use  to insult each other, the historical  territorial issues, differences in culture 
and  means of economic subsistence are all sources of  conflicts  between  them  
which the  regional state  has inherited. Moreover, these issues are not only sources of 
conflicts in the regional state. They also affect relations between the indigenous 
people and the people of the neighbouring regional states. This means the issues in the 
Benishangul-Gumuz   have direct impact on the intergovernmental relationships with 
the neighbouring regional states. This will be discussed in detail in Chapter Nine. 
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  Primordial versus Social Construct of Ethnic Identity in the Regional State 
The above description of the indigenous ethnic groups and non-indigenous people in 
the regional states demonstrates how elements of the primordial and socially 
constructed characteristics of ethnic identity interact and determine the dynamics of 
conflict in the regional states.  These can be summarised in the following way. 
 
The primordial ties in the indigenous groups remain intact among all their members.   
For example, the Gumuz have well-structured, traditional social rules that govern the 
role of elders in the society, their marriage system, the relationship between the 
members of communities and their environment; and conflict management systems 
(Abbute, 2002).  These rules are well established among the sub-clans. For example, 
if a person wants to be a member of a sub-clan, they have to have blood ties that can 
be accepted by the existing members of that sub-clan. Moreover, as the members of 
sub-clans usually reside in the same location they are protected from outsiders. This 
situation is reinforced by other social commitments and labour mobilisation among 
the communities (Abbute, 2002; Mebratie, 2004). 
 
The hostile attitude of the neighbouring ethnic groups has contributed to a 
strengthening of primordial ties between members of the indigenous groups. This 
confirms the general theory of ethnicity that when an ethnic group is threatened by 
others the solidarity between the members of the ethnic group increases (Eriksen, 
2001). Historically, the slavery system that devastated the Gumuz forced them to 
retreat to a safe area which sheltered them from the „highlanders‟ slave raids. This has 
created deep-rooted hatred and suspicion against the highlanders. The resulting 
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struggle for self-protection from slave raids, and for the survival of ethnic identity, 
has contributed to a strengthening of Gumuz primordial ties. 
 
Despite the small size of the Komo ethnic group, and their geographical proximity to 
the Oromo ethnic group, they have retained their ethnic identity. This is also 
connected to historical factors, living conditions and the religion of the Komo ethnic 
group. Historically, the Komo were subjected to slave raids by neighbouring ethnic 
groups. They mainly live by fishing and hunting, which is considered a lower form of 
occupation by the neighbouring people.
3
. This has led to them being considered as 
lower status by the neighbouring Oromo ethnic group. Moreover as the Komo ethnic 
group are predominantly Muslim this has enabled them to define themselves as a 
distinct ethnic group in their relationship with the predominantly Christian 
neighbouring Oromo ethnic group.  
 
This is not always the case. For example, the Mao ethnic group have a tendency to 
assimilate their identity with the neighbouring Oromo ethnic group. This is because 
everyone in this group was considered Oromo before the change of government in 
1991 and the establishment of the federal system
4
. An informant
5
 from the Mao ethnic 
group confirmed this and that he speaks fluent Oromifa.  The mother tongue of many 
Mao from the Woreda remains Oromifa. Moreover, the assimilation of identities 
within the Oromo population has been further encouraged by the fact that the different 
ethnic groups have similar occupations.  This suggests that whether an ethnic identity 
                                                 
3
 Interview notes, informant from  Mao/ Komo Woreda, Asossa, May 2008 
4
  Many people in the special Woreda were counted as Oromos during  the 1994  census 
5
  An informant  from the Mao ethnic group and a member of the Benishangul-Gumuz regional Cabinet, 
Asossa, May 2008 
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changes or remains intact depends on the influence of the environment and the 
advantages and disadvantages of that influence for members of the ethnic groups. 
 
 However, generally speaking, ethnic identities are clearly demarcated in the regional 
state. For example, despite the small population size of the Gumuz in Gojjam 
(compared to the Amhara ethnic group) their ethnic identity has remained separate 
from the Amhara ethnic group. This is also a result of the historical relationship 
between Gumuz and Amhara and differences in living conditions and culture between 
the two ethnic groups. This distinctiveness can be seen in their different approaches to 
farming; the Christian faith of the Amhara as opposed to the traditional spiritual belief 
of the Gumuz; and the bride-price-based marriage system of the Amhara rather than 
the sister exchange marriage of the Gumuz (Mebratie, 2004; Abbute, 2002).  Thus, 
these ethnic markers have created different meanings, which are manifested in 
different ethnic identities and the residential territories of the ethnic groups. This is 
also the case with the relationship between the Berta and other neighbouring ethnic 
groups. 
 
However, the primordial ties are not as static as the primordialists suggest (Esman, 
2004:31).  Some of the ethnic markers of the indigenous groups have been influenced 
over time by the relationships between individual members of the ethnic groups. For 
example, members of the Gumuz ethnic group who are living with the Oromos and 
the Agaw have adopted a common inter-ethnic conflict management system that is 
known as Muchu (Endalew, 2002; 15). This is a traditional conflict management 
institution through which people from different ethnic groups manage inter-ethnic 
conflict (Ibid). Moreover, the Gumuz, who were traditional faith believers, have been 
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influenced by the Christian and Islam religions of the highlanders of Ethiopia and 
Sudan (Mebratie, 2004). 
 
The economic subsistence lifestyle of the Gumuz has also been influenced by the non-
indigenous groups. For example, although land is considered as communal property in 
Gumuz society, land renting and crop sharing systems have been adopted from the 
highland people.   Furthermore, the Gumuz have established friendly relationships 
with the non-indigenous people, which enable them to share information and 
resources (Abbute, 2002:269-270). Inter-ethnic marriage practices have also 
developed among Gumuz government employees and Agaw women in the Woredas 
of Metekel (Abbute, 2002:270-271). 
 
On the other hand the Gumuz have also influenced the non-indigenous people in 
various respects. For example, the non-indigenous people have learnt from the Gumuz 
about the gathering of forest foods, the planting of oppa and pumpkin, the 
consumption of bamboo sprouts, and field cultivation using simple hand tools to 
maintain soil fertility (Abbute, 2002:272).  
 
The above two-way relationship of the indigenous and the non-indigenous groups in 
Benishangul-Gumuz regional state demonstrates that ethnic identity can be socially 
constructed by the interaction of the neighbouring ethnic groups. Moreover, it shows 
ethnic identity  is  a social phenomena that is  constructed over time, due to the 
interaction of the members of the ethnic group with each other and through the 
interaction of the different ethnic groups (Vayrynen, 1999).  
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 Certainly, some informants associated inter-ethnic violent conflicts in the regional 
state with the culture of the indigenous groups and mainly with the culture of the 
Gumuz
6
.  This is because the sister exchanges marriage of the Gumuz, and the social 
value of Gumuz that accept murder, make the Gumuz society vulnerable to violent 
conflict.  Sister exchange marriage is part of the Gumuz culture and arranged between 
clans. However, this has exposed the Gumuz to intra-ethnic conflict because the 
exchange of sisters of bridegrooms is not always successful (James 1975 cited in 
Abbute, 2002:227). 
 
 Murder is also considered to be a source of pride, and a patriotic act, by members of 
the Gumuz ethnic group. It is not clear how this custom has developed, but the 
Gumuz society honours people who commit homicide. As a result, women encourage 
their husbands to kill someone and if the deceased person is from the Amhara ethnic 
group the killer receive great recognition from Gumuz society
7
. However, the honour 
associated with murder differs from place to place, and is less popular for people who 
have adopted „new‟ religions than those who still exercise traditional beliefs. For 
example, informants noted that the number of homicides among the Gumuz 
traditional spiritual faith followers of Dibate and the Mandura Woredas of Metekel 
zone are higher than in the Gumuz Christians of Kamashi zone Woredas
8
.  
 
 Nevertheless, it is hard to conclude that the cultural values of the Gumuz are the 
major contributing factors for inter-ethnic violent conflict. Firstly, although there are 
problematic cultural practices in Gumuz society, they are practiced mainly within the 
                                                 
6
 . Interview notes, informant from Shinasha ethnic group, Asossa, May 2008 
7
  Interview notes, Head of Women‟s Affairs Bureau of the Benishangul-Gumuz regional state, Asossa, 
May 2008 
8
 Interview notes, Gumuz elders, Asossa, May 2008 
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circle of the Gumuz clans themselves and their consequences are also seen in the 
Dibate and the Mandura Woredas of the Metekel Zone
9
. Secondly, the Gumuz live 
peacefully with other people whose ethnic identities and cultures are different. They 
live peacefully with the Agaw and the Shinasa people in many places in Wombera 
Woreda. Moreover, the Gumuz used to live peacefully with the Oromo in the 
common borders of the Kamashi zone until a government change in 1991. It would be 
expected, if the main source of inter-ethnic conflict was cultural, that frequent violent 
conflicts would happen between the Gumuz and, for example, the Shinasha and the 
Agaw, who have daily contact with them. However, the Gumuz have experienced less 
conflict with the Shinasha and the Agaw than with the Amhara. This is because the 
Shinasha do not threaten the territories of the Gumuz – they neither cultivate land (left 
fallow by the Gumuz) nor cut trees in the forests used by Gumuz for honey and 
hunting.
10
  Moreover, as many Kebeles of Shinasa live with Kebeles of the Gumuz, 
they know how to treat each other and respect their neighbours‟ cultures as well. 
 
 In fact, homicides between the Gumuz and the Amhara or the Agaw occur mainly as 
a result of business activities. This usually arises from the mistrust which has 
historical roots.   Indeed, this kind of conflict usually occurs when an Amharan and a 
Gumuz trade over crop sharing or land rental. In this situation if the Gumuz thinks 
that the Amhara is cheating him he resorts to violence.  Equally, the Gumuz may also 
kill a new internal immigrant because he may violate the Gumuz‟s territorial rules.11.  
Clearly, cultural differences cannot be the main source of inter-ethnic violent conflict 
in the regional state. 
                                                 
9
  According to the regional Police sources Dibate and Mandura  Woredas have  the highest  homicide 
rates in the regional state 
10
 Interview notes,  informants Gumuz elders,  Asossa, May 2008 
11
 Interview notes, Members of  Dibate Woreda Administration, July 2008 
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Overall, ethnic identities in the regional state are not primordial ties which cannot   be 
changed or influenced due to circumstances. Rather they are social constructs which 
are influenced by the historical relationships between the neighbouring ethnic groups 
and changes of political environment; and social and economic relationships. Inter-
ethnic conflicts in fact are not merely the result of cultural differences between ethnic 
groups; or a consequence of unbalanced historical relationships, but are usually 
invoked by factors such as land use problems and cultural inequalities. 
 
Political History of the Regional State  
Early historical records of the indigenous people indicate that the Shankilla, Bega, 
Ganz, Bareya and Sasu, who lived in the borderlands of the central highlands, were 
among the earliest inhabitants of present day Ethiopia.  For example, the   Sasu who 
lived in the west (including in the highlands of Metekel and along the shores of the 
Blue Nile), had trade contacts with the Axumites as early as the Axumite kingdom  
for their gold reserves (Pankhurst, 1997:27-33).   
 
 However, slavery and slave raids against these indigenous people arose in the 
highlands of Abyssinia from various factors. Firstly, the slavery system was 
considered as religiously acceptable (Leviticus,25:44-46) and was legally supported, 
mainly by the  medieval Solomonic kings of Ethiopia, and enshrined in „legal‟ 
documents such as the Kibre Negest (the Glory of kings) and Fetha Negest ( the Law 
of Kings) (Tibebu,1995:56). 
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Secondly, acquiring slaves became a sign of economic strength for all the imperial 
regimes of the Abyssinian highlanders. This is because slaves helped to strengthen the 
domestic economy and were exported to Arab countries and elsewhere in exchange 
for different goods. As a result the transference of slaves was seen as a form of tax, 
accepted by the imperial regimes and exercised from the medieval period to the early 
20
th
 century (Mebratie, 2004; Pankhurst, 1997:366).   
 
Thirdly, slaves had a great importance, in the strengthening of the imperial regimes‟ 
military power, mainly during the Gondar monarchies, and as construction workers 
for the imperial palaces.  For example, some Baryas (slaves) were recruited into the   
Emperor Amda Seyons‟s army as early as the 14th century (Pankhurst, 1997:97).  The 
Emperor Susneyos, whose capital was in the Lake Tana area, launched an expedition 
towards the „Black‟ people between 1615-1616, in order to capture slaves who could 
work in the construction of his palace (Pankhurst, 1997:353). 
 
Finally, because the customs and beliefs of the Baraya (slave) were different from the 
Abyssinian societies this meant the Baraya were regarded with fear or suspicion. The 
term Baraya was often employed as the name of an evil spirit, for example, in a 
number of Ethiopian Christian prayers (Pankhurst, 1997:357). As a result, the people 
were considered by the citizens of Gondar, as „unworthy of consideration‟ (Pankhurst, 
1997:366).  This led to the Baraya being enslaved not only for economic purposes but 
because they were thought to be evil spirits.  As a result, slave raids against the „Black‟ 
people lasted for centuries, from the early medieval to the modern period of Ethiopia 
(Zewde, 2002; Mebratie, 2004; 69). 
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The consequences of the slave raids were severe on the Gumuz and other „Black’ 
people. Firstly, as the raids were carried out against the „Blacks‟ continuously, the 
people were forced to retreat from their previous settlement areas and move into the 
harsh lowlands along the Blue Nile shores. Secondly, the slave raids had a negative 
effect on population. For hundreds of years, women and children were taken as slaves 
by the Abyssinian highlanders. Men were also killed during these raids, and, if they 
surrendered, they were taken as slaves (Pankhurst, 1997). Finally, the above 
relationship between the highlanders and the „Black‟ people resulted in the 
highlanders of both the Amhara and Oromo people classifying the ‘Black’ people as 
inferior. This, in turn, created deep-rooted hatred and mistrust between the ethnic 
groups (Abbute, 2002: 246). This categorisation persists in the 21
st
 century. An 
informant from the Kamashi Gumuz said: 
In market areas the goods provided by the Gumuz are not seen as equal to the 
goods provided by others. In addition, if Gumuz are being served in catering 
places, others do not want to be served from the same plate that the Gumuz 
person has used
12
 .  
 
Thus, the stigma of the slavery system is still fresh in the memory of many indigenous 
people and this can be a source of conflict between them and the non-indigenous 
groups. Moreover, the words Barya (slave) and Shanqella are also commonly used as 
insults, and this can lead to violent conflict. 
 
The relationship between the unitary state and the indigenous groups has remained as 
one of centre and periphery, and hostile, in modern Ethiopia.  After the establishment 
                                                 
12
 Interview notes, informant from  the Gumuz ethnic group, Asossa, May 2008 
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of the modern state and following the abolition of slavery, the relationship the state 
had with the indigenous groups shifted to the acquisition of agricultural lands and 
collection of taxes. The lands of Berta and Gumuz , however, were considered „no 
man‟s land‟ and/or „virgin land‟ to be colonised and the people, mainly the Gumuz, 
were labelled „rebellious and barbarous who kill others for no reason‟ (Mebratie, 
2004:74).  The local chiefs of the Haile Selassie regime demanded the indigenous 
groups pay more taxes, in order to earn extra money for themselves (Mebratie, 
1996:78 cited in Mebratie, 2004:74).  Similarly, the Haile Selassie regime abolished 
the role of Sheikdoms in the Berta ethnic group and appointed an administrator from 
the centre who was totally unrelated to the ethnic group
13
. Thus, centre and periphery 
relationship between the state and the indigenous people continued during the military 
regime, when they were administered by governors who were recruited from the 
central highlands (Abbute, 2002; Mebratie, 2004).   
 
The military regime also promoted the idea of the resettlement programme which 
displaced the indigenous people. This in itself has provided a source of conflict for a 
number of reasons. Firstly, the displacement of the indigenous people is a recent event; 
it is fresh in the memory for most of the surviving indigenous population. Abbute 
(2002:294) noted that around 18,000 Gumuz were forced away from around 250,000 
hectares of their traditional land, when 48 settler villages were established in the Pawe 
special Woreda in 1984. Similarly, the Berta people were displaced from Bambassi 
and the area around Asossa, due to the resettlement programme of the same year. The 
reason for the displacement was because the residential areas of the indigenous people 
were considered by the government as „unoccupied‟ land which had agricultural 
                                                 
13
  An informant  from  Berta noted that  a person called Debrethion, who was sent  from  the centre, 
was the first  governor  to the Asossa  region,  
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potential (Viezzoh, 1992 cited in Yntiso, 2003). As a result the displacement caused 
unexpected changes in their day to day life and customary services which, in turn, 
contributed to the impoverishment of the people (Yntiso, 2003, Alex de Waal, 
1991:318). Secondly, the resettlement negatively affected the size of the land that 
could be cultivated by shifting cultivation and the forests where the indigenous people 
collected supplementary food and hunted.  As a result, the indigenous groups were 
hostile towards the settlers mainly in the Gumuz areas, leading to community wide 
violent conflict after the change of government in 1991(Abbute, 2002:169). 
 
Over all, the indigenous people were marginalized and unable to take advantage of the 
benefits of the state during the imperial and military regimes.  The people remained 
an illiterate population, compared to the neighbouring Amhara and Oromo people 
(Abbute, 2002). For example, there was only one university graduate from the Berta 
ethnic group throughout the Imperial and Military regimes
14
.  The access of the 
Gumuz to education, health and other services remained difficult as well. The 
occupations of the ethnic groups have remained limited to traditional subsistence, due 
to low infrastructural development and scarce modern economic activities (Rahmato, 
1988). 
 
   Conclusion 
In conclusion, structural differences concerning subsistence, antagonistic historical 
relationships between the indigenous and non-indigenous people, and centre and 
periphery relationships between the state and the indigenous people have become 
sources of conflict in the regional state. The indigenous people practice shifting 
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 Interview notes, Berta  elders, Asossa, May,2008 
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cultivation using hand tools cross a wide tract of land, left fallow periodically. To 
supplement their diet they hunt in forests, which also helps to maintain the ecosystem.  
The traditional spiritual faiths of the indigenous people are closely connected to this 
shifting cultivation practice and the forests. Land is considered to be communal 
property that a member of the sub-clan cultivates on the basis of a traditional tenure 
system. 
 
On the other hand, the non-indigenous people practice plough cultivation, which 
requires full clearing of land, and farming labour provided by a single family and 
oxen.  Land is considered private property, rented using the legal means of the 
country. As the non-indigenous people live in the territories of the indigenous people 
the structural difference in the styles of subsistence of the two groups create 
incompatible interests, which can lead to conflict.  
 
Antagonistic historical relationships also contribute to the current violent conflict.  
The indigenous people have been continuously displaced from their ancestral homes 
by slave raids. These began hundreds of years ago but were still happening in the 
early 20
th
 century. They were forced to move by neighbouring ethnic groups.  They 
have been categorised as slaves and „lower‟ citizens; this marginalization is still 
evident today in business relationships and social interaction with non-indigenous 
people. As a result, hatred and suspicion between the groups remains high. This can 
contribute to the current conflicts.  
 
The peripheral and centre relationships between the state and the indigenous people 
have also been a source of conflict. The medieval Emperors considered the 
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indigenous people as a resource pool, and this lasted until the Haile Selassie regime. 
The military regime also displaced the indigenous people from their settlements and 
marginalised them from the benefits of government. These factors all contribute to the 
current conflict and to horizontal inequalities between the indigenous and non-
indigenous people. This will be discussed at greater length in the following chapter.  
The poor political and economic history of the ethnic groups underlined the 
importance of the federalisation of the state as a means of restoring the dignity of the 
people and resolving the basic causes of conflict in the state. 
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Chapter Six 
Federalism and Intra-regional Conflict and Conflict Management in the 
Benishangul-Gumuz Regional State 
 Introduction  
 This chapter explores the federal implementation process based on field visit data. It 
focuses on the structural sources of intra-regional conflicts in the regional state of 
Benishungul-Gumuz and the management of conflict. To this end, the horizontal 
inequalities between the indigenous and non-indigenous people and the territorial 
issues of the indigenous people and land use right of settlers in the regional state are 
discussed. The chapter addresses these issues at greater length and explores the extent 
to which the federal system has addressed them over the last 19 years. 
 
 The Establishment of the Regional State and the Impact on the Root Causes of 
Conflicts 
The 1995 Federal Constitution of Ethiopia not only acknowledged the right of self-
determination but also created conditions conducive to self-administration by ethnic 
groups (Article 39). As a result, the indigenous groups of the Benishangul-Gumuz 
regional state have been able to establish a regional and local administration for the 
first time in their history. An elder from the Berta ethnic group explained: “We knew 
that we were equal citizens with others in 1992.”1  Although the people were legally 
citizens of Ethiopia during the imperial and military regimes, their citizenship rights 
were essentially worthless because their collective rights, and their right to administer 
themselves, were not respected by the state.  
                                                 
1
  The first regional states were established in 1992 on the basis of the transitional charter of the 
country. 
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The regional state was established with a regional Council (Legislative), an Executive 
and a Judiciary. Four political organisations, which formed a united front, under the 
name of Benishangul Gumuz People’s Democratic United Front, run   the regional 
Council.  It has a total of 99 seats, of which 40 are for Berta, 35 are for Gumuz, 11 are 
for Shinasha, 2 for Mao and 2 for Komo. Other non-indigenous people occupy the 
remaining 9. The General Assembly is convened twice a year. There are also local 
councils established in the Woreda and Kebele of the indigenous groups‟ areas. The 
non-indigenous people can also be represented in the local councils, for example, the 
Pawe special Woreda was established for non-indigenous people (BIPPCSA, 2005). 
The Regional Executive is established from indigenous groups, and almost all the 
indigenous groups are represented on it. Nevertheless, there is no clear power-sharing 
mechanism between the indigenous ethnic groups, and this has been the source of one 
of the complaints of Berta ethnic group representatives. Members of the judiciary are 
assigned by the Regional Council, after being nominated by the regional President.
2
 
 
 Indigenous people can also become members of the House of People‟s 
Representatives (HOPR) of the federal government. In addition, every indigenous 
ethnic group is represented by at least one person in the House of Federation (HOF). 
This means the regional states are represented by at least five members in the HOF 
(Article 61 of the federal constitution).  
 
 
                                                 
2
 Interview notes, legal advisor to the President of  the Benishangul- Gumuz  regional state, Asossa, 
2008 
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The official language of the regional state is Amharic. However, the three languages 
of the major indigenous groups (Berta, Gumuz and Shinasha) have recently been 
adopted as a medium of instruction in primary education (Vaughan, 2006). 
 
The federal constitution stipulates that  “the peoples of Ethiopia as a whole, and each 
nation, nationality and people in Ethiopia in particular, have the right to improved 
living standards and to sustainable development” (Article 43/1). In implementing this 
constitutional right the federal government allocates a budget subsidy every year, 
which covers nearly 90% of capital and recurrent budget of the Benishangul-Gumuz 
regional state. For example, out of the 307 million Birr total budget 280 million was 
allocated from federal government sources as a budget subsidy in the 2007/2008 
budget year
3
. The regional state is also a beneficiary of the national infrastructural 
expansion, education and health services as noted in Chapter Five. 
 
The regional state has fairly distributed the regional institutions to the urban centres. 
For example, the men‟s boarding training centre for small-scale industries is in the 
Kamashi zone. The regional teacher training college and women‟s Boarding School 
are in Metekel. Others such as the agricultural training college, the agricultural 
research centre, and the technical skills training centre are in Asossa. A university will 
be also established in Asossa by the federal government.
4
 
 
Overall, the establishment of the regional state has brought a radical change in the 
political history of the people (Young, 1999). It reaffirmed the equality of the 
indigenous people with dominant neighbouring ethnic groups. They have been 
                                                 
3
  Benishangul-Gumuz regional state annual budget,  Finance and Planning Bureau of the regional 
state , 2008 
4
 Interview notes, a Cabinet member, Asossa, May 2008 
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enabled to administer themselves and to negotiate with their neighbours with regard to 
issues such as common borders and the use of agricultural land. This can be 
considered a total reverse of the earlier political pattern that displaced the indigenous 
people from their territories. Moreover, representation in the HOPR and HOF has 
given them equitable participation rights in national affairs, and enabled them to 
negotiate about budget subsidies for their special circumstances
5
.  
 
The establishment of the regional state has, however, been accompanied by intra-state 
and inter-state conflicts. These have certain structural causes, some inherited from 
historical factors and some created by the federal system itself. The federal 
distribution of political power itself also causes intra-state conflict. This chapter deals 
with how the structural sources of conflicts have been addressed by the ethnic-based 
arrangement. Issues related to the role of political parties and the distribution of 
political power in the regional state will be dealt with in Chapters Seven and Eight.  
 
Social and Economic and Inequalities 
Scholars argue that social and economic inequalities which manifest themselves in 
unequal access to employment opportunities, other social services and economic 
activities between different ethnic communities can be causes of conflicts. The 
success of federal states in multi-ethnic countries can depend upon addressing such 
inequalities between ethnic groups (Stewart, 2008).  
 
 
                                                 
5
 For example, the former President of Benishangul-Gumuz regional state had several discussions with 
the HOF with regard to the special budget subsidy requirements of the regional state. He also presented 
it in some common forums, attended by other regional state leaders (interview notes, May 2008). 
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The federalisation of the Ethiopian state was a first step to redress the historical 
inequalities and marginalisation of the indigenous people. However, whether this 
becomes sustainable depends not only on the constitutional federal arrangement but 
also on the federal process. According to a survey by the Central Statistical Agency in 
2010, the numbers of urban dwellers as well as employment opportunities have grown 
significantly in Benishangul-Gumuz over the last 20 years. For example, the number 
of urban dwellers, who are mainly non-indigenous people, was estimated at around 
113,279 in 2010. Economic activity in the urban areas has reached 61.5%, which is 
very close to Addis Ababa (64.5%) and higher than the urbanised areas of the 
neighbouring regional states of Amhara (57.9%) and Oromia (58.9%). Unemployment 
in the urban areas of Benishangul-Gumuz, at 9.2%, is lower than the average national 
level (15.7%) and also lower than the urban areas of Oromia (12.9%) and Amhara 
(12.8 %) (CSAE, November, 2010). 
 
 However, if we compare the access of indigenous groups to urban centres with that of 
non-indigenous groups, significant variation can be observed. For example, table 6.1 
below shows the ratio of people living in urban and rural areas from the major ethnic 
groups that represent either the indigenous or non-indigenous people in the regional 
state. Although the population of Berta is greater than the Amhara population in the 
regional state, the Amhara population who live in the urban areas are three times 
greater than those the Berta. Moreover, while the number of Oromo living in the 
regional state is less than the population of Gumuz, the number of Oromo living in the 
urban areas is twice the size of the urban Gumuz population. This indicates that the 
indigenous groups have limited access to modern social services and business 
activities compared to the non-indigenous groups living in the regional state. 
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6.1. The ratio of people living in urban and rural areas from the major ethnic groups in 
the Benishangul-Gumuz regional state 
  Ethnic group  Population Urban  Percentage  Rural  Percentage
6
 
 Total 
population 
670,847 97,965 13.5 572,882 86.5 
Berta 173,743 8,794 8.98 164,949 28.79 
 Gumuz 141,654 9999 10.21 131,646 22.98 
Amhara 142,557 36,660 37,42 105,897 18.48 
 Oromo 89346 21693 22.14 67653 11.81 
 Shinasha 50,916 7638 7.80 43,278 7.55 
mao 12,774 1628 1.66 11116 1.94 
Komo 6,464 168 .17 6296 1.10 
 Tigray 4559 1853 1.89 2706 .47 
 
Source: CSAE, census, 2007 
 
It seems also that the indigenous people are choosing to distance themselves from the 
urban centres as urbanisation expands in the regional state.  For example, the Gumuz 
people who were living in the surroundings of the town of Gilgelbeles, which is at the 
centre of the Metekel zone, are now living far away as the town has expanded since it 
became the centre of the zone administration.  Almost all the urban dwellers are non-
indigenous except the political representatives of Gumuz and guards who work for 
government offices
7
 (Abbute, 2002). 
The former regional state President, Ato Yaregal, explained the dangers of this: 
… Although the indigenous people are politically empowered, they are not 
economically active because all economic activities are controlled by the non-
indigenous people. For example, Asossa is a centre of the Benishangul (Berta). 
However, the Bertas have nothing to do in Asossa. Everything is controlled by 
others. Such differences have also led to political conflicts. During the last 
election (2005), the settlers in the regional state voted for the opposition 
                                                 
6
 Percentage is added  by the author 
7
 Interview notes, Informant from  Mandura Administration office, Gilgelbelese, July 2008 
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groups, who do not recognise the right of self-determination of the indigenous 
groups. As a result, the reaction of the indigenous groups to the settlers was 
hostile
8
. 
 
The participation of the indigenous groups in the civil service staff is minimal 
compared to the non-indigenous groups. Table 6.2 shows the participation of the 
indigenous and non-indigenous groups in the Civil Service staff of the regional state 
as of July 2008.  For example, although the general population of the indigenous 
groups is around 58% in the regional state, their participation in the civil service staff 
amounts to only 27 %, and this is less than the participation of the Amhara ethnic 
group (38%). Overall, 73% per cent of the Civil Service staff comes from non-
indigenous groups among which 64% are Amhara and Oromo.  In fact, the 27% 
participation of the indigenous people in the Civil Service staff only emerged after 
affirmative action taken by the regional state, enabling them to participate in the 
regional and local administrations
9
. Hence, as argued by Kefale (2008), the 
preferential treatment provided by the federal government for the indigenous people 
in respect of college and university admissions becomes justifiable to redress their 
historical marginalisation, regardless of the opposition from the non-indigenous 
people in the regional state. For example, if admission to a preparatory college after 
completing high school is set at 2.50 on a scale up to 4.00 for all students, students 
from the indigenous groups can be admitted at 2.40. Students who were able to finish 
the preparatory college also get better opportunities than the non-indigenous people in 
the regional state. Priority is also given to students from the indigenous people for 
technical vocational and teacher training (Kefale.2008:172-173). 
                                                 
8
 Interview notes, Asossa, May 2008 
9
 Interview notes, Dean of the Agricultural technical college, Bambassi, May 2008 
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6.2. Participation of the indigenous and non-indigenous groups in the regional civil 
service 
Ethnic group Male Female Total 
Berta 606 267 873 
Gumuz 530 114 644 
Shinasha 769 168 937 
Mao/Como 72 14 86 
Amhara 2484 1133 3617 
Oromo 1784 648 2432 
Agaw 360 179 539 
Tigray 119 23 142 
Gurage 82 27 109 
Others 70 16 86 
Total 6876 2589 9465 
  
Source: Benishangul-Gumuz Civil Service Bureau.  
 
The regional state has been one of the poorest, after Tigray and Afar, in the country. 
For example, the 1990 Household Income, Consumption and Expenditure (HICE) 
survey results indicated that the proportion of people living in absolute poverty in the 
regional state was 54% – significantly higher than the national figure (44.2%)10.   The 
figure was the same (54%) in the 1999/2000 HICE survey
11
.   The HICE survey also 
showed that the rural people, mainly indigenous, were the main contributors (55%) to 
the absolute poverty in the regional state
12
. Moreover, informants from Dibate 
Woreda noted that the living conditions between the indigenous and non-indigenous 
people in the Woreda were hardly comparable. The non-indigenous people could 
produce enough crops to feed their families and pay for extra expenses. However, 
many of the indigenous people were not able even to eat three times a day
13
. 
                                                 
10
 Poverty Profile of Ethiopia: Analysed based on the  1999 HICE and WM survey results, Ministry of 
Finance and Economic Development(MOFED) Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, March 2002. 
11
 Ibid 
12
 Ibid 
13
 Interview notes, informant, Public relation officer of Dibate Woreda administration, Dibate, July 
2008. 
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Observation on a Saturday market day, during the data collection in the town of 
Asossa in May 2008, noted that some mango and bamboo products were brought by 
Bertas, who lived near the town of Asossa, but all the other goods in the market were 
brought by non-indigenous groups.  In fact the grievances of the indigenous people 
are numerous.   As a Gumuz informant from the Metekel zone put it:  “While we are 
living as we were centuries ago, others are using our resources to buy brand new 
cars”14. 
 
Overall, although it requires  further study, the evidence  of indigenous  participation 
in the  regional civil service,  and  their involvement in urban areas and in economic 
activities suggests that  horizontal inequalities   might   have widened  during the 
federal process  even though development opportunities and education are expanding  
in  the regional state. Unless the development endeavours  are properly  tuned  to the  
context of the population,  there is  the danger of   a potential source of conflict as 
horizontal inequalities  can create  unmet demands  which,  in turn,  can lead to 
violent conflicts.   
 
In addressing the above inequalities, the focus of the federal and regional 
governments has been on expansion of social services and in taking some affirmative 
action to encourage the participation of indigenous people in the Civil Service. 
Moreover, an attempt has been made to use the languages of Berta, Gumuz and 
Shinasha as mediums of instruction in primary schools (Vaughan, 2007). However, 
the problems require a comprehensive action plan that considers the special 
circumstances and the territorial demands of the indigenous people. Moreover, the 
                                                 
14
 Interview notes, a Gumuz elder,  Gilgelbeles town, July 2008 
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indigenous people need further capacity development activities which can take their 
cultural practices into account. It might be useful to model a plan on lessons drawn 
from other countries such as Australia and Canada, which have a great deal of 
experience of dealing with inequality between indigenous people and other citizens. 
 
Cultural inequalities 
Cultural inequalities have also been a source of conflict between the indigenous and 
non-indigenous groups.   Historically, the indigenous groups‟ cultures, and especially 
those of the Gumuz and the Berta, have not been regarded as equal to the highland 
cultures.   The Gumuz and Berta suffered racial discrimination from neighbouring 
Amhara and Oromo. As Donham (1986) noted the Black people were not considered 
to be proper marriage partners for Abyssinians. For example, anyone born from an 
informal sexual union between the Abyssinians and the „Shankilla‟ could be 
prevented from integrating into Abyssinian society for many generations (Donham, 
1986, 13).   
 
The Oromo and the Amhara generally undermine the indigenous groups and consider 
them as lower class citizens. This is manifested in public areas and in business 
interactions.  For example, a quarrel between two Gumz and other two Ormos sparked 
a violent conflict among the two communities in Sasiga and Bolegengofoy woredas 
from the Oromia and Benishangul- Gumuz regional states respectively in May 2008.
15
  
Hatred and historical prejudices are the main sources of conflict between the Amhara 
and Gumuz along the common borders of these two regional states, as disclosed by a 
                                                 
15
 Interviews notes, a member of Parliament, June 2008 
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joint committee from the Amhara and Benishangul-Gumuz regional states in 2005
16
. 
As discussed in  Chapter  Five  this  is  rooted  in the  relationships between the 
highlanders  and the indigenous people  going back to   the early medieval period  of    
the Abyssinian state and continued through to  the  20
th
 century. For example, Ras 
Hailu, the son and successor of Tekle Haimanot (1850s-1901) actively participated in 
the slave trade in the region (Tsega 1997, 69). Slave raids also continued up to 1921 
by different governors including Zeleqe Liqu who was a governor of the region in the 
first two decades of the twentieth century. In 1921, for example, his forces penetrated 
as far as Wanbara to capture slaves, apparently with Haylu‟s blessing. Unable to 
defend themselves, many of the victims fled to the Sudan (Abdussamed 1995:62 cited 
in Endalew, 2002:18). This kind of recent historical relationship has remained sharp 
in the memory of the indigenous people and created a favourable condition for inter-
ethnic conflict between the indigenous and non-indigenous people. 
 
Violent conflicts, caused by cultural inequalities, are also reinforced by the cultural 
practices of the Gumuz people. As discussed in Chapter Five, the Gumuz respect, and 
consider as a hero, someone who kills, and, when the murdered person is from the 
Amhara, the murderer and his family get significant respect from their community. 
This has greatly contributed to the inter-ethnic conflicts in some Woredas, such as 
Dibate and Mandura.  
 
As a result, the number of crimes in the regional state in general, and in Gumuz 
society in particular, is significant. Table 6.3 shows that an increasing crime rate in 
the regional state.  Police reports on crime in the regional state show that crime 
                                                 
16
   A report of field research  on the conflicts  existing  in the Amhara and Benishangul-Gumuz  
regional  state  Border Areas, March 2005 
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increases with the level of illiteracy in the rural areas. The police reports also indicate 
that the major crimes in the regional state are related to physical harm, often resulting 
in disability and murder
17
. 
 
Table 6.3: Number of crime committed in Benishangul- Gumuz regional state 
Year Number of crime 
Committed 
 Number of persons 
participated 
2001 2242 3593 
2002 1366 2165 
2003 2356 3808 
2004 2986 4678 
2005 3007 4862 
2006 3062 4640 
 
Source: the Benishangul-Gumuz Police Commission 
 
Overall, regardless of the federalisation of the state, historical and cultural inequalities 
and prejudices still undermine the relationship between the indigenous and non-
indigenous ethnic groups. In these circumstances, a focus on ethnic identity can result 
in more violent conflict, as will be discussed in Chapter Nine.  
 
Thus, federalisation of the state has to create an enabling environment for the 
transformation of the structural causes of conflict, by creating regional and local 
government institutions and fostering leadership. Strengthening of regional and local 
institutions and the fostering of leadership are considered the basis of democratisation 
and democratic consolidation in traditional societies, like the indigenous people of 
Benishangul- Gumuz, according to the World Development Report 2011. 
 
                                                 
17
 Interview reports, Police head, Dibate Woreda, July 2008 
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Nevertheless, although government institutions, such as regional and locally-elected 
Woreda and Kebele councils, and police and militia organisations, have been 
established in the Benishangul-Gumuz regional state, the capacity of these institutions 
to address the complex social, economic and cultural sources of violent conflict 
remains weak. For example, according to a study by Action Aid Ethiopia (2006), 
regional Woreda and Kebele councils have serious capacity problems in attempting to 
address the social, economic and cultural causes of conflict in the regional state. The 
Woreda councils were characterised by capacity deficits, poor education of elected 
representatives, inadequately trained staff and a weak financial base provided by the 
regional government. The capacity deficits include lack of training, an absence of an 
ability to meet guidelines or an ethical code for leaders, the lack of a clear definition 
of the duties and responsibilities of the different offices, a lack of cabinet job 
descriptions, an inability to follow-up on decisions and compile timely reports, and a 
failure to undertake periodic evaluations of the peace and development issues of the 
Woredas. Citizens were asked to rank, by 1 to 8, the most serious problems they faced 
in the regional state. The list included corruption, inefficient government services, 
unemployment and poverty, inadequate strategy for controlling HIV/AIDS, crime, 
human rights violations, and lack of security/stability. Inefficient government services 
were ranked the highest followed by corruption and crime (Action Aid Ethiopia, 
2006). 
 
Similarly, some of the institutions which are responsible for managing violent conflict 
are weak. For example, the regional state police force numbered around only 600 in 
2006. The strength of the police is still exceptionally low for an area of 50,390 km
2
. 
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There is a shortage of police transport and communication facilities
18
. Moreover, 
according to interviews in Mandura and the Dibate Woredas of Metekel Zone, police 
officers at Woreda level are influenced by the traditional leaders and this hinders them 
from discharging responsibilities such as controlling crime suspects.  
 
The above analysis of the structural causes of conflict and the capacity of the regional 
institutions of governance reveal two interrelated factors. First, there are structural 
causes of conflict which can lead to violent conflicts in the regional state.  In addition, 
the regional state lacks strong institutions of governance to address the structural 
causes of conflicts. This means that  any  analysis of conflict, which does not give due 
attention to structural causes of conflict and the capacity for governance, is inadequate, 
when considering the problems associated with the federal process in Ethiopia. For 
example, Asnake Kefale (2008), analyses the sources of inter-regional and local 
conflicts in the Benishangul-Gumuz regional state in relation to the federal 
arrangement, without considering the structural causes of conflict or the capacity of 
the institutions of governance in the regional state. This makes the analysis inadequate. 
 
  Territorial Issues of the Indigenous Groups: Issues of Agricultural Land Use 
Land use is one of the sources of conflict in the regional state. It is influenced by three 
interrelated factors: immigration and land encroachment, the resettlement 
programmes in the territories of the indigenous people, and rural development policies.  
In the highland areas of Ethiopia, there is a shortage of land as it is the main resource 
that supports the livelihood of tens of millions of rural people (MOFED, 2003:15). 
Due to this reason many people immigrate to the Benishangul-Gumuz regional state, 
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 Interview notes, secuirty expert , Secuirty  and Adminstration Bureau, Asossa,  May  2008 
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either to settle permanently or to work temporarily. The movement of people to the 
regional state has become a threat for the indigenous groups, because their main 
occupation, shifting cultivation, requires that large areas of land are given over to 
forest, and a decrease of the size of the forest devastates the traditional livelihood of 
the people and their environment (Abbute, 2002).  
 
Evidence from field visits suggests that many people come to the regional state 
searching for fertile land. For example, many families and community members come 
from Wollo to join existing settlers, who came during the Derge era, in resettlement 
sites in Pawe, Assosa and Bambassi in particular. Farmers from the Gojjam, Gondar 
and Agew areas are also moving into the rural areas of Metekel. Oromo farmers from 
East and West Wallega are pushing into areas of the Kamashi zone, and the Bambasi 
and Mao Woredas. Sudanese and the so-called „Felata‟ migrants and merchants also 
come from Sudan across the international border. 
 
These migrations have become a source of conflict between the indigenous and non-
indigenous people for a number of reasons
19
.   Firstly, conflict occurs between the 
immigrants and the indigenous people when the immigrants try cut down trees in the 
forest. This happens because to the immigrants the fallow land covered by forest 
seems virgin or unutilized
20
. Moreover, the immigrants do not care about the 
environment and the natural forest because they have no legal right to live in the 
regional state, so their commitment to long-term sustainability is low. In addition, 
                                                 
19
 Interview notes, Informants  from Amhara  and  Oromia  regional states, Bahrdar, July 2008, Addis 
Ababa, June 2008 
20
 Interview notes, Metekel zone administration, Gelegelbeles, July 2008 
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they cut down the trees because their cultivation system is based on full clearance of 
farm land
21
.  
 
An elder from the Gumuz ethnic group, who is a leader of a committee that deals with 
common border issues in the regional state explained: 
There are conflicts due to land use along the common borders of Benshangul- 
Gumuz and Amhara regional states. The Gumuz tend to own a larger land plot 
that can be cultivated on the basis of shifting cultivation. However, when the 
Amharans came they began to cultivate the Gumuz land plot; they also cut 
down trees so they could harvest crops on cleared land. Therefore, this became 
a source of continuous conflict with the indigenous people
22
.  
 
All the informants from the indigenous people whom I interviewed during the field 
visit noted that immigration is a major source of conflict between the indigenous and 
non-indigenous groups
23
. When people migrated to the regional state from the 
neighbouring states, their numbers were so large that they were able to establish their 
own Kebeles. For example, according to the Administrator of the Metekel zone 
around 10,000 internal immigrants enter the zone every year, mainly from the Gojjam, 
Gondar and Wollo areas of the Amhara regional state.
24
   As a result, the indigenous 
people who lived there have been systematically forced to move away.  Then the new 
settlers were encouraged by the neighbouring regional states to request a referendum 
in order to determine which regional state should administer their area. This has led to 
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 Interview notes, Metekel zone administration,  Gelgelbeles, July 2008 
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 Interview notes, a  Gumuz elder, Asossa, May 2008 
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 Interview notes, Indigenous informants,  Asossa and Metekel, May-July 2008 
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 Interview notes, Metekel zone administration,  Gelgelbeles, July 2008 
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systematic encroachment on the Benishangul-Gumuz territories by the neighbouring 
regional states
25
.   
 
A Cabinet member of the Benishangul-Gumuz regional state explained: 
Areas in Daliti were given to the Benishanul-Gumuz regional state by 
referendum. But since then many people from the Oromia regional state have 
come and settled in the same area.  Now the Oromia migrants have started to 
call for another referendum, which would make these areas part of the Oromia 
regional state. You can also see this kind of thing happening in Assosa and 
Bambasse Woredas. People come searching for arable land but then they start 
claiming that land as part of the Oromia state; which is unacceptable to us
26
. 
 
This source of conflict is reinforced by different understanding of land use among the 
indigenous and non-indigenous people.  For the indigenous people the issues of land 
use are directly linked with their survival. This is not because of the scarcity of land in 
the regional state, but because of the long-term systemic displacement and the recent 
increasing number of immigrants. This increase has been considered a threat to the 
survival of the indigenous groups and their right of self- administration in their own 
regional state
27
.  
An elder from Berta ethnic group explained: 
There can be systemic and non-systemic displacement of the indigenous 
people following the mobility of other people to the regional state. These 
threats should be prevented
28
. 
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 Interview notes, a  Cabinet member of  the  Benishangul-Gumuz regional state, Asossa, May 2008 
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  Interview notes, President of the regional state, Asossa, May 2008 
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  Interview notes, A member of  the Benishangul- Gumuz regional state, Asossa,  May,2008 
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On the other hand, the land use issues are resource-based disputes for the non- 
indigenous people. This is because land is a resource which was bought and sold 
during the imperial regime and which can be leased, like any commodity, during the 
current regime.  In addition, the non-indigenous people are plough cultivators who 
sustain themselves by cultivation of smaller land plots.  As a result, the use of larger 
plots by the indigenous people is not acceptable to the non-indigenous, especially 
since there is a land shortage in the highland areas.  
An OPDO   representative in the town of Asossa confirmed this point: 
There is shortage of arable land in the highland areas of the Oromia regional 
state.  As a result there has been resource-based conflict along the common 
border between the Oromia and Benishangul-Gumuz regional states. The 
Berta and Gumuz complain about land encroachment by the Oromos, but they 
are not using their arable land properly.
29
 
 
A senior officer in the federal Police also spoke about this: 
In my opinion, the problem is resource-based conflict.  The Gumuz always 
claim that their resources have been taken by the Oromos, but they have not 
used their resources properly
30
. 
  
 However, the authorities of Benishangul-Gumuz regional state believe that people 
from the Oromia regional state were deliberately forced to move to the lowland areas, 
such as Tongo, in order to get them access to land. Similarly, the Bambassi local 
authorities expressed concern about the numbers of Oromo peasants pushing into 
Bambasi, in order to obtain land without going through legal processes.  This kind of 
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 Interview notes, Head of  OPDO office, Asossa, May 2008 
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 Interview notes, a senior  officer  at the Federal Police,  Addis Ababa, June 2008 
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peasant movement is worst in some Kebeles along the common border areas of the 
Eastern Wallega zone and Bambassi Woreda, including Boshuna Kergege, Moutsa 
Mado, and Wemba kebeles.  Around 400 illegal migrants were expelled in 2006 from 
these areas; most went back to Begi or Mendi, which share borders with Bambasi 
(Vaughn, 2006). Based on interviews with members of the regional Council, there 
seems to be a common concern among regional state leaders that immigrants from the 
neighbouring regional states might outnumber the indigenous people
31
. 
 
This has become a challenge to the Benishangul-Gumuz regional state in the 
formulation of rural land use guidelines that protect the rights of the indigenous 
groups.
32
  This is because the rural land use guidelines‟ are difficult to implement 
across all indigenous groups and this might encourage more immigration to the 
regional state. Moreover, the government does not have a clear idea about the benefits 
of the land use guidelines for the indigenous groups and their shifting cultivation 
systems.  There is no national experience model on this matter that the regional 
government can utilise. The only available experience is contained within the 
provision of certificates to farmers, which guarantee the right to use land given to 
them by the government. These certificates have been issued in the Amhara regional 
state, for example
33
. However, as this is related to plough cultivation, it is not 
applicable to the shifting cultivators. The result is that the regional state has preferred 
to postpone ratification of the land use guidelines to discourage internal immigrants.  
 One of the Cabinet members of the regional state explains: 
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We don‟t have rural land use guidelines. We would like to work on the basis 
of the federal constitution. If there is massive demand for resettlement from 
another regional state to this regional state, the sender and receiver regional 
states should discuss this matter beforehand.
34
 
 
The above analysis of land use rights in the regional state shows how structural issues 
have been complicated by the ethnic-based federalisation of the state. Firstly, the 
people in the highland areas have real resource constraints. Therefore, they want to 
come and work in the relatively fertile land of the Benishangul-Gumuz regional state. 
In practice the federalisation of the state did not stop this kind of people‟s movements 
across the common territories of the regional states. Rather, it has complicated the 
movement of people, by creating ethnic-based regional and local administrations, 
whose interest lies is gaining land from each other. This is because the lower level 
administrations in the common border areas want to expand their territories. The 
neighbouring regional states have also become interested in the land use of the border 
lands and are reluctant to demarcate their borders for various reasons identified in 
Chapter Nine. The result, as noted above, has been territorial insecurity for indigenous 
people. This will remain a structural cause of conflict unless there is federal 
government intervention balancing the interests of both immigrant and the indigenous 
people in the regional state.  
 
Land use rights of settlers in the regional state 
  Based on interviews with representatives of the non-indigenous people, land use by 
the settlers has also become a source of conflict between the indigenous and non-
                                                 
34
 Interview notes, Cabinet  member of the Benishungul- Gumuz   regional state , Asossa, May 2008 
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indigenous people since the establishment of the regional state
35
. As discussed in 
Chapter Five the military regime resettled many people from the highland areas, 
displacing the Berta and Gumuz from their residential areas.  The settlers were given 
around one hectare of farm land per family for individual residential quarters and 
private vegetable gardens when they arrived in the resettlement areas. In addition, 
each of the settlers‟ cooperatives collectively owned around 500 hectares, but this was 
redistributed to settlers after the downfall of the military regime, and the average 
landholding of each settler became smaller just as demand for additional land plot due 
to the increasing population.  For example, the average household landholding 
decreased to 0.5 hectare in one of the settler villages close to Asossa (Kefale, 
2008:171-172).  So, the people demanded additional land plots.  However, this 
increase was considered a threat to the indigenous groups‟ land use practice. 
Moreover, some of the settlers near the town of Assosa were removed in 2006 from 
their farming land because of infrastructure development and, as yet, the regional state 
has not compensated them
36
.  
 
The regional head of the Administration and Security Bureau summarised this 
situation:  
The settlers claimed more land to accommodate their population growth. The 
people are still cultivating the land given to them when they arrived here 30 
years ago. Since then no additional land plots have been given to any family. 
On the other hand, the natives do not accept that additional land plots should 
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  40 per cent of the total informants, in Benishangul-Gumuz regional state, are non-indigenous people 
36
 Interview notes, an elder settler, Asossa Woreda,  May 2008 
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to be given to the settlers – as they consider their land to have been inherited 
from their ancestors
37
. 
 
Furthermore, according to the focus group discussion held with the non-indigenous 
people in Bambassi Woreda
 38
, the indigenous groups have started reclaiming land 
plots that were given to the settlers during the military regime. This has happened in 
the Bambassi Woreda of the Asossa zone.  Ato Getachew Ayalew, who was 
Administrator of the local area during the military regime, gave the settlers in the 
village of Amba 14 additional land plots, which they have  cultivated and grown 
vegetables and fruit and  irrigated for around 21 years.
39
  
 
The Berta village of Gambella is near the settler village of Amba 14.  As some of the 
settlers in Amba 14 were Muslims they had a good relationship with the Bertas of 
Gembella before the violent conflict erupted in 2007.  They enjoyed common social 
activities and conducted inter-ethnic marriages
40
. However, a quarrel occurred in 2007 
between two individuals, one from Berta and the other a settler, over the borders of 
land plots. After the incident, the Gambella community claimed the settler‟s land, 
which had been irrigated and cultivated.  Later the entire harvest from this land was 
destroyed by people unknown. The matter is still being investigated by the police, and 
as a result, the local administration has prevented all harvesting of the land.  This led 
to a breakdown in the social relationship between the settlers and the Berta people and 
they started using different mosques and market places.
41
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An informant from the Gambella Kebele, who participated in a focus group 
discussion, said:  “We do not have any quarrel with the settlers. We were deprived of 
our land. So we have only claimed our land. The land is ours”42 
 
 On the other hand, an informant from village 14, who participated in another focus 
group discussion, says, of the same issue:  
When we started cultivating the land plot 21 years ago, it was virgin and full 
of forests. Since then, we have been cultivating the land without any problems. 
The land claim came when the regional government and the local 
administration said the land belonged to the indigenous groups.   Therefore, 
the problem is related to the Asossa zone and the Bambassi Woreda 
administrations because they see everything in the Woreda as belonging to 
them.
43
  
 
Although the regional administration did not make a thorough study of the nature of 
the problem, it did halt the conflict by dividing the irrigated land into two. Half of the 
land plot, which is on the river side and adjacent to Gambella village, was given to the 
Berta ethnic group. The remaining half, which is   on the other side of the river and 
adjacent to village 14, was given to the settlers
44
.  This has left both the Berta and the 
settlers still complaining about the decision. The Berta complain because the land plot 
originally belonged to them and the settlers complain because half of the land, which 
they cultivated for more than 21 years, was given to the Berta
45
. They say they have 
                                                 
42
 Interview notes,  a settler informant, Bambassi Woreda,  May 2008 
43
 Notes, focus group discussions elders settlers, Bambassi Woreda,  May  2008 
44
 Interview notes, the Economic Advisor of the regional President, Asossa,  May 2008 
45
 Focus group discussions held with both the Berta and settlers, Bambassi, May 2008 
 222 
accepted the decision for the „sake of peace‟46.   Nevertheless, it has all left the 
relationship between the settlers and Berta polarised. 
 
 The evidence about land uses in the regional state shows different interpretations of 
the indigenous and non-indigenous people. Land use for the indigenous is not only 
about land cultivation, but also about ancestral land ownership. The land use issue is 
in fact an identity issue to the indigenous people, and because of this they still claim 
the land plots given to the non-indigenous people 30 years ago. However, this point 
alone does not explain the issue. There is political ethnicity of local leaders which 
exploits historical factors. Because of this claims erupted into violence when members 
of the indigenous people controlled the administrative institutions. This demonstrates 
the political instrumentality of ethnicity in different circumstances as noted above in 
Chapter Two. 
 
  However, the maintenance of territorial security for the indigenous people cannot be 
achieved in isolation from the individual rights of the other groups in the regional 
state. Maintenance of basic citizenship rights is a fundamental constitutional 
obligation of all regional states. Moreover, the number of the non-indigenous people 
is almost equal to the number of the indigenous people in the regional state.  In other 
words, sustainable conflict management can only be maintained by balancing 
individual and group rights in the regional state. 
 
 However, in association with the federalisation of the state, land use conflicts 
between the indigenous and non-indigenous show incompatible interests between the 
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group rights of the indigenous people and the individual rights of the settlers. 
Although the regional constitution clearly states that any individual has a right to 
work and acquire property (Article 40) in the regional state, in practical terms that 
person has to be a member of an indigenous group to acquire land. This has clearly 
been shown in the denial of farming land not only to new immigrants but also to the 
older settlers who need additional land plots, and who lost their land plots due to the 
infrastructural development. This shows the federal process lacks the means to 
balance citizenship rights and group rights in the regional state. In other words, the 
federal and regional constitutions and authorities have to recognise   that people have 
a right to define themselves other than by the identity of the ethnic groups in the 
regional state. Moreover, it has to be recognised that the people who define 
themselves by different identities should have equal political and economic rights 
with the indigenous people. A lack of balance between the group rights of the 
indigenous people and the citizenship rights of the non-indigenous people has the 
potential to destabilise the regional state.  
 
Rural Development Policies of the Federal Government 
Some of the development plans initiated by the federal government have become 
manifestations of centre and periphery relations between the peripheral regional states 
and the federal government.  As discussed in Chapter Five, after the abolition of the 
slavery system the Haile Selassie regime only focused on exploitation of the fertile 
land of Metekel. Similarly  the Military regime considered  the land of Gumuz and   
Berta land  as „no man‟ land  and initiated a   massive resettlement  programme which  
resulted in displacement of  the Gumuz and  Berta people from their  territories. For 
example, the development initiatives   in the Gumuz territories of Metekel resulted in 
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land seizures, loss of life and destruction of homes. In addition, the development 
policies caused a decline in Gumuz economic activities, further marginalisation, and 
erosion of their customary laws and regular periods of food insecurity. Deforestation 
associated with economic development programmes caused disappearance of wild 
animals and wild forest foods which are important ingredients of the Gumuz diet 
(Yintso, 2003:6). 
 
 The development polices of the current regime, which focus on promotion of  big 
agricultural farms in the Benishangul- Gumuz regional state do not give due attention 
to the identity and collective rights of the indigenous people. There are two major 
points. Firstly, the rural development policy and strategy focuses on expanding 
modern farms in the territories of the indigenous people without due consideration of 
the livelihood of the local people. For example, the rural development policy 
categorizes the agro-ecological zones of the country into three areas: 
1. The east, and to some extent, the southern arid lands where the main 
livelihood is cattle herding. 
2. The west lowlands, where there are large areas of  uncultivated land and a 
small population  
3. The highlands, which are ideal for farming but where farm land is limited and 
rapidly being eroded and where population density is high (ADPS, 2002:16).  
 
If we assume the second category of agro-ecological zones applies to the 
Benishangul-Gumuz regional state
47
, the development policy does not consider the 
farming practice of the indigenous people as it only takes account of the smallness of 
                                                 
47
 It is because  the location of the regional state is exactly in the second category of agro-ecological 
zone 
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their population size and the suitability of the land fertility for modern farms. Where 
the policy encourages development it focuses on setting up large commercial farms 
and the opportunity to attract agricultural labourers from the densely populated 
highland areas to settle in the region. The policy does not include anything from 
which the local people could benefit (ADPS, 2002, 58).  
 
The expansion of modern farming in the regional state confirms the above analysis. 
For example, new investment farms, known as the Mandura Organic Agricultural 
Development and the Bengeth River Agricultural Development, were given to 
investors in the territories of the indigenous people in 1996/97 and 1997/98 (Abbute, 
2002:123). Other rain-fed modern agricultural development were also established, 
mainly in the Metekel zone, without due consideration of the livelihoods of the 
indigenous people and the environment (ibid). Overall between 1995-1999 the 
regional government licensed a total of 17 commercial farms and gum and incense 
extraction firms, and mining companies leased over 122,590 hectares of arable land – 
all of which did negatively affect the livelihoods of the local people (Yintso, 2003:3) 
In addition, the regional government recently provided around 1.2 million hectares of 
land to the federal government, for cultivation by foreign investors
48
. Although it is 
too early to evaluate the impact of this decision on the livelihoods of the indigenous 
people, it is clear it might cause violent conflict if due consideration has not been   
given to their territorial issues.  
 
Secondly, the agricultural extension programmes that have been implemented in the 
regional state do not take into account the traditional practices of the indigenous 
                                                 
48
  Ethiopia‟s first web page, interview with Ato Meles Zenawi, Prime Minster of Ethiopia, November 
26 2009 
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people.  This is because they focus on plough cultivation training and the settling in of 
indigenous groups in specific places (sedentarization) (Abbute, 2002:277; Yintso, 
2003:4). As noted by Mebratie (2004) it is widely considered that plough cultivation 
is more productive than shifting cultivation.  Dessalegn (1988) argues that shifting 
cultivation, which is considered an outdated system of cultivation, contributes to the 
lower productivity of the indigenous groups in Metekel. However, Mebratie (2004) 
argues that although the productivity of shifting cultivation is low this does not mean 
that plough cultivation is more productive because there is no evidence that it 
produces more than subsistence level output in the highland areas of the country.  
Moreover, plough cultivation tends to disrupt the ecosystem, which can result in 
deforestation and other environmental degradation.  
 
 In fact, the agricultural extension programme is not tuned to the specific situation of 
the indigenous people. The regional President‟s six months‟ progress report of 2009 
confirmed that lack of adequate agricultural extension packages, tailored to the 
regional state situation, was one of the main problems for the implementation of 
agricultural extension. The regional administration lacks capacity that enables it to 
formulate agricultural development programmes suitable to the context of the regional 
state
49
. The support of the federal government for the regional state was inadequate, 
according to the former regional state President. The agricultural extension workers 
also found it difficult to communicate with the indigenous people, because of their 
different languages (Kassaye, 2002:106). 
 
                                                 
49
 Interview notes, Economic Advisor to the regional President, Asossa, May 2008. 
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The evidence discussed above suggests  that  the establishment  of federal structure  
on the basis of ethnicity  is not enough  to address  the historically  marginalised  
ethnic groups. The development policies are formulated at national level and 
implemented by the regional states.  Hence, they often ignore important aspects of   
social, economic and environmental factors of the indigenous people. This implies 
development endeavours should also be tuned to the cultural and environmental 
context of the people under investigation. Otherwise development induced problems 
can undermine the benefits of the federal state for the indigenous people.  
 
 These kinds of problems could also have similar implications in other multi-ethnic 
regional states such as the Southern state.  In addition,  the problem  implies that a 
lack of  regional  capacity  to develop  regional policies  contributes  to the conflicts  
in the regional states  as Feyisa (2006) has identified  taking  Gambella regional state 
as a case study.  The centralised policy and decision making of the ruling party can 
contribute to this problem as noticed in Chapter Four. Hence, in addition to the efforts 
required from the regional states the federal institutions should also allow the regional 
states to stand by themselves in regional policy formulation to alleviate the problem. 
 
Conclusion 
In spite of the federalisation of the state and the intended political empowerment of 
the indigenous people, the structural causes of violence have not been well addressed 
in the regional state. These arose as a result of conflict over the territorial insecurity of 
the indigenous people and the land use demands of the non-indigenous people, 
whether those who were living in the regional state or those who migrated from the 
 228 
neighbouring regional state. The federalisation of the state actually aggravated the 
conflict by defining the use of land in terms of ethnicity.  
 
The territorial insecurity of the indigenous people is also closely associated with the 
centre periphery relationships between the federal government and the Benishangul-
Gumuz regional state. This is manifested by development policies, which focus on 
exploiting the fertile land of the region through modern farms and a rural 
development policy aimed at transforming the cultivation methods of the indigenous 
people away from shifting cultivation into plough cultivation. However, this has 
placed the indigenous people at a disadvantage in relation to the adoption of rural 
development extension package technologies, compared to the non-indigenous people. 
This disadvantage is reinforced by the social, economic and cultural inequalities 
between indigenous and non-indigenous people. These have shown a tendency to 
widen during the federal process of the last 19 years.  
 
 The result is that neither the indigenous groups nor the non-indigenous groups are 
secure in the regional state. The indigenous groups are insecure because their 
territorial rights are not well respected because of the land use disputes between them 
and the immigrant non-indigenous people, and the threats posed to their territories by 
national development projects. The non-indigenous people are also insecure. This is 
because their rights of use of land have been determined on the basis of ethnicity. As 
a result, they do not know what the future will hold for their children.  This relates to 
the inability of the federal and regional constitutions and the federal process to 
harmonise group rights and individual rights in the regional state. It is hardly 
surprising that the regional state is prone to violent conflict. 
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 If the federal system is to be embedded successfully in the regional state the 
following issues need to be addressed: territorial claims and land use rights of non-
indigenous people, and the horizontal inequalities between the indigenous and non-
indigenous; development policies must be tuned to  the specific situation of the 
indigenous people; the capacity of the regional government must be enhanced; it must 
be able to articulate not only the demands of the indigenous people but also those  of 
the non-indigenous people in the regional state. 
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Chapter Seven 
Federalism and the Role of Political Parties in the Conflict Management Process 
of the Benishangul-Gumuz Regional State 
 Introduction 
 This chapter examines the role of political parties in the conflict management process 
of the Benishangul-Gumuz regional state. It investigates how the relationships 
between the national and regional political parties influence the capacity of the 
regional leadership and how this in turn influences the dynamics of the federal 
process and conflict management in the regional state. For this purpose, the chapter 
looks at the role of the Benishangul-Gumuz People‟s Liberation Front (BPLM) during 
the initial period of federalisation, the role of other regional parties which took over 
the regional leadership after the BPLM became illegal, and their relationship with the 
EPRDF and neighbouring regional parties such as OPDO and ANDM.  
 
The chapter details that how the ethnic-based organizational structure of the regional 
parties and relationships with the national ruling party has undermined the leadership 
capacity of the political elite in the regional state. This has been caused by the ethnic 
competition between the political parties of the indigenous people and influence of 
geopolitical factors. It is, in fact, not only the federal structure that determines the 
conflict management in the federal process but also the political leadership created by 
the activities of the political parties in the country in general and the regional parties 
in particular. 
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The Political Parties in the Regional State 
 There are three kinds of political party in the regional state: the regional political 
parties; members of the EPRDF (ANDM and OPDO); and opposition parties. The 
regional political parties operate separately among their respective ethnic groups and 
as a coalition front at regional level. They aim to govern a given regional state as a 
coalition if they win elections. The EPRDF considers the regional party as its partner. 
So the EPRDF supports the regional coalition party, mainly by sending 
representatives from the centre, and through neighbouring regional member parties 
such as the ANDM and OPDO. In addition, the EPRDF does not compete for national 
and regional parliamentary seats against the regional political parties. The opposition 
parties do not have permanent representation in the regional state but they operate 
through representatives, mainly during elections. 
 
The Benishangul People’s Liberation Front 
The Benishangul Peoples Liberation Front (BPLM) was the first regional party to 
operate in the Benishangul-Gumuz regional state. The BPLM emerged in late 1989 as 
an ethnic-based armed political party in opposition to the military regime (Young, 
1999). It was, in fact, a continuation of the Berta‟s attempt to oppose the military 
regime in their towns during the 1970s. At the time the military regime easily 
defeated the opposition, but some of the survivors established the BPLM in Khartoum 
with the assistance of the Sudanese government (Young, 1999; Vaughan, 2006; 
Kefale, 2008). At its establishment the BPLM was dominated by members of the 
Berta ethnic group and there was little participation by other ethnic groups such as 
Mao Komo and Shinasha and only a few Gumuz members. The BPLM launched 
some attacks on the military regime along the Ethio-Sudan international borders 
 232 
around Assosa, but it had little impact on the anti-Derg war because its military 
capacity remained small.  
 
 An added complication was that the BPLM, since its inception, had been in conflict 
with the OLF, another armed group operating against the military regime in Wallega. 
This was because the OLF has always considered the indigenous people of 
Benishangul-Gumz as „Black Oromos‟, did not accept their right of self-determination. 
For this reason, the BPLM clashed with the OLF in 1991, but it was easily defeated 
because of the better military capacity and organisation of the OLF at the time.  At 
that point the OLF was able to control all the Benishangul areas. It attempted to 
introduce Oromifa as a working language instead of Amharic amongst the local 
people, including the Berta, the settlers in Assosa, and the Gumuz in the current 
Kamashi zone. In addition, it punished people who spoke Amharic in the streets. It 
was this that led to opposition amongst the inhabitants, subsequent intervention by the 
EPRDF and a war between EPRDF and OLF forces in January 1992. More generally, 
elsewhere, at this point, the OLF boycotted the transitional government and attempted 
to start a guerrilla war against the transitional government. It was easily defeated in 
the subsequent conflict with the EPRDF in the Oromia regional state (Vaughan, 2006). 
 
 The result was that the BPLM became the main political player in the regional state 
during the transitional period. The political situation which emerged after the defeat 
of the OLF created favourable conditions for the BPLM to take this role. Firstly, the 
ethnic-based political set-up of the BPLM mirrored the EPRDF‟s ideological 
understanding of the Ethiopian national question. It had managed to create a good 
relationship with the TPLF during the armed struggle and in fact, its members had 
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been given military training in Hagerreselam, a base area of the TPLF, during the 
final offensive against the military regime (Kefale, 2008). Secondly, the hostility of 
the BPLM towards the OLF also contributed to establishing a better relationship 
between the EPRDF and BPLM. The BPLM was one of the transitional conference 
participants that had signed the transitional charter and established the transitional 
government in 1991
1
. The result was that the BPLM became the regional party which 
established the regional state of Benishangul-Gumuz. It played a major role in the 
regional government and all the regional Presidents during the transitional period 
came from the Berta, a practice which continued until 1995 – although the presidents 
changed three times (Vaughan, 2006). 
 
However, there were a number of reasons why the BPLM was unable to maintain the 
stability of the regional state or become a sustainable ally of the EPRDF. Factionalism 
became a major challenge to the integrity of the BPLM during the transitional period, 
and one of the causes was related to the composition of the Berta people. The Berta 
incorporate people of Arab origin who came to conquer the region centuries ago as 
well as indigenous Bertas. The distinction is very clear, for example, in places such as 
Menge woreda. The point is that there is a clear competition between those who 
consider themselves Arabs and the indigenous Berta. It was believed although the 
BPLM was a mix of all Berta clans, that its leadership was dominated by the people 
of Menge, who are not considered to be real the indigenous Berta. This division 
between Berta elite groups was one reason for the fast turnover of presidents who 
came from the Berta during the transitional period.
2
 Another reason possibly related 
to the above point is that, historically, the leadership of the Berta has been drawn from 
                                                 
1
 Minutes of the Transitional Conference, July 1991. 
2
 For example, the first president, Atom Mustopha, was from the indigenous people, but could not get 
support from the mixed Arabs and served only for six months. 
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four Watawit families. However, the strong rivalry between these families contributed 
to the instability of leadership within the ethnic group. Equally, it appeared that the 
Hojelle Al Hassan family, who allied with Menilek during the formation of the 
modern state in Ethiopia, still plays a decisive role in the leadership of Berta, although 
it has been unable to create coherent leadership within the group (Vaughan, 2006). 
 
The BPLM‟s dominant role during the transitional period and the factionalism within 
the party had different implications for the integrity of the regional state and for the 
maintenance of the federal authorities‟ interest in the regional state. The dominant 
role of the BPLM in the regional state became inconsistent with the political demands 
of the other ethnic groups created by the federalisation of the state. Therefore, the 
other ethnic groups such as the Gumuz and Mao/Komo rapidly established their own 
ethnic-based political parties. For example, in 1992, Gumuz members left the BPLM 
and established their own political party, the Gumuz People‟s Liberation Movement 
(GPLM). In a similar move, the other indigenous ethnic groups established their own 
ethnic parties, including the Shinasha People‟s Democratic Movement (Boro-SPDM), 
the Mao People‟s Democratic Movement (MPDM) and the Komo People‟s 
Democratic Movement (KPDM)
3
. 
 
This obviously undermined the dominance of the BPLM in the regional state. The 
first regional government of the Benishangul-Gumuz regional state, established in 
1993, was actually under the leadership of a newly formed coalition party, the 
Benishangul North West Ethiopia People‟s Democratic Unity Party (BNWEPDUP), 
although the BPLM kept the dominant role in the party structure. In the process, 
                                                 
3
 Interview notes,  current chairman of the Benishangul-Gumuz   People‟s Democratic  Unity Front, 
Addis Ababa, March 2011 
 235 
though, the BPLM lost its claim to multi-ethnicity and was forced to change its name 
to the Ethiopian Berta Democratic Organisation (EPDO) after a June 1996 conference 
chaired by the Federal Deputy Prime Minster. Subsequently, in 1998, the various 
ethnic-based political organisations united to form the Benishangul-Gumuz People‟s 
Democratic Organisation. This is an EPRDF affiliated party and it has controlled state 
power ever since
4
. 
 
In addition, the factionalist tendency within the BPLM also led it into connections 
with the Islamic fundamentalism which became state policy in Sudan after 1989. 
Indeed, one faction of the BPLM fell under the influence of the Sudanese extremists 
who supplied it with arms and training, and facilitated the entry of Islamic elements 
into the Benishangul-Gumuz regional state. This led to demands for the self-
determination of Benishangul and the declaration of a jihad against the Ethiopian 
government forces, which led to skirmishes on the borders of Sudan and Ethiopia 
(Young, 1999). Seventy-seven civil servants were dismissed for their connection with 
the BPLM and their role in peace and anti-development activities, and among  the 
accused were the vice-chairman of the region and the head of the Education Bureau 
and as well as lower ranking officials. Currently, there are over 30 prominent BPLM 
leaders behind bars
5
. With the outbreak of the Ethio-Eritrean conflict, several moves 
were made to negotiate an amnesty for BPLM fighters. As a result, many returned to 
the Assosa zone, particularly to Menge and Sherkole Woredas, in 1999. The amnesty 
process was repeated, with other waves of returnees in the subsequent years (Vaughan, 
2006). 
                                                 
4
 Ibid. 
5
 Interview reports, Security and Administration Bureau head of the Benishangul- Gumuz regional state, 
May 2008. 
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Despite this, the BPLM, based in Eritrea, has continued its attempts to influence the 
Berta ethnic group. Getting logistical support from the Eritrean government, the 
BPLM fighters have attempted several times to penetrate the Assosa zone. For 
example, they destroyed some government property and around 45 civilians and 
police were killed and injured during an attack near Kurmuck in May 2008. In fact, 
the regional authorities thought this question was linked with members of the 
Ethiopian Berta„s Democratic Movement (EPRDF‟s affiliated party), and the Vice-
President of the regional state and other Berta authorities were detained on suspicion 
of a relationship with the BPLM
6
. 
 
 The fluctuations in the future of BPLM show three interrelated factors which have 
affected the outcome of the federal process in the regional state. First, the emergence 
of the ethnic-based political parties has played a significant role in the decline of the 
BPLM‟s role in the regional state. This is why the BPLM took the option to try to use   
the constitutional right of self-determination and push for the independence of the 
Benishangul from the regional state. This was intended to maintain its dominance at 
least amongst the Berta ethnic group, but its mobilisation capacity was seriously 
diminished by the factional tendencies within the party. Second, centre and periphery 
relationships also played a part in the rise and fall of the BPLM.  As discussed above, 
the regional political parties in the Benishangul-Gumuz regional state survived not 
only because they were ethnic-based but also because of their political support from 
the centre. Once it became clear that the BPLM had links to the Sudanese government, 
The EPRDF began to consider it as a threat to the national security of the country. It 
worked to undermine the BPLM by encouraging the establishment of other EPRDF-
                                                 
6
 IBID 
 237 
affiliated ethnic-based political parties and bringing them into a coalition. Third, 
wider geo-politics issues also played a significant role in undermining the BPLM. 
BPLM links with Islamic extremists in Sudan led to the deterioration of its influence 
amongst the Berta elite group, which preferred to strengthen its ties with the EPRDF.  
 
According to Kefale (2008), the relatively small availability of political and 
administrative positions for the Berta elite also contributed to a factional struggle for 
control of power and resources within the ethnic group, this in turn contributed to the 
decline of the BPLM. This is, in fact, quite similar to the findings of Aalen (2008) 
from her investigation into the impact of the self-determination on the political elite of 
the Sidama ethnic group. The political elite of the Sidama was , in fact, weakened by 
the right of self-determination following by the federalisation of the state, because 
some clans that were marginalised within the ethnic group wanted to assert their 
rights by organising themselves under a separate political party. The result was to 
undermine the coherence of the Sidama political elite (Aalen, 2008).  
 
Lack of experience in self-administration in the peripheral areas was another 
contributing factor in the decline of the BPLM‟s supremacy. This was manifested by a 
severe shortage of well-educated personnel to fill the new administrative and political 
vacancies made available by the federal restructuring (Kefale, 2008).  
 
Overall, the decline of the BPLM negatively influenced the federalisation process and 
undermined the quality of the regional leadership. It also created instability which 
resulted in delay to the formal establishment of the regional state and early regular 
elections after the federalisation of the state.  
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Benishangul-Gumuz People’s Democratic Unity Front (BGPDUF) 
After the decline of the BPLM it was the Benishangul-Gumuz People‟s Democratic 
Unity Front (BGPDUF) which took over the leadership of the regional state. This 
coalition party was established formally in 1998 from the Gumuz, Shinasha, 
Mao/Komo and former BPLM members, and other Bertas who decided to work as 
members of the coalition party. The coalition party also decided to work in alliance 
with the ruling party. This meant that neither the individual political parties nor the 
coalition became members of the EPRDF, but merely worked in partnership with it 
(Vaughan, 2007:10). Nevertheless, since its establishment, the BGPDUF has 
dominated the politics of the regional state. It has won all the regular national and 
regional elections since 1995, including the highly contested parliamentary elections 
of 2005. 
 
Power is shared between the political parties in the coalition in consideration of the 
population size of the indigenous ethnic groups. The Gumuz political party controlled 
the presidential post from 1995 until 2008. The Berta took the vice-presidential post 
and the chairmanship of the coalition party. The Shinasha, which is the third most 
populous indigenous group, take the post of Secretary of the Regional Executive. 
Other executive seats are allocated in the same manner: Berta (4), Gumuz (4), 
Shinasha (2), and Mao/Komo (1) with 1 seat going to the non-indigenous people of 
the regional state. 
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The coalition party abolished the ethnic-based organisational structure and united to 
create a centralised structure in October 2009
7
. According to the Chairman of the 
united party
8
, ethnic barriers between the political parties became obstacles to 
addressing the common political and development issues. A united party leadership, 
elected on a merit basis, was considered to have better capacity to address regional 
development issues. A merit-based leadership could also gain legitimacy to work with 
every ethnic group because it did not affect the constitutional rights of the various 
ethnic groups. The ethnic groups could maintain the ethnic-based state institutions 
which enabled them to adapt federal and regional policies to their circumstances. 
However, a study of federalism and leadership in the Southern regional state has 
shown that the ethnic groups complain about the centralised decision-making process 
of the regional party even after the regional coalition parties united some years ago. 
Whether the united party structure will affect the constitutional right of self-rule of the 
indigenous people in the Benishangul-Gumuz regional state remains to be seen. 
 
 Since the end of 2008, the position of president has been held by a Berta, the vice-
presidential post by a Gumuz member and the chairmanship of the United Front has 
gone to the Shinasha. This followed 15 years control of the presidential and other 
critical regional positions by the Gumuz. The reasons for the long leadership of the 
former regional president, Ato Yaregal Aysheshim, and the changes made in 2008 lie 
in combination of  regional, inter-regional and federal political factors. It is clear the 
EPRDF shifted its support from the BPLM to the BGPDUF because of BPLM links 
with Islamic extremists and internal factional instability in the party. The appointment 
of a regional president who was a Gumuz and did not have any extremist links was 
                                                 
7
 The major data collection about  the regional party was completed in May 2008 
8
  Addtional interview reports, Addis Ababa, March 2011 
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important for the stability of the regional state and to satisfy the security interests of 
the federal state. In addition, a Gumuz president was in a position to create an alliance 
between the different indigenous ethnic groups while factionalism between rival 
groups within the BPLM had become a serious threat to the integrity of the Berta elite 
group and to its alliance with the other ethnic groups. According to the current 
Chairman of the regional Party
9
, Ato Yaregal had been the best person to create 
stability in the regional state by bringing indigenous peoples together and create better 
relationships with the federal government and neighbouring regional governments. As 
long as these conditions were satisfied, the EPRDF gave continuous support to Ato 
Yaregal. As a result he became the longest-serving regional president in the country. 
 
 At the same time, he faced several challenges. First, regardless of the support of the 
EPRDF, the Berta wing of the BGPDUF continuously demanded the presidential 
position (See below Chapter Eight). Second, the relationship between the Kamashi 
Gumuz and the neighbouring Oromia steadily deteriorated to the point of an outbreak 
of violent conflict which took around 200 lives, displaced tens of thousands of people 
and destroyed many properties (see Chapter Nine). These issues led to parliamentary 
debates and an investigation and prosecution of some lower-level administration in 
the conflict areas of the Benishangul-Gumuz and Oromia regional states. According 
to Addis Fortune, it was the poor performance of the then regional president in 
conflict management with neighbouring Oromo which led the federal authorities to 
pressurise him to resign. Others criticised him for the low economic development 
performance of the regional state over the previous 15 years (Addis Fortune, 3 
November 2008).  
                                                 
9
 Interview notes,  Addis Ababa, March 2011 
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The federal government used the opportunity to address the demands of the Berta 
ethnic group for the presidential post by bringing in a Berta president, Ahmed Naser, 
who was born in Metehara (Afar regional state) and had few close relations with Berta 
in Assosa. Ahmed Naser only moved to the home of his grandparents, Asossa, in 
1993 following the establishment of the regional government as one of the Bureau 
heads. He has served in different posts for the regional and federal governments
10
. 
The reason that the federal government wanted to bring in a Berta president was also 
associated with the decline of Islamic extremism among the Berta over the last decade 
which, in turn, can be related to the decline of Islamic extremist influence in the 
Sudanese government.  
 
The domestic politics of the regional state and the balance of power between the 
political parties has been determined by the relationship of regional, federal and 
international political factors. It is the federal political factor which usually 
determines the rise and fall of political parties and individual members. The federal 
political interest also plays a dominant role in determining the degree of power-
sharing between the ethnic groups in the regional states. For example, although the 
Berta‟s population is greater than that of the Gumuz, the federal government gave its 
support to a Gumuz president for about fifteen years. This shows that the federal 
process in the regional state is determined not only by the federal structure but also by 
regional, national and international political dynamics. 
 
 
 
                                                 
10
  Additional interview notes, advisor to speaker of the Benishangul- Gumuz regional council, Addis 
Ababa, March 2011. 
 242 
The Role of EPRDF and its Member Parties 
The EPRDF operates in the regional states through the regional parties and their 
components. As noted above, the EPRDF influence on the regional parties emerged 
during the armed struggle against the military regime. At that time, the main purpose 
of the EPRDF was to support partner political parties which could fight and 
undermine the legitimacy of the military regime. It extended its support to all ethnic-
based groups, including armed groups in Gambella, Afar and Benishangul regions. 
After the downfall of the military regime, most of the armed groups that had 
relationships with the EPRDF took up government responsibilities and became 
partners of the EPRDF in their respective areas. 
 
However, the EPRDF has used different categorisations for the various ethnic groups. 
For example, political elites came from those ethnic groups whose livelihood 
depended on plough cultivation were considered as the basis of revolutionary 
democracy. They were thought to have a better socio-economic basis for fostering the 
ideology of revolutionary democracy. As a result, the political elite groups which 
emerged from Tigray, Amhara, Oromia and the Southern regional states were 
considered as EPRDF members because of the similarity of their socio-economic 
situations. By contrast the political elites from pastoralist peoples including Somali, 
Afar, and the shifting cultivators of Benishasngul-Gumuz and Gambella were not 
considered as possible EPRDF members because of their clan-based relationships and 
their low regard for women‟s participation in political activities11. Equally, it is not 
clear why the pastoralist peoples of South Omo and Borena were considered as 
EPRDF regions regardless the similarity of their way of life to other pastoralists. It 
                                                 
11
  Interview notes, former member of the council of EPRDF, Addis Ababa, May 2011. 
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indicates that the EPRDF had little knowledge of the socio-economic similarities and 
differences between ethnic groups, regardless of their general ethnic categorisation. 
 
 As the above analysis indicates, the relationship between the EPRDF and the 
peripheral regional states has created categories of EPRDF and non-EPRDF regional 
states. Tigray, Amhara, Oromia, and the Southern regional states are considered as 
EPRDF regional states because member parties of EPRDF are based there. The 
EPRDF itself competes for regional and national parliamentary elections in these 
states. However, the other regional states (the peripheral states of Afar, Benishangul-
Gumuz, Gambella and Somali) are considered as non-EPRDF because their regional 
parties are not considered as members of the EPRDF. In addition, the EPRDF does 
not fight elections in the peripheral regional states. It merely supports its partner 
parties in elections against opposition parties. 
 
Of course, the EPRDF has the upper hand in influencing the regional parties on the 
basis of its own interests if only because it was the first ruling party which devolved 
power to ethnically-based regional elites. Additionally, the EPRDF initiated the 
proliferation of ethnic-based political parties in the peripheral regional states. This 
relationship between the EPRDF with the peripheral regional parties allows them to 
undermine the role of opposition parties in the regional states. 
 
The EPRDF influences its partner regional parties through political training and by 
sending representatives from the centre to the regional states. Members of the 
affiliated parties have been trained in the political and economic policies and 
strategies of the EPRDF in Tatek, which was a centre of military training during the 
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military regime and the earlier period of the federal system, and more recently in 
Miychow town in Tigray. Representatives of the EPRDF advise the partner parties on 
all political, social and economic aspects of polices for the regional states
12
. They also 
conduct peace and development conferences and carry out performance evaluations in 
the regional states. Several peace and development conferences, for example, were 
held in Benishangul-Gumuz, in 1996, 2002 and 2008. These were associated 
respectively with the crisis of the BPLM, the demands of the Berta ethnic group for 
more devolution of power within the regional state, and the violent conflicts between 
Gumuz and Oromos. 
  
The EPRDF also operates in the Benishangul-Gumuz regional state through ANDM 
and OPDO member parties for two purposes. The ANDM is an EPRDF member party 
which operates mainly in the Amhara regional state. It has been the ruling party there 
since the EPRDF came to power in 1991. Similarly, the OPDO is an EPRDF member 
party which operates in the Oromia regional state. It has also been the ruling party in 
Oromia since the EPRDF came to power. Both the ANDM and OPDO are active in 
the Benishangul-Gumuz regional state for two reasons.  First, as the non-indigenous 
ethnic groups are mainly Amharas and Oromos, both the ANDM and the OPDO want 
to operate among their respective ethnic groups. They also stand for election in the 
residential areas of the non-indigenous people against opposition parties. If no 
EPRDF-affiliated political parties operated within the non-indigenous groups, 
opposition parties could dominate the politics of those groups. Second, as the non-
indigenous groups in Pawe have special representation in the Regional Council, and 
the non-indigenous groups in Asossa can also send one representative to the Regional 
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 Interview notes, member of EPRDF council, Addis Ababa, May 2011. 
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Council, both political parties compete in these places against opposition parties. 
Given this perspective, the operations of the ANDM and OPDO in the Benishangul-
Gumuz regional state are aimed at supporting the regional parties, as both the ANDM 
and the OPDO are member parties of the EPRDF
13
. 
 
Nevertheless, according to informants from the non-indigenous people in Asossa 
Woreda, the operations of both the ANDM and the OPDO do not have significant 
acceptance among non-indigenous groups
14
. This is because their wider political 
agendas are not related to the agendas of land use and political representation of the 
non-indigenous groups in the regional state. Although individual members of the 
political parties may support non-indigenous group issues, they don‟t have clear 
answers for them in the positions of the political parties. The EPRDF considers the 
issues of the settlers as regional issues that have to be settled on the basis of the 
regional constitution. It was due to this that the ANDM did not win elections for the 
regional seats in either Pawe or Asossa Woredas in 2005
15
. 
 
 It is generally believed that OPDO and ANDM interfere in the regional affairs mainly 
over the relationships between indigenous and non-indigenous people. As both OPDO 
and ANDM have offices in Assosa they deal with many such issues. For example, 
people are convinced that members of ANDM agitated the settlers in Assoa to 
complain to the HOF when they were banned from standing for elections in the 2000 
parliamentary and regional elections.  In 2006, around seven ANDM cadres were 
accused of involvement in the violent conflict between the settlers and the Berta 
ethnic group of Asossa Woreda (Vaughan, 2006).  The same year the ANDM office in 
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Asossa was also involved in managing conflicts caused by the use of irrigated land 
between the Berta in Gambella Kebele and Mender (village) 14 of the settlers of 
Bambassi Woreda. 
 
 The result is that the regional political parties of Benishangul-Gumuz are sceptical 
about the operations of the OPDO and ANDM in the regional state for two reasons. 
First, both the OPDO and the ANDM only operate amongst the non-indigenous 
groups which have many grievances in relation to land use and political representation 
in the regional Councils and the executive bodies. As a result, the regional political 
parties do not trust members of the OPDO and ANDM because they may aggravate 
the grievances of the non-indigenous peoples who are generally believed by regional 
political parties to work against the interests of indigenous groups
16
. Second, both the 
Amhara and Oromia regional governments have border issues with the Benishangul-
Gumuz regional state. These have not yet been resolved. So, the offices of the OPDO 
and ANDM in Asossa are seen as branch offices of the main party offices in Bahrdar 
and Addis Ababa, respectively. The regional political parties therefore do not trust the 
party branches in Asossa.
17
 
 
The above analysis of the relationship between the ruling party and the regional 
parties shows two interrelated points. First, the ruling party always maintains its 
relationship with the Benishangul-Gumuz regional party by not competing with it in 
the regional party‟s territory. This created favourable conditions for establishing a 
partnership relationship with the regional party and strengthening the ruling party‟s 
rule in the regional state. Second, however, the relationship between the Benishangul-
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Gumuz regional parties and the EPRDF‟s member parties has not been as smooth as 
an outsider might imagine.  The Benishangul-Gumuz regional state is situated 
between the two most populous regional states.  Hence, the Benishangul-Gumuz 
regional authorities are always alert to the implications of increasing numbers of non-
indigenous people immigrating from the neighbouring regional states. The immigrants 
may, in future, come to outnumber the indigenous people and this could undermine 
the constitutional right of self-determination of the indigenous people. In addition, it 
could invite more involvement by the neighbouring regional states.  
 
In fact, the relationship between the regional party and the EPRDF‟s regional parties 
is always one of conflict and collaboration. There is conflict because the EPRDF 
member parties have their own regional agendas associated with the use of land and 
common border issues. The neighbouring regional states want to have access to the 
fertile land of Benishangul-Gumuz because of population growth and land 
degradation problems in the highland areas. They are keen to maintain the 
constitutional right of movement of people from the highland areas to the 
Benishangul-Gumuz lowland areas. The local administrative authorities in both 
Amhara and Oromia regional states also have a tendency to expand their borders 
towards Benishangul-Gumuz. These threats from the neighbouring regional states 
create conflicting relationships with the political elite of the Benishangul-Gumuz 
regional state, manifested in party and intergovernmental relationships.  
 
At the same time, however, the Benishangul-Gumuz regional state authorities are 
inclined to collaborate with the neighbouring regional states. This is because they 
need support from both the OPDO and ANDM in rallying the non-indigenous people 
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during elections. These can only be mobilised by both the ANDM and OPDO or by 
the opposition parties. If the regional parties lost support from the non-indigenous 
people during parliamentary elections, their representation in the federal institutions 
could be put in jeopardy. This shows the federal structure is not in fact a guarantee of 
implementation of the right of the indigenous people to participate in the federal 
political institutions. Self-rule of the indigenous population could also be undermined 
if the ANDM and OPDO mobilised the non-indigenous people against the interests of 
the Benishangul-Gumuz regional party. The result is that this kind of relationship 
between EPRDF‟s member parties and regional parties makes ethnic-based federalism 
prone to conflicts. This can certainly escalate violence when there are triggering 
factors, as will be discussed in Chapter Eight.  
 
The opposition parties  
The activities of the legal opposition parties have become insignificant since the 
establishment of the regional state. For reasons primarily associated with the political 
agendas and organisational capacities of these parties. As discussed in Chapter Five, 
the indigenous people have been marginalised and segregated for centuries. 
Recognition of their self-determination and enabling them to administer themselves in 
their localities are the minimum criteria to gain their support. Despite this most of the 
national opposition parties have focused on implementing only universal political 
rights. This has undermined the support that they might gain from the indigenous 
people. However, the political agenda of the opposition parties might enable them to 
gain support from non-indigenous peoples because ethnic federalism has placed the 
non-indigenous peoples in a minority status and led to their under-representation in 
the political institutions of the regional state. Overall, however, as most of the 
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opposition parties were established after the downfall of the military regime, thier 
organisational capacity to operate among the non-indigenous people has been weak. 
The political environment certainly limited the political activities of opposition parties 
in the regional state prior to 2005
18
.  
 
 In 2005, however, the opposition parties were able participate significantly in the 
2005 parliamentary and regional elections. Initially, the election process sparked a 
democratic culture which was accompanied by televised debates and discussions 
about alternative polices of the contending parties towards addressing political, 
economic and other issues. Unfortunately, the post-election period was accompanied 
by the contending parties accusing each other of vote rigging, threats to challenge the 
constitutional order through violence, confrontations with the police, the deaths of 
hundreds of people and the arrest of the leaders of the main opposition party, the 
Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD). 
 
Unlike the situation in some regional states and in Addis Ababa, the 2005 election in 
Benishangul-Gumuz ended peacefully. The regional ruling party, the BGPDUF, 
competed in the residential areas of the indigenous people while the CUD, who put up 
stiff competition to the EPRDF at the national level, mainly competed among the non-
indigenous people.  According to the National Election Board the BGPDUF 
candidates managed to win 88 per cent of the seats on the regional council and nine 
seats in the House of People‟s Representatives. The CUD managed to secure nine 
regional council seats, mainly in the areas where the non-indigenous voters were 
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present in greatest numbers. Two independent candidates were also elected to the 
council.  
 
The EPRDF representatives were unable to win in the polling stations of the non-
indigenous people
19
. According to informants from the non-indigenous people, the 
EPRDF candidates did not have any real agenda addressing the political and 
economic issues of interest to the non-indigenous people. Similarly, the CUD could 
not win a single seat amongst the indigenous people because their agenda did not 
address the issues of territorial insecurity. This divide shows clearly enough that 
without a political compromise considering both the territorial insecurity of the 
indigenous people and the basic political and economic rights of the non-indigenous 
people an election process on the basis of the current political setup could lead to 
violent conflict in the future. The following comment of an informant from the 
indigenous people (after the election results of 2005) explains the political paradox in 
the regional state: 
While they (the non-indigenous people) live in our territories, how could they 
vote for the opposition parties – who do not accept our right of self-
determination in our territory? If they want to exercise their right in this way, 
they have to go to their previous settlements. 
 
On the other hand an informant from the settlers of Asossa Woreda explained his 
grievance towards the regional state as follows: 
If the worst comes to the worst, it should be clear that our population size and 
economic capacity enables us to rally an „armed struggle‟ aimed at 
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 National Election Board, election results, 2005. 
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maintaining our political rights in the regional state. This could be the only 
way that makes the regional and federal governments accept our basic political 
and economic rights in the regional state. 
  
After the 2005 election, the CUD disintegrated due to lack of ideological coherence, 
party discipline and under pressure from the government.  In the 2010 parliamentary 
and regional elections only one of the CUD factions competed in the non-indigenous 
rural and urban areas. It did not win any seats. The national and regional election 
process was entirely dominated by the ruling party and its regional partners. 
  
 Conclusion 
It is clear that the coherence of the regional party and its relationship with the national 
ruling party determine the capacity of the regional leadership for conflict management. 
Currently, the political leadership capacity of the regional party to articulate regional 
interests in intergovernmental relationships has become weak because of the factional 
tendencies in the Berta political elite and the ethnic rivalry between Gumuz and Berta. 
The focus of the ruling party on security matters and the role of geo-political factors 
have also contributed to weakening the regional political leadership. This has 
contributed to the power struggles among the indigenous people and the violent 
conflict between Benishangul-Gumuz and the neighbouring regional states, which 
will be discussed in subsequent chapters. 
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Chapter Eight 
Federalism and Power Relationships in the Benishangul-Gumuz Regional State 
 Introduction 
 This chapter examines the power relations between the ethnic groups in the 
Benishangul-Gumuz regional state. It focuses on investigating how the federalisation 
of the state has changed the different power relationships between the ethnic groups 
and how this, in turn, has led to empowerment and disempowerment of the ethnic-
based political elite groups in the regional state. It concludes that a workable power-
sharing arrangement between the indigenous ethnic groups, and accommodation of 
non-indigenous people into the main political system, could create sustainable peace 
in the regional state. 
 
 General Background 
 There is no doubt that the federalisation of the state has created different power 
relationships among the ethnic groups in the regional state. First, it has politically 
empowered the indigenous groups in the regional state. The constitution allowed the 
indigenous groups to achieve self-rule and participate in the federal political 
institutions (preamble of the regional constitution, 2002:71 and article of 39 of the 
federal constitution). However, this political arrangement marginalised ethnic groups 
which had previously been in part nationally and regionally dominant from political 
participation in the regional state.  For example, the Amharan settlers, who were part 
of the nationally dominant ethnic group, during the Haile Selassie and military 
regimes, are badly represented in the regional political institutions. Similarly, it 
disempowered the Oromo people previously administered under the Wallega province, 
who now live in the Kamashi and Asossa zones of the Benishangul-Gumuz regional 
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state with little participation in the regional political institutions. In effect, the 
federalisation of the state has introduced another dimension of conflict which has 
manifested itself in the relationships between the indigenous and the non-indigenous 
(that is the settlers and immigrant) people of the regional state. 
 
In accordance with the regional constitution, the Benishangul-Gumuz regional state 
was established by the indigenous ethnic groups. This created both cooperation and 
conflict among them. They cooperate against the dangers posed by the non-
indigenous people and the threat to territorial insecurity. The regional political elites 
believe that the activities of non-indigenous people have to be checked, in order for 
their own political and economic activities to be promoted. On the other hand, the 
inclusion of different indigenous groups in regional political institutions has led to 
ethnic-based political rivalry manifested in competition between the regional political 
parties for control of regional power and resources. This chapter investigates how the 
power relationships between the ethnic groups influence the federalisation process in 
the regional state.  It focuses on power relationships between Berta and Gumuz, the 
establishment of nationalities councils and settlers representation in the regional state. 
 
The Power Struggle between the Indigenous Groups 
Historically, the indigenous groups who established the regional state had little 
contact with each other. The Gumuz ethnic group, who live in the Metekel and 
Kamashi zones, were administered by the provinces of Gojjam and Wallega (Triulzi, 
1981 and Dessalegn, 1988). The Berta, whose centre is Asossa, were also 
administered by the Wallega province until Asossa became an autonomous 
administrative region (for a brief time), in accordance with the 1987 constitution of 
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the military regime. However, the problem with the former administration was that 
the provinces were administrative units which lumped   ethnic groups into artificial   
administrative areas. For example, the Gumuz were dispersed into separate provinces   
predominantly inhabited by the Amharas and Oromos largely responsible for the 
suppression of the Gumuz and their political and cultural inequality.  Similarly, the 
Mao and Komo ethnic groups were administered under Wallega province which 
forced them into cultural assimilation with the dominant groups, while the Berta were 
also administered under the Wallega administration which  had abolished their  own 
traditional administration. 
 
Both the Gumuz and Berta (including Mao, Komo and Shinasha) came under one 
administration after the change   of government in 1991. The reason for bringing them 
into one regional administration, according to local elders who worked for the 
transitional regional government, was to correct the weakness of the unitary state‟s 
administration. Firstly, both ethnic groups shared similar historical backgrounds; they 
had been treated as slaves and subjected to the slave raids. In addition, they had both 
been marginalized, in comparison to the neighbouring dominant Amhara and Oromo 
ethnic groups.  Secondly, they lived in a similar geographical location, and both 
practiced shifting cultivation as their main occupation
1
. Finally, scholars of 
ethnography and historians also defined them as belonging to the Nilo-Saharan ethnic 
groups (Mebratie, 2004; Abbute, 2002, Zewde, 2002). 
 
The regional government was formally established during the first regional elections 
in 1992 on the basis of the transitional charter. This was endorsed by the regional 
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 Interview notes, a Berta elder, Asossa, May 2008 
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constitution when it became effective in 1996.
2
 The regional constitution states that 
the people who can establish the regional government are the indigenous groups 
(Article 20), and the regional executive power should be assumed by the political 
party with the majority of seats in the regional council (Article 50). In addition, the 
constitution gives the indigenous groups the right of self-determination and the right 
to establish their own regional administration (Article 47). 
 
As discussed earlier, membership of the BPLM (the party that established the regional 
state) came mainly from the Berta ethnic group during the transitional period. The 
BPLM failed to establish a good relationship with the federal government and other 
regional political parties and eventually became an illegal political party in 1995
3
. As 
a result, the regional presidential position shifted from the Berta ethnic group to 
Gumuz, a situation which continued until the end of 2008. However, this regional 
power distribution did not satisfy the Berta elite. The political party from the Berta 
raised a number of issues after the 1995 election eventually causing it to withdraw 
from the regional government. Firstly, the political party proposed that the regional 
Presidency and Secretary positions should be given to the ethnic group with the 
largest population. Moreover, it requested that the number of Woredas in the regional 
state   should be restructured according to the size of the ethnic groups.  It also wanted 
representation to the regional Councils and the executive body to be on the basis of 
population size. Secondly, it complained that the Berta ethnic group had failed to 
benefit proportionally from regional development endeavours.  Thirdly, it requested 
that the Shinasha and the Mao/Komo should not be represented in the regional 
Council in the same way as the other ethnic groups, and their representation should 
                                                 
2
 Constitution of the Benishangul- Gumuz regional state, page 69 
3
 Interview notes, a Berta elder , Asossa,  May 2008 
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either be considered a special case or limited to Woreda level. Fourthly, the political 
party said they would not recognise the regional government until their earlier 
demands had been satisfied, emphasizing that they were accountable to the federal 
government, on the basis of article 47 of the federal constitution
4
. When these 
demands were ignored, the People‟s representative of the Berta ethnic group resigned 
from the regional Council, demanding that the HOF call a public meeting. 
 
 A meeting was eventually held in March 2001 and was attended by 278 Berta and 
220 people from other indigenous ethnic groups and non-indigenous people
5
.The 
meeting had two objectives. Firstly, it aimed to convince the Berta representatives to 
return to the regional council and present their requests to the regional government. 
Secondly, it aimed to show that the demands were unconstitutional, and to some 
extent undemocratic. Power-sharing issues were discussed, including the regional 
constitution regulation which says that the party/parties with the majority of seats 
should establish the regional government.  The regional president presented a report 
about the distribution of development resources to the different zones and the political 
appointments, made within each ethnic group to the regional government
6
. However, 
the question remained how power should be shared within the majority coalition party. 
This was not clarified during the meeting. Nevertheless, the representatives of the 
Berta did recognise the regional government, agreeing to present their future demands 
to that government
7
.  
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In 2002 a peace conference was hosted by the regional government under the auspices 
of the Ministry of Federal affairs.
8
 The purpose of the conference was to address the 
issues that were preventing the elites of the ethnic groups from working together.  The 
Berta representatives requested that a Council of Nationalities be established in the 
regional state. This request was acknowledged and several articles relating to the 
Council of Nationalities were included in the regional constitution when it was 
amended later that year (Articles 73-95). The details of the articles have been 
described in the following section of the chapter. 
 
Since the constitutional amendment in 2002 the status quo of the Regional Council 
has been maintained but the political party from the Berta ethnic group has not been 
stabilised for two reasons. Firstly, although the regional government cannot be 
established by any single ethnic-based political party, due to the fact that every ethnic 
group is a minority at the regional level, there is still no recognised power sharing 
arrangement within the coalition. In other words, there is no common mechanism 
which to distribute power among the ethnic groups. The result is that the power 
sharing mechanisms implemented so far have failed to satisfy the Berta political 
party
9
. 
 
Secondly, violence erupted in seven Kebeles in a place called Endulu, which was 
under the administration of the Menege Woreda of the Asossa Zone. The seven 
Kebeles wanted to establish their own Woreda administration. They claimed the 
centre of the Woreda was so far away that it was difficult for them to receive services.  
Moreover, they said that since they didn‟t have equal representation in the Woreda 
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political structure they had not benefited as others from the Woreda administration. 
The regional administration did not accept the appeal of the Kebeles
10
 and as a result 
the Kebeles dismantled all the regional government branches and the Kebeles‟ 
administration. There followed a period of about nine months without legal 
administration. The problems were seen by the regional government as either 
associated with the weakness of the political party or with the sabotage of some of its 
senior members. This was at a time when the insurgencies of BPLM along the Sudan 
border had also affected the Ethiopian Berta Democratic Organisation (EBPDO). 
Some senior party members were suspected of involvement and arrested
11
.   
 
A number of points need to be considered in relation to the power struggle between 
The Gumuz and the Berta and the resulting instability in the regional state. Firstly, for 
many Bertas the entitlement of Vice President was unacceptable in light of their 
history.  The administration of the Berta Sheikh had been relatively autonomous and 
accepting „second position‟ in the regional administration dented the pride of the 
Berta elite.  
A Berta elder who interviewed in Asossa spoke of this: 
Benishangul had its own government before we became part of Ethiopia 
during Emperor Menilek‟s regime. The Berta government had continued as an 
autonomous administration until Emperor Haile Selassie dismantled it, 
because of the power struggle between local leaders after the death of the 
popular leader Sheck Hogele.  Our ancestors also fought against the Italian 
aggression in Adwa in 1889
12”. 
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This led the Berta elite to consider themselves superior to the other indigenous groups 
which administered the regional state. It motivated the Berta elite to try to acquire 
better positions in the regional state, and when this was not possible they started to 
look at the possibility of secession. 
 
Secondly, some informants in the regional state noted that the Berta‟s attitude towards 
the non-indigenous people was very negative, even more negative than other 
indigenous groups
13
.  For example, the Berta elites complained that they were 
becoming poorer and poorer when others were becoming richer and richer using their 
resources.  Moreover, although restriction of the non-indigenous people‟s political 
rights were generally accepted by all the indigenous groups, the Berta representatives 
made some extreme claims which were objected to by the representatives of other 
indigenous groups
14
. Overall, the Berta ethnic group tried get an upper hand in the 
regional state, even to establish their own regional administration, so they could 
implement their own plans
15
. 
 
Thirdly, informants from the non-governmental organisations (NGOs) operating in 
the regional state also associated the problem with corruption and control of the 
bamboo fields in the Asossa zone
16
. The Asossa zone is well known for its bamboo 
trees. The fields are mainly controlled by a few Berta families associated with the 
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traditional elite of their ethnic group. The establishment of an independent regional 
state enabled them to extend this control of the bamboo, the commercial value of 
which is increasing due to higher domestic and international demand
17
. 
 
Finally, the demand of Hundule Kebeles of Menge Woreda for the establishment of 
Woreda administration may also be associated with the historical power struggle 
between the elite families in the ethnic group.  Some associate it with clan/sub-clan 
differences of the Hundule Kebeles from the remaining Kebeles of the Woreda 
(Vaughan, 2007:42). However, informants from the Berta ethnic group strongly argue 
that there are no such clan differences between the Kebeles in Hundule and the other 
Kebeles in the Woreda
18
. However, many leaders of the ethnic group and many 
BPLM members who fought against the military regime come from these Kebeles. So, 
despite the administrative problems, one of the main driving forces for the Kebeles‟ 
demand has been the desire of the local elites to create a local government which 
would enable them to administer the block government grants. In other words the neo-
patrimonial interests of the local elite have been the driving force for the 
establishment of a Woreda administration.  
 
The elite group of Gumuz, however, has been able to maintain the balance of power 
using different mechanisms. The representation of the ethnic groups in the regional 
Council was based on the number of Woredas until this was corrected after the 2000 
regional elections and the 2002 consitutional changes.  This meant Gumuz had been 
more represented in the regional Council although the population size of the Berta 
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was greater than the Gumuz as shown in the table below.  The Gumuz live in 11 
Woredas,  and the Berta live in 7 (Van der Beken, 2009:10). 
 
8.1. Ethnic representation of the   Benishangul-Gumuz regional council 
Ethnic group  population Total population % representatives 
before the dispute 
% of 
representation 
after  the dispute 
Berta 122 883 26.7 35 40 
Gumuz 107 495 23.4 43.75 35 
Shinasha 32 105 6.9 7.5 11 
 Mao-Komo 3843 .83 5 5 
0thers 194 133 42.17 8.75 9 
Total 460 459 100 100 100 
 
Source: Asnake Kefale, PhD thesis, 2008. 
 
 It should also be noted that a lack of clarity in forming Woreda administrations can 
also contribute to the flow of resources to which ever ethnic group has the larger 
number of Woredas in the state.  There are no clear criteria in the regional constitution, 
or presented in other legal documents, which addresses this situation.  As a result, 
regional Cabinet members have no common understanding when dealing with the 
issues.  Some members of the Cabinet suggest that if the general population of a 
group of Kebeles reaches around 28,000, the Kebeles should be able to establish a 
Woreda administration. However, others say Woreda administration can be 
established only if the population in the Kebeles is 50-60,000 and if it can contribute 
revenue for a recurrent budget.
19
  For example, table seven below shows the 
population distribution of the Woredas in the regional state. The zones (Kamashi and 
Metekel) of the Gumuz ethnic group have 11 Woredas with an average population of 
24,993; the Asossa zone of the Berta has seven Woredas with an average population 
of 38,203.  In this circumstance this remains a potential source of conflict between the 
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Berta and the Gumuz, especially as Woreda administration status has a direct impact 
on the allocation of the federal block grants and regional budgets. 
 
8.2. Range of population size of Woredas in Benishangul-Gumuz 
Zone Range Woreda Population 
Metekel Highest Dibate 54180 
Lowest Guba 14801 
Kamsh Highest Belojeganfoy 24993 
 Lowest Yaso 12,619 
 Asossa Highest Asossa 87,366 
 Lowest Kurmuk 13,579 
 
Source: CSAE, census, 2007 
 
In maintaining the regional state status quo the Gumuz elite group has been able to get 
the support of the smaller indigenous groups. For example, the Shinasha have created 
an alliance with the Gumuz, because they live together with Gumuz in some Woredas 
of the lowland areas of Metekel.  These have given them some advantage of 
employment in the regional Civil Service staff and in the regional government 
political institutions
20
.  In addition, the opposition of the Berta elite to the role of the 
Shinasha and the Mao/Komo in the regional government has also strengthened the 
alliance of the smaller ethnic groups with the Gumuz.
21
  
 
 As discussed earlier the link of the BPLM to external threats and the fact that its main 
influence focused on the Berta elite group has been a reason for the Federal 
government authorities to give their support to the Gumuz elite group which had not 
such relationship with BPLM. This has been manifested in two ways. Firstly, the 
                                                 
20
  According to the regional Civil Service Bureau   members of Shinasha ethnic group have the highest 
number in the regional civil service following the non-indigenous people in the regional state. 
21
 Representatives of the Berta ethnic group publicly opposed the equal representations of Shinasha, 
Mao and Komo at the regional parliament and executive branches at the public meeting held in March 
2001. 
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representatives of the Federal government authorities have supported maintenance of 
a status quo that favoured the Gumuz elite group.  Consequently, the former President 
became the longest serving regional President in the country. Secondly, the federal 
government authorities supported the administrative measures taken in handling the 
Berta and the BPLM issues. For example, when the BPLM attacked the small towns 
near the border of Sudan and Ethiopia in 2008 many members of the Berta political 
party were suspected of involvement – including  the Vice President of the regional 
state and other senior members. This was addressed not only by the regional 
administration but also by advisors from the federal government and the ruling 
EPRDF. The Berta communities protested against these accusations, claiming they 
were deliberately attacked aimed at undermining their role in the regional state
22
. 
 
In summary, the Gumuz elite group has successfully manipulated the relationships of 
the smaller indigenous groups, the Berta elite, and the security threats to the regional 
state and federal government from BPLM.  At the same time, there is no doubt this 
has contributed to the instability of the regional government, lack of harmonised 
regional leadership and its inability to articulate the regional state‟s interest in 
intergovernmental relationships. Since the regional state is multi-ethnic, it seems 
likely that resource and power-based conflict will persist between the ethnic-based 
elite groups. Nevertheless, it should be possible to manage this by establishing 
accepted power-sharing mechanisms and by providing federal incentives that 
encourage identity groups‟ co-operation. 
 
 
                                                 
22
 Interview notes,  Berta elders,  Asossa, May 2008 
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 The Establishment of the Nationalities Councils 
The constitutional amendment of 2002 allows each indigenous group to establish its 
own Council of Nationality from the regional and Woreda representatives, utilising 
the organs of the Nationalities Administration Council (NAC) and the Judiciary. Each 
Council has its own office led by a speaker and a deputy speaker.  It is considered the 
supreme political power of each indigenous group and given the task of promoting the 
language and culture of the group.  Moreover, it can issue and enforce laws, which are 
not contrary to the regional law, evaluate and approve budgets, and recommend the 
appointment of judges for the high court (Article 75). 
 
The Council of Administration, which is the highest executive organ of the Council of 
Nationalities, is led by the Chief Administrator, the Deputy Chief Administrator and 
the Heads of Executive (Article 78).  It is responsible for all administrative issues, 
including implementation of the laws and decisions of the regional government; the 
organisation of government departments; agreeing the annual budget and submitting it 
to the Council of the nationality; and formulating detailed economic and social plans, 
according to the policies of the regional government (Article 79). Every indigenous 
ethnic group in the regional state has the right to establish its own Council of 
Nationality although no one has launched it yet. However, according to the legal and 
economic advisors to the regional president and other informants from the Shinasha 
ethnic group
23
, this has been very controversial among the members of the Regional 
Council. A number of issues were raised in this regard. 
 
                                                 
23
  The informants from the Shinasha ethnic group noted the extent to which it is problematic to 
implement the constitutional law about   Council of Nationality, Asossa, May 2008. 
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First and foremost, it is difficult to establish the Council of Nationalities with 
executive responsibilities in the territories of the indigenous groups. For example, the 
Shinasha ethnic group lives together with the Gumuz in some Woredas of Metekel. If 
two Councils of Nationalities, one for each ethnic group, are established in the area 
there is likely to be an administration overlap which could cause intra-regional 
conflict. Second, the right to establish a Council of the Nationalities is given only to 
the indigenous groups, ignoring the non-indigenous groups. Moreover, the working 
language of the Nationalities is to be the relevant indigenous language.  This could 
marginalize non-indigenous people who prefer to teach their children their own 
language. This again affects the peaceful coexistence of the ethnic groups in the 
regional state
24
.  
 
Third, the establishment of the Council of Nationalities may also constrain 
development activities in the regional state. This is because it will create unnecessary 
offices and hierarchal administrative institutions that require additional recurrent 
budgets.  This money will have to come from the state‟s capital budget. Moreover, 
unnecessary administrative hierarchies can also create implementation inefficiency 
because any communication gaps between the higher and lower levels of the 
administration and the public is widened (Ndulo, 2006).  
The legal advisor to the President of the regional state expressed his concern: 
How does a regional state that sustains itself by the federal government budget 
subsidy create additional administrative structures that consume its budget? 
                                                 
24
 Interview notes, legal advisor to the Benishangul-Gumuz  regional  state President, Asossa, May 
2008 
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This constitutional right is not only vulnerable to conflicts but also consumes 
the regional budget‟s scarce resources25. 
 
Finally, the regional state lacks the expertise to implement a Council of Nationalities. 
The economic and legal advisors to the President stated that the regional state lacks 
expertise in the preparation of the guidelines that would enable the constitutional right 
to introduce the Councils to be implemented. Moreover, as the Council of 
Nationalities will be a new structure in the country it has become difficult to find 
experts in the Federal government who could assist the implementation, or to secure 
experience from other regional governments. The southern nations have this kind of 
regional institutional arrangement, but there it aims to play a role in the management 
of conflict rather than having any executive responsibility. Some of the endogenous 
groups in the Amhara regional state also have their own Nationality Council. This was 
formed to protect the smaller nationalities from domination by the much larger 
Amhara ethnic group which constitutes 95% of the population (Van der Beken, 2007).  
 
Issue of the Settlers’ Political Representation in the Regional State 
The political representation of the settlers has also become controversial in the 
regional state. This is because the regional constitution does not permit full 
participation of the non-indigenous people in regional and federal political institutions 
(Article 71). Moreover, although the constitution says representation of the non-
indigenous people shall be given special consideration, and that the policies will be 
determined by law (Article 45/3), nothing has yet been implemented by the regional 
council and executive body which are dominated by indigenous groups. For example, 
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 Interview notes, Asossa,  May 2008 
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when the Council of Nationalities was legislated, the issues of non-indigenous people 
were side stepped with the excuse that these would be dealt later by another law
26
.  
 
In these circumstances non-indigenous people wanted to participate in the national 
elections of 2000. However, the political party from Berta lobbied the National 
Election Board (NEB) to declare that as non-indigenous people did not speak the 
native language they should be banned from running elections. The NEB approved 
this request and the representatives were banned from running elections
27
.  However, 
the settlers did not accept the decision of the NEB and complained to the HOF that 
their constitutional right to vote and run elections had been violated. The issue was 
forwarded to the Federal Constitutional Enquiry Commission (FCEC), which 
investigates constitutional issues and advises the HOF.  The FCEC took expert 
opinion.  
 
The controversies about the political representation of the non-indigenous people 
underline the problems of minority rights protection that was omitted in the federal 
constitution. In other words, the constitutional emphasis on ethnicity has  resulted  in  
members  of Berta  ethnic groups  using ethnicity  as a political instrument  to 
undermine  the political representation of the non-indigenous people and to promote 
their   own dominance  in the regional  administration.  The following expert opinion 
about the issue also shows the extent to which the emphasis of the federal constitution 
on ethnicity has created difficulties in implementing the basic political rights of 
citizens.   
 
                                                 
26
 Interview  notes, legal advisor  to the  regional  President, Asossa, May 2008 
27
 A letter written  to Asossa Zone election coordinator from  the National Election Board Office, Addis 
Ababa,18 February, 2000(10 Feburary 1992 E.C) 
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 In the first place, some of the experts considered the decision of the NEB as 
constitutional. This was because if a people‟s representative could not speak either of 
the local languages, s/he could not properly represent the people, and the people 
would not be able to apply their right of self-administration at the regional level. In 
other words, the experts considered the decision of the NEB to be related to the 
implementation of self-determination of indigenous groups
28
. However, other experts 
considered the decision of the NEB to be unconstitutional on the basis that the right to 
vote and run elections is a basic political right of all citizens, and is not to be 
associated with either ethnicity or language
29
. Moreover, as the regional working 
language is Amharic the persons who wanted to hold an election could in fact speak 
the required language. Hence, the decision of the NEB was unconstitutional.  After 
considering all advice, the FCEC took the issue to the HOF, which finally voted 
against the NEB‟s decision.30 
 
 However, although the non-indigenous people were then able to organise elections 
based on the decision of the HOF, the number and distribution of seats in the regional 
state are determined by the regional constitution and the regional Council. Following 
the violent conflict in 1992, the settlers in Pawe Woreda acquired special 
representation in the regional Council. However, other settlers in Asossa could only 
be represented by one seat in the regional Council. Moreover, they could only be 
represented in a Woreda council by a third of the representatives when they account 
for the majority of the population of the Woreda.  Representatives of the HOF, who 
went to the regional state to conduct a public meeting in 2001, saw the issue as a 
                                                 
28
  Comments  in favour of the decision of NEB, by Dawit Yohans, the then   Speaker of the House of 
Federation,  16 June, 2001(08 June 1993 E.C) 
29
  Comments forwarded by the late Kifle Wodajo against  the decision of NEB, 2001 
30
 Minutes of the  House of Federation decision  about  the issue of the settler‟s representation,  07 July 
2008 (June 29 1992 E.C) 
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national issue that had to be addressed at national level
31
.  The Director General of the 
NEB, however, believed such questions should be treated within the sovereignty of 
the regional state, as the issue fell under the constitutional rights of the regional state
32
.  
The settlers themselves have never accepted the decision of the regional state. As the 
settlers have lived in the regional state for more than 30 years, and their children were 
born there, they want representation equal to the indigenous groups.  Moreover, they 
want their majority status to be respected in Asossa Woreda
33
. 
One of the settlers in Bambassi Woreda who participated in group discussions 
explained:  
We came by force here 30 years ago. Our children who were born here have 
become middle-aged adults now. If this regional state does not belong to our 
children where should they go? Therefore, our children should get access to 
land and the political institutions in the regional state as equals of the native 
people
34
. 
 
Kefale (2008) argues that the settlers‟ demand for proportional political representation 
also has an economic dimension.  Certainly it is clear that if they have proportional 
political representation in the regional political institutions this would help them 
address the socio-and economic problems and issues associated with land use rights in 
the regional state, as discussed in Chapter Six. Equally, there have been differences 
among the regional political authorities with regard to this issue. For example, as 
discussed above, the political elite of the Berta demanded the exclusion of the non-
indigenous people from the political process of the regional state. On the other hand, 
                                                 
31
  Minutes of public meeting held in  Asossa, 20-24  March 2001(12-14  March 1993 E.C) 
32
 Interview notes, the Director General of the office of  National Election Board, June 2008, Addis 
Ababa  
33
  Focus group discussion notes, Amba 14(settler‟s village), Bambassi, May 2008 
34
 Ibid 
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the former regional president, Ato Yaregal Ayisheshim, and representatives of other 
ethnic groups were concerned about the impact of the Berta‟s demand on the peace 
and development of the regional state. They requested reconsideration of the NEB‟s 
decision banning the participation of non-indigenous people in the regional and 
parliamentary elections of 2000. 
 
At the same time, interviews held with senior members
35
 of the regional state 
underline the lack of political willingness in the regional state to accommodate the 
demands of the settlers for proportional political representation. They give a number  
of  reasons. The regional authorities still believe that the non-indigenous people have 
alternative places to live, whereas the only choice for indigenous people is 
Benishangul-Gumuz. In addition, this issue of minorities is a nation-wide issue. For 
example, there are similar problems in the Oromia and the Harrari regional states, as 
discussed in Chapter Four. So there can be no reason for Benishangul-Gumuz alone to 
deal with the issue of the settlers when other regional states do nothing, particularly 
when there is no pressure from the federal government to act. Indeed, according to the 
regional authorities the handling of minorities in Benishangul-Gumuz is better than 
other regional states
36
. 
 
 Despite this, the issue of the settlers‟ political representation certainly indicates a 
violation of basic political rights in the regional state.  This can be seen with respect 
to both individual and group rights. Individually, although settlers have a right to vote 
they do not have proportional representation rights in accordance with their 
population. Further, a basic principle of federalism is to enable a minority to make 
                                                 
35
 Several senior members of the regional council were interviewed during field visit. All of them have  
similar opinion with regard to the non-indigenous people‟s political representation 
36
 Interview notes, a senior  Cabinet member of Benishangul- Gumuz regional state, Asossa, May 2008 
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decisions on issues that concern them in their local areas (Watts, 2001).  In this case, 
the settlers have been deprived of this right because of their identity, even when they 
are in the majority as in Asossa Woreda.  
 
The Role of the Federal Government 
 The federal government has handled the power struggle between the political elites of 
the Benishangul- Gumuz regional state in a way that has enabled it to maintain 
government survival. For example,  the federal state  maintained  the  regional 
president  post  for  the Gumuz and a concession was  given to  the Berta which 
enables them  to establish  a Council of Nationalities, although  this is something to be  
applied  to all the  indigenous groups in the regional state.  As discussed above, this 
arose in response to the insurgency of the BPLM from across the borders of Sudan 
and the religious radicalism   in Sudan which focused on the Berta (Young, 1999). In 
other words  a Gumuz  regional president was  seen  as  more loyal  to the federal  
authorities  than  a Berta  president   during the initial  years  of the federal system. 
 
The result is that representatives of the ruling party do not treat the ethnic groups in 
the regional state equally. In Benishangul-Gumuz the federal government favoured 
the Berta ethnic group during the transitional period. However, when the influence of 
insurgent groups increased in Berta territories, the focus of the federal government 
shifted from the Berta to the Gumuz and it let the Gumuz take control of the critical 
regional posts. Since then, the Berta have felt alienated and excluded from the 
benefits of the regional government
37
. Moreover, they felt that they had been attacked 
indiscriminately by the federal government following an increase in insurgent groups 
                                                 
37
 Interview notes, Berta elders, Asossa, May, 2008 
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in the region
38
. This also contributed to competition between the ethnic groups for 
influence with the federal authorities. They know from experience that, if they are 
able to influence the centre more successfully than others they can retain power.  
 
The result is that  the way the federal government  has dealt with  the regional issues  
from the perspective  of regime survival on one hand  and the ethnicity politics  of  the 
ethnic leaders   of the indigenous groups  on the other  has incapacitated  the regional 
state  leadership. This emphasizes that the concern of many scholars (Aalen, 2006, 
Tronvoll, 2009, Clapham, 2009) about the ruling party‟s failure to implement the 
constitutional right of self-determination of the ethnic groups‟ in the country is 
justified.  
 
 At the same time, the federal authorities have implemented different power-sharing 
mechanisms which have created temporary leadership stability in the regional state. 
For example, the under-representation of Berta in the regional council and the 
regional executive was corrected after the Berta political party threatened to leave the 
regional state. Now the Berta ethnic group has more representation in the regional 
council, in accordance with its population. Similarly, it has better representation in the 
regional executive body. The regional presidency has also been held by the Berta 
since the end of 2008. The idea of establishing a nationalities council has been 
introduced, in order to accommodate the demands of the Berta although as noted it 
has proved difficult to implement it symmetrically in the regional state. The regional 
state now also takes population size into account when allocating Woreda budgets.  
 
                                                 
38
 There is an opposition party in the region called „Behenen‟ conducting armed movements usually by 
crossing over the common border with Sudan. 
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However, the federal government‟s approach is not a sustainable solution for the 
power struggle between Berta and Gumuz. There are several reasons for this. Firstly, 
there is no well-institutionalised power-sharing agreement between the ethnic groups 
to create leadership stability in the regional state. The power sharing agreement 
always depends on the federal interest, which in turn depends on inter-regional and 
international relations. This makes power-sharing between the ethnic groups 
unpredictable, and encourages them try to manipulate and influence political groups 
in the regional state and the federal authorities.  Secondly, it is obvious that no single 
identity group has majority status in the Benishangul-Gumuz regional state and the 
regional state cannot be dominated by any single ethnic group. This encourages the 
different ethnic groups to continue to struggle for power or to establish a separate 
regional state. There is a need for other economic, social and security advantages to 
motivate the ethnic groups to cooperate each other.   At the moment, however, 90 % 
of the regional budget and the Woreda block grant are allocated by federal subsidy; 
infrastructure improvements are also mainly carried out by the federal government 
and there is no security threat which would force the Berta ethnic group to create an 
alliance with the Gumuz. So, on the basis of the federal constitution, the Berta can 
still think they will gain better economic advantage and political status if they 
establish their own regional state. This view is reinforced by the fact that the majority 
of the Berta population are Muslim. They had their own kingdoms during   the 
medieval period and an autonomous administration during the Menelik period. The 
result is that there remains the strong intention among the Berta political elite to 
establish a separate regional state. 
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 Such intentions, however, have little relevance for the other ethnic groups, especially 
the Gumuz. Firstly, as the Gumuz lives on both sides of the Abbay River, a regional 
state which includes the Berta and the capital of Asssa could be useful, in order to 
maintain access between the Gumuz of Kamashi and the Gumuz of Metekel. 
Secondly, as the Gumuz live in several Woredas, they benefit from Woreda bloc 
subsidies. Finally, historically the Gumuz were administered separately under Oromos 
and Amharas. They have shown no interest in demanding their own regional 
administration.  
 
The federal government  has attempted to influence the Benishangul regional state by 
utilising federal government structures such as the Office of Regional Affairs which 
was organised by the office of the Prime Minister until 2002, and then by the Ministry 
of Federal Affairs. The Office of the Regional Affairs sent regional advisors to the 
state, hosted peace and democracy conferences, and offered teams of experts to 
provide technical support to the regional state. The Ministry of Federal Affairs has 
been doing similar activities since its establishment in 2002.  In addition, since 2009 
members of the Ministry of the Federal Affairs have been assigned, at regional and 
Woreda level, to advise the regional and Woreda cabinets on issues of development. It 
was thought, correctly, that the peripheral regional states (non- EPRDF) were lagging 
behind the EPRDF regional states as far as development was concerned. However, the 
members of the Ministry of Federal Affairs were recruited not from the Benishangul-
Gumuz regional state but from the EPRDF controlled regional states, particularly the 
Amhara region. 
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 In fact, the relationship between the federal government and the peripheral regional 
states, which essentially mirrors the relationship between the Bolshevik party and the 
autonomous republics of the former Soviet Union, has led to greater interference of 
the ruling party and the federal state in the internal affairs of the regional states. 
According to the interviews carried out during the field visit to the Benishangul-
Gumuz, the representatives of the EPRDF focus mainly on security matters in the 
regional states. These representatives lacked the capacity and expertise to advice on 
development policy or the strategies needed in the Benishangul- Gumuz regional state. 
The effect was to undermine the regional capacity for policy making. In addition, the 
federal intervention has aggravated the power struggle between the ethnically-based 
elite groups of the regional state and their attempts to gain the support of EPRDF, 
something which is critical to maintaining regional power control. Nor have the 
regional and Woreda advisors sent by the Ministry of Federal Affairs to the regional 
state encouraged additional capacity in the regional state. According to the Advisor to 
the Speaker of the Benishangul-Gumuz regional state, the Woreda advisors simply do 
not have enough expertise to advise Woreda administrations
39
.  
 
The federal government has taken some measures to accommodate the rights of the 
non-indigenous people in the regional state. As discussed above non-indigenous 
people were allowed to stand in elections, although other non-indigenous people in 
Oromia and Harari regional states were not allowed to stand. This concession was 
given to non-indigenous people in Benishangul- Gumuz regional state because of 
their organised complaint against the decision of NEB in 2000. Following the HOF 
decision, contrary to that of NEB, they were allowed to participate in Woreda and 
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Kebele administrations, although not at a level of representation proportional to their 
population. 
 
Despite these successes the basic political and economic rights of non-indigenous 
people are not respected. Non-indigenous people do not have constitutional 
proportional political representation as the indigenous people do.  Nor do they have 
equal land use rights as citizens of the country. The rights given to non-indigenous 
people by the regional state can be revoked as the regional state chooses, and there is 
no constitutional law which limits the regional states‟ authority to do this.  In fact, 
neither the federal nor regional constitutions respect the political rights of minorities 
which have been created through the federalisation of the state. The result is that the 
relationship between indigenous and non-indigenous people is difficult with the 
political rights of non-indigenous people excluded from the constitutional design of 
the federal process. 
 
Conclusion 
The federalisation of the state in Ethiopia has devolved power and resources to 
peripheral areas, like the Benishangul-Gumuz regional state. However, whether the 
devolution of power and resources to the ethnic groups brings real change depends 
not only on federal restructuring but also on the federal process itself which, in turn, is 
determined by the power relationships of different interest groups and actors (Elazar, 
1986). The transformation of the structural causes of conflict in the Benishangul-
Gumuz also depends on the well-established and stable regional power relationships 
between the political leadership of the ethnic groups. So far, the establishment of the 
regional state  and  the devolution of  power and resources  to the regional state  has 
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not brought significant changes  to  the structural causes of conflict because of  the 
power struggle between the main ethnic groups within the regional state, and the 
under representation of non-indigenous people in the political institutions of the 
regional state. In addition, the focus of the federal state on regime survival, in 
response to security concerns and threats from across international borders, has also 
greatly affected regional domestic politics. Federal state support to the continuation of 
the Gumuz elite group in power for more than 15 years for security reasons has  also 
contributed to the power struggle between the Berta and Gumuz elites, ultimately 
undermining the capacity of regional leadership. 
 
So, if constitutional power devolution is going to bring real change, the mechanisms 
of power-sharing must be well institutionalised and address regional interests. The 
more the federal government intervenes in the regional state, the more the power 
struggle between the ethnic groups will increase in order to influence the federal 
authorities. Equally, the non-indigenous people need to be well represented in the 
regional institutions, as their numbers are already almost equal to those of the 
indigenous population. In other words, effective mechanisms of political 
representation must be devised which balance the group rights of indigenous people 
and the basic political rights of non-indigenous people. Without this, the regional state 
will not unable to transform the structural causes of conflict, as discussed in Chapter 
Six, it will also become prone to further violent conflict.  
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Chapter Nine 
Federalism and Inter-regional Conflict Management in the Benishangul-Gumuz 
Regional State 
 
 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the inter-regional conflict management process between 
Benishangul-Gumuz and the neighbouring regional states. It discusses the nature of 
conflict between the neighbouring regional states, and attempts to relate the basic 
sources of inter-regional conflict to historical and cultural factors, relationships 
between small regional states and the nation state, common border issues, 
international frontiers, and extensive possession of small arms. Secondly, it discusses 
how these basic causes of inter-regional conflict lead to violence and how the 
federalisation process has influenced this process. For this purpose it considers two 
case studies: a violent conflict between Gumuz and Amharas dating from 1992-1994, 
and a violent conflict between Gumuz and Oromos in May 2008. Finally, it 
determines the relevance of formal and informal intergovernmental relationships and 
the promotion of co-operation between regional states for the management of inter-
regional violent conflict. 
 
 Nature of Inter-regional Conflict: Historical and Cultural Factors 
Inter-regional violent conflict in this area of Ethiopia is associated with historical 
issues and cultural factors. As discussed in Chapter Five, for centuries the indigenous 
groups in the Benishangul- Gumuz state were considered slaves, and segregated from 
integrating into the dominant neighbouring ethnic groups. The regimes of the nation-
state also advocated segregation of the indigenous groups, and did not consider them 
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citizens of the country until the modern era of the Haile Selassie regime (Donahm, 
1985).  The military regime displaced them from their territories (Mebratie, 2004). 
The stigma of this history is still fresh in the memory of the indigenous people and of 
the neighbouring ethnic groups contributing significantly to the conflicts between the 
neighbouring regional states
1
. 
 
The conflict between the regional states is also associated with the historical 
administrative structures of the regional states. As discussed in Chapter Five, 
historically, the Kamashi and Assosa zones of the Benishangul-Gumuz regional state 
were administered by Wallega during the Haile Ssilase and military regimes.  The 
people in the zone administrations were seen as „Black Oromos‟ by the Oromos, 
although this was considered derogative by the Gumuz and Berta people who live in 
the Kamashi and Assosa zones. In addition, the OLF considered the Berta‟s and 
Gumuz as „Black Oromos‟ and attempted to introduce Oromifa as a spoken language 
in the early years of the transitional period a process which encountered strong 
opposition from local people. 
 
The Metekel zone, which is the third zone of Benishangul-Gumuz, was part of 
Gojjam during the Haile Selassie and military regimes. During this time many people 
from Amhara and Agew migrated to the territories of the Gumuz and the area became 
considered as part of the territory of the Amhara. Hence, when the new regional states 
were established (after the downfall of the military regime in 1991), the Amhara 
regional state claimed the Dibate, Mandura and Pawe Woredas, and this contributed 
to the violent conflict between Gumuz and Amharas after 1992. 
                                                 
1
  A report prepared by a joint committee from Amhara and Benishangul-Gumuz regional states, 2005 
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The nature of inter-regional conflict is also related to cultural factors. The culture of 
the neighbouring Amhara and Oromo people is greatly influenced by the Christian 
religion (Donham, 1985). However, although Christianity is spreading among the 
Gumuz ethnic group, their culture is related to traditional spirit faith, as discussed in 
Chapter Five (Mebratie, 2004). Although the Bertas are predominantly Muslim, 
traditional spirit faith also plays a greater role in their life than Islam (Triulzi, 1981).  
The neighbouring ethnic groups consider themselves culturally superior to the 
indigenous people because of this. Moreover, the neighbouring ethnic groups see the 
culture of the indigenous people as a „source of evil‟.  The name Baraya (slave) had 
been associated with evil, mainly in the Gondar areas (Pankhurst, 1997). Similarly, 
the Oromos also consider the traditional culture of the indigenous people as 
uncivilised. The result is they undermined indigenous people when they met in public 
places and during interaction in the lower level administrations
2
.  In effect cultural 
inequalities have played a significant role in creating a polarised relationship between 
the lower level administrations of Oromia and Benishangul-Gumuz states, which, in 
turn, have contributed to the violent conflict that occurred in 1994, 2007 and 2008
3
. 
 
The Relative Size of the Benishangul-Gumuz Regional State and Relationships to 
the Central Power Structures 
The small population density of the regional state is another factor which has caused 
conflict between the neighbouring regional states. The population density of 
Benishangul-Gumuz is 14.5 per kilometre, while the Oromia and Amhara regional 
states are 104.5 and 117.4 per kilometre respectively
4
.  In addition, much land in the 
                                                 
2
 Interview notes, a Gumuz  elder, Asossa, May 2008 
3
 Ibid 
4
 The population density variation is also high in the neighbouring zones and Woredas, which have 
seen violent conflict between Gumuz and Oromos and Gumuz and Amharas. For example, the 
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territory of the Benishangul-Gumuz is fertile yet unexploited compared to the land in 
the territories of the Amhara and Oromia regional states. The Benishangul-Gumuz 
regional state is therefore attractive to immigrants from the neighbouring regional 
states and there have been land encroachments along the common borders. This has 
been the reason for high immigration from the Amhara regional state and illegal 
settlements in Mandura, Pawe, Dangur and Mankush in the Metekel zone.
5
. The zone 
administration attempted to control the movement of people by establishing check 
points along main roads, but this became impractical. Some migrants arrived in a 
systematic way and settled with relatives who had come earlier. Others came in 
groups and settled by establishing their own Kebele administrations (Asres, 2010). 
The Oromos also pushed their settlements into the Kamashi and Asossa zones. As a 
result, the previous settlement patterns have changed significantly over the last twenty 
years. According to Fufa (2010) the movement of people towards Asossa and 
Kamashi, along the regional frontiers, occurs not only from Oromia but also from the 
Amhara regional state. 
 
As discussed in Chapter Five the past relationship of the people with the nation state 
also influenced the current relationships with the regional and federal states. The 
federal government and the ruling party consider the Benishangul-Gumuz as one of 
the emerging regional states which requires special support, not only from the federal 
government but also from the neighbouring regional states. The people who have 
been sent by the government to support the regional state are mainly from the Amhara 
or Tigray regional states. So long as they are members of EPRDF they have been 
                                                                                                                                            
population density of Kamashi zone is 11.5 per kilometre, whereas the population density of East 
Wallega zone is 107.1 per kilometer. Moreover, the population density of Metekel zone is 10, whereas 
the population density of the Awi zone is 113.1 per Kilometre (CSAE, 2010). 
5
  Interview notes,  Metekel zone  zone administration head, Gilgelbeles, July, 2008 
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considered politically capable in comparison with members of the regional party. 
Nevertheless, according to the former Regional President of the Benishangul regional 
state some of the advisors and experts who were sent to the regional state by the 
federal government were incapable of fulfilling their mission. According to the legal 
advisor of the speaker of the regional council many of the advisors who have been 
sent to the regional state by the Ministry of Federal Affairs since 2009 are no better 
than the members of the regional party
6
. This suggests that the influence of the centre 
and periphery relationships still undermines the regional state‟s policy-making 
capacity. 
 
The under-representation of the regional state in the federal executive political 
institutions, by comparison with neighbouring regional states, is also a source of 
conflict. As discussed in Chapter Four, Amhara and Oromia regional states are the 
biggest and most highly populated in the country. This means these regional states 
have larger representation in the parliament and the executive body of the federal 
government. For example, the Amhara and the Oromo control six cabinet positions 
each in the federal government, while the Benishangul-Gumuz regional state is not 
represented at all. This undermines the status of the Benishangul-Gumuz regional 
state not only in federal-intergovernmental relationships, but also in regional 
intergovernmental relationships. This is because the authorities of the federal 
government not only represent the federal institutions but also their own regional 
states and the EPRDF‟s regional parties (OPDO, ANDM, TPLF or SEPDM), 
operating in the regional states.  There are, in fact, opportunities for the federal 
authorities to favour their own regional states when there is conflict of interest in 
                                                 
6
 Interview notes, legal advisor   to the speaker of the regional council, April, 2011 
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intergovernmental relationships, and  this  was clearly seen for example in the 
allocation of budget subsidies in 2006.  
 
  The Issue of Border Demarcation 
 The relationships between the Benishangul- Gumuz and the neighbouring   regional 
states are also associated with the territorial insecurity of the indigenous groups. 
Historically, the indigenous people were pushed away from their territories by the 
neighbouring ethnic groups (Mebratie, 2005; Pankhurst, 1997). The federalisation of 
the state enabled them to establish their regional state, and, according to the federal 
constitution, the common borders of regional states are to be determined on the basis 
of ethnic identity and the residential territories of the ethnic groups (Article 46).  
However, despite an initial attempt at border demarcation between the Benishangul-
Gumuz and the Amhara regional state, the common borders have not yet been ratified.  
Indeed, border disputes have become a frequent issue along the common borders of 
the regional states. For example border disputes occurred along 19 Woredas and 71 
kebeles on the Oromia side and 8 Woredas and 48 Kebeles on the Benishangul- 
Gumuz regional state side along nearly a thousand kilometers of borders of the 
Benishangul-Gumuz and Oromia regional states (Fufa, 2010).  
 
This has been complicated by the different views of the regional states about the 
necessity of regional border demarcations.  Evidence from the field visit suggests that 
on the one hand, the Benishangul-Gumuz regional administration is an advocate of 
border demarcation. It is widely believed that a demarcated border would enable the 
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regional authorities to maintain law and order
7
 . If there are clearly defined common 
borders between the regional states, people will be aware of the location of their 
residential areas and clear about which state laws they must abide by. Moreover, the 
demarcated borders will enable regional states to know where the boundaries of their 
own borders are and the confusion over the issue of land claim and counter claim 
should be significantly reduced
8
. Border demarcation also helps the regional state 
award investment licenses to investors, and controls the direct and indirect 
displacements of indigenous people and the illegal arms trade
9
. The Benishangul-
Gumuz regional state therefore considers border demarcation to be a crucial element 
in maintaining law and order.  
 The former President of the regional state, Ato Yaregal, explained: 
Both the Amhara and Oromia regional states have argued against border 
demarcation in some workshops. This may be due to the population pressure 
they have in their regional states. However, no one can settle in a place of his/ 
her preference without consideration of the law and order of the Benishangul-
Gumuz regional state. Mobility of people from one regional state to another 
regional state has to be done in a way that does not threaten the survival of the 
indigenous people.
10
 
 
On the other hand, evidence from the field visit to Amhara and Oromia regional states 
shows that both the Amhara and Oromia regional states have concerns about the 
                                                 
7
  All informants from the Benishangul-Gumuz regional state have emphasised the necessity of border 
demarcation to maintain law and order. 
8
 Interview notes,   Cabinet member of Benishangul-Gumuz regional state, Asossa, May 2008. 
9
 Interview notes, Cabinet member of Benishangul-Gumuz  regional state, Asossa, May 2008 
10
 Interview notes, Asossa,  May 2008 
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necessity of border demarcation
11
. Firstly, it is believed that demarcated borders could 
instigate further conflicts. This is because the highland people along the common 
borders of the Metekel and Kamashi zones normally subsidize their income by 
temporarily cultivating land and harvesting crops in the lowland areas, due to their 
geographical proximity. This was common practice long before the establishment of 
the regional states. However, when the regional states of Amhara, Oromia and 
Benishungul-Gumuz were established, this practice was not considered.  Bringing it 
to an end contributed to a shortage of land in the highland areas, and it has become a 
reason for the increasing number of internal immigrants to the Benishangul-Gumuz
12
.  
 
In addition, demarcated borders have become a source of conflict in some Kebeles of 
the Amhara and Afar regional states where local leaders want to limit the movement 
of people into their localities. Equally, border demarcation may not reduce the 
expansion of the highlanders towards the indigenous groups.  For example, in spite of 
the defined common borders between some Woredas of Benishangul-Gumuz and the 
Amhara regional states the Amharan and Agaw people are still moving from Dangur, 
Jawi and the Gangwa Woredas into the territories of Metekel, in search of fertile 
land.
13
  
 
Secondly, the Benishangul-Gumuz regional state and the Gumuz insist on border 
demarcation that focuses on ancestral residential areas as a major criterion, but this is 
impractical because settlement patterns have significantly changed in the common 
                                                 
11
 Interview notes, Department head at the Security and Administration Bureau of Amhara regional 
state, Bahardar, July, 2008;  Experts, Security and Administration Bureau of  Oromia regional state, 
June  2008 
12
 Ibid 
13
 This was confirmed by  a senior official of   the  Security and Administration Bureau of Amhara 
regional state, Addis Ababa, July 2008   
 286 
border areas over the last two decades. The Benishangul-Gumuz‟s criterion of border 
demarcation could therefore lead to inter-ethnic violent conflict. A senior officer from 
the Oromia Security and Administration office said: 
The Gumuz always say they were living in the gorges of the rivers because of 
the highlanders. Moreover, they claim every place that was inhabited by the 
Gumuz, despite their current settlement areas.  If that is an acceptable reason, 
we can claim Asossa. But this will be impractical and a source of conflict. 
14
 
 
Indeed, if the Benishangul-Gumuz regional state insists on border demarcation, the 
Oromia regional state will demand referenda.  This is because it is believed that a 
referendum would enable the regional state to consider the true views of the people.  
The Oromia regional state in fact asked the HOF in 2008 to conduct a referendum 
along the common borders of the two regional states
15
. 
 
The Benishangul-Gumuz regional state however strongly opposes referenda as a 
means of border demarcation because it believes that indigenous groups of the 
regional state were pushed out by Oromo over the last 18 years.  Moreover, the 
Oromia regional state resettled other Oromo, mainly from the Bale zone, in the 
controversial borders between the two regional states. Thus, many Kebeles of Oromo 
have already been established in the territories of Benishangul-Gumuz.  The fear is 
that the outcome of a referendum (in these common border areas) would lead to the 
approval of displacement of the indigenous groups from their ancestral lands.  
Benishangul-Gumuz believes border demarcation should be done using other factors, 
                                                 
14
 Interview notes,  Cabinet member of the Oromia  regional state, Addis Ababa, June 2008 
15
 A letter written to the House of Federation (HOF)   from the Cabinet of the Oromia regional state,  
21 May 2008(13
th
 of May 2000 E.C.)  
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including historical guidelines and the administrative ownership of the land during the 
four years of the transitional period after 1991
16
.  
 
 Recently, the House of Federation and the regional states have implicitly accepted 
that the referenda would not be effective in managing conflicts   along the common 
borders of the Benishangul- Gumuz and Oromia regional states.  This is because 
following the violent conflict between Oromo and Gumz in 2008, the HOF mediated 
demarcation of their borders through negotiation rather than referenda.  The two states 
established a joint committee and demarcated around 600 kilometers borders by 
consensus. However, most of the controversial territories along the Deddessa River, 
which were the causes of violence in 2008, have yet to be demarcated according to 
sources in the Benishangul- Gumuz regional government
17
.  
 
In some places, the ethnic groups have been living peacefully together. This has 
happened with Oromo and Mao in the Mao/ Komo special Woreda of Benishangul-
Gumuz and the Kelem zone of the Oromia regional state. But the variety of identities 
in this Woreda is also another problem that hinders border demarcation based on 
identity differences. Overall it is difficult to implement border demarcation in places 
where people with different identities live (Vaughan, 2007:40). It might be added that 
as neighbouring regional states argue movement from place to place is a basic 
constitutional right of citizens in the country (Article 32) any regional state policy of 
making mobility illegal is against the basic democratic rights of citizens. 
 
                                                 
16
 Interview notes, a Cabinet member of the Benishangul-Gumuz  regional state  Asossa, May 2008 
17
  Interview notes, Advisor to the speaker of the House of Representatives of the Benishangul- Gumuz 
regional state, April, 2011. 
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 All this indicates that the regional states have followed different directions to  foster 
their own regional interests. For example, there has been serious disagreement 
between the Oromia and Benishangul-Gumuz regional states with regard to the 
Mao/Komo special Woreda during the transitional period (1991-1994). The Mao 
Komo border was established by a referendum held in 1995, as a result of which the 
highland areas of Begi went to Oromia, and the lowland areas went to Benishangul-
Gumuz. However, the Benishangul-Gumuz authorities still think that the highland 
areas of Begi went to Oromia regional state because they were not politically and 
organisationally strong enough to campaign effectively during the referendum. On the 
other hand, the Oromia regional state is not still happy with the present arrangement, 
which places a large Oromo population, and small Mao and Komo groups, under 
Benishangul-Gumuz administration. The problem is manifested mainly by the 
establishment of overlapping administrations in the common border areas leading to 
violence (Vaughan, 2006). 
 
Similarly, the Gumuz, in the Metekel side of Benishangul-Gumuz regional state, 
considered their border stretched up to Metema and Welkayit. However, during the 
transitional period people in these places were forced to vote for the Amhara national 
regional State (ANRS), and the ANRS has moved a lot of settlers to the Metema area. 
During the transitional period the ANRS claimed some Woreda of Metekel and this 
sparked tension, which contributed to the violence of the mid 1990s (see below). 
Since then both regional states have discussed their problems and this has led to better 
relationships and clearer border demarcation between them. Nevertheless, research 
jointly conducted by both regional states in 2005 showed that migration and illegal 
resettlement from ANRS into Benishangul-Gumuz regional state had led to land 
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encroachment and systemic displacement of the Gumuz from their territories. In 
addition, the 1995 land distribution by the Amhara regional authorities effectively led 
to territorial expansion of the Amharan regional state because many Amhara were 
given certificates which guaranteed them the use of land in Gumuz territories. Unless 
continuing immigration, and the tendency of the Gumuz to retreat from their 
settlements, is better controlled it could become a cause of future conflict between the 
regional states
18
. 
 
The federal constitution enables the regional states to administer land and land 
resources (Article, 52).  It also allows for common borders between regional states to 
be defined on the basis of ethnicity. These factors have completely transformed the 
issue of land use between the highlanders and lowlanders along the common borders 
of the Benishangul-Gumuz and the neighbouring regional states. First, the local 
administrations of the neighbouring regional states tended to grab each other‟s land. 
This is because territorial expansion enables them to acquire more land, which, in turn, 
allows them to levy tax on land use and the use of land resources. Accordingly, the 
authorities of the Oromia regional state wanted to gain more land from the 
Benishangul-Gumuz regional state by claiming the residential areas of migrant 
Oromos. The Amhara regional state has also been reluctant to demarcate common 
borders in some places. It gave certificates of land use in some areas which were 
claimed by the Benishangul-Gumuz regional state. On the other hand, the 
Benishangul-Gumuz regional state also wanted to demarcate its territories on the basis 
of earlier settlement of the Gumuz people. This does not take into account changes in 
the settlement pattern that have occurred over the last 20 years. The regional state 
                                                 
18
 Interview notes, Head of Metekel Zone administration, Gilgelbeles, July 2008. 
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even attempted to return the so-called illegal immigrants from Metekel and Bambassi 
to their earlier settlement areas (Vaughan, 2006. Land use is not only an issue for 
local administrators; it also involves regional level administrators.  
 
The Dynamics of the International Frontier 
The violent conflict in the regional state is also associated with the dynamics of the 
frontier. As mentioned in Chapter Five the regional state shares common people
19
 and 
borders with Sudan. The Berta people are found in both Ethiopia and the Blue Nile 
province of Sudan. For example, many people in the Asossa zone send their children 
to school across the border. The area inhabited by the Gumuz people also stretches 
across the border into Sudan. For instance, the Gumuz in Guba of Metekel are closely 
related to the Sudanese Gumuz across the border, the majority of whom are now 
Arabic-speaking Muslims who have adopted many aspects of Sudanese culture 
(Vaughan, 2006). 
 
The common border between Ethiopia and Sudan, in the Benishangul-Gumuz 
regional state, is not well-controlled by either government. It has served as a base for 
insurgent movements and arms are traded across the borders. For example, the Guba 
Woreda in Metekel has been used as a crossing point for opposition armed groups 
moving from Sudan to Gojjam. It also served as a safe haven for EPRP fighters during 
the military regime. The international borders in the Asossa zone also served as an 
entry point for OLF fighters during the early period of the federalisation of Ethiopia, 
                                                 
19
 Both Berta and Gumuz ethnic groups live in Ethiopia and Sudan. 
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and for BPLM fighters until 2008. This uncontrolled common border is, in fact , a 
source of conflict in the Benishangul-Gumuz regional state
20
. 
 
 The dynamics of the frontier are also associated with geo-political factors.  The 
relationship between Sudan and Ethiopia and the domestic political factors in Sudan 
have greatly influenced the political situation and conflict in the regional state during 
the 1980s, 1990s and post-1998 (the Ethio-Eritrea war). 
  
During the military regime the Ethio-Sudan common borders in the Asossa zone were 
places of cross-border insurgent supported by both the Ethiopian and Sudanese 
governments.  As discussed in Chapter Eight after the military regime came to power 
in Ethiopia in 1974, the Benishangul People‟s Liberation Movement (BPLM) 
conducted insurgent activity in the Benishangul areas, against the military regime and 
with the  support of the Sudanese government, though they  did not become a 
significant threat. In turn, the military regime also supported the Sudan People‟s 
Liberation Army (SPLA), which made Gambella its base area and conducted 
insurgent activities against the Sudanese government from various places in Ethiopia, 
including Asossa, until it was expelled by the new EPRDF government in 
1991(Young, 1999).  In 1989 the EPLF forces came to Asossa through the Sudan 
borders, captured it from the military regime and turned it over to the OLF until the 
Derge regime recaptured it again. With the hostile relationship between the two 
countries, and the insurgent activities along the border, the Ethiopian government 
eventually used Asossa as a buffer zone (Young, 1999; Vaughan, 2006). 
 
                                                 
20
 Interview notes, Head of Metekel zone administration, Gilgelbeles, July 2008. 
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After the EPRDF came to power in Ethiopia in 1991, the dominating Islamic 
fundamentalism in the Sudanese government played a role in destablising the 
Beneshangul-Gumuz regional state.  The Sudanese government started operating in 
the area along with some of the factions of the BPLM.  Subsequently, the pro-
Sudanese faction within the BPLM demanded self-determination for Asossa and 
declared a Jihad against the government. This led to some military skirmishes. The 
Ethiopian government downgraded the diplomatic mission of Sudan in Ethiopia and 
closed Sudanese-affiliated NGOs which were operating in the state. It expelled from 
the state a number of alleged Sudanese agents who had been working as senior and 
lower ranking officials.  It also renewed its relationships with the SPLA, allow it to 
use Asossa as a spring-board to attack the military forces of Sudan. Despite this, 
BPLM terrorists continued to destabilise the area around Asossa until the beginning of 
1997 (Ibid). 
 
The regional state finally became relatively stable after the relationship between 
Ethiopia and Sudan normalised after 1998, and particularly after the Sudanese 
government signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement with the SPLA. Since then 
the regional state has become a member of the Border Commission, which operates 
with the Southern Sudanese regional government to promote the common trade and 
security interests of both countries. Many armed fighters of the BPLM received 
amnesty from the Ethiopian government and returned home in 2001/02 (Vaughan, 
2006). Nevertheless, BPLM still operates along the common borders of Sudan and 
Ethiopia, and has been supported by the Eritrean government since the Ethio-Eritrea 
war. It has attempted to destabilise the regional state several times. For example, it 
killed several people and burned a public bus near Kurmuck ,  a small town on the 
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border of Asossa and Southern Sudan, in 2008
21
.  This led to instability in the Berta 
political party, still a member of the regional state. The Vice President of the regional 
state was suspected of being connected to the BPLM and was caught leaving for 
Sudan
22
. 
 
 The existence of a refugee camp in the Assosa zone is another source of conflict 
associated with the frontier. The Sherkole refugee camp is located in Komosha 
Woreda and established in 1997 on some 600 hectares of land for refugees from as far 
away as Uganda, Rwanda and the Congo. It had 14,244 refugees in September 2006, 
mostly Sudanse Dinka but also Funji and Uduk (Vaughan, 2006). According to the 
Director of Refugee Affairs   of Ethiopia, since the peace agreement between the 
Sudanese government and the SPLA many Sudanese refuges have returned 
voluntarily to their country, and there were only around 5,000 refugees in the centre in 
August 2008. The main problem associated with refugee camps is that thier 
inhabitants get involved in different illegal activities, including growing, smoking and 
selling hashish. More important, as a major source of conflict is the environmental 
degradation caused by the refugees burning trees and brush, and killing wildlife in the 
area, leading to conflict with indigenous people. 
 
Possession of Small Arms 
The widespread possession of small arms is another factor contributing to the violent 
conflict along the common borders of the regional states. For example, the Federal 
Police confiscated 192 small arms and 725 other weapons immediately after the 
                                                 
21
 This incident happened  when I was  in the Benishangul-Gumuz  regional state  for data collection 
22
 Interview notes, President of the Benishangul- Gumuz regional state,  May 2008 
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violence between the Gumuz and Oromo in May 2008
23
. There are a number of 
reasons for the increase in small arms in the conflict areas. Firstly, the armed 
opposition parties (such as the OLF and EPRP) who fought against the military 
regime left weapons behind when they operated in the Kamashi, Asossa and Eastern 
Wallega areas (Vaughan, 2006). Secondly, the people who live along the common 
borders of the regional states have felt vulnerable to conflict since the transitional 
period, and they have acquired small arms to protect themselves. This is shown not 
only in the culture of the Gumuz people, who consider small arms possession a 
symbol of pride and accumulation of wealth
24
, but also within the Oromo and Amhara 
groups, who previously did not pay much attention to possession of weapons.  
 
 In addition, the open regional and international borders have created favourable 
conditions for an illegal small arms trade into the conflict areas. For example, Chagni 
in the Agawi zone of Amhara regional state and Gumba in the Metekel zone are 
centres of an illegal small arms trade, according to informants from the Federal 
Police
25
. Ayalew (2010) also noted that the flow of small arms across international 
borders is one of the reasons for the increase in small arms possession in the Bahrdar 
Woreda of Amhara regional state, which is a long way away from the international 
border. The small arms are mainly traded by smugglers, who take advantage of poor 
border control across the Woredas of the common borders of both countries. For 
example, the border at Guba is exceptionally remote and sparsely populated, with next 
to no infrastructure, which makes it difficult to control the small arms trade. The Guba 
and Mankush Woredas of the Metekel zone have seen a dramatic increase in the 
                                                 
23
 Federal Police Commission progress report on the violent conflict along the common borders of 
Benishungul-Gumuz and Oromia, Addis Ababa, June 2008 
24
 Interview notes, informant,  Mandura Woreda, July 2008  
25
 Interview notes, a senior officer from the main operations department of the Federal Police, Addis 
Ababa, June 2008 
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volume of ammunition being traded through the Wembera and Gilgelbelese. The 
capacity of the police and militia to control these activities is limited (Vaughan, 2006). 
 
 All this indicates that the causes of inter-regional conflict are not only associated with 
the federalisation of the state. Other reasons are associated with inherited historical 
factors, or related to cultural factors and the frontiers of the regional state, which 
require long-term socio-economic transformation and the building of a common 
national identity (federal identity) among the people of the neighbouring regional 
states to resolve. However, the main cause of conflict between Benishangul-Gumuz 
and the neighbouring regional states remains related to border issues, which in turn is 
embedded in the resource issues of the highlanders and territorial insecurity of the 
indigenous people. The following section discuses how these issues have been 
politicised, involving the lower and higher levels of administration, and have led to 
violent conflict before being managed by the institutions of the federal system. 
 
  Federalism and Management of Inter-regional Violent Conflict  
Whether the above causes of conflict led to violence has depended on the mechanisms 
and institutions of conflict management used in the conflict areas.  To explore this, we 
will examine two case studies of inter-regional conflict, which happened between 
Gumuz and Amhara between 1992-1994 and between Gumuz and Oromo in 2008. In 
particular, the examination will focus on the relationship of the conflict to their  basic 
causes, the heavy losses suffered by both sides and the extent to which the 
neighbouring regional states became involved as well as  the wider national impact of 
the development of conflict management institutions in the federal process. 
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The data for this part was collected from different sources, including documentary 
sources and the regional states institutions concerned. Contributions were also 
obtained from eyewitnesses, members of Parliament who investigated the causes of 
the conflict, the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission, the Federal Police, Ministry of 
Federal Affairs, the House of Federation and NGOs operating in the conflict areas. 
 
 Case One: The Violent Conflict between the Gumuz and Amhara 
The change of government in 1991 made significant changes to the state structure, 
allowing the Gumuz elite group to have a say in the politics of their localities. 
Accordingly, the Metekel region, which is inhabited mainly by Gumuz, became a 
zone administration and the Gumuz elite group became the key players within that 
administration. During the transitional period, border issues between the states of 
Benishangul-Gumuz and Amhara flared up. Accordingly, the Amhara regional state 
and the ANDM demanded that Dibate, Mandura and Pawe Woredas be included in its 
territory. However, this was seen by the political elite of Gumuz who were members 
of the BPLM, as a continuation of annexation of the Gumuz territories by the Amhara 
and Agew. The competitive stance of the ANDM and the BPLM, which were 
operating in Amhara and Benishangul-Gumuz respectively, complicated the situation 
in the common border areas of both regional states (Vaughan, 2007). 
  
During this situation, a member of the Gumuz ethnic group was killed by a settler 
during a ceremony commemorating the death of an elderly Gumuz man in 1992. The 
death was accidental, in fact, as it was caused by a bullet fired by the settler to show 
respect to the occasion according to the Gumuz tradition. Nevertheless, the accident 
sparked violent conflicts that continued until 1994 and claimed hundreds of lives 
 297 
along with the destruction of property and the displacement of thousands of people 
(Abbute, 2002: 249-251). 
 
Following this incident, the Gumuz suddenly attacked neighbouring settler villages on 
27 December 1991 and again on 28 December. They also attacked people in a market 
area used by settlers on September 11 1993. The settlers made a retaliatory attack on 
22 September 1993 and killed the local administrators of the Gumuz and the Shinasha, 
who were considered as the main organisers of the attacks against the settlers (Abbute, 
2002:252). It was after this development that the government intervened to stop the 
violence. 
Losses during the violence were documented by Berihun: 
329 persons were killed; and elders, children and disabled persons were burnt 
alive with their houses. A total of 6,833 rural houses, 185 Mosques that are 
made of grass roofs, one church, five elementary schools and a service co-
operative shop were burned during the conflict. About 1792 cattle and too 
many sheep and goats were looted. In addition, the harvest both stored at 
home and at the field was destroyed (Berihun, 1996:119 cited in Abbute, 
2002:249). 
 
 It was an accidental killing of a Gumuz man by a member of the settlers that ignited 
the grievances of the Gumuz into violence. The conflicting parties were quickly 
categorized as Gumuz and „others‟ that is the „black‟ (Tikur) colour on one side and 
the fair (key) colour on the other side (Abbute, 2002). Nevertheless, this did not mean 
that the conflict was ethnic, it was rather a manifestation of historical relationships 
inherited from the past (Mebratie, 2004:19). Moreover, it was the involvement of the 
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armed political parties that were operating in the areas that made the conflicts violent. 
According to an informant who was a member of the ANDM and was a zone 
administrator in the conflict area, members of the Gumuz ethnic group who were also 
members of the BPLM were engaged in mobilising the Gumuz by aggravating their 
territorial insecurity. They exploited the Gumuz‟s grievances of displacement which 
had occurred during the military regime resettlement programme in 1984. They also 
manipulated the historical land encroachments by neighbouring Amhara and Agaw 
people which displaced the Gumuz from their previous territories (Vaughan, 2006).  
 
The orginal grievances  were hardly  a sufficient  condition for  the violence, but  the 
ethnicity politics  of  the BPLM and the inability  of the  transitional  government  to 
manage  the conflicts  before they developed  into violence allowed  the grievances  to 
escalate  into violent conflict. The situation was complicated by the fact that the 
ANDM army was part of the transitional government defence forces. They found 
themselves in a dilemma over whether to act as a mediator or on behalf of the 
Amharas who had been attacked by the Gumuz
26
. In fact, according to Gumuz 
informants who were in Mandura Woreda during the violence, the ANDM army 
killed many Gumuz and Shinasha who were considered as organisers of the violent 
conflicts
27
. In other words the interests of the government and of the political parties 
became mixed because the role of political parties and government institutions were 
not clearly demarcated during the transitional period. 
 
 Since the outbreak of violent conflict between Amhara and Gumuz, 1992-1994, a 
number of measures have been taken to prevent any recurrence. Firstly, a combination 
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of legal and traditional means of conflict management has been used to maintain 
peace among the ethnic groups. According to Abbute (2002), this has been done by 
establishing multi-ethnic Councils of Elders along the bordering Woredas of Amhara 
and Benishangul-Gumuz. The Councils have had supportive sub-committees of elders 
in the respective peasant associations across the entire area affected. They have been 
assigned to restore peace and return looted property. Moreover, they disarmed illegal 
arms holders in co-ordination with the local authorities. All the activities of these 
Councils of Elders have been supervised by the ruling party, the EPRDF, and the local 
administration (Abbute, 2002:260-262). In addition, hostilities were assuaged 
according to the traditions of the Gumuz with the local administration providing oxen 
to be slaughtered during the reconciliation process (Ibid). 
 
Some administrative restructuring activities were undertaken which partly addressed 
the aggravating factors. The Pawe area became a special Woreda, directly accountable 
to the state of Benishangul-Gumuz and Muslims who lived in the borders between the 
Agawi zone and the Metekel zone became part of Agawi (Abbute, 2002: 260-262). 
The ruling party also recruited and trained a number of cadres to assume 
administrative positions with the specific task of dealing with the causes and solutions 
of the violence (Ibid). 
 
Finally, and importantly, activities started in the aftermath of the violence have 
continued as integral elements of leadership activity for lower administrative 
authorities. This has been done through the Peace Committees established at the zone 
administration, lower administration and Kebele levels, through reconciliation 
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activities whenever inter-ethnic homicides have occurred and by memos for economic 
and social cooperation between the two states
28
. 
 
 Interviews conducted in zone and other lower level administrations of Benishangul-
Gumuz and Amhara regional states, make it clear that the Peace Committees are 
basically established jointly by both the neighbouring zones
29
. This can be, for 
example, between the Agawi and Metekel zones within Amhara and Benishangul-
Gumuz, respectively. The peace committees include zone leaders, heads of the Police 
Commissions and other responsible people at zone levels. They are also established in 
the same way at Woreda level. However, at the level of the kebeles, they include local 
elders of the communities in addition to the kebele administrators
30
. 
 
The function of the Peace Committees at zone and Woreda level is focused on dealing 
with security matters, common border issues and common development activities. 
Accordingly, the zone level Peace Committees work together on common security 
and development issues and meet every six months to evaluate the progress made. 
They can organise inter-ethnic public conferences aimed at reconciliation if there has 
been recent violence. Similarly, the Woreda Peace Committees meet every month to 
evaluate the implementation process of their plans. The function of the Peace 
Committees at kebeles level is focused on prevention of conflict and reconciliation if 
there has been any homicide. In order to do this, they can organise reconciliation 
ceremonies between conflicting families. They also manage land use disputes 
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between the highlanders and the Gumuz. They meet regularly every 15 days to 
evaluate the security situation in their respective kebeles.
31
 
 
In addition, the sectors of the respective Peace Committees can meet either formally 
or informally to activate plans between regular meeting days. For example, when 
there are interethnic homicides both police forces from the neighbouring Woredas 
take responsibility for arresting suspects. At the same time, the lower level Peace 
Committees conduct reconciliation activities between families and communities in 
dispute.
32
 
 
The traditional reconciliation process can be arranged using public conferences in the 
neighbouring Woredas and kebekes if there are cases of violent conflict. Elders from 
the Woredas or kebeles are invited to a public meeting and swear not to resort to 
violence. At the same time, government authorities use the public conferences to 
address the issues of conflict to a wider audience. Several peace conferences for 
example have taken place in Gangwa and Dibate Woredas in both states. According to 
the Dibate and Gangwa Woreda administrations, harmonisation of legal measures and 
the traditional reconciliation processes have been the main factors that enabled the 
authorities to maintain law and order along their common borders.
33
 
 
Informants of the Ministry of Federal Affairs however suggest the public conferences 
have both advantage and disadvantage. The advantage is that they are useful to 
discuss the causes of conflicts, identify the initiators and maintain social connections 
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between the conflicted parties. On the other hand, they are conducted post-conflict 
and therefore do not provide any direct contribution to prevention of violence. 
Moreover, some of the agreements reached at peace conferences may be impractical 
because the people who participate in these meetings are few in number compared to 
the general population. There is always a chance that the decisions of the meetings 
may not reach to grass-roots level. Agendas are politically imposed and are not 
initiated by the local people. Above all, the meetings are expensive to conduct at 
Woreda and zone levels.
34
 
 
Efforts at regional cooperation have also been encouraged in both Amhara and 
Benishangul-Gumuz. Both states allocate budgets from their own resources. The 
budget is used to establish health centres, elementary schools and to extend rural 
roads that can be used by people along the common borders. The implementation of 
these common development activities is monitored by the regional leaders and the 
Peace Committees at zone level. Informants from both states confirm that these 
activities have significantly contributed to minimize conflicts because they have been 
focused on promotion of the common social interests of the people in the border areas. 
Moreover, Amhara regional state has helped Benishangul-Gumuz in various ways. 
For example, it constructed the Teacher Training College in Metekel, and trained 
police officers from the Metekel zone in the regional police training colleges
35
. 
 
According to informants from Dibate Woreda in Metekel and Gungwa Woreda in 
Agawi, this co-operation has helped in creating good relationships between the 
neighbouring people of both Woredas. First, common social services such as health 
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centres and schools have created common ownership and better interactions between 
people of the two states. According to Abbute (2002), students who had studied in the 
common schools played a pivotal role in bringing conflicting parties to reconciliation 
during the 1992-1994 conflicts. Second, the support provided by Amhara to 
Benishangul-Gumuz has helped enhance the capacity of the Metekel local 
administration which, in turn, has contributed to the state‟s capacity for conflict 
management. 
 
As a result, violent inter-ethnic conflict has been kept under control in the common 
borders areas. There have been no significant inter-ethnic violent conflicts that have 
involved either the regional or federal forces, and when there have been homicides 
that could lead to inter-ethnic conflicts, the local administrations have kept control. 
The process is enforced by integrating law and order with traditional means of 
conflict management, and this has created a sense of security in the communities of 
the two states
36
. 
 
Second, the encouragement of common plans and activities between the lower level 
administrative authorities has created good understanding of each other, a common 
understanding of the border issues and a sense of common accomplishments. For 
example, both the lower administrative hierarchies resolve land-use conflicts by a 
win-win approach. Instead of confronting each other by land claim and counter-claim, 
they utilize the land in a way which will benefit the two conflicting parties. Moreover, 
regardless of the higher authorities‟ opinion on border demarcation, the Woreda 
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administrations of Gungwa and Dibate Woerdas, for example, believe that further 
demarcation can minimize conflicts along their common borders.
37
 
 
The above conflict management process between the Benishangul-Gumuz and 
Amhara regional states shows the extent to which federalisation of the state was 
necessary to reverse the historical conflicts between Gumuz and Amhara people. 
Unless  the Gumuz  had been made to administer themselves, it  would have been 
unthinkable for the Gumuz   to have  local institutions such  as the zone  and  Woreda 
administrations and the  police institutions which  have created favourable  conditions  
to present their agendas  in intergovernmental  relationships. The federalisation of the 
state was the precondition for the win-win approach to conflict management between 
Amhara and Gumuz.  Of course a unitary state also can create these kinds of 
institutions, as the unitary state of UK devolved power to Scotland, Northern Ireland 
and Wales. However, the unitary state in Ethiopia did not attempt to devolve power at 
any point.  Nor is the power devolved by a unitary state to lower units entrenched 
through constitutional means, whereas power devolution in federal states is protected 
through constitutional means and cannot be easily amended (Kings, 1982).. 
 
 At the same time, the federal structure has never been enough for a win-win approach 
of conflict management between Gumuz and Amhara. Restraint from using ethnicity 
by both the Amhara and Gumuz administrations in the issues of land use and inter-
ethnic homicides has also contributed to the effectiveness of the conflict management 
institutions of the regional states. In addition, the regional administrations invented 
additional conflict management institutions such as the peace committees, integrate 
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the legal and traditional conflict management institutions. Regional institutions gave a 
focus to promote regular contact between the ethnic groups by investing in common 
social services like clinics and rural roads which   are used by all ethnic groups in the 
border areas. All this contributed significantly to the stability in the common borders 
of the regional states. 
 
It does not mean that the relationships between the regional states have been entirely 
smooth since 1994. As discussed earlier, there are always tensions arising from the 
historical and cultural relationships of the people in the regional states. Moreover, 
continuous internal migration of people from the Amhara regional state to the Metekel 
zone and the unmarked common borders between some Woredas of the Dangela and 
Agawe zones in Amhara and the Metekel zone in Benishangul-Gumuz continue to 
create tensions between the regional states which require regular co-operation and 
negotiations between the authorities of both regional states. 
  
Case Two: The Violent Conflict between the Gumuz and Oromo 
The violent conflict between the Gumuz and the Oromo happened in 2008, along the 
common borders of Belojeganfoy and Sasiga Woredas from the states of 
Benishangul-Gumuz and Oromia, respectively. Historically, the people along the 
common borders of the two states have not been involved in violence, but since the 
establishment of the regional states some issues that might cause violent conflict have 
emerged. After the establishment of the states, the two states tended to expand their 
territories towards each others‟ borders. For example, according to the informants 
from the Parliament, Oromia conducted resettlement programmes in places that were 
claimed by Benishangul-Gumuz. Moreover, both states established local 
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administrations according to residential settlements of ethnic groups, and 
administrative overlap occurred in places where the ethnic groups intermingled.
38
 
According to a study by experts from the Oromia regional state, administration 
overlap occurred in a number of Woredas including between Sasiga and Bolegangofy 
and between Haro limu and Yaso Woredas of Oromia and Benishangul-Gumuz 
regional states respectively. This contributed to the outbreak of conflict in May 2008. 
  
There are also some places administered by Oromia that have been claimed by 
Benishangul-Gumuz. For example, the Kebeles of the former Deddessa Agricultural 
Development Center (DADC), which are currently administered by Oromia, are 
claimed by Benishangul-Gumuz. According to the informants from Benishangul-
Gumuz, when the military regime started modern farming and a military training 
centre in Deddessa, the people displaced were Gumuz, but following the 
establishment of the modern farms other people, mainly Oromos, moved in
39
. On the 
other hand, informants from Oromia said that both Gumuz and Oromo had been 
displaced when the modern farming and military training centre were established. 
However, the reason that the transitional government gave these places to Oromia was 
because, when the farming centre was closed after the change of government in 1991, 
the people who were living there were Oromos
40
. 
 
In relation to these problems, relationships between the local administrations of both 
states have polarised since the transitional period, leading to similar developments 
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between the local people along the common border areas. The result was  violent 
conflicts in 1994 and 2007
41
. 
 
Following the 2007 conflict both regional states agreed in a meeting called by the 
Ministry of Federal Affairs in May 2007 (May 1999 E.C) to resolve their problems. 
The two regional governments established a joint committee that was meant to 
produce a report and recommendations about issues along the common borders.
42
 The 
regional states agreed to bring to justice suspects who had participated in the previous 
conflicts. However, the joint committee could not agree on the issues to be included in 
their report; as a result, the committee disintegrated and conducted separate studies, in 
which each accused the other. Nor did either state manage to bring anyone to justice 
before the 2008 conflicts erupted
43
. 
 
 Evidence from the field visit suggests that the trouble began when Gumuz and 
Oromo labourers quarrelled and two Oromos attacked two Gumuz with a knife in 
Village 4 of Horowota Kebele, Sasiga Woreda of Eastern Wellega on 3 May 2008 (25 
April 2000 E.C.)
44
 The Oromia local administration took the victims to Nekemte 
Hospital for further treatment and arrested the offenders, but released them on bail 
later. Rumours circulated in the neighbouring Gumuz kebeles that the victims had not 
been treated well in Nekemte Hospital and the attackers had also been released. So, 
the Belojeganfoy Woreda administration took the victims away from Nekemte 
Hospital as a sign of its discontent with the Oromia Woreda administration
45
. 
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Then the Gumuz suddenly attacked Village 4 on 17 May 2008 (9 May 2000 E.C). 
Armed Gumuz, including police, militia and others with military expertise, 
participated in the attack. They killed and injured many Oromos and destroyed the 
village. The Oromia regional anti-riot police and Woreda Police counter-attacked 
neighbouring Gumuz villages five hours later, killing and injuring many Gumuz and 
destroying their villages.
46
 Overall, 171 people were killed and 62 were injured during 
the attack and counter-attack. Some 1650 houses were set on fire and around 48,976 
people were displaced, according to Federal Police sources
47
. 
 
 According to members of Parliament who investigated the case, no attempt was made 
to follow the principles of cooperation between the regional and local level 
administrations to manage the conflict following the original incident
48
. Different 
reasons for this can be put forward. First, polarised relationships between the lower 
administrations contributed to the violence. For example, although Peace Committees 
were established after the 2007 conflict, they were not operational due to the lack of 
co-operation. Moreover, the stigma of cultural inequalities between the lower level 
administrations in general and the tendency of the Oromia lower administration to 
undermine their Gumuz equivalents along with the internalization of this by the 
Gumuz administration also played a role in the trouble
49
. 
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Equally, regardless of the agreement reached by the two regional states to bring 
criminal suspects from the 2007 conflicts before the courts, no-one had been arrested. 
Indeed, according to the members of Parliament who investigated the case the 
individuals who participated in those troubles had been protected by thier respective 
regional states. This, in turn, made the reconciliation activities carried out after the 
2007 violence meaningless
50
. 
 
Third, the regional administrations were at least negligent and at worst participatory 
in the conflict in 2007. For example, when no criminal suspects were arrested in the 
respective regional states, the regional authorities did not look into the problem even 
after the joint research committee disintegrated, neither regional state attempted to 
sort out the reasons. As a result, the split in the research committee was, by itself, one 
of the contributing factors in subsequent outbreak of violence in 2008
51
.  
 
There was plenty of scope for the authorities of the regional states to have become 
involved in the problem. For example, although all the Benishangul-Gumuz regional 
authorities who participated in interviews for this research denied that they had been 
informed about the Gumuz preparations to attack the neighbouring Oromos, some of 
the preparations included open recruitment of personnel and military training.
52
 On 
the Oromia side, the counter attack was made by regional anti-riot police, who are 
clearly accountable to the regional authorities. It is clear both regional authorities 
either ignored or were participants in the violence. 
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 Certainly, the lower level administrations as well as local security forces of both 
regional states were participants. Their relationship was already polarised due to land 
claims and counter-claims between them, and the Belojeganfoy Woreda 
administration and police fully participated in organising the armed men who attacked 
the Oromos. The neighbouring Oromia Woreda administration and police also 
participated in the counter-offensive along with the regional anti-riot police. This 
certainly made the cost of the violence higher than it would  otherwise have been, 
especially since there were no common security or development activities in a 
position  to  minimize the impact of the  polarised relationships
53
. 
 
 The violence between Gumuz and Oromo shows that the federal structure by itself 
simply cannot manage violent conflicts. It also demonstrates that unless regional and 
local administrations restrain themselves from using ethnicity politics the structure 
itself can instigate violent conflicts. The historical relationship between Oromo and 
Gumuz was not known for violent conflict.  The relationship between the Oromos and 
the Gumuz in Wallega was good in the early 19
th
 century following a pact between 
Moreda Bakere, who was the ruler of north Wallega, and the Gumuz (Shankila).  
When many Gumuz fled to Wallega, due to the problems they encountered in 
Southern Gojjam, they were offered protection by Moreda. Though later the son of 
Moreda, Dejazmach Gebreezehaber, conducted slave raids that made the Gumuz 
move to the lower levels of the Diddessa valley which runs into the Blue Nile.  
Overall, however, the relationship between Oromo and Gumuz remained essentially 
nonviolent when compared to the relationship of the Gumuz and the Amhara (James, 
1986:130).  It was after the federalisation of the state that the cycle of violence began 
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because the federal process was not supported by co-operative intergovernmental 
relationships promoting commonness between the ethnic groups.  
 
The case study of conflict management between Benishangul-Gumuz and Amhara 
demonstrates that interregional co-operation and common institutions, such as joint 
Peace Committees, joint Research Committees, public conferences and   joint 
development activities, can play a significant role in managing interregional conflict.  
They are influential because of widespread co-operative motivation, at all levels of 
administration. On the other hand, the case study of violent conflict between Gumuz 
and Oromos demonstrates that hostilities between the lower levels of administration 
render the mechanisms of co-operation between them non-existent. As a result, the 
possibility of violent conflict between neighbouring peoples increases. So, whether 
inter-regional violence can be managed or not depends largely on the level of co-
operation which exists between the different levels of administration, and the 
mechanisms and institutions of conflict management which can be utilised. 
 
 The Role of Intergovernmental Relationships  
As discussed elsewhere, the overall federal arrangement has been able to manage 
protracted conflicts between the indigenous people and the neighbouring dominant 
ethnic groups. This was achieved by enabling the indigenous groups to establish their 
regional state and participate equally in federal institutions. However, whether this 
comprehensive federal approach to conflict management can fully address the 
conflicts that may arise during the federalisation process depends on 
intergovernmental relationships (Simeon, 2007). 
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 Intergovernmental relationships between the regional states of Benishangul-Gumuz, 
Amhara and Oromia have become informal, focussing on bilateral meetings between 
the regional leaders, sometimes mediated by the House of Federation. For example, 
both the Benishangul-Gumuz and Amhara regional governments have had several 
meetings resulting in common consensus on some issues, the drawing up of memos of 
co-operation and the establishment of joint committees. Similarly, both Benishangul-
Gumuz and Oromia attended bilateral meetings in 2007 called by the Ministry of 
Federal Affairs. Following this, there were meetings of both regional governments 
that resulted in the establishment of joint committees along their common borders. 
These inter-governmental relationships between the regional states were not, as such, 
supported by institutional mechanisms and binding agreements.
54
 
 
The intergovernmental relationships in fact focused on joint committees of the lower 
level administrations. These can be categorised as Peace and Research Committees, 
essentially informal institutions, which are established by the neighbouring zones, 
Woredas and Kebeles.  As already noted, they have a significant role in maintaining 
law and order.  There are also Research Committees, joint teams established for 
specific, temporary purposes. For example, Benishangul-Gumuz and Amhara states 
established joint Research Committees in 2005 and 2007, aimed at studying the 
reasons for conflict along their common borders
55
. Similarly, both Benishangul-
Gumuz and Oromia established joint Research Committees in 2008 aimed at sorting 
out the problems along their common borders
56
. 
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Federal institutions such as the House of Federation, Parliament or the Ministry of 
Federal Affairs can intervene in managing inter-regional state conflicts. The House of 
Federation can arbitrate in common border issues when invited by the regional states 
concerned and can budget subsidy allocations. Parliament can also intervene through 
its powers of legislation and through the Human Right Commission when there are 
human rights violations. The Ministry of Federal Affairs can intervene through the 
Federal Police and its responsibility to support the emerging regional states. The 
Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development can also influence regional states‟ 
affairs by its authority to formulate agricultural and natural resources development 
policies. Finally, the Prime Minister can intervene if there are serious security threats 
that have grown beyond local capacity or when there are serious human rights 
violations (Proclamation No.359/2003). 
 
Indeed, the Prime Minister‟s office made decisions on some places in dispute between 
the states of Amhara and Benishangul-Gumuz during the transitional period, in 
January 1995.  This was because neither the central institutions that should have taken 
the decisions on inter-regional issues during the transitional period nor the regional 
institutions were well established. 13 Kebeles from Dibate and 17 Kebeles from 
Dangur Woredas were incorporated into Amhara and others into Benishangul-
Gumuz
57
. Similarly, the Kebeles on the former Dedessa state farm were allocated to 
the Oromia regional state
58
.  
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The extent to which the decision considered the territorial issues and ethnic politics in 
the areas is unclear. Whether the decision was influenced by representatives of the 
dominant ethnic groups also requires further investigation. Certainly, the authorities 
of the Benishangul-Gumuz regional state complained that the decision makers did not 
consult the local people and that the decision was not supported by any thorough 
study of the territorial issues of the indigenous people
59
.  As a result, the claim of 
Benishasgul-Gumuz to these Kebeles still continues and, in fact, this was one of the 
contributing factors to the violence along the Kamashi and Eastern Wellega borders in 
2008. 
 
The federal institutions do not practice institutionalised relationships with the regional 
states, For example, regardless of the violent conflicts between the Oromia and 
Benishangul-Gumuz regional states, the HOF never intervened until 2007. This is 
because, according to the speaker from the HOF, it has never been invited either by 
Oromia or Benishangul-Gumuz. As an alternative, after the 2007 conflicts the HOF 
invited both Presidents of the regional governments to discuss the issues
60
. 
Accordingly, the regional Presidents agreed to sort out the problems in their own 
ways. The priorities of the HOF were actually with the conflicts between Oromia and 
the states of Somali and the Southern Region. The Ministry of Federal Affairs also did 
nothing except mediate between the regional Presidents to resolve the violence
61
. 
 
There are various reasons for the lack of institutionalised intergovernmental 
relationships. Interviews of informants from the Oromia regional state suggest that for 
the authorities of the Oromia regional state the border issues between Oromia and 
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Benishangul-Gumuz were less of a priority compared with the problems with the 
Somali and Southern regional states
62
. Although the authorities of Benishangul-
Gumuz have made several efforts to sort out the border issues with Oromia, the 
efforts of the federal government to realise the constitutional rights of the emerging 
regional states remain minimal. Moreover, the socio-economic problems of the 
regional states are hardly understood by the federal government. Overall, 
intergovernmental relationships have focused on urgent and short term issues rather 
than long term issues
63
. 
 
There is also a belief that the smaller regional states like Benishangul-Gumuz do not 
have an institutional mechanism that enables them to be heard at the federal level. 
This is because the institutions of conflict management are dominated by people from 
the highland areas. For example, the HOF has been under the control of Oromos since 
its establishment in 1995. The Federal Ministerial Cabinet is also dominated by 
people from Amhara, the South, Oromia and Tigray. As already noted, Benishangul-
Gumuz does not have any representation on the executive body
64
. 
 
This situation has led to two problems. Firstly, as the people in authority at the 
executive level are mainly from the highland areas, they have less understanding 
about issues affecting the indigenous groups of Benishagul-Gumuz. This can be 
clearly seen in the agricultural policies designed by the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Rural Development. The budget allocations made to the regional states demonstrates 
this relationship between the smaller regional states and federal institutions. The 
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budget subsidy to the regional states is allocated according to the criteria of 
population size, development level and the ability of the regional state to collect tax 
revenues (Addis Fortune, 2008). However, in the 2006 budget year the federal 
government gave 61% weight to population size, which benefited the bigger regional 
states and resulted in a smaller recurrent budget, which was in fact insufficient to pay 
salaries in the smaller regional states
65
. 
 
Secondly, this has resulted in a lack of trust in the federal institutions amongst the 
smaller regional states. For example, Benishangul-Gumuz does not trust the HOF, and 
the regional state authorities wrote several letters to the Oromia regional state and 
copied
66
 them to the Ministry of Federal Affairs, which they consider neutral in 
comparison to the House of Federation
67
. The HOF solution for border disputes 
causes difficulties for the Benishangul-Gumuz authorities. This is because it 
supported a referendum as the solution for border disputes between Somali and 
Oromia states and between Oromia and the Southern regional states.  This was, 
however, an acceptable solution for the authorities of Benishangul-Gumuz state in 
their border disputes with Oromia
68
. 
 
By contrast, the team leader of federal issues at the Ministry of Federal Affairs has 
noted that the necessity of institutionalised inter-governmental relationships has not 
been well understood at all levels of the government
69
. The result is that the role of 
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the federal institutions in preventing violent conflicts has become reactive rather than 
proactive. Their intervention is not supported by early warning mechanisms. If there 
were such mechanisms, the immediate causes of and preparations for violent conflict 
could be detected and analysed, as is done by IGAD‟s Protocol on Conflict  Early 
Warning and Response mechanism (CEWARN) along the common borders of Kenya 
and Ethiopia (Apuuli, 2004:176). Moreover, the support of the Ministry of Federal 
Affairs to the Benishangul-Gumuz regional state has become a fire-fighting approach 
instead of producing capacity development activities that could address the special 
needs of the state. The result has been that the advisors sent by the federal government 
to the regional state not only lack the required capacity but do not have a clear 
mission
70
. 
 
The Impact of the Federalisation of the State on Regional Conflict Management 
Some commentators associate violent conflict in the regional state directly with the 
federalisation of the state.  For example, Abbute believes the violent conflict in 
Metekel in 1992 was caused by the ethnic character of the political system (2002:262), 
it has been argued that  the attempt to define regional common borders, on the basis of 
ethnic primordial ties, created problems in defining the mixed residential places of the 
ethnic groups and the administrative boundaries of the regional states (Kefale, 
2004,2008), and that  this led to violent conflict between neighbouring ethnic groups, 
including the Oromo and the Gumuz, who did not have any  protracted violent 
conflicts  previously. 
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In fact this is hardly the case. The Gumuz were involved in violent conflict from the 
medieval period to the fall of the military regime. The Gumuz were forced into 
slavery and were forcibly displaced from their territories, and in response the Gumuz 
made counter attacks, though they suffered heavy losses during the medieval period 
(Pankhurst, 1997, Mebratie, 2004; 66).  They also killed a chief who administered 
them during the Haile Selassie regime (Mebratie, 2004:74). It is clear that the 
violence of 1992 actually reflected aspects of the protracted violence in the region. 
 
The new phenomenon that has happened since 1991 is that the Gumuz have been able 
to control government institutions and resources that were denied them for centuries. 
As a result, the Gumuz have not been displaced from their settlements, despite the 
violent conflicts that have occurred since they started to participate in government 
institutions. For example, they were not permanently displaced by the violent conflict 
in Metekel in 1992
71
. The reason for this is the existence of the federal government, 
which could and did intervene as a neutral institution, and the existence of the 
regional state that could act on behalf of the Gumuz.  
 
The basic territorial issues that can lead to violence are similar along the Benishangul-
Gumuz borders with the Amhara and the Oromia regional states.  However, the 
violent conflict has been well managed in the relationship of the Amhara and the 
Benishangul-Gumuz regional states for more than 16 years. As a result, the Gumuz 
people have been able to maintain peaceful relationships with the Amhara since 1994. 
If the ethnic nature of the federal system had been the main source of violence, the 
conflict between the Gumuz and the Amhara would have continued.   It is therefore 
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local governments and traditional elders. 
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clear that the federal arrangement can bring reconciliation between historically 
polarised ethnic groups as has happened between the Amhara and the Gumuz. 
 
 Of course, if the existence of an ethnic differentiation between ethnic groups is a 
social phenomenon, accepting their ethnic identity can also mean political 
empowerment for the ethnic groups. This can create a strong autonomy that fosters 
real integration of diversities which can maintain peaceful relationships between the 
differentiated identity groups, on the basis of mutual respect and tolerance (Fleiner, 
2007:57). In other words, if the ethnic groups are not politically empowered, the state 
becomes a suppressing machine, as happened to the indigenous groups of 
Benishangul-Gumuz before they established their regional state.   This means that 
unless there is an institutional arrangement, in which the ethnic groups can define 
themselves, partnership based co-operation cannot be established. Majeed et al 
explains this: 
Only when the diversities can define themselves and build on their proper self-
consciousness are they able to co-operate on a partnership basis with other 
diversities and thus contribute to the added value of the common nation 
(2007:57). 
 
This kind of relationship between the state and the identity groups has been relevant 
in the Benishangul-Gumuz regional state where group and individual rights have 
become two sides of the same coin.  In other words, for the indigenous groups of 
Benishangul-Gumuz, group rights are directly related to individual rights. This means 
the economic and cultural survival of an individual is related to the existence of the 
community, sub-clan and clans. Moreover, the ethnic cohesion of the indigenous 
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groups is also high, due to the hostile historical relationship with the highlanders 
(Mebratie, 2004).  Federalism that defines state relationships on the basis of ethnic 
identity can therefore address the issues of the indigenous groups because its aim is to 
recognise their group identities and make them feel empowered in their territories 
(Hawkes, 2001:159). This can create a condition conducive to the evolution of 
democratic institutions in the context of the ethnic groups. 
 
The federalisation of the state has also reversed the marginalisation of the indigenous 
groups which developed during the unitary state. It has enabled them to participate in 
federal and regional political institutions, and in the regional Civil Service. Moreover, 
the resource-sharing mechanisms of the federal government have also played a 
significant role in benefiting the indigenous groups in relation to delivery of social 
services and the infrastructure development of the country
72
. In addition, the resource-
sharing mechanisms have enabled them to establish and run regional institutions (such 
as the regional and Woreda administrations, the police, and schools and colleges), 
which contribute to enhancing the dignity and capacity of the people and to enabling 
them to play an equal role, as partners of the other ethnic groups, in the political 
affairs of the country. 
 
However, other factors can still mean that referendum and border demarcation on the 
basis of ethnic identities may lead to protracted and violent conflict. Firstly, although 
the ethnic groups in the neighbouring regional states have their own residential areas, 
they still live together along the common borders. This is true for the Oromos and the 
Gumuz in the Kamashi zone and for the Agaw and the Gumuz in the Metekel zone. 
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Secondly, in some places, mainly in the Mao/ Komo special Woreda, there is a mix of 
Mao and Oromo identities, due to intermarriage
73
. Neither referendam nor border 
demarcation on the basis of ethnic identity are useful for peaceful conflict 
management in places where ethnic groups live together.  
 
The federalisation of the state also created a favourable environment for the 
emergence of formal and informal local conflict management institutions. For 
example, according to informants from the lower level administrations in 
Benishangul-Gumuz and Amhara regional states, the co-ordinated activities of 
regional police institutions and courts play a significant role in preventing inter-
regional violent conflict
74
. Other informal institutions such as Peace Committees play 
a similar role. Moreover, the emergence of these formal and informal institutions has 
counteracted the weakness of the traditional conflict management institutions, which 
were used to maintain the status quo but which have not stopped the homicides that 
led to inter-ethnic violence. 
 
Overall, however, there can be no doubt that the effectiveness of the regional and 
local institutions of conflict management depends on the attitudes and ambitions of 
the evolving ethnic-based elite groups. The ethnic-based elite groups in Ethiopia first 
emerged as significant political forces during the Haile Selassie regime. The 
suppressive policy of the military regime ultimately led to armed ethnic-based 
movements that eventually caused the regime‟s collapse in 1991 and the subsequent 
political empowerment of ethnic-based elites (Mengistab, 1997; Young, 1998).  This 
was reinforced by the federal and regional constitutions which encouraged greater 
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participation of members of the ethnic groups in federal, regional and local political 
institutions. As a result, members of ethnic-based elite groups got direct access to 
public institutions and resources, such as the regional police and budget. In parallel to 
this, the expansion of education enabled the ethnic groups to participate in the Civil 
Service, which, in turn, enabled them to recruit more members from their respective 
ethnic groups. It is in the last 18 years of the federal experiment that the ethnic-based 
elite groups have emerged as significant political players in the country. 
 
This has played different roles in promoting ethno-national and regional interests, 
depending on the historical relationships between the ethnic groups. For example, the 
goal of the Benishangul-Gumuz elites has been influenced by a desire to have their 
ethnic identity recognised, and their rights to their territories accepted, by their 
neighbours
75
. They have used all their regional capacities, created by federalisation of 
the state, to attain this goal.  By contrast, nationalism for the Oromos is not only an 
assertion of rights. It also has elements of domination, which are reflected by a desire 
to expand their territories into the lands of the indigenous groups
76
. This is certainly 
the ambition of the lower level administrations along the common border areas
77
. 
Ethnic-based federalism has encouraged ethnic-based resource competition, and this 
certainly led to violent conflict at times. 
 
Nevertheless, as discussed in the case studies, federalisation of the state has also 
created an enabling environment for the regional states to define their common 
                                                 
75
  A number of the regional state informants have reflected that their concern is lack of recognition to 
their territories and lack of equal access to the regional state apparatus, by neighbouring regional states. 
76
  As an informant from the Oromia regional state noted, the ambition is also   driven from the 
competition the Oromos have with Amharans in influencing the small ethnic groups in the territories of 
Benishangul-Gumuz regional state. 
77
 Interview notes, Member of Parliament,  Addis   Ababa,  June  2008 
 323 
economic, social and security interests. This has been done, for example, by the 
Amhara and Benishangul-Gumuz, in the sharing of local plans for development, 
jointly implemented in the common border areas
78
. It can therefore lead the regional 
states into greater co-operation, which, in turn, could enhance the federal identity of 
citizens. 
 
Conclusion 
There are some necessary conditions for the outbreak of violent conflict such as 
unfavourable historical relationships, cultural inequalities and border disputes 
between neighbouring ethnic groups. However, the case studies presented here reveal 
that these factors by themselves are not sufficient conditions for violence. Whether 
the basic sources of conflict will translate into violence depends on the degree of 
inter-governmental co-operation and the efforts made to maintain law and order. In 
places where there are multi-ethnic communities, if the regional and other lower level 
administrations show serious co-operation and if they jointly attempt to maintain law 
and order, then they cannot only control violent conflicts but can also lay down a 
favourable basis for transforming the basic causes of these conflicts. This is because 
inter-governmental relationships cannot only facilitate peaceful coexistence between 
various peoples but can also support evolving civil societies that, in turn, promote 
common accomplishments through the provision of common public goods. The 
relationship between the Amhara and Benishangul-Gumuz regional states 
demonstrates this conclusion. 
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The case study of violent conflicts between the Oromos and the Gumuz also confirms 
the extent to which polarised inter-governmental relationships can instigate inter-
ethnic violent conflicts. Involvement of the lower level administrations in conflicts, 
lack of accountability at all levels of the regional administrations, and lack of law and 
order have  all contributed to the eruption of violence. In other words, although the 
basic causes of conflict are similar in both case studies, the involvement of the lower 
administrations in conflicts and lack of accountability of the regional administrators 
have played a significant role in creating violent conflicts between the Gumuz and 
Oromos.  
 
In the last resort, whether a federal arrangement can sucessfuly address the sources of 
violent conflicts depends on the extent to which federal, regional and local inter-
governmental relationships promote federal co-operation and are accountable for the 
actions they take. Maintaining law and order, particularly the ability of the lower 
administrations to bring people who aggravate violent conflicts to justice, and 
undertaking reconciliation activities between conflicted families and communities 
significantly contributes to promoting peace which, in turn, creates favourable 
conditions to deal with the sources of conflict. 
 
The federal arrangement can never resolve all the causes of conflict in the regional 
state. Other factors, such as geopolitical configurations, affect the nature of regional 
conflict. Inevitably, the relationship between Sudan and Ethiopia, and the political 
stability of South Sudan, greatly affect the stability of the Benishangul-Gumuz 
regional state. This underlines the fact that the federal arrangement must be supported 
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by inter-state cooperation and diplomatic efforts to reach the goal of sustainable 
conflict management. 
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Chapter Ten 
Conclusion 
The questions this research set out to answer were whether federalism has created an 
enabling environment to manage the sources of conflict in Ethiopia, and what   
explained the conflicts in the Benishangul-Gumuz regional state and the federal 
response to their management. The conclusions also relate the findings of the research 
to national and theoretical issues of federalism which offers a comprehensive 
approach to conflict management. 
 
Federalisation of the state was a necessary step for the integrity of the country during 
the early 1990s.  Although Ethiopia is a country of many ethnic groups, the previous 
nation state building project aimed at homogenising and imposing one language and 
culture on all citizens. As a result, ethno-national movements, which called for self-
rule and secession, became the main resistance groups, eventually overthrowing the 
military regime in 1991. Federalisation of the nation-state, which included recognition 
of regional self-rule and equal participation of ethnic groups in federal shared 
institutions, meant civil war had to be curbed, in order to maintain, or re-establish, the 
integrity of the country.  
 
  Here, however, I argued that there are some problems in the relationship between the 
current federal structure and the historic trajectories of the Ethiopian state. The 
Ethiopian state became unitary and gave priority to building an Ethiopian identity 
more than a hundred years ago. Some consider themselves as Ethiopians only rather 
than as members of any specific ethnic group.  The Ethiopian constitution however 
proposes that every citizen must define him/herself as a member of one or other ethnic 
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groups. It excludes persons who do not want to define themselves as members of any 
ethnic group for whatever reason. This has lead to the use of language criteria for 
defining the ethnic groups and their administrative boundaries in places where it is not 
always appropriate to do so.  It has also led ethnic groups into identity-based or 
resource-based conflicts; and encouraged the tendency to try to gain land from each 
other.  The violent conflicts between Oromos and Gumuz in the common borders of 
the regional states can be partly explained in this respect.  The imbalance between 
citizenship and group rights remain a potential problem that can lead to violence and 
undermine the legitimacy of the federal system.  
 
In addition to drawing attention to this constitutional drawback, the study emphasises 
the necessity for federal co-operation in situations where an emerging ethnic-based 
elite group has become a significant political player. The emergence of ethnic-based 
elite groups creates a wider space for ethnic-based competition over resources, power 
and recognition. This is particularly the case where the basis of the relationship is 
ethnicity politics promoting ethnic differences for the purpose of controlling the 
patrimonial state resources. In other words, unless other mechanisms are employed 
encouraging federal and inter-regional co-operation, competition between the ethnic-
based elite groups can challenge and undermine the legitimacy of the federal system. 
However, the emergence of ethnic-based elite groups is not a threat in itself.  Indeed, 
it can be a source of stability if relationships between the elite groups are guided 
towards partnership and co-operation, as is happening in countries like the Philippines 
and Belgium. In both countries the co-operative relationship between ethnic-based 
elites has been a source of stability (Elazar, 1987). Similarly, in India the greater role 
of regional-based political parties in the federal system has contributed to the stability 
 328 
and strength of democracy. This is because the Congress Party, which stayed in power 
for about 40 years, institutionalised co-operation between the regional-based political 
parties and the supreme federal institutions in the country (Majeed, 2005:203). 
Therefore, promotion of co-operation between the emerging ethnic-based elite groups 
on the basis of their common Ethiopian national identity, their federal identity, is an 
important aspect of determining the sustainability of the federal process. 
 
The federalisation of the state has created regional states with significant variation of 
size. This is a potential source of conflict between the ethnic-based regional states or 
the allocation of federal subsidies. The bigger regional states may want to secure 
larger federal budget subsidies by giving more emphasis to their population size.  It 
can also lead to a belief that their tax payers subsidize the smaller regional states 
because the federal government collects more revenue from the bigger regional states. 
The corollary is not necessarily to propose a division of bigger regional states into 
smaller ones. Any division of bigger regional states could instigate violent conflict as 
the issue of self-determination was a cause of civil war during the imperial and 
military regimes, and ethnic awareness has increased with the ethnic focus of the 
federalisation process after the downfall of the military regime in 1991. Designing 
transparent and equitable resource allocation mechanisms, and enabling the regional 
states that contribute more resources to the federal revenue to gain relatively more 
benefit from federal resources would be a more sustainable solution to any conflicts 
arising from incompatible interests in the use of federal resources. 
 
The structure of the federal state in itself has led to greater interference by the federal 
government in the internal affairs of the regional states. This is partly related to the 
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dominance of the EPRDF as a centralised ruling party, as discussed in Chapter Four.  
One effect has been a failure to create sufficient regional leadership capacity, 
particularly in the peripheral regional states. Although the peripheral regional states 
are not structurally controlled by the ruling party, the federal authorities have 
consistently interfered in their internal affairs, using the federal structures operating 
alongside the regional governments. This has led to lower competencies in regional 
policy-making and intergovernmental relationships in the regional states.  This could 
certainly become a source of conflict unless special consideration is given to correct 
the gap in capacity in the peripheral regional states. 
 
Federal agricultural projects can also reinforce the historical marginalisation of the 
smaller (peripheral) regional states from the centre. The federal state has been 
expanding major projects including sugar and cotton cultivation and construction of 
hydroelectric dams in the lowland areas of the country. However, insufficient effort 
has been made to make these programmes compatible with the livelihood of the 
pastoralist peoples in Afar and South Omo or with the shifting cultivators of 
Benishangul-Gumuz. The most direct effect of the federal projects has tended to be 
displacement of the local people from their own settlements. This is  another potential 
source of conflict between the peripheral regional states and the centre. 
 
Lack of minority rights‟ protection also remains a problem of the Ethiopian federal 
constitution and the process of federalism.  The concept of minorities has been 
defined by the constitution with respect to the ethnic groups with smaller populations. 
However, the rights of the people who have become minorities due to the federal 
arrangement have not been protected either by the federal or regional constitutions. 
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For this reason the basic political rights of the non-indigenous people in Benishangul-
Gumuz and other people in the Oromia and Harari regional states have been 
determined on the basis of ethnicity. This violates the fundamental basis of federalism, 
which is harmonisation of group and individual rights. Unless the system harmonises 
political rights with group rights these will continue to be a source of violent conflict 
as happened between settlers and the Berta ethnic group in the Benishangul-Gumuz 
regional state. It should be noted that it is because of the sensitivity of minority rights 
that some federal constitutions in multi-ethnic countries such as India have prioritised 
their protection. There is a clear need for the Ethiopian federal process has to protect 
minority rights to prevent future violence that might undermine its legitimacy.   
 
 Related to this is the lack of genuine democratic participation though it is a 
constitutional right of citizens. This is primarily associated with the centralised 
political culture of the elite group of the country. In Ethiopia the political culture has 
remained centralised and top-down as it was during the imperial and military regimes. 
The present ruling party has followed a centralised party structure. This has resulted 
in a top-down approach and control-based relationship between the centre and the 
regional states, with regime survival as a major objective. This undermines the 
capacity of the regional states to formulate regional policies which are suitable to the 
context of their regions. Moreover, the centralised top down approach of the ruling 
party has led to misunderstandings over demands for self-determination, such as the 
Silte‟s identity-based demands (Chapter Four), and attempts at imposition from above 
as demonstrated by the case of the Wogagudu language in the southern regional state. 
The territorial issues of indigenous groups in Benishangul-Gumuz are another 
example (Chapter Six). In fact, regardless of the federalised state structure, a top 
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down approach and centralised political structures limit the right of self-determination 
of the ethnic groups in the country.  Such an approach contributed largely to the 
failure of political systems such as in the former Soviet Union (Chapter Two). The 
more nationalised and centralised the party system becomes the more centralised is 
the federal system (Kincaid, 2005:429). Demands for self-determination must be 
genuinely respected and should involve the participation of the people in order to 
prevent any conflicts that might undermine the federal system. 
 
The centralised approach of the ruling party and its domination in domestic politics 
over the last 19 years has devalued the role multiparty elections might play in the 
federalisation process.   This is because of the control mechanisms used by the ruling 
party as well the organisational weakness of opposition parties themselves.  It is 
important that domestic politics is democratic enough to accommodate citizen 
demands and sustain the federalisation process. Emphasis has to be given to 
developing the capacity of the regional states and regional parties, which can create a 
basic ground for democratic participation as happened in India after the long 
centralised rule of the Congress Party. Correction of the organisational weakness as of 
the opposition parties and a focus on genuine multi-national political parties can only 
enhance the democratic space in the country. 
 
The study has shown how horizontal inequalities between the indigenous and non-
indigenous people evolved and became a source of conflict during the federalisation 
process. This highlights the need for further study on whether power devolution and 
the resource-sharing mechanisms of the federal system have minimized  horizontal 
inequalities in  multi-ethnic regional states, such as in the south.   
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 The evidence from Benishangul-Gumuz regional state indicates that the 
implementation of the federal system in the state created profound political and 
economic opportunities for the indigenous people. These made up some of the ethnic 
groups which were previously prohibited from integrating into the nation-state 
(Chapter Five). The federalisation of the state reduced this marginalisation by 
enabling ethnic groups to establish their own regional state, allowing them to 
participate in the centre, alongside everyone else. This created favourable conditions 
for the indigenous groups to engage with the state and to develop a federal identity. 
Moreover, as the regional state is made up of different ethnic groups of similar socio-
economic backgrounds, it has enabled them to combine to protect their interests. They 
can negotiate together through their regional state with neighbouring ethnic groups, 
with regard to territorial identity. This was unthinkable during the unitary state. They 
can also amend national development policies in accordance with their specific 
requirements and traditional practices. In this respect federalisation of the state has 
worked well for these ethnic groups, ensuring continuity of their identities in their 
own territorial areas. 
 
While these ethnic groups received significant advantages from the federal 
arrangement, the sustainability of the benefits depends on whether the federal process 
is able to manage causes of conflict in the regional state.  Firstly, there are the 
structural causes of conflict, which have led to violent conflict between the 
indigenous and non-indigenous groups and between the indigenous people themselves 
(Chapter Six). Addressing the basic causes of these conflicts requires assuring the 
territorial rights of the indigenous groups, guaranteeing sustainable land use rights 
 333 
according to traditional practices, and protecting the integrity of their territories from 
encroachment by neighbouring ethnic groups. 
 
Moreover, development policies and the expansion of urban areas also have to adapt 
to accommodate the traditions of indigenous peoples, in order to minimize the 
horizontal inequalities between the indigenous and non-indigenous people. This must 
be supported by a clear power sharing mechanism for the ethnic groups to utilise, in 
order to minimize power-based competition between them. In addition, the political 
rights of the non-indigenous people have to be respected, to maintain the stability of 
the regional state. As discussed in Chapter Six, the population size of the non-
indigenous people is almost equal to that of the indigenous people in Benishangul- 
Gumuz regional state. A political arrangement that excludes the non-indigenous 
people cannot create stability in the long run. Harmonisation of both the political 
rights of the non-indigenous people and the group rights of the indigenous people is 
required, by constitutional amendment and though other regional development 
policies. 
 
Secondly, the federal implementation process in the regional state has been 
accompanied by violent conflict (Chapter Nine). This is because the criteria regarding 
border demarcation within the federal constitution, which focused on ethnic identity, 
also encouraged competition between the regional states rather than co-operation 
(Article 46).  As a result, the relationship between the Oromo and the Gumuz elite 
groups has become competitive over border issues, and this has been manifested by 
administration overlaps, and in land claims and counter claims.  In addition, the 
federal process and, more especially, intergovernmental relationships have not been 
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established in such a way to encourage regional elite groups to advance inter-group 
federal co-operation.   
 
 The result is that intergovernmental relationships between the Benishangul-Gumuz 
regional state and the neighbouring regional states, and the federal state itself, have 
become fragile, and largely dependent upon informal mechanisms. There are no 
formal binding responsibilities and procedures that govern inter-governmental 
relationships, so interaction is informal and dependent on the good will of leaders.  
When relationships between regional leaders are good, relationships between the 
lower level leaders and other institutions also improve – as happened in the 
relationship between the Amhara and the Benshungul-Gumuz regional states. 
However, when there are hostilities, the informal inter-governmental relationships can 
totally disappear, as happened in the relationship between the Oromia and the 
Benishangul-Gumuz regional states before the eruption of the 2008 violent conflict.  
This meant there was no intervention when the Joint Study Committee of the regional 
states disintegrated, because these were informal arrangements, established only 
through the good will of the regional leaders.  Both the federal and regional 
institutions investigated the problem after the 2008 violent conflicts, but this approach 
can be characterised as a no more than a „fire fighting’ approach to conflict 
management.  The introduction of formal intergovernmental relationships that 
promote federal co-operation between regional states has become an urgent issue in 
the management of inter-regional conflict. 
 
 Nor does the existing relationship between political parties enhance federal co-
operation in the regional state. As discussed in Chapter Seven, the ethnic-based 
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political parties of the regional state formed a coalition in 1995 and united in 2009. 
However, there is little indication of any strong unity between them. The political 
elite of the Berta ethnic group still aspires to have a dominant role in the regional 
government or to create a separate regional state. This attitude has led to direct 
intervention by the national ruling party, the EPRDF, in the internal affairs of the 
regional state and to give support to political groups which fit its criteria. Because of 
this, the political elites of the regional state compete with each other to secure better 
support from the EPRDF the result is a less coherent regional leadership.  Creating 
proportional representation between the political elites of the regional party in the 
regional state and enabling the regional party to acquire better capacity for policy-
making are clearly critical aspects for managing conflict in the regional state. 
 
The management of the federal process in the regional state is also related to the rule 
of law. The rule of law that governs the authority‟s exercise of power is a condition 
for effective enforcement of the constitutional rights of citizens. To this end, the rules 
that govern political activities should be transparent and local authorities should be 
accountable for the decisions and measures they take (Haysom, 2002:229).  However, 
no regional authority has been held accountable apart from the lower level 
administrative authorities in both the Oromia and the Benishangul-Gumuz regional 
states when regional anti-riot police, Woreda administrations and Woreda police 
participated in the violent conflict between the Gumuz and the Oromos in 2008.  Nor 
does the federal government have any clear procedures that enable it to maintain the 
rule of law when regional states fail to arrest criminal suspects who aggravate inter-
ethnic conflict. For example, it did not interfere when the Benishangul-Gumuz and 
Oromia regional states gave protection to crime suspects after the 2007 conflict, until 
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another round of violent conflict erupted in 2008. Federal and regional authorities 
have to be accountable for the actions they take or for their negligence if the rule of 
law is to be nurtured in the regional state. Equally, the regional state has to be able to 
maintain the safety and security of people by controlling homicides which threaten the 
peaceful relationship of ethnic groups. This requires harmonisation of legal and 
traditional mechanisms of conflict management. 
 
 The undefined common borders between the regional states challenge the 
fundamental territorial divisions of power. Territory remains the basis for political 
action and for the rule of law. If territorial divisions are not clear, regional authorities 
cannot protect the rights of the people and the minorities living in their jurisdiction 
(Elazar, 1987:74). As a result, concern over territory has become a source of violent 
conflict between the regional states. Illegal arms possession is another factor that 
undermines the rule of law. The country lacks small arms possession laws that can be 
enforced across the regional states. Federal and regional policies are not so well 
organised that they can control the illegal small arms trade and possession of arms in 
the country
1
.  Defining common regional borders, with consideration for the interests 
of the people, as well as   introducing laws to   control illegal arms trade and the 
possession of weapons, are also vital for effective conflict management in the regional 
state.  
 
 In addition to consideration of the impact of federalism on regional and inter-state 
conflict, this research also contributes to the theoretical debates about conflict and 
federalism in general, and in the context of multi-ethnic African countries in 
                                                 
1
 Interview notes, head  crime prevention main department, Federal Police, Addis Ababa, June, 2008 
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particular. This focus has special relevance for issues such as the source of inter- and 
intra-regional conflict, and how it should be managed during a federalisation process. 
 
It has provided detailed data with regard to the sources of inter-regional conflict in the 
context of a federalised African country. Many scholars have associated inter-regional 
conflict in Africa either with the greed of ethnic leaders (Collier, 2001:150-152) or 
primordial ethnic identities. This study has clearly demonstrated that intra-state 
conflict can also be associated with historical factors and horizontal inequality. This 
demonstrates the relevance of Brown (1997) and Stewart‟s (2004) theoretical 
assumptions in analysing the causes of conflict in the context of African countries 
such as Ethiopia.  In situations where there are hostile historical relationships, unmet 
identity-based demands, and horizontal inequalities, ethnic leaders can play a 
significant role in aggravating conflict and leading the groups into violence in order to 
satisfy their economic and political interests. For example, the territorial insecurity of 
the Gumuz, manifesting itself in land claims and counter claims, has been a basic 
cause of conflict.   In other words as long as the root source of conflict has not been 
transformed, the elites will continue to manipulate ethnic groups and mobilise them 
for violence.   
 
 The study also shows that ethnic groups, which have different cultures and hostile 
historical relationships, can coexist if the system recognises their identity and, in 
particular, if the institutions of governance are able to manage the source of the 
violence.  The analysis of the relationship between the Benishangul-Gumuz and 
Amhara regional states reinforces this.  This disproves theoretical assumptions about 
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ethnicity that focus on primordial ties and cultural differences to explain intra-state 
conflict involving ethnic groups.  
 
This research introduces the concept of indigenous peoples‟ territorial issues into the 
context of Africa reference to a situation in which there were no white settlers. The 
issue of indigenous peoples‟ territorial concerns is widely associated with their 
relationships with white settlers, for example in the USA, Canada, Australia or New 
Zealand.  This study has shown that there are some ethnic groups in Ethiopia which 
have similar territorial demands to the aboriginal people in some western countries 
and Latin America. The similarity of the indigenous peoples in Ethiopia to other 
indigenous people, in the West or Latin American countries, is based on their 
relationship to the ecosystem and the natural world. In addition, they do not consider 
themselves to be part of the group of leaders who control the nation state (Eriksen, 
2002:125-126). Moreover, they have a different culture and farming system that 
differentiates them clearly from the non-indigenous people. The land encroachment of 
the Amhara and the Oromos on the territories of the Gumuz and the Berta has had a 
similar effect to the early migration of whites in the USA and Australia. This 
relationship between indigenous and non-indigenous peoples in Ethiopia should 
encourage further study in the context of Africa. 
 
The study demonstrates the importance of federalism as a comprehensive approach to 
conflict management in the context of multi-ethnic African countries. Many African 
countries have considered ethnicity as an „individual‟ issue rather than a social 
phenomenon. It seems „taboo‟ to talk about ethnicity because it has been considered 
as a source of violence (Ottaway, 1999). However, this research has shown quite the 
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opposite. Addressing intra-state conflict by providing self rule to ethnic identities can 
contribute to the stability of a country.  The minutes of the Ethiopian Constitutional 
Assembly held in 1994 show that accepting the self-rule of ethnic groups contributed 
significantly to disarming many ethnic-based political parties which fought against the 
military regime.  Equally, the partnership-based relationship between the Amhara and 
the Gumuz has also largely reversed the hostile relationship between them. 
 
Overall, this underlines the value of further study for the relevance of the federal 
approach to managing violent conflict in multi-ethnic African countries. The 
introduction of a federal system, in general, and self-rule, in particular, can certainly 
be considered as a means of intra-state conflict management for intra-state conflict 
that involves ethnic identity. This management of conflict can be useful, particularly 
if countries can utilise it at the right time and if they can maintain democratic 
governance through rule of law and accountability of state authorities.  It can 
ultimately contribute to national unity with diversity. In this respect, for example, if 
the Sudan government had provided self-rule to southern Sudan in the 1980s, it is 
very possible that it could have maintained the integrity of the country. Similarly, if 
the earlier federal arrangement between Eritrea and Ethiopia had been properly  
implemented by the imperial regime, it would have contributed to resolving the issues 
that caused the thirty year armed struggle which led to secession of the province in 
1993 (Goumenos, 2008:32-38). Despite setbacks, it is clear the Nigerian federal 
system has contributed to maintaining the integrity of the country across deep ethnic 
and religious divides (Suberu, 1994:63-64). Constitutional choices must depend upon 
the situation and the country in focus, but this research has demonstrated clearly that 
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the idea of federalism can offer considerable progress in managing conflicts and civil 
wars in the context of African multi-ethnic countries. 
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Appendix 
Appendix 1: Interview questionnaires 
1. General  questionnaires 
 What are   the basic causes of conflict in the regional state? 
  What are the consequences of the conflict? 
  What measures have been taken to manage the conflict? 
  What were the outcomes of the measures? 
2. Specific questionnaires 
Questionnaires related to use of Agricultural lands 
 Why the uses of Agricultural land plots are sources of conflict in the regional 
state? 
 Which places are vulnerable for land use-based conflict in the regional state 
and why?  
  Who are the participants in the conflict? 
 What is the role of governmental institutions in the conflict? 
 What were the consequences of the conflict? 
  How did you manage the conflict? 
Questionnaires related to common border issues 
 What are the common border issues in the regional state? 
 Which places are vulnerable for common border-based conflict and why? 
 Which communities/ethnic groups are the participants in the conflict? 
 What is the role of the regional and local administrations  in the conflict 
 What is the role of federal, regional and local administrations in managing the 
conflict? 
 What measures have been taken to manage the issues of common borders? 
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Questionnaires related to Settlers’ political representation 
 How are the indigenous and non-indigenous people represented in the political 
institutions of the regional state? 
 What are the grievances of the settlers? 
  How did the regional state resolve them? 
  What was the role of the federal institutions? 
 What was the role of Political parties? 
Questionnaires related to intergovernmental relations 
  What are the mechanisms of intergovernmental relations in the regional state? 
 How do you describe your relationship with the neighbouring regional states? 
  How do you describe your relationship with the federal institutions? 
  What is the role of political parties in the intergovernmental relations? 
Questionnaires related to power-based conflicts in the regional states 
 How is the regional power shared between the indigenous political parties? 
 What were the objections of Berta? 
 How did the regional state address them? 
  What was the role of federal institutions in managing the Power-based 
conflict? 
Questionnaires related to the inter-regional violent conflicts 
 What were the causes of the violent conflict in Metekel and Kamashi zones? 
 Who were the participants in the violent conflict? 
 What were the consequences of the violence? 
  What was the role of governmental institutions in the conflict? 
  How did you manage the violent conflict? 
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  What was the role of NGOs and customary institutions in managing the 
conflict? 
